United States v. Ozuna-Cabrera

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 09-2174

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

YEIFRIN RAFAEL OZUNA-CABRERA,
a/k/a Jeffrey Ozuna,
a/k/a Howard Edward Bond,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Lynch, Chief Judge,
Howard and Thompson, Circuit Judges.

Lisa Aidlin for appellant.
Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.

November 2, 2011
 HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Yeifrin Rafael Ozuna-Cabrera

appeals his conviction for aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1028A, and the reasonableness of his 70-month prison sentence.

After careful review, we affirm.

I. Background

The pertinent facts are uncomplicated. On March 19,

2008, Ozuna-Cabrera applied for a U.S. passport under the alias

"Howard E. Bond." In support of the application, he presented an

expired U.S. passport that bore Howard Bond's name, but

Ozuna-Cabrera's picture. The inconsistency was promptly

discovered, and upon his arrest, Ozuna-Cabrera admitted to

purchasing the once-valid passport, as well as a social security

card, from the real Howard Bond.

Facing multiple charges, Ozuna-Cabrera pled guilty in

March 2009 to two counts of false statements in a passport

application, 18 U.S.C. § 1542, one count of unlawful re-entry of a

deported alien, 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and one count of aggravated

identity theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. The district court imposed a

mandatory 24-month term of incarceration on the count of aggravated

identity theft, consecutive to a 46-month prison term on the

remaining counts, for an aggregate sentence of 70 months.

II. Analysis

Ozuna-Cabrera appeals both his conviction and sentence.

First, he contends that his guilty plea to aggravated identity

-2-
theft must be vacated because it violated Rule 11(b)'s requirements

that it be knowing, voluntary, and amply supported by facts. See

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G), (b)(2) and (b)(3). Specifically, he

argues that because he purchased, rather than stole, Howard Bond's

passport, he had lawful authority to use the misrepresented

identity and was therefore not guilty of a § 1028A violation.

Second, he challenges the district court's sentence calculation,

asserting that it was unreasonably enhanced based on a nearly

twenty-year-old conviction. We review each of these claims in

turn.

A. Rule 11 Claims

Ozuna-Cabrera's Rule 11 arguments turn almost entirely on

his construction of § 1028A. The aggravated identity theft statute

provides, in relevant part:

Whoever, during and in relation to any felony
violation enumerated in subsection (c),
knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses,
without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person shall, in
addition to the punishment provided for such
felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of 2 years.

18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (emphasis added). Ozuna-Cabrera concedes

every element of the offense but one: that his use of Howard Bond's

identification was "without lawful authority."1 He argues that,

1
It is undisputed that Ozuna-Cabrera used Bond's identity to
apply for a U.S. passport in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542, which
is one of the specifically enumerated felonies in subsection (c) of
18 U.S.C. § 1028A. See § 1028A(c)(7) (any provision relating to

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because Bond willingly sold him the means of identification, its

subsequent use in support of Ozuna-Cabrera's passport application

was lawfully authorized. This claim presents an issue of first

impression for us: whether, in the context of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1028A(a)(1), the phrase "without lawful authority" must be

construed to require that the means of identification be stolen, or

otherwise taken without permission of the owner. We reject such a

narrow reading.

As a preliminary matter, because Ozuna-Cabrera failed to

raise this claim below, we review it only for plain error.2

Accordingly, Ozuna-Cabrera bears the heavy burden of showing that

his interpretation of the phrase "without lawful authority" to

require theft of the means of identification is "compelled by the

language of the statute itself, construction of the statute in

light of the common law, or binding judicial construction of the

statute." United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 F.3d 62, 70

(1st Cir. 2007). We begin by looking at the language of § 1028A.

passports and visas). It is also undisputed that Ozuna-Cabrera
knew the passport once belonged to another person named Howard
Bond. See United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 53-54 (1st Cir.
2008)(requiring the government to prove that the defendant knew
that the means of identification belonged to another person).
2
Ozuna-Cabrera's argument that his Rule 11 challenge was
preserved by defense counsel at the sentencing hearing is plainly
incorrect. At sentencing, his counsel explicitly conceded that
Ozuna-Cabrera's conduct violated § 1028A(a)(1), noting only that it
was an atypical case of aggravated identity theft.

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 Ozuna-Cabrera's reliance on the statutory text itself is

unavailing. The phrase "without lawful authority," he argues,

definitionally equates to "without authorized permission." We

disagree. Though "authorized" activity may in many cases also be

"lawful," the terms are not interchangeable. Rather, Black's Law

Dictionary defines "lawful" as "not contrary to law," and

"authority" as "[t]he right or permission to act legally on

another's behalf." Black's Law Dictionary 152 & 965 (9th ed.

