United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 09-2174
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
YEIFRIN RAFAEL OZUNA-CABRERA,
a/k/a Jeffrey Ozuna,
a/k/a Howard Edward Bond,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Howard and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
Lisa Aidlin for appellant.
Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
November 2, 2011
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Yeifrin Rafael Ozuna-Cabrera
appeals his conviction for aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A, and the reasonableness of his 70-month prison sentence.
After careful review, we affirm.
I. Background
The pertinent facts are uncomplicated. On March 19,
2008, Ozuna-Cabrera applied for a U.S. passport under the alias
"Howard E. Bond." In support of the application, he presented an
expired U.S. passport that bore Howard Bond's name, but
Ozuna-Cabrera's picture. The inconsistency was promptly
discovered, and upon his arrest, Ozuna-Cabrera admitted to
purchasing the once-valid passport, as well as a social security
card, from the real Howard Bond.
Facing multiple charges, Ozuna-Cabrera pled guilty in
March 2009 to two counts of false statements in a passport
application, 18 U.S.C. § 1542, one count of unlawful re-entry of a
deported alien, 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and one count of aggravated
identity theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. The district court imposed a
mandatory 24-month term of incarceration on the count of aggravated
identity theft, consecutive to a 46-month prison term on the
remaining counts, for an aggregate sentence of 70 months.
II. Analysis
Ozuna-Cabrera appeals both his conviction and sentence.
First, he contends that his guilty plea to aggravated identity
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theft must be vacated because it violated Rule 11(b)'s requirements
that it be knowing, voluntary, and amply supported by facts. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G), (b)(2) and (b)(3). Specifically, he
argues that because he purchased, rather than stole, Howard Bond's
passport, he had lawful authority to use the misrepresented
identity and was therefore not guilty of a § 1028A violation.
Second, he challenges the district court's sentence calculation,
asserting that it was unreasonably enhanced based on a nearly
twenty-year-old conviction. We review each of these claims in
turn.
A. Rule 11 Claims
Ozuna-Cabrera's Rule 11 arguments turn almost entirely on
his construction of § 1028A. The aggravated identity theft statute
provides, in relevant part:
Whoever, during and in relation to any felony
violation enumerated in subsection (c),
knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses,
without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person shall, in
addition to the punishment provided for such
felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of 2 years.
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (emphasis added). Ozuna-Cabrera concedes
every element of the offense but one: that his use of Howard Bond's
identification was "without lawful authority."1 He argues that,
1
It is undisputed that Ozuna-Cabrera used Bond's identity to
apply for a U.S. passport in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542, which
is one of the specifically enumerated felonies in subsection (c) of
18 U.S.C. § 1028A. See § 1028A(c)(7) (any provision relating to
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because Bond willingly sold him the means of identification, its
subsequent use in support of Ozuna-Cabrera's passport application
was lawfully authorized. This claim presents an issue of first
impression for us: whether, in the context of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1), the phrase "without lawful authority" must be
construed to require that the means of identification be stolen, or
otherwise taken without permission of the owner. We reject such a
narrow reading.
As a preliminary matter, because Ozuna-Cabrera failed to
raise this claim below, we review it only for plain error.2
Accordingly, Ozuna-Cabrera bears the heavy burden of showing that
his interpretation of the phrase "without lawful authority" to
require theft of the means of identification is "compelled by the
language of the statute itself, construction of the statute in
light of the common law, or binding judicial construction of the
statute." United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 F.3d 62, 70
(1st Cir. 2007). We begin by looking at the language of § 1028A.
passports and visas). It is also undisputed that Ozuna-Cabrera
knew the passport once belonged to another person named Howard
Bond. See United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 53-54 (1st Cir.
2008)(requiring the government to prove that the defendant knew
that the means of identification belonged to another person).
2
Ozuna-Cabrera's argument that his Rule 11 challenge was
preserved by defense counsel at the sentencing hearing is plainly
incorrect. At sentencing, his counsel explicitly conceded that
Ozuna-Cabrera's conduct violated § 1028A(a)(1), noting only that it
was an atypical case of aggravated identity theft.
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Ozuna-Cabrera's reliance on the statutory text itself is
unavailing. The phrase "without lawful authority," he argues,
definitionally equates to "without authorized permission." We
disagree. Though "authorized" activity may in many cases also be
"lawful," the terms are not interchangeable. Rather, Black's Law
Dictionary defines "lawful" as "not contrary to law," and
"authority" as "[t]he right or permission to act legally on
another's behalf." Black's Law Dictionary 152 & 965 (9th ed.
