Klen v. City of Loveland, Colo.

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

PUBLISH November 15, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court

TENTH CIRCUIT

EDWARD J. KLEN, DIVERSE
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Colorado
corporation; STEPHEN J. KLEN;
HOLSTEIN SELF-SERVICE
STORAGE, LLC, organized under
Colorado law,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. Nos. 10-1311 & 10-1327

CITY OF LOVELAND, COLORADO,
a Colorado municipal corporation;
THOMAS HAWKINSON, CITY OF
LOVELAND BUILDING OFFICIAL,
in his individual and official
capacities; GREG GEORGE, CITY OF
LOVELAND, COMMUNITY
SERVICES DIRECTOR, in his
individual and official capacities;
JOHN R. DUVAL, CITY OF
LOVELAND ATTORNEY, in his
individual official capacities;
KRISTINE BURNS, CITY OF
LOVELAND BUILDING PERMIT
COORDINATOR, in her individual
and official capacities; DAVID
SPRAGUE, CITY OF LOVELAND
PLANS REVIEWER, in his individual
and official capacities; CINDY
WORAYETH, CITY OF LOVELAND
EMPLOYEE, in her individual and
official capacities,

Defendants-Appellees.
 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 1:07-CV-00347-RPM)

Submitted on the briefs: *

Michael P. Zwiebel, Springer and Steinberg, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for
Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Thomas J. Lyons, Esq., Malcolm S. Mead, Esq., Lance E. Shurtleff, Esq., Hall &
Evans, L.L.C., Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before O’BRIEN, ANDERSON, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs brought this civil rights action against the city of Loveland,

Colorado (City) and various City employees, alleging a plethora of constitutional

violations involving the defendants’ alleged imposition of deliberate delays and

unreasonable requirements for plaintiffs’ building permit; solicitation of illegal

and extortionate fees for the permit; selective prosecution for building without a

permit; use of perjury in criminal ordinance violation proceedings; retaliation for

*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

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plaintiffs’ exercise of their First Amendment rights; forgery of plaintiffs’ permit

application to facilitate a wrongful prosecution; and trespassing by a building

inspector. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

defendants on plaintiffs’ federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over their state-law claims. 1 Plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s

award of summary judgment to defendants. We affirm in part, reverse in part,

and remand. 2

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs’ claims arose out of their attempts to obtain a building permit

from the City. After the permit was delayed, plaintiffs expressed increasing

frustration with the delay by making vituperative and abusive comments to and

concerning City employees and, according to the City, by conducting illegal and

unauthorized construction without the permit. Plaintiffs contend the City

retaliated by further delaying the permit, by issuing nearly sixty unjustified

municipal citations to plaintiff Edward J. Klen (Ed Klen), by using perjury and

forgery to prosecute Ed Klen, by trespassing on plaintiffs’ work site, and by

preventing City employees from patronizing plaintiffs’ business.

1
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their Equal Protection claims, and assert
that they intended to dismiss their supplemental state law claims as well. See
Aplt. Opening Br. at 5 n.4.
2
Case No. 10-1311 was initiated by plaintiff Edward Klen’s notice of
appeal. Case No. 10-1327 was initiated by the remaining appellants. We have
consolidated these appeals for purposes of disposition.

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 1. The Anasazi Phase 2 Permit Applications

Plaintiffs Ed Klen and Stephen J. Klen are partners in plaintiff Holstein

Self-Service, LLC (Holstein). They are also shareholders in plaintiff Diverse

Construction, Inc. (Diverse). Holstein owns land in Loveland known as Anasazi

Park, which it contracted with Diverse to develop.

In 2003, plaintiffs completed construction of a commercial project in

Anasazi Park known as “Phase 1.” Early in 2004, they began the process of

obtaining City approval for a new commercial project in Anasazi Park, known as

“Phase 2.” Plaintiffs had two potential anchor tenants lined up for Phase 2:

a martial arts studio (the “Oriental School of Mudu”), and a shooting range.