2009). Combining these definitions, § 1028A(a)(1) reasonably

proscribes the transfer, possession, or use of another person's

means of identification, absent the right or permission to act on

that person's behalf in a way that is not contrary to the law. In

other words, regardless of how the means of identification is

actually obtained, if its subsequent use breaks the law -

specifically, during and in relation to the commission of a crime

enumerated in subsection (c) - it is violative of § 1028A(a)(1).

Ozuna-Cabrera's contextual argument also fails. As he

points out, the aforementioned language of § 1028A(a)(1) is

virtually identical to that of the general identity fraud statute,

18 U.S.C. § 1028, which provides:

Whoever . . . knowingly transfers, possesses,
or uses, without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (emphasis added). Thus, Ozuna-Cabrera

asserts that unless we construe the phrase "without lawful

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authority" to require theft under § 1028A(a)(1), the statute would

cover the same conduct as § 1028(a)(7), and consequently be

rendered superfluous. He further submits that this construction is

supported by the statute's title, "Aggravated identity theft," and

its enhanced penalty provision, which he suggests is intended to

punish the theft of an identity more harshly than merely putting it

to fraudulent use.

This argument ignores the broader statutory framework.

As a general rule of statutory construction, "identical words used

in different parts of the same Act are intended to have the same

meaning." United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 11 (1st Cir. 2009)

(quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995))

(internal quotation mark omitted). This rule is strengthened

where, as here, the relevant statutory provisions are in close

proximity to each other. Comm'r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250

(1996). If Congress had intended for the phrase "without lawful

authority" to have substantially different meanings in

§ 1028A(a)(1) and § 1028(a)(7), "it would have manifested its

intention in some concrete fashion." Upton, 559 F.3d at 11

(quoting Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 438 n.9 (1982)) (internal

quotation mark omitted). There is no reason to diverge from this

canon of construction here. Instead, to discern the interplay

between these two statutes, we need only refer back to the

statutory language.

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 The identity fraud statute, § 1028(a)(7), covers the

commission, or aiding and abetting in the commission, of "any

unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or

. . . a felony under any applicable State or local law." By

contrast, the aggravated identity theft statute, § 1028A(a)(1),

covers "any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c)" - a

discrete list of federal felonies. The statutes are therefore

distinguishable not by the method of procuring the means of

identification, but by the underlying criminal conduct that they

respectively target. Section 1028A(a)(1) is a logical extension of

§ 1028(a)(7), and punishes more severely those identity crimes

committed during and in relation to a specifically enumerated

subset of problematic felonies.3 See, e.g., United States v.

Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 62 (1st Cir. 2008) (Lynch, C.J., concurring)

("[In enacting § 1028A,] Congress was responding to the drastic

upsurge in what are called identity theft crimes and which

3
Ozuna-Cabrera makes much of the statute's title, arguing that
inclusion of the term "theft" suggests that the identity must be
stolen. As we have previously held, we do not "rely on the titles
of statutory enactments in plumbing their meaning . . . at the
expense of the text itself." Mass. Ass'n of Health Maint. Orgs. v.
Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176, 180 (1st Cir. 1999) (internal citation
omitted). Even if we did consider the title, it supports the
present interpretation of the statutory language. The term
"aggravated" in "aggravated identity theft" underscores the use of
§ 1028A as an extension of § 1028 to punish particular crimes
warranting harsher sentences. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 59 ("It is
not clear that, by using the word 'theft' [in the title of §
1028A], Congress intended to limit 'identity theft' to . . .
scenario[s] involving traditional theft)".

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encompass a variety of situations."); United States v. Jimenez, 507

F.3d 13, 22 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[T]he purpose of [§ 1028A] is to

create an additional penalty for using false identities that are

particularly difficult to expose or that are used in conjunction

with terrorism offenses.").

Legislative history supports this interpretation. Ozuna-

Cabrera accurately notes that Congress added § 1028A to the United

States Code through the "Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act,"

Pub. L. No. 108-275, 118 Stat. 831 (2004). He is also correct that

the House Report is replete with references to "theft" and

"thieves," and that one stated purpose of the statute is to

increase sentences for "identity thieves." H.R. Rep. No. 108-528,

at 3, as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 780. The report

provides several examples of conduct that fit within the

traditional definition of theft, like stealing credit-card and

social security numbers, and stealing identities to file false tax

returns or apply for social security benefits. Id. at 5-6, 2004

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 781-82.

