FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 8, 2011
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 10-3307
CESAR OSBALDO ARMENDARIZ
SOTO, a/k/a Santiago Maldonado-
Valenzuela,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 2:07-CR-20099-JWL-DJW-16)
Submitted on the briefs *:
Dionne M. Scherff, Erickson Scherff, LLC, Overland Park, Kansas, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Barry R. Grissom, United States Attorney, and James A. Brown, Assistant United
States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before GORSUCH, HOLLOWAY, and McKAY, Circuit Judges.
GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
Must a district court allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea — even
when the request is based on a lie? Unsurprisingly, we hold the answer is no.
The law does not permit anyone to compel judicial action based on intentionally
false statements.
This case began with Cesar Osbaldo Armendariz Soto facing an indictment
for his involvement in a drug distribution conspiracy. The government charged
him with, among other things, conspiracy to distribute large quantities of cocaine
and marijuana, money laundering, and a firearms violation. As part of an effort
to show his cooperation and reduce his sentence, and in consultation with his
attorney, Mr. Armendariz Soto initially agreed to (and did) plead guilty to these
charges without a plea agreement. But then, some months later (though still
before his sentencing hearing), he tried to reverse course, asking the court to
allow him to withdraw the plea he had entered and the court had accepted.
The district court convened a hearing to consider the question. There, Mr.
Armendariz Soto argued his plea wasn’t entered knowingly or voluntarily. This,
Mr. Armendariz Soto testified, was because Thomas Telthorst, his counsel at the
time of the plea, promised him a fifteen year sentence if he agreed to admit his
guilt. And it turned out that counsel had no basis for making such a promise. Mr.
Armendariz Soto thus argued that his decision to plead guilty was premised on a
misunderstanding of the facts. Of course, Mr. Armendariz Soto still had to
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explain one thing. During his plea colloquy the district court clearly and
repeatedly asked Mr. Armendariz Soto if he understood that his plea guaranteed
him no specific sentence — and each time Mr. Armendariz Soto said he did. Mr.
Armendariz Soto explained, however, that Mr. Telthorst told him to answer “yes”
to the district court’s questions whether or not he understood them.
For his part, Mr. Telthorst disputed all this. He testified that he had a
sentencing strategy aimed at “laying the groundwork for a comprehensive
biographical sentencing memorandum that would give us credibility to ask for the
statutory minimum 15-year sentence.” But, he said, he never promised any
sentence to his client. Indeed, counsel testified that he explained fully and clearly
to Mr. Armendariz Soto that he could guarantee no sentencing outcome. Counsel
also swore that he never remotely suggested that his client should answer yes to
every question during the plea colloquy. “My guidance would have been just the
contrary. As a matter of practice, I always tell clients that . . . if they have
questions or don’t understand something they should stop the proceeding and we
should talk privately.”
Ultimately, the district court refused to allow Mr. Armendariz Soto to
retract his guilty plea. “Frankly,” the district court explained, “I do not find Mr.
Armendariz Soto’s testimony credible. . . . I simply think he is not telling us the
truth.” In support of this finding the court cited the fact that, during his plea
colloquy Mr. Armendariz Soto told the court twice that no one — including his
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lawyer — had made any promises or guarantees about what his sentence would
be. And, the court found, it had “no basis to believe that Mr. Telthorst’s conduct
in any way misled Mr. Armendariz Soto” into thinking he should simply answer
“yes” to all the court’s questions. In sum, the district court concluded, “the
record shows that Mr. Armendariz Soto’s plea was entered into knowingly . . .
[and] voluntar[ily] . . . and I do not believe that he has demonstrated a fair and
just reason for withdrawing the plea.” The court further found that “I think based
on the hearing we have had today that Mr. Armendariz Soto simply, when the
time came [to proceed to sentencing], decided that he didn’t think his position
looked as good as he hoped it would be and perhaps in a sense of desperation
decided to see if he could start the process all over again.”
Later at Mr. Armendariz Soto’s sentencing hearing, the district court held
that the false testimony he had given in his effort to undo his plea warranted the
imposition of a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice (U.S.S.G.
§ 3C1.1) and the denial of a potential sentencing reduction for acceptance of
responsibility (U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1). The court’s resulting sentencing calculations
yielded an advisory guidelines range of 420 months to life imprisonment. After
weighing the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court
imposed a sentence of 420 months, the bottom end of the guidelines range.