2009). Combining these definitions, § 1028A(a)(1) reasonably
proscribes the transfer, possession, or use of another person's
means of identification, absent the right or permission to act on
that person's behalf in a way that is not contrary to the law. In
other words, regardless of how the means of identification is
actually obtained, if its subsequent use breaks the law -
specifically, during and in relation to the commission of a crime
enumerated in subsection (c) - it is violative of § 1028A(a)(1).
Ozuna-Cabrera's contextual argument also fails. As he
points out, the aforementioned language of § 1028A(a)(1) is
virtually identical to that of the general identity fraud statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1028, which provides:
Whoever . . . knowingly transfers, possesses,
or uses, without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (emphasis added). Thus, Ozuna-Cabrera
asserts that unless we construe the phrase "without lawful
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authority" to require theft under § 1028A(a)(1), the statute would
cover the same conduct as § 1028(a)(7), and consequently be
rendered superfluous. He further submits that this construction is
supported by the statute's title, "Aggravated identity theft," and
its enhanced penalty provision, which he suggests is intended to
punish the theft of an identity more harshly than merely putting it
to fraudulent use.
This argument ignores the broader statutory framework.
As a general rule of statutory construction, "identical words used
in different parts of the same Act are intended to have the same
meaning." United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 11 (1st Cir. 2009)
(quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995))
(internal quotation mark omitted). This rule is strengthened
where, as here, the relevant statutory provisions are in close
proximity to each other. Comm'r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250
(1996). If Congress had intended for the phrase "without lawful
authority" to have substantially different meanings in
§ 1028A(a)(1) and § 1028(a)(7), "it would have manifested its
intention in some concrete fashion." Upton, 559 F.3d at 11
(quoting Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 438 n.9 (1982)) (internal
quotation mark omitted). There is no reason to diverge from this
canon of construction here. Instead, to discern the interplay
between these two statutes, we need only refer back to the
statutory language.
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The identity fraud statute, § 1028(a)(7), covers the
commission, or aiding and abetting in the commission, of "any
unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or
. . . a felony under any applicable State or local law." By
contrast, the aggravated identity theft statute, § 1028A(a)(1),
covers "any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c)" - a
discrete list of federal felonies. The statutes are therefore
distinguishable not by the method of procuring the means of
identification, but by the underlying criminal conduct that they
respectively target. Section 1028A(a)(1) is a logical extension of
§ 1028(a)(7), and punishes more severely those identity crimes
committed during and in relation to a specifically enumerated
subset of problematic felonies.3 See, e.g., United States v.
Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 62 (1st Cir. 2008) (Lynch, C.J., concurring)
("[In enacting § 1028A,] Congress was responding to the drastic
upsurge in what are called identity theft crimes and which
3
Ozuna-Cabrera makes much of the statute's title, arguing that
inclusion of the term "theft" suggests that the identity must be
stolen. As we have previously held, we do not "rely on the titles
of statutory enactments in plumbing their meaning . . . at the
expense of the text itself." Mass. Ass'n of Health Maint. Orgs. v.
Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176, 180 (1st Cir. 1999) (internal citation
omitted). Even if we did consider the title, it supports the
present interpretation of the statutory language. The term
"aggravated" in "aggravated identity theft" underscores the use of
§ 1028A as an extension of § 1028 to punish particular crimes
warranting harsher sentences. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 59 ("It is
not clear that, by using the word 'theft' [in the title of §
1028A], Congress intended to limit 'identity theft' to . . .
scenario[s] involving traditional theft)".
-7-
encompass a variety of situations."); United States v. Jimenez, 507
F.3d 13, 22 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[T]he purpose of [§ 1028A] is to
create an additional penalty for using false identities that are
particularly difficult to expose or that are used in conjunction
with terrorism offenses.").
Legislative history supports this interpretation. Ozuna-
Cabrera accurately notes that Congress added § 1028A to the United
States Code through the "Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act,"
Pub. L. No. 108-275, 118 Stat. 831 (2004). He is also correct that
the House Report is replete with references to "theft" and
"thieves," and that one stated purpose of the statute is to
increase sentences for "identity thieves." H.R. Rep. No. 108-528,
at 3, as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 780. The report
provides several examples of conduct that fit within the
traditional definition of theft, like stealing credit-card and
social security numbers, and stealing identities to file false tax
returns or apply for social security benefits. Id. at 5-6, 2004
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 781-82.