Without question, Congress harbored concerns over

criminals who actually steal other people's identities. There is

nothing to suggest, however, that Congress intended to so narrowly

restrict the statute's reach to identity crimes involving such

traditional notions of theft. On the contrary, the same House

Report stated that "[t]he terms 'identity theft' and 'identity

-8-
fraud' refer to all types of crimes in which someone wrongfully

obtains and uses another person's personal data . . . ." H.R. Rep.

No. 108-528, at 4, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 780. Indeed, the report

describes several anecdotal examples of identity theft that do not

involve stealing the means of identification. In one instance, a

man used his brother-in-law's name and social security number to

obtain social security benefits, and in a similar case, a woman

used her husband's social security number to collect disability

benefits. Id. at 6, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 782. This legislative

record demonstrates that Congress intended § 1028A to address a

wide array of identity crimes, and not only those iterations

involving conventional theft.

Finally, although this issue is new to this court, we do

not write on a blank slate. Five other courts of appeals have

concluded that theft of the means of identification is not required

to trigger criminal liability under § 1028A(a)(1). See, e.g.,

United States v. Retana, 641 F.3d 272, 273-75 (8th Cir. 2011)

(father's permission to use his social security number does not

amount to "lawful authority" to excuse defendant's fraudulent use

of the information to commit other crimes); United States v.

Mobley, 618 F.3d 539, 547-48 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding a § 1028A

violation for credit card conspiracy where victims willingly

provided their social security numbers); United States v.

Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 602, 607-09 (4th Cir. 2010) (affirming a

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§ 1028A conviction for the fraudulent use of lawfully acquired

Medicaid information); United States v. Carrion-Brito, 362 F. App'x

267, 273 (3d Cir. 2010) (permission or payment to use another's

identity does not bestow "lawful authority" on the perpetrator);

United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 607-08 (11th Cir. 2007),

abrogated in part on other grounds, Flores-Figueroa v. United

States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (same); see also Godin, 534 F.3d at 59

(stating, in dicta, that "it is . . . plausible that Congress

intended to define 'identity theft' as using someone else's

identity rather than taking someone else's identity").

Ozuna-Cabrera fails to identify any contrary, binding

judicial precedent that compels his interpretation of the statute.

His reliance on Flores-Figueroa and United States v. Villanueva-

Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2008), is misplaced. Those courts

were addressing a substantially different question - whether

§ 1028A requires proof of a defendant's knowledge that he was using

a real person's identity. Neither court squarely considered, much

less determined, whether the statute would be violated if the means

of identification was not actually stolen. At best, Flores-

Figueroa and Villanueva-Sotelo may support the presently unhelpful

proposition that theft is a sufficient, but not necessarily

required, element of § 1028A. Thus, in light of the existing

precedent, which overwhelmingly supports our textual and contextual

analysis, we conclude that § 1028A(a)(1) does not require theft, or

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any other illicit method of procurement, of the means of

identification.4

Although Ozuna-Cabrera attempts to parse this issue from

his Rule 11 arguments, the alleged Rule 11 violations depend almost

entirely on the assumption that his construction of § 1028A is

correct.5 Absent this foundation, his remaining Rule 11 arguments

necessarily crumble.

Ozuna-Cabrera first challenges the factual basis for the

charges, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3), arguing that the district

court erred in accepting the prosecution's explanation of the

aggravated identity theft charge without conducting an independent

review. It is not error to accept the government's recitation of

the facts as the basis for a plea. See United States v. Matos-

Quiñones, 456 F.3d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 2006) (accepting uncontradicted

facts proffered by the government as a rational basis for

defendant's plea). In any event, the court did not rest there, as

it confirmed that Ozuna-Cabrera understood the facts, and

4
Ozuna-Cabrera additionally points us to the rule of lenity
and the interpretive canon that criminal statutes must be strictly
construed. The rule of lenity does not apply here, however,
because § 1028A(a)(1)'s text is unambiguous. See United States v.
Nunez, 146 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1998).
5
Insofar as Ozuna-Cabrera's remaining Rule 11 arguments depend
on his construction of § 1028A, we will not revisit the issue. The
court need not have delineated a theft requirement that does not
exist in the statute, and Ozuna-Cabrera's argument that his
construction of § 1028A precludes a sufficient factual basis for
his plea inevitably fails.

-11-
summarized the evidence supporting the identity theft charge.

Ozuna-Cabrera's 11(b)(3) challenge consequently fails. See United

States v. Cheal, 389 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that Rule

11(b)(3) is fulfilled if the court ensures that there is, on the

record as it stands at the time of the plea, a reasoned basis to

believe that the defendant actually committed the crime to which he

is admitting guilt).

