In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-3430
C ATHLEEN R. S AMBRANO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
R AY M ABUS, Secretary of the Navy,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 08 C 718—Charles R. Norgle, Judge.
S UBMITTED O CTOBER 5, 2011—D ECIDED N OVEMBER 8, 2011
Before E ASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and M ANION and
R OVNER, Circuit Judges.
E ASTERBROOK, Chief Judge. Cathleen Sambrano filed
with the EEOC a charge accusing her employer, the
Department of the Navy, of discriminating on account
of race, sex, national origin, age, and disability. When
the employer is a federal agency, the EEOC can resolve
the grievance and not just mediate, its role for private
employment. The EEOC found that Sambrano’s charge
2 No. 10-3430
is unsupported. Federal employees are entitled to a
de novo decision by a federal court, see Chandler v.
Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976), and Sambrano filed a
complaint repeating the administrative allegations.
The district court set a discovery schedule. Nothing
happened. The Navy did not need discovery, and
Sambrano did not serve interrogatories or schedule
any depositions. Instead, several months after the ex-
piration of the time for discovery, Sambrano filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion
asserted that discovery is unnecessary because the pro-
ceeding was an “appeal” from the EEOC’s decision. That
proposition is wrong; a suit is not an appeal. Although a
federal employee can prevail when the administrative
record itself contains all the necessary evidence, see
42 U.S.C. §2000e–16(c), which Chandler discusses, the
EEOC had found that the evidence does not support
Sambrano’s contentions. Sambrano’s lawyer did not
contend that the EEOC misunderstood the evidence;
indeed, his motion for judgment on the pleadings did not
discuss the administrative record at all. Instead counsel
asserted that the court should rule in Sambrano’s
favor because she was too ill to participate in discovery.
The motion did not explain why evidence could not be
gathered from other sources. By declining to present
evidence, Sambrano’s lawyer doomed his client’s case.
The district judge denied the motion for judgment on
the pleadings and likely supposed that Sambrano’s
lawyer (A. Jun Joaquin, Jr.) then would request a new
opportunity to take discovery. But nothing happened. No
No. 10-3430 3
motions, no requests, just silence. After more than a year
of inaction had elapsed, the district judge dismissed
the case for want of prosecution, citing N.D. Ill. Rule 41.1.
That spurred Sambrano’s lawyer to action—but the
action he took was preposterous. He filed an ex parte
motion for relief from judgment. Counsel did not serve
the motion on his adversary or explain why a secret
motion was authorized. And lack of service was not an
oversight: the document’s caption reads: “EX PARTE
MOTION TO VACATE DISMISSAL”. The motion asserts
that Local Rule 41.1 is unconstitutional but does not
contain a legal argument in support of that dubious
contention. (Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 632–33
(1962), holds that the Constitution permits federal courts
to dismiss dormant suits for failure to prosecute.) The
district judge denied the motion under Local Rule 5.3
because Sambrano’s lawyer deliberately failed to serve
the defendant.
Counsel’s next step was an appeal. He might have
argued that the district judge acted precipitately.
Although the judge waited more than a year after
denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings, a
court ordinarily should warn the litigant that inaction
puts the suit in jeopardy. Gabriel v. Hamlin, 514 F.3d 734,
737 (7th Cir. 2008); Ball v. Chicago, 2 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir.
1993). The district judge did not issue such a warning.
Yet Sambrano does not rely on this principle or contend
that the judge abused his discretion. Instead the brief
maintains that Local Rule 41.1 violates the fifth amend-
ment’s due process clause. At least we think that this
is the brief’s argument. It is almost unintelligible.
4 No. 10-3430
Here is the brief’s entire summary of argument:
1) Property interest in employment.
2) Due process of law.
3) Motion for judgment on the pleadings under
FRCP Rule 12c.
That isn’t a summary of argument or even the conclu-
sion of an argument. The “argument” section of the
brief, which runs one and a half pages, is little better; it
contains a few platitudes but does not attempt to show
how the district judge erred. And here’s the brief’s state-
ment of the standard of review: “The constitutionality
or propriety of the District Court’s Local Rule 41.1
insofar as it relates to appellant’s right to due process
under the 5 th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” That
might be an effort to frame an issue for appellate
review, but it has nothing to do with the standard of
review. (Since Sambrano appears to be making a strictly
legal argument, the court of appeals makes an indep-
endent decision, usually called de novo review.)