Without question, Congress harbored concerns over
criminals who actually steal other people's identities. There is
nothing to suggest, however, that Congress intended to so narrowly
restrict the statute's reach to identity crimes involving such
traditional notions of theft. On the contrary, the same House
Report stated that "[t]he terms 'identity theft' and 'identity
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fraud' refer to all types of crimes in which someone wrongfully
obtains and uses another person's personal data . . . ." H.R. Rep.
No. 108-528, at 4, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 780. Indeed, the report
describes several anecdotal examples of identity theft that do not
involve stealing the means of identification. In one instance, a
man used his brother-in-law's name and social security number to
obtain social security benefits, and in a similar case, a woman
used her husband's social security number to collect disability
benefits. Id. at 6, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 782. This legislative
record demonstrates that Congress intended § 1028A to address a
wide array of identity crimes, and not only those iterations
involving conventional theft.
Finally, although this issue is new to this court, we do
not write on a blank slate. Five other courts of appeals have
concluded that theft of the means of identification is not required
to trigger criminal liability under § 1028A(a)(1). See, e.g.,
United States v. Retana, 641 F.3d 272, 273-75 (8th Cir. 2011)
(father's permission to use his social security number does not
amount to "lawful authority" to excuse defendant's fraudulent use
of the information to commit other crimes); United States v.
Mobley, 618 F.3d 539, 547-48 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding a § 1028A
violation for credit card conspiracy where victims willingly
provided their social security numbers); United States v.
Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 602, 607-09 (4th Cir. 2010) (affirming a
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§ 1028A conviction for the fraudulent use of lawfully acquired
Medicaid information); United States v. Carrion-Brito, 362 F. App'x
267, 273 (3d Cir. 2010) (permission or payment to use another's
identity does not bestow "lawful authority" on the perpetrator);
United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 607-08 (11th Cir. 2007),
abrogated in part on other grounds, Flores-Figueroa v. United
States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (same); see also Godin, 534 F.3d at 59
(stating, in dicta, that "it is . . . plausible that Congress
intended to define 'identity theft' as using someone else's
identity rather than taking someone else's identity").
Ozuna-Cabrera fails to identify any contrary, binding
judicial precedent that compels his interpretation of the statute.
His reliance on Flores-Figueroa and United States v. Villanueva-
Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2008), is misplaced. Those courts
were addressing a substantially different question - whether
§ 1028A requires proof of a defendant's knowledge that he was using
a real person's identity. Neither court squarely considered, much
less determined, whether the statute would be violated if the means
of identification was not actually stolen. At best, Flores-
Figueroa and Villanueva-Sotelo may support the presently unhelpful
proposition that theft is a sufficient, but not necessarily
required, element of § 1028A. Thus, in light of the existing
precedent, which overwhelmingly supports our textual and contextual
analysis, we conclude that § 1028A(a)(1) does not require theft, or
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any other illicit method of procurement, of the means of
identification.4
Although Ozuna-Cabrera attempts to parse this issue from
his Rule 11 arguments, the alleged Rule 11 violations depend almost
entirely on the assumption that his construction of § 1028A is
correct.5 Absent this foundation, his remaining Rule 11 arguments
necessarily crumble.
Ozuna-Cabrera first challenges the factual basis for the
charges, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3), arguing that the district
court erred in accepting the prosecution's explanation of the
aggravated identity theft charge without conducting an independent
review. It is not error to accept the government's recitation of
the facts as the basis for a plea. See United States v. Matos-
Quiñones, 456 F.3d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 2006) (accepting uncontradicted
facts proffered by the government as a rational basis for
defendant's plea). In any event, the court did not rest there, as
it confirmed that Ozuna-Cabrera understood the facts, and
4
Ozuna-Cabrera additionally points us to the rule of lenity
and the interpretive canon that criminal statutes must be strictly
construed. The rule of lenity does not apply here, however,
because § 1028A(a)(1)'s text is unambiguous. See United States v.
Nunez, 146 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1998).
5
Insofar as Ozuna-Cabrera's remaining Rule 11 arguments depend
on his construction of § 1028A, we will not revisit the issue. The
court need not have delineated a theft requirement that does not
exist in the statute, and Ozuna-Cabrera's argument that his
construction of § 1028A precludes a sufficient factual basis for
his plea inevitably fails.
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summarized the evidence supporting the identity theft charge.
Ozuna-Cabrera's 11(b)(3) challenge consequently fails. See United
States v. Cheal, 389 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that Rule
11(b)(3) is fulfilled if the court ensures that there is, on the
record as it stands at the time of the plea, a reasoned basis to
believe that the defendant actually committed the crime to which he
is admitting guilt).