Ozuna-Cabrera further contends that his guilty plea was

not knowing and voluntary because the district court never

explained the elements of aggravated identity theft; in particular,

that the district court failed to unpack the statute's scienter

requirement. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). The record

suggests otherwise. During the plea colloquy, the district court

informed Ozuna-Cabrera that:

Count Three of the indictment again charges
essentially the same crime; however, here it
alleges that on March 19, 2008, in making a
false statement in an application for a
passport you used somebody else's
identification, knowing that you weren't
authorized to use that identification.

(Emphasis added). Later in the hearing, at the court's request,

the government also addressed the aggravated identity theft count

as follows:

Aggravated identity theft makes it unlawful
. . . to, without lawful authority, use a
means of identification during and in relation
to a violation of a variety of federal
offenses, including [making false statements
in a passport application]. "Means of

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 identification" is defined in [18 U.S.C.
§ 1028(d)(7)], and includes such items as:
Name, Social Security number, date of birth,
and state-issued driver's license. Here there
is a real Howard Edward Bond, and the
defendant used his name and all of his
identifiers to try to obtain a passport on
March 19, 2008.

The court then asked Ozuna-Cabrera if he understood the nature of

the charges, and ensured that he was pleading willingly and had

received sufficient time to discuss the charges with his attorney.

On a plain error standard of review, the question is not

whether the plea colloquy satisfied Rule 11, but whether it was so

deficient that it affected substantial rights and seriously

affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the

judicial proceedings. See United States v. Savinon-Acosta, 232

F.3d 265, 268 (1st Cir. 2000). Based on a thorough review of the

record, the answer to this question must be no. See United States

v. Cruz-Rivera, 357 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that where

the charges are not complex, a simple recitation of the indictment

may be sufficient to satisfy Rule 11); see also United States v.

Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d 1215, 1220 (1st Cir. 1995) ("The

description of the charges need not come directly from the court so

long as the record reveals that the defendant understood them.").

Finding no plain error in the district court's construction of

§ 1028A or its acceptance of Ozuna-Cabrera's guilty plea, we affirm

his conviction.

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 B. Sentencing Challenges

Ozuna-Cabrera also appeals his sentence. The presentence

investigation report (PSI Report) recorded his base offense level

at 8, applied a sixteen-level enhancement for a prior drug

trafficking charge, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i),6 and recommended

a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, id.

§ 3E1.1. Ozuna-Cabrera's prior convictions, and the fact that he

had committed the instant offense while under a criminal sentence,

placed him in criminal history category (CHC) V. Assuming an

adjusted offense level of 21 and a CHC of V, the guideline

sentencing range (GSR) would have included a mandatory 24 months

for the count of aggravated identity theft, and spanned 70-87

months on the remaining three counts, for an effective advisory

guideline range of 94-111 months.

While Ozuna-Cabrera did not object to the PSI Report, he

did file a sentencing memorandum asserting that his CHC

overrepresented the gravity of his prior offenses, which, he

alleged, stemmed largely from his personal use of drugs and

alcohol. He also urged a variant sentence, arguing that the nature

6
Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Sentencing Guidelines
advises that "[i]f the defendant previously was deported . . .
after a conviction for a felony that is a drug trafficking offense
for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months . . . increase
[the base offense level] by 16 levels." U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i). In 1991, Ozuna-Cabrera was convicted of a
drug-trafficking offense for which he was sentenced to six months
for the original violation, and a further nine months for violating
probation. He was deported shortly thereafter.

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and timing of his 1991 drug trafficking conviction did not warrant

a sixteen-level enhancement, and that the absence of an early

disposition program created an unacceptable disparity.7

The district court agreed that Ozuna-Cabrera's CHC

overrepresented the seriousness of his past crimes and departed

downward to a CHC of IV. In light of the absence of an early

disposition program, the court also reduced the offense level from

21 to 19, shrinking the GSR to the mandatory 24 months for

aggravated identity theft, and 46-57 months for the remaining three

counts. The court refused, however, to grant a sentence below the

reconfigured sentencing range, imposing a total incarcerative term

of 70 months.

On appeal, Ozuna-Cabrera mounts both procedural and

substantive challenges to his sentence. Procedurally, he contends

that the district court, in following the guidelines and applying

the sixteen-level enhancement, failed to consider the sentencing

factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Substantively, he argues

7
Early disposition or "fast-track" programs permit prosecutors
to provide the prospect of shorter sentences in return for prompt
guilty pleas and, in some cases, waiver of appellate rights. In
2003, Congress authorized the Attorney General to create fast-track
programs on a district-by-district basis, and directed the
Sentencing Commission to promulgate a policy statement allowing
downward departures in eligible cases. See Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act, Pub.
L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003).
Massachusetts was not one of the districts chosen for a fast-track
program. Ozuna-Cabrera argued that the absence of a fast-track
program in the District of Massachusetts resulted in an unwarranted
sentencing disparity.

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that the application of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) renders his sentence

unreasonable. Given a properly calculated GSR, we review a

sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.

38, 51 (2007); United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir.

2008).

Ozuna-Cabrera's sentence is both procedurally and

substantively sound. As to the procedural challenge, although the

district court only summarily acknowledged its consideration of

§ 3553(a), it need not have engaged in an exhaustive analysis of

each factor. United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 205 (1st Cir.

2006) ("[The district court] is not required to address [each

§ 3553(a)] factor[], one by one, in some . . . rote incantation

when explicating its sentencing decision."). Nor must the court

provide a voluminous explanation of its reasoning. Where a

sentence is within the applicable guidelines, it "require[s] a

lesser degree of explanation than those that fall outside the

guideline sentencing range," and we think that particularly true

where, as here, "the sentence is at the very bottom of the

Guidelines range." United States v. Arango, 508 F.3d 34, 48 (1st

Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d

34, 41 (1st Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court considered both the PSI Report and the

sentencing memorandum, and ultimately reduced Ozuna-Cabrera's

sentence to account for his criminal history and the unavailability

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of an early disposition program. Given Ozuna-Cabrera's pattern of

recidivistic addiction, the court also referred him to a drug

treatment program, and with respect to the application of the

sixteen-level enhancement, the court stated:

[O]n balance, I think I come out closer to
[the government's] position than I do the
defendant's. There's just too many crimes,
too many missed opportunities, too many
aliases.

In stark contrast to the allegedly mechanistic application of the

GSR, the court appears to have specifically tailored its sentence

to Ozuna-Cabrera's individual circumstances, based at least in part

on § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (accounting for the

defendant's personal history and characteristics), (a)(2)(D)

(providing needed medical care), & (a)(6) (adjusting to avoid

"unwarranted sentencing disparities"). The fact that the district

court chose not to sentence Ozuna-Cabrera according to his

counsel's recommendation does not establish that it failed to

consider the relevant factors. United States v. Butler-Acevedo, --

- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 3831681, at *2 (1st Cir. 2011).

Turning to the substantive challenge, when evaluating the

substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we consider the totality

of the circumstances and give due deference to the district court.

See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Wallace, 573 F.3d 82, 97

(1st Cir. 2009). A defendant who attempts to brand a within-range

sentence as unreasonable must carry a heavy burden, United States

-17-
v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194, 204 (1st Cir. 2006), and a sentence

will withstand a substantive reasonableness challenge so long as

there is "a plausible sentencing rationale and a defensible

result," Martin, 520 F.3d at 96.

To the extent that Ozuna-Cabrera challenges the

substantive reasonableness of his sentence - specifically, the

purported draconian nature of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.28 - the sentence was

not only amply supported by the record, but was also the lowest

within the GSR. In determining whether to apply the sixteen-level

enhancement, the court concluded that the underlying 1991

conviction was not merely an aberration, but one of a lengthy list

of convictions in Ozuna-Cabrera's rather extensive criminal

history.9 This conclusion, and the resulting sentence, were both

plausible and defensible, and Ozuna-Cabrera presents no powerful

mitigating reasons to suggest that the district court was

unreasonable. See United States v. Beatty, 538 F.3d 8, 17 (1st

Cir. 2008) (requiring "powerful mitigating reasons" for any

"defendant who wishes to attack an in-guideline-range sentence as

8
Ozuna-Cabrera also argues that a § 2L1.2 enhancement is not
available under Almandarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224
(1998). We have repeatedly rejected this argument, and do so again
here. See, e.g., United States v. Charlton, 600 F.3d 43, 55 (1st
Cir. 2010).
9
When the PSI Report was compiled, Ozuna-Cabrera had fifteen
convictions, with an additional ten charges pending. The
government stated, and Ozuna-Cabrera did not refute, that he had
used fourteen different aliases with fifteen different birth dates
and twelve different social security numbers.

-18-
excessive") (quoting United States v. Navedo-Concepción, 450 F.3d

54, 59 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Without

more, we see no basis for disturbing his sentence.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Ozuna-Cabrera's conviction and

sentence are affirmed.

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