United States v. Brian Rivers

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4199

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BRIAN EDWARD RIVERS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:09-cr-01093-PMD-1)

Submitted: September 29, 2011 Decided: November 3, 2011

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Vacated in part and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Cameron J. Blazer, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles,
United States Attorney, Matthew J. Modica, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

On October 25, 2010, Brian Edward Rivers pleaded

guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to possession with intent

to distribute five or more grams of cocaine base, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (2006), and use and carry of

a firearm during and in relation to, and possession in

furtherance of, a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006). The charged criminal conduct

occurred on or about July 10, 2009. The district court

sentenced Rivers on February 15, 2011, to a cumulative term of

120 months in prison.

Rivers now appeals, claiming that the district court

erred when it failed to apply the provisions of the Fair

Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) in imposing his sentence. The

Government has filed a motion, with the consent of Rivers, to

remand to the district court for resentencing in accordance with

the amendments wrought by the FSA. We grant the motion and

accordingly vacate Rivers’ sentence and remand the case to the

district court to permit resentencing.

By this disposition, however, we do not indicate a

view as to whether the FSA is applicable to a defendant such as

Rivers, whose offense conduct occurred before the August 3, 2010

enactment of the FSA, but who was sentenced after that date. We

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leave that determination in the first instance to the district

court. ∗

VACATED IN PART
AND REMANDED

∗
We note that at Rivers’ sentencing hearing, counsel for
the defendant unsuccessfully argued for application of the FSA.
Nevertheless, in light of the Attorney General’s revised view on
the retroactivity of the FSA, as well as the development of case
law on this point in other jurisdictions, we think it
appropriate, without indicating any view as to the outcome, to
accord the district court an opportunity to consider the matter
anew.

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