Ozuna-Cabrera further contends that his guilty plea was
not knowing and voluntary because the district court never
explained the elements of aggravated identity theft; in particular,
that the district court failed to unpack the statute's scienter
requirement. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). The record
suggests otherwise. During the plea colloquy, the district court
informed Ozuna-Cabrera that:
Count Three of the indictment again charges
essentially the same crime; however, here it
alleges that on March 19, 2008, in making a
false statement in an application for a
passport you used somebody else's
identification, knowing that you weren't
authorized to use that identification.
(Emphasis added). Later in the hearing, at the court's request,
the government also addressed the aggravated identity theft count
as follows:
Aggravated identity theft makes it unlawful
. . . to, without lawful authority, use a
means of identification during and in relation
to a violation of a variety of federal
offenses, including [making false statements
in a passport application]. "Means of
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identification" is defined in [18 U.S.C.
§ 1028(d)(7)], and includes such items as:
Name, Social Security number, date of birth,
and state-issued driver's license. Here there
is a real Howard Edward Bond, and the
defendant used his name and all of his
identifiers to try to obtain a passport on
March 19, 2008.
The court then asked Ozuna-Cabrera if he understood the nature of
the charges, and ensured that he was pleading willingly and had
received sufficient time to discuss the charges with his attorney.
On a plain error standard of review, the question is not
whether the plea colloquy satisfied Rule 11, but whether it was so
deficient that it affected substantial rights and seriously
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
judicial proceedings. See United States v. Savinon-Acosta, 232
F.3d 265, 268 (1st Cir. 2000). Based on a thorough review of the
record, the answer to this question must be no. See United States
v. Cruz-Rivera, 357 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that where
the charges are not complex, a simple recitation of the indictment
may be sufficient to satisfy Rule 11); see also United States v.
Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d 1215, 1220 (1st Cir. 1995) ("The
description of the charges need not come directly from the court so
long as the record reveals that the defendant understood them.").
Finding no plain error in the district court's construction of
§ 1028A or its acceptance of Ozuna-Cabrera's guilty plea, we affirm
his conviction.
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B. Sentencing Challenges
Ozuna-Cabrera also appeals his sentence. The presentence
investigation report (PSI Report) recorded his base offense level
at 8, applied a sixteen-level enhancement for a prior drug
trafficking charge, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i),6 and recommended
a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, id.
§ 3E1.1. Ozuna-Cabrera's prior convictions, and the fact that he
had committed the instant offense while under a criminal sentence,
placed him in criminal history category (CHC) V. Assuming an
adjusted offense level of 21 and a CHC of V, the guideline
sentencing range (GSR) would have included a mandatory 24 months
for the count of aggravated identity theft, and spanned 70-87
months on the remaining three counts, for an effective advisory
guideline range of 94-111 months.
While Ozuna-Cabrera did not object to the PSI Report, he
did file a sentencing memorandum asserting that his CHC
overrepresented the gravity of his prior offenses, which, he
alleged, stemmed largely from his personal use of drugs and
alcohol. He also urged a variant sentence, arguing that the nature
6
Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Sentencing Guidelines
advises that "[i]f the defendant previously was deported . . .
after a conviction for a felony that is a drug trafficking offense
for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months . . . increase
[the base offense level] by 16 levels." U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i). In 1991, Ozuna-Cabrera was convicted of a
drug-trafficking offense for which he was sentenced to six months
for the original violation, and a further nine months for violating
probation. He was deported shortly thereafter.
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and timing of his 1991 drug trafficking conviction did not warrant
a sixteen-level enhancement, and that the absence of an early
disposition program created an unacceptable disparity.7
The district court agreed that Ozuna-Cabrera's CHC
overrepresented the seriousness of his past crimes and departed
downward to a CHC of IV. In light of the absence of an early
disposition program, the court also reduced the offense level from
21 to 19, shrinking the GSR to the mandatory 24 months for
aggravated identity theft, and 46-57 months for the remaining three
counts. The court refused, however, to grant a sentence below the
reconfigured sentencing range, imposing a total incarcerative term
of 70 months.
On appeal, Ozuna-Cabrera mounts both procedural and
substantive challenges to his sentence. Procedurally, he contends
that the district court, in following the guidelines and applying
the sixteen-level enhancement, failed to consider the sentencing
factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Substantively, he argues
7
Early disposition or "fast-track" programs permit prosecutors
to provide the prospect of shorter sentences in return for prompt
guilty pleas and, in some cases, waiver of appellate rights. In
2003, Congress authorized the Attorney General to create fast-track
programs on a district-by-district basis, and directed the
Sentencing Commission to promulgate a policy statement allowing
downward departures in eligible cases. See Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act, Pub.
