[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL1, 2008
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 07-10024
CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 06-00002-CV-5
WILLIAM HOPE DAVIS,
Petitioner–Appellant,
versus
STATE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES,
MILTON E. NIX, JR., Chairman,
GARLAND R. HUNT, Vice-Chairman,
GARFIELD HAMMONDS, Member,
EUGENE P. WALKER, Member, et al.,
Respondents–Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(April 1, 2008)
Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
William Hope Davis, a pro se Georgia state prisoner, appeals the denial of
his federal habeas petition as untimely. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2244(d)(1)(D).
Davis argues that the district court erred when it determined that the “factual
predicate” which began the statute of limitations period was the Board of Pardons
and Paroles’ (“Board”) initial May 23, 1997 decision to deny Davis parole and not
its subsequent June 2, 2005 denial on reconsideration. Without reaching the issue
of which event triggered the limitations period with respect to Davis’s claim, we
affirm.
We previously have held that § 2241 petitions brought by individuals in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court are subject to the exhaustion
requirements of § 2254—including exhaustion of state remedies. Dill v. Holt, 371
F.3d 1301,1302-03 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049,
1059 (11th Cir.2003)); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). It is firmly established under
Georgia law that a parole decision can be challenged by filing a petition for writ of
mandamus. Brown v. Barrow, --- F.3d ----, 2008 WL 108706, at *2 (11th Cir.
2008) (citing Lewis v. Griffin, 376 S.E.2d 364 (1989); Justice v. State Bd. of
Pardons and Paroles, 218 S.E.2d 45 (1975)). Davis did not present his claim in a
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state court mandamus proceeding or in any other state judicial proceeding.
Therefore, even assuming arguendo that Davis could not have known the factual
predicate for his claim until the Board denied him parole for the second time in
June 2005, his petition was nonetheless properly denied because Davis failed to
exhaust remedies available to him in the Georgia state courts.
The dismissal of Davis’s habeas petition by the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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