UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4196
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
COREY FLEAMON TOWNSEND,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:10-cr-00147-WO-1)
Submitted: October 27, 2011 Decided: November 14, 2011
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr.,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Lisa Blue Boggs, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Corey Fleamon
Townsend pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm after having
previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of
imprisonment exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2006). The district court found Townsend
qualified for sentencing pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal
Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and sentenced him to 225
months’ imprisonment. Counsel for Townsend has filed this
appeal pursuant Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
averring that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, but
asking this court to review the armed career criminal
designation. In his pro se supplemental brief, Townsend asserts
that his attorney provided constitutionally ineffective
representation. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Although counsel raises the issue of whether Townsend
was properly designated an armed career criminal, he concludes
the district court committed no error in this regard. We agree.
This court “review[s] de novo whether a defendant’s previous
conviction was for a predicate offense under the ACCA.” United
States v. Harcum, 587 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2009). Under 18
U.S.C. § 924(e), if a defendant violates § 922(g) after
sustaining three prior convictions for violent felonies or
serious drug offenses, the statutory mandatory minimum term of
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imprisonment is fifteen years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). A
violent felony is defined as a crime, punishable by a term
exceeding one year of imprisonment, that (a) “has as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against” another person; or (b) is burglary, arson, or
extortion; involves explosives; “or otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
the district court properly determined that Townsend’s three
prior North Carolina convictions for felony breaking and
entering, felony assault with a deadly weapon with intent to
kill inflicting serious injury, and felony robbery with a
dangerous weapon, qualified as ACCA predicates. Furthermore,
there is no temporal restriction on prior felony offenses for
purposes of the ACCA. See United States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64,
69-70 (4th Cir. 1995); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.4
cmt. n.1 (2010). Thus, the fact that the felony breaking and
entering conviction was more than fifteen years old at the time
of Townsend’s sentencing is of no legal significance.
In his pro se supplemental brief, Townsend asserts his
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
obtain the state court records relevant to his prior
convictions. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are
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not cognizable on direct appeal unless the record conclusively
establishes that counsel provided ineffective assistance.
United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008).
Townsend’s claim is not ripe for review because the record
contains no conclusive evidence that counsel was ineffective.
In accordance with the requirements of Anders, we have
examined the entire record for any meritorious issues and found
none. The district court complied with the mandates of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting Townsend’s guilty
plea, and the within-Guidelines sentence the court imposed was
procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that
counsel inform Townsend, in writing, of the right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Townsend requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Townsend. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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