L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003).
Massachusetts was not one of the districts chosen for a fast-track
program. Ozuna-Cabrera argued that the absence of a fast-track
program in the District of Massachusetts resulted in an unwarranted
sentencing disparity.
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that the application of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) renders his sentence
unreasonable. Given a properly calculated GSR, we review a
sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007); United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir.
2008).
Ozuna-Cabrera's sentence is both procedurally and
substantively sound. As to the procedural challenge, although the
district court only summarily acknowledged its consideration of
§ 3553(a), it need not have engaged in an exhaustive analysis of
each factor. United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 205 (1st Cir.
2006) ("[The district court] is not required to address [each
§ 3553(a)] factor[], one by one, in some . . . rote incantation
when explicating its sentencing decision."). Nor must the court
provide a voluminous explanation of its reasoning. Where a
sentence is within the applicable guidelines, it "require[s] a
lesser degree of explanation than those that fall outside the
guideline sentencing range," and we think that particularly true
where, as here, "the sentence is at the very bottom of the
Guidelines range." United States v. Arango, 508 F.3d 34, 48 (1st
Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d
34, 41 (1st Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court considered both the PSI Report and the
sentencing memorandum, and ultimately reduced Ozuna-Cabrera's
sentence to account for his criminal history and the unavailability
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of an early disposition program. Given Ozuna-Cabrera's pattern of
recidivistic addiction, the court also referred him to a drug
treatment program, and with respect to the application of the
sixteen-level enhancement, the court stated:
[O]n balance, I think I come out closer to
[the government's] position than I do the
defendant's. There's just too many crimes,
too many missed opportunities, too many
aliases.
In stark contrast to the allegedly mechanistic application of the
GSR, the court appears to have specifically tailored its sentence
to Ozuna-Cabrera's individual circumstances, based at least in part
on § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (accounting for the
defendant's personal history and characteristics), (a)(2)(D)
(providing needed medical care), & (a)(6) (adjusting to avoid
"unwarranted sentencing disparities"). The fact that the district
court chose not to sentence Ozuna-Cabrera according to his
counsel's recommendation does not establish that it failed to
consider the relevant factors. United States v. Butler-Acevedo, --
- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 3831681, at *2 (1st Cir. 2011).
Turning to the substantive challenge, when evaluating the
substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we consider the totality
of the circumstances and give due deference to the district court.
See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Wallace, 573 F.3d 82, 97
(1st Cir. 2009). A defendant who attempts to brand a within-range
sentence as unreasonable must carry a heavy burden, United States
-17-
v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194, 204 (1st Cir. 2006), and a sentence
will withstand a substantive reasonableness challenge so long as
there is "a plausible sentencing rationale and a defensible
result," Martin, 520 F.3d at 96.
To the extent that Ozuna-Cabrera challenges the
substantive reasonableness of his sentence - specifically, the
purported draconian nature of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.28 - the sentence was
not only amply supported by the record, but was also the lowest
within the GSR. In determining whether to apply the sixteen-level
enhancement, the court concluded that the underlying 1991
conviction was not merely an aberration, but one of a lengthy list
of convictions in Ozuna-Cabrera's rather extensive criminal
history.9 This conclusion, and the resulting sentence, were both
plausible and defensible, and Ozuna-Cabrera presents no powerful
mitigating reasons to suggest that the district court was
unreasonable. See United States v. Beatty, 538 F.3d 8, 17 (1st
Cir. 2008) (requiring "powerful mitigating reasons" for any
"defendant who wishes to attack an in-guideline-range sentence as
8
Ozuna-Cabrera also argues that a § 2L1.2 enhancement is not
available under Almandarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224
(1998). We have repeatedly rejected this argument, and do so again
here. See, e.g., United States v. Charlton, 600 F.3d 43, 55 (1st
Cir. 2010).
9
When the PSI Report was compiled, Ozuna-Cabrera had fifteen
convictions, with an additional ten charges pending. The
government stated, and Ozuna-Cabrera did not refute, that he had
used fourteen different aliases with fifteen different birth dates
and twelve different social security numbers.
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excessive") (quoting United States v. Navedo-Concepción, 450 F.3d
54, 59 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Without
more, we see no basis for disturbing his sentence.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Ozuna-Cabrera's conviction and
sentence are affirmed.
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