On appeal, Mr. Armendariz Soto argues that (1) he should have been
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, (2) the district court erred in applying an
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obstruction of justice enhancement and denying an acceptance of responsibility
reduction, and (3) his sentence was substantively unreasonable. We examine each
argument in its turn.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure dictate that a defendant may
withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing when he or she can provide “a fair and
just reason” for the request. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). We have identified
some considerations that can help illuminate whether a particular request
qualifies, but we have also recognized that the Rule’s standard — inviting and
even commanding a general inquiry into fairness and justice — is not so easily
captured and compartmentalized. See United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1572
(10th Cir. 1993). For this reason, we have explained, it always and ultimately lies
“within the sound discretion of the district court to determine” on a case by case
basis when the standard is and isn’t met. Id. (quotation omitted). At the same
time, we retain our traditional function to review the district court’s decision for
an abuse of discretion and to delineate appropriate rules regarding when “the
defendant can [and cannot] show that the court acted unjustly or unfairly.” Id. at
1572-73.
We exercise those functions here to offer one rule in light of the facts of
this case. Whatever else may be said about its powers under Rule 11(d), we hold
that a district court does not abuse its discretion in refusing a motion to withdraw
where, as here, the defendant’s request relies solely on a claim that his plea
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wasn’t knowing and voluntary and that claim is predicated on an intentional
falsehood. Fairness and justice do not dictate that a party may compel any
judicial action on the basis of a lie — let alone an action that would require the
court, the government, as well as victims and witnesses to endure the significant
cost, time, and all the other tribulations associated with a trial. Mistake or
confusion, in the interests of fairness and justice, may merit more latitude from a
court. But an intentional falsehood under oath about such a material matter as a
plea agreement is not something any district court is forced to countenance.
Having said this much, it surely remains open to a defendant in Mr.
Armendariz Soto’s shoes to challenge the district court’s factual finding that he
intentionally lied. A district court’s factual findings are, of course, reversible
only if they are clearly in error. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S.
564, 573-75 (1985). But if Mr. Armendariz Soto could show that the district
court clearly erred in finding that he told an intentional untruth rather than simply
made a mistake or was confused, he might begin to make some headway toward
showing (whether or not he would compel the conclusion) that the court abused
its discretion in refusing relief from his plea.
Mr. Armendariz Soto tries to take up this challenge, but he does so
unsuccessfully. He claims before us, as he did before the district court, that he
entered his plea only because of promises his attorney made — or at least only
because of promises he thought his attorney made. If he misunderstood the
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lawyer, he says, it was only because of his lack of sophistication and familiarity
with the legal system. The problem is that the district court rejected these
arguments, noting that Mr. Armendariz Soto had “attempted to articulate his
position in a thought-out and conceived manner, and clearly this was a willful
intent to mislead the court.” And the record before us contains no facts
suggesting that this finding was erroneous, let alone clearly so. The record shows
that Mr. Armendariz Soto’s claim he entered his guilty plea unknowingly and
involuntarily conflicts both with his own repeated statements to the district court
during the plea colloquy and with the testimony of his attorney who confirmed
that his client was properly advised of the consequences of his plea. Mr.
Armendariz Soto’s assertion that his attorney instructed him to answer “yes” to
all the district court’s questions is likewise contradicted by the attorney’s
testimony denying all this; the attorney adamantly testified that he conveyed
accurately just the opposite.
The same problems confronting Mr. Armendariz Soto’s Rule 11 argument
also beset in his sentencing enhancement and reduction arguments. He argues
that the district court erred when it applied a two-level obstruction of justice
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. But by its terms that enhancement applies
when the defendant “(A) willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct
or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the . . . prosecution[] or
sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct
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related to . . . the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct.”
And each of these conditions is satisfied when a defendant intentionally lies under
oath in an effort to scuttle a previously entered plea. After all, an intentional lie
in these circumstances is, by definition, an effort to impede the administration of
justice with respect to the prosecution and sentencing of the case, seeking as it
does to undo a conviction obtained pursuant to lawful procedures and to force the
proceedings to begin anew. And it necessarily relates directly to the defendant’s
offense of conviction as it represents an effort to unring the bell on an already
agreed to conviction for that offense. See also § 3C1.1, cmt. n. 4(B) (indicating
that perjury provides a basis for the enhancement).
Neither can it come as much surprise that a defendant who receives an
obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement is generally ineligible for a
sentencing reduction predicated on an acceptance of responsibility. The whole
point of trying to obstruct justice, after all, is usually to prevent a full accounting
of one’s criminal actions. For precisely this reason, the comments to the
guidelines explain that “[c]onduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1
(Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice) ordinarily indicates that
the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct” and is
therefore ineligible for a sentencing reduction on this basis under U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1. In an abundance of caution the guidelines leave open the possibility that
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there might be some situation where a defendant obstructs justice but is still
eligible for an acceptance of responsibility reduction. But such a case,
the comments tell us, will be the “extraordinary” one. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 4.
Mr. Armendariz Soto’s case is not the “extraordinary” one. He argues that
he should receive an acceptance of responsibility reduction because he never
asserted his innocence after pleading guilty, he never frivolously challenged
relevant conduct during the sentencing process, and he did not engage in a
continuing course of criminal activity after his arrest. And all of these things are
true. But the district court found that, despite this, Mr. Armendariz Soto’s effort
to avoid the consequences of his plea agreement using intentional lies under oath
demonstrated that he “ha[d] not accepted responsibility . . . [for] the extent of his
involvement” in the criminal scheme or “come to grips with the reality of the role
he played.” Under our precedents, the question whether a defendant has or hasn’t
accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct is one of fact reviewed under the
clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Tom, 494 F.3d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir.
2007). And, we hold, there’s nothing clearly wrong about a finding that a
defendant’s intentional misrepresentation under oath to a court to avoid the
consequences of his criminal actions demonstrates a lack of acceptance of
responsibility that isn’t fully cured or offset by his decision not to
pursue other frivolous arguments or engage in still more criminal conduct.
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Even if all this is so, Mr. Armendariz Soto argues that his sentence remains
substantively unreasonable. Because his sentence falls within (at the bottom of)
the properly-calculated guidelines range, however, it is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness or rationality on review in this circuit. United
States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007); Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Mr. Armendariz Soto tries to carry his burden of
overcoming that presumption and show that the district court’s decision was
nonetheless unreasonable or irrational (and so reversible) in essentially two
different ways, but neither is persuasive.
First, Mr. Armendariz Soto claims that his sentence is excessive because
the head of the drug trafficking conspiracy, Rene Garcia Rodriquez, received less
prison time than he did. And it is certainly true that the law requires a sentencing
court to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated
defendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). But rational reasons can exist for treating
co-defendants differently at sentencing. A district court must, after all, consider
the criminal history, degree of cooperation, specific offenses of conviction, and
personal backgrounds of each of the defendants before it. See id. And what a
court uncovers when considering these factors may well reasonably lead it to
distinguish otherwise similarly situated individuals. This is such a case. Unlike
Mr. Armendariz Soto, and as the district court found, Mr. Garcia Rodriquez
extensively cooperated with the government. Neither is there any indication in
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the record before this court that Mr. Garcia Rodriquez sought to obstruct justice
or failed to accept responsibility for his conduct. Given all this, we are in no
position to conclude (as we must to reverse on the basis of a putatively
unwarranted disparity among co-defendants) that the district court lacked any
rational reason to distinguish between the two men.
Second, Mr. Armendariz Soto contends that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable in light of his age and lack of education or sophistication. The
district court expressly considered these and other related points raised by the
defense before announcing its sentence. But the court found them insufficient to
warrant a sentence lower than the advisory guidelines range because of competing
evidence showing that Mr. Armendariz Soto well understood his actions to be
unlawful and was deeply involved in a significant drug trafficking conspiracy.
Specifically, the court found that Mr. Armendariz Soto served as the “right hand
man” to the head of the conspiracy and was “involved in the whole process.”
(ROA v. 3 at 27.) And “the process” involved the distribution of over 150
kilograms of cocaine and 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, as well as money
laundering and firearms violations.
To be sure, weighing a defendant’s personal background against the degree
of his culpability, the need to deter and protect others, and the many other
disparate considerations in § 3553(a) is no easy thing and hardly a task
susceptible to a single right answer in every case. A choice is necessarily
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involved. It is a choice that calls for much humility and humanity, and is among
the most difficult choices district judges must make. But at least the district
judge bears first-hand experience with the defendant, any co-defendants, victims,
and other witnesses. And it is precisely because of all this — because of the
relative superiority of the district judge’s vantage in making a choice where the
considerations are so many, so varied, and so grave — that appellate courts can
sensibly do no more than police the outer boundaries, reversing only when we can
say a district court’s substantive sentencing choice falls outside “the realm of
the[] rationally available choices.” See United States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049,
1053 (10th Cir. 2007). In this case we may be able to see how a different judge
could have reached a different choice about the comparative importance of the
defendant’s age and experience versus the depth of his involvement in a large
criminal scheme, but we are no less at a loss to see how we might say the choice
this district judge made was an irrational one.
Affirmed.
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