The remainder of the brief is similarly wretched. For
example, the statement of appellate jurisdiction is inco-
herent. It invokes Circuit Rule 28(a)(3)(ii), which is
not a source of appellate jurisdiction, and the Cohen
collateral-order doctrine, even though the district court
entered a final decision ending the suit. Counsel also
violated Circuit Rules 30(a) and (d). Rule 30(a) requires
the appellant to include, “bound with the main brief,
an appendix containing the judgment or order under
review and any opinion, memorandum of decision” or
No. 10-3430 5
other equivalent statement of reasons. Rule 30(d) requires
counsel to certify compliance with Rule 30(a). (The
clerk’s office cannot tell whether the appendix contains
all the necessary materials; the court uses the certifi-
cate under Rule 30(d) to ascertain whether counsel is
familiar with this rule, and if the certificate is in proper
form the court accepts the brief without independent
inquiry into compliance with Rule 30(a).) Joaquin
included a Rule 30(d) certificate, but it is false. The dis-
trict court filed two short memoranda explaining its
decisions (first to dismiss, and then to deny the motion
to vacate the dismissal). Neither of these explanations is
in the appendix—though Joaquin did put in several
documents, such as his “EX PARTE MOTION TO
VACATE DISMISSAL” and a post-decision affidavit by
his client that Rule 30 neither requires nor allows in
the appendix to the brief.
This appeal is frivolous. It bypasses the only possible
argument (that the district judge abused his discretion
by dismissing the suit without first warning Joaquin
about the risks of procrastination) while advancing
an argument with no prospect of success (that Local Rule
41.1 is unconstitutional, a contention unsupported by
argument or any attempt to address Link). The Navy’s
brief as appellee points this out and adds that Joaquin
did not preserve his argument in the district court. (Recall
that the judge struck the post-judgment motion, rather
than addressing its merits, because Joaquin had failed
to serve the adverse party.) Joaquin then bypassed his
opportunity to file a reply brief and, a few days before
the date set for oral argument, filed a motion to waive
6 No. 10-3430
argument. We granted that motion, because there was
no reason to compel the Navy’s lawyer to waste any
more time, but if Joaquin thought that the maneuver
would lead the court to overlook his sorry perfor-
mance—in the district court as well as this court—he
was mistaken.
A violation of Circuit Rule 30 is sanctionable. See, e.g.,
Mortell v. Mortell Co., 887 F.2d 1322, 1326–27 (7th Cir. 1989);
Urso v. United States, 72 F.3d 59, 61–62 (7th Cir. 1995). So
is the pursuit of a frivolous appeal. Mars Steel Corp. v.
Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 938–40 (7th Cir. 1989)
(en banc). Sanctions such as orders to pay the other
side’s attorneys’ fees may redress injuries done to put-
upon adversaries, but they do not redress injuries a
lawyer may have done to his own client. We have no
idea whether Sambrano had a good claim against the
Navy—but we do know that, if she had, Joaquin
massacred it.
His conduct in this case implies that Joaquin is not
competent to protect the interests of litigants in the
federal courts. In other recent cases we have ordered
lawyers whose ineptitude injured (or may have injured)
their own clients to show cause why they should not be
suspended from practice or disbarred. See, e.g., Lee v.
Chicago, 635 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Clark,
2011 U.S. App. L EXIS 19032 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 2011); Stanard
v. Nygren, 2011 U.S. App. L EXIS 19213 (7th Cir. Sept. 19,
2011). That step is appropriate here too. Judges are
better able than clients to separate competent from bun-
gling attorneys, and we have a duty to ensure the mainte-
No. 10-3430 7
nance of professional standards by members of our bar.
We therefore give Joaquin 21 days to show cause why
he should not be subject to monetary sanctions for filing
a frivolous appeal and violating Circuit Rule 30, and
why he should not be censured, suspended, or disbarred
on account of his apparent inability to practice com-
petently and diligently in the federal courts. See Fed. R.
App. P. 38, 46.
The judgment is affirmed. An order to show cause
is issued.
11-8-11