[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
U.S.
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 14, 2011
No. 10-13577 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-00070-JRH-WLB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff–Appellee,
versus
WALTER MARION WILLIAMS,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant–Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(November 14, 2011)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Walter Marion Williams pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and was sentenced to a term of 108 months’
imprisonment to be followed by 3 years of supervised release. Williams appeals
from his sentence, which he argues was an unreasonable upward variance from his
guidelines range of 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment.1
I.
From 1992 until 2009, Williams, who was a licensed insurance broker, took
over 1.9 million dollars from several of his friends, relatives, and congregants at
the church he attended, promising that he would invest their money in annuities
and viatical settlements. But instead of investing their money, Williams used it to
pay gambling debts and support a relatively luxurious lifestyle. Toward the end of
this scheme several of the “investors” grew suspicious of Williams and asked that
he return their money. Williams gave them cash in attempt to appease them, but
only compounded his fraud, because he “refunded” them by taking more money
from other victims.
After hearing testimony at sentencing from several victims of Williams’s
scheme and considering the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district
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Williams does not challenge the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. And
although Williams also challenges his sentence as an unreasonable upward departure from the
guidelines, the judge made clear at sentencing that he was varying upward. As we agree that the
above-guidelines sentence was imposed as a variance because the guidelines range was correctly
calculated and the district judge considered it inadequate to achieve the purposes of 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), we do not address Williams’s upward-departure argument. See United States v.
Irizarry, 458 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2006).
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judge imposed a sentence of 108 months’ imprisonment. In explaining why he
thought such a lengthy sentence was necessary, the judge noted that he did not
think that the guidelines range adequately reflected the seriousness of Williams’s
conduct and as such he felt the need to impose an upward variance.
II.
We review all sentences, whether they are imposed inside or outside the
guidelines, “only for reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard.”
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1186 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) cert. denied
131 S. Ct. 1813 (2011). In reviewing the substantiative reasonableness of a
sentence we look at the totality of the circumstances including the extent of any
variance from the guidelines range. United States v. Saac, 632 F.3d 1203, 1212
(11th Cir. 2011). But “we must give due deference to the district court’s decision
that the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the
variance.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
Here, the district judge noted the length of the defendant’s scheme, the
financial burden it imposed on its victims and their families, the small likelihood
of recovering any of the defrauded funds, and the age of the victims, as well as
Williams’s use of personal and familial relationships to defraud the victims.
Although that last element (abuse of trust) was taken into account in the guidelines
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calculations, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion by
concluding the defendant’s abuse of trust was more egregious than what was
contemplated by the guidelines. And given the district court’s reasoned and
considered explanation of why the facts in this case warranted a sentence outside
the guidelines, we also conclude the district court imposed a reasonable sentence
and thus did not abuse its discretion.
AFFIRMED.
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