Contractors who construct buildings within the City must obtain approval

for their structures. The City approves various phases of industrial construction

in incremental stages by granting permits, inspecting work performed pursuant to

these permits, and granting final approval based on successful inspection results.

The City makes available several different types of building permits with

differing requirements and different time frames for issuance. “Footing and

foundation” permits allow a builder to pour the concrete foundation and footings

for a building. “Core and shell” permits allow the builder to construct the core

and shell of the structure. “Tenant finish” permits allow completion of the

building so that it may be occupied by tenants. Finally, “special use” permits are

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used where the builder intends to use a building for a purpose not permitted by

existing zoning.

Anasazi 2 was not zoned for a martial arts studio or a firing range.

Accordingly, when plaintiffs submitted their building permit application on

July 6, 2004, they filed for both a tenant finish permit (allowing them to complete

the structure from start to finish) and a special use permit. According to

plaintiffs, defendant Thomas Hawkinson, the City’s permit coordinator, suggested

to them that things might move faster if they withdrew their application for a

tenant finish and special use permit, and simply filed instead for a core and shell

permit to get started on the building. This was because, under the City’s

municipal ordinances, plaintiffs could obtain a core and shell permit by right,

whereas the City had discretion concerning whether to issue a special use permit

and would impose strict requirements before issuing such a permit. Hawkinson’s

seemingly reasonable suggestion would lead to no end of trouble as things

progressed.

Even now, there is considerable factual disagreement between the parties

about the nature of the permit plaintiffs actually sought and the delays they

endured in obtaining it. The City contends that rather than withdrawing their

request for a special use permit, the Klens wanted both permit applications (core

and shell and special use) to proceed simultaneously. In this way, they could

obtain their special use approval quickly after they completed the core and shell

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of Anasazi 2. Following this logic, the City characterizes plaintiffs’ complaints

as only involving delays in obtaining the special use permit. It then argues that

plaintiffs have little cause for complaint about delays in receiving something to

which they were not even entitled by law. Plaintiffs respond that the delays they

are complaining about involved the core and shell permit, to which they were

entitled by law. See Aplt. Reply Br. at 6. Because there is evidence that supports

plaintiffs’ version of events sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute on this

point, see Aplt. App., Vol. 1B at 325-26; Vol. 1D at 1141, 1264, 1292, we will

assume for purposes of summary judgment analysis that it was the core and shell

permit that was delayed.

2. Permit Delays

Plaintiffs complain of unreasonable delays in obtaining their permit. It is

not entirely clear whether they attribute the initial delays to simple incompetence

or to a pre-existing malicious or discriminatory attitude toward them by the City

or its employees. See, e.g., Affidavit of James Cook, id. at 374 (“The speed and

ease with which a builder’s project and plans progressed through the permitting

process at the City of Loveland often depended on whether the builder was part of

an insider group. . . .Builders who were members of this group tended to be given

preference, better treatment, and have their problems and concerns resolved more

quickly”); Affidavit of Marlaine Maslen, id. at 378 (“The filing practices of the

City of Loveland offices were bad. Approximately 25 percent of building files

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were temporarily lost and ten percent of the plans were permanently lost”);

Second Amended Complaint, id. at 329 (alleging Cindy Worayeth with City’s

planning department “possessed a malignant animosity toward [Ed Klen] and was

resolved to harm him if possible”). As time went on, however, plaintiffs allege

that the City’s actions were motivated by animosity and a desire to retaliate

against them.

Plaintiffs allege that at the outset of the permitting process, Hawkinson and

other City officials told them that their core and shell permit would issue within

six to eight weeks. Hawkinson also stated that the footing and foundation permit,

which would allow them to get started on the building, would be easy to obtain.

Acting on this information, plaintiffs applied for and obtained a construction loan

with an envisioned construction start date of September 2004. On August 12,

2004, they resubmitted to the City their plans for a core and shell permit.

Plaintiffs began clearing the site and began preliminary work in late 2004.

Things did not go as swiftly as anticipated. On September 14, 2004, David

Sprague, a plan reviewer for the City, indicated he would not approve plaintiffs’

permit application unless they submitted mechanical, plumbing, and electrical

drawings. Plaintiffs contend this was an unreasonable requirement for approval

of their core and shell permit application because the drawings Sprague requested

could not be done until the tenant requirements were known, and thus these

requirements were part of tenant finish, not core and shell. Plaintiffs also claim

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the City’s records show that when Sprague eventually approved the plans eight

months later, he did so without the drawings.

On November 19, 2004, plaintiffs met with Hawkinson to determine when

they could expect issuance of the permit. He told them he did not see any

problems, and that they could continue doing the “dirt work” at the site for a few

days until the permit issued. Three days later, on November 22, 2004, plaintiffs

closed on the construction loan.

Plaintiffs assert that Hawkinson told them on December 1, 2004, that they

could proceed with work on the building foundation even though no permit had

yet been issued. According to two former City building inspectors who filed

affidavits on behalf of plaintiffs and plaintiff’s expert witness, the City routinely

permitted builders to begin building before they were issued permits.

3. The Stop Work Order

On December 28, 2004, despite his prior verbal approval for work to

commence, Hawkinson issued plaintiffs a stop work order (SWO). The order was

served on plaintiffs by Inspector Richard Hoskinson during a concrete pour,

which they were allowed to complete.

The next day, plaintiffs met with Hawkinson and Sprague about their

permit and the SWO. They discovered that Sprague had not finished reviewing

the plans they had submitted. When Sprague showed them the plans he had been

reviewing, Steve Klen pointed out that these were the plans with tenant finish

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submitted in July 2004. Sprague then claimed that he had never received the core

and shell plans that plaintiffs had later submitted in August 2004. The Klens

expressed frustration that Hawkinson and Sprague had not yet issued the

appropriate permit. Hawkinson then told the Klens to continue working despite

the SWO. 3

4. The “Ghost Line” Problem

In December 2004, a surveyor informed the Klens that “a ‘ghost line’

which had been added to the [Anasazi] Phase I plat at the City’s request had

somehow been transformed by Larimer County into a property line.” Aplt. App.,

Vol. 1D at 1158. Plaintiffs’ attorney Richard Ball testified that in his experience

this sort of issue has been easily resolved with the City in the past through

issuance of a memorandum of understanding that would permit work to proceed

while the plat was corrected. Plaintiffs assert that despite the City’s initial

approval of such a memorandum of understanding in early 2005, on March 19,

2005, City Attorney John Duval told Ball he was rejecting the memorandum.

On April 8, 2005, Duval told the Klens and their attorney that the plat issue

could only be resolved by obtaining affidavits of correction from all the affected

landowners. Plaintiffs resolved the plat issue on May 9, 2005, when their

3
In addition to the SWO served on December 28, 2004, the City contends
that it posted SWOs at the construction site on March 28, 29, and 30, 2005, and
on April 5, 2005.

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attorney presented Duval with thirteen affidavits of correction. Duval then

allegedly told plaintiffs they could resume work.

5. Additional Delays

In April 2005, plaintiffs allege that Sprague imposed new requirements for

issuance of their permit. Sprague told plaintiffs they would have to submit

elevations. When plaintiffs protested that they had already submitted elevations

twice before with their July and August 2004 plans, Sprague told them he needed

the documents stamped by their engineering firm. Plaintiffs contend this

requirement was bogus because elevations do not need to be prepared by an

engineer.

In May 2005, Colleen Cameron of the City Water Department told

plaintiffs they would have to resubmit the water taps on their plans to show two

three-quarter inch, rather than one, one-inch, tap. The Klens’ engineer, Jeff

Couch, told them he had never heard of such a thing and he expressed his opinion

that the City was “just plain messing with you now.” Id. at 1161. Nevertheless,

the Klens submitted new plans with the water tap changes, delivering them on

May 23, 2005, to Kristine Burns.

On May 31, 2005, Ed Klen called Colleen Cameron. She told him that she

had not yet received the plans from Burns. When Ed called Burns, she told him

she had lost the plans. According to plaintiffs, she also stated she had not

intended to call the Klens to let them know that she had lost the plans. On June 3,

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2005, Ed resubmitted the water tap plans in person. He told Burns he needed to

get them to the water department immediately. Plaintiffs allege “Burns responded

that it wasn’t her problem and [stated] maybe Ed should just quit being a builder.

Burns then turned to Ed and stated, ‘contractors are dickheads.’” Id. at 1162.

After the water department signed off on the plans, on June 13, 2005, the

Klens approached Burns again about their permit. She and Hawkinson told

plaintiffs they would have to pay capital expansion fees (CEFs). The Klens assert

that they showed Burns and Hawkinson municipal ordinances providing that CEFs

were not due until final inspection for a certificate of occupancy, which would not

be issued until the tenant finish was complete. The Klens also asked Burns to

pull up the fee schedules on her computer; she claimed that they were

unavailable.

Two days later, plaintiffs met with Duval. They contend that he told them

they had never applied for a core and shell permit, and that a footing and

foundation permit had been issued to them in January 2005. (Plaintiffs dispute

whether the footing and foundation permit was issued.) Plaintiffs then met with

Burns again. She provided them with a fee estimate that was approximately

$125,000 more than the earlier estimate that her predecessor, Worayeth, had given

them.

Plaintiffs allegedly told Burns her estimate was incorrect because she was

charging them for a commercial use, whereas the core and shell permit was an

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application for industrial use. They showed her a printout from 2004 in which the

Department had estimated a fee based on industrial use that was $125,000 less

than the one she was now quoting. Plaintiffs claim Burns then “tore up the

printout and threw the pieces, stating, ‘continue to piss me off and I’ll double

your fees . . . . Just bring your checkbook and shut up if you want your permit.”

Id. at 1163. The Klens later paid the fees (which actually were doubled) under

protest, and a permit finally issued on June 16, 2005.

6. Confrontations with City Employees

The Klens allege they confronted various City defendants on many

occasions during the permitting process between September 2004 and June 2005,

each time expressing their frustration that the appropriate permit had not yet been

issued, and at times using profane language and insults out of frustration.

Plaintiffs describe the following specific confrontations involving City

employees:

• In September 2004, Ed Klen confronted Sprague, telling him he must not
have looked at the permit application or he would have known the drawings
he was asking for were not required. He asked Sprague why he was lying
and also demanded to know “what the hell was going on” in his department.
Aplt. App., Vol. 1B at 330.

• In October 2004, Stephen Klen confronted Sprague and complained that
Sprague was “treating us like shit” and couldn’t “get [his] job done
properly.” Id., Vol. 1D at 1132 (depo. pp. 182-83). The Klens “questioned
the competence of both Sprague and Hawkinson, asking, ‘when the hell are
you going to get your shit together in this department?” Id., Vol. 1B at 331
¶ 62.

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• In a December 2004 meeting with Hawkinson and Sprague, Ed Klen asked
“[w]here is our damn permit?” Id., Vol. 1D at 1142 (depo. p. 143).

• In March 2005, the Klens met with City manager Don Williams to complain
about City Attorney John Duval and Hawkinson. During this meeting, Ed
Klen called Duval a “boob.” Id., Vol. 1C at 948 (depo. p. 121). He stated
that “Hawkinson was acting like an ‘asshole’ in running his department.”
Id., Vol. 1D at 1158-59. Williams terminated the meeting, warning them
“you’re big boys and you know what you are getting into.” Id. When they
later met with Hawkinson, he stated “so I’m an asshole, huh? We’ll see
about that.” Id. Two days later, Duval cancelled without explanation a
mandatory neighborhood meeting required for their special review permit.

• On March 19, 2005, the Klens went to the Building Division and learned
that nothing had been done on their permit application. They expressed
their disgust for the management of the division. They were immediately
called into Hawkinson’s office, where he handed Ed Klen a citation for
continuing work in violation of an SWO.

• On May 17, 2005, the Klens examined the Building Division’s printout and
came to the conclusion that it had been tampered with. They expressed
their outrage, stating “they considered this to be ‘ridiculous . . . bullshit’
and demanded to know, ‘where’s our fucking permit?’” Id., Vol. 1B at 338
¶ 115. They were then called into Hawkinson’s office, where Hawkinson
attempted to serve twenty-one citations on Ed Klen, including tickets for
working without a permit.

• On June 13, 2005, during a dispute about Capital Expansion Fees, Steve
Klen asked Hawkinson, “what kind of idiot are you, if you can’t even run
your own goddamned department?” Id., Vol. 1D at 1162. Two days later,
during a meeting with Duval, Duval told them they had “made a, ‘slap in
the face of authority,’” for which they must pay. Id.

7. Citations Issued to Ed Klen

By the time plaintiffs received their permit, the City had issued a total of

nearly sixty citations to Ed Klen for working without a permit or in violation of

the SWO. The citations often were served in large batches. Hawkinson served

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the first citation on Klen on March 29, 2005, after the Klens expressed severe

criticism of the Building Division’s management. In April, plaintiffs’ attorney

informed them that twenty more citations for working without a permit and in

violation of an SWO had been issued against Ed Klen. The attorney indicated

that these citations could be resolved if they stopped work until the plat had been

corrected. They complied, and did not return to work until May 10, 2005, after

the plat issue had been resolved.

Later in May 2005, after plaintiffs expressed outrage that City officials had

allegedly tampered with the official logs, Hawkinson called the Klens into his

office and attempted to serve twenty-one additional tickets on Ed Klen for

working without a permit. Ed refused to sign for them.

On May 23, 2005, Ed appeared in Loveland Municipal Court on the

citations issued to him thus far. The hearing was postponed and Ed attempted

unsuccessfully to reach a plea agreement with the City. On June 15, 2005, Duval

informed plaintiffs that thirteen more citations had been issued against Ed Klen.

8. Alleged Perjured Affidavit and Forged Permit Application

Plaintiffs assert that in August 2005, Duval moved to add an additional

thirty-four counts of violating a SWO to the existing citations for building

without a permit, and to join all the counts for trial. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss

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the citation proceedings for selective prosecution. They assert that in response to

their selective prosecution argument,

Duval solicited and presented to the Loveland Municipal Court a
false affidavit by Thomas Hawkinson, in which Hawkinson stated
untruthfully that he personally issued and served on Ed all the
citations, that he never gave the Klens permission to proceed, that Ed
was the only contractor ever discovered by City building officials to
be building without a permit who continued to build after a stop work
order issued, or after being verbally requested to stop work, and that
Hawkinson had repeatedly advised Ed and Steve Klen to stop
construction of the building until the permit issued.

Id. at 1164.

The Loveland Municipal Court denied Ed Klen’s motion to dismiss. He

subsequently accepted a plea bargain whereby he pleaded no contest to twenty

counts and received a deferred judgment. He was ordered to pay a $20,000 fine

plus court costs. The court imposed a one-year deferred sentence and judgment,

and Ed had his contractor’s license placed on probationary status for two years.

Plaintiffs contend that when they reviewed their file at the Building

Division in March 2006, they discovered that their permit application had been

replaced by one they had not prepared. The forged application contained

materially different information from plaintiffs’ previous applications. It showed

Ed Klen’s name as the applicant rather than Holstein’s, and was signed with the

forged signature of Ed Klen. Plaintiffs claim this was done in order to hold Ed

Klen personally liable for the work giving rise to his criminal citations.

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 9. Trespass by Hoskinson

On May 3, 2005, plaintiffs served the defendants with their notice of intent

to sue. Eight days later, a City building inspector, Richard Hoskinson, entered

the premises of Anasazi Phase 2. Hoskinson entered the premises without a

warrant or consent and without notice to plaintiffs. The Klens assert they stored

personal items and machinery, supplies and tools inside the premises. They claim

that Stephen Klen found Hoskinson eighty feet inside the building, going through

their personal items and tools. Hoskinson told the Klens that no one had sent him

and that he was just killing time. But plaintiffs allege that defendant Greg George

told them the next day that he, Duval and Hawkinson had sent Hoskinson to

conduct the inspection. Plaintiffs contend the inspection was in retaliation for

their notice of intent to sue.

10. Further Alleged Retaliation by City Employees

Plaintiffs claim that the City continued its retaliatory actions against them

for years after the permit issued. They assert that (1) Burns delayed in assigning

addresses to plaintiff’s property during 2006 and 2007; (2) Hawkinson improperly

denied them a certificate of occupancy for the property in 2008; and (3) in June

2009, when the lessee of the firing range gave up the lease and the Klens took

over the operation, Don Williams ordered Loveland police officers to stop using

the range in order to deny the Klens the City’s business.

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 ANALYSIS

1. Standard of Review

“We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same

standard as the district court . . . .” Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1215

(10th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view the record on

summary judgment in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Gwinn,

354 F.3d at 1215.

2. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Plaintiffs claim the City retaliated against them for their criticisms of

City employees by taking a variety of maliciously motivated actions against

them. 4 To successfully pursue a first amendment retaliation claim against a

defendant who is not his employer, a plaintiff must establish the following

elements:

(1) that the plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected
activity; (2) that the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff to suffer
an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from
continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) that the defendant’s

4
To the extent defendants assert that the only type of retaliation of which
plaintiffs complain is the delay in obtaining their permit, we reject that
construction of plaintiffs’ complaint. In fact, plaintiffs complain that many of the
City’s actions were retaliatory.

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 adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to the
plaintiff’s exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.

Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000).

The district court concluded plaintiffs failed to establish even the first

element of this test. It reasoned their “protestations were not public statements

and were all within the context of interactions with the defendants. That is not

protected speech.” Aplt. App., Vol. 1D at 1479. This analysis is open to at least

two interpretations: (1) the Klens’ statements weren’t constitutionally protected

because they were made privately to the defendants; or (2) their statements

weren’t constitutionally protected because they didn’t deal with matters of public

concern. Defendants opt for the latter interpretation. We agree that this is likely

the point the district court intended to make.

Thus clarified, however, the district court’s reasoning contains a legal error

that vitiates its analysis. Simply put, the Klens are private citizens, not public

employees. The “matter of public concern” requirement therefore did not apply

to them. See Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007)

(“[T]he [public concern] test quite properly applies to claims brought by

government employees--but its scope reaches no further.”).

Defendants attempt to salvage the district court’s analysis, arguing that

Van Deelen does not apply here because it involved the petition clause, not the

speech clause, of the First Amendment. See Aplee. Br. at 13. But they supply no

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principled distinction between the two clauses for purposes of determining the

scope of the public concern requirement. As Van Deelen repeatedly emphasizes,

the point of imposing a public concern requirement on the speech of government

employees is that the government has a “need to maintain an efficient workplace

in aid of the public’s business.” Van Deelen, 497 F.3d at 1156. This rationale

applies as much to speech as it does to petitions for redress of grievances. See

Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011) (“The substantial

government interests that justify a cautious and restrained approach to the

protection of speech by public employees are just as relevant when public

employees proceed under the Petition Clause. Petitions, no less than speech, can

interfere with the efficient and effective operation of government.”). But this

rationale does not apply to private individuals like the Klens.

Moreover, Van Deelen’s analysis draws no limiting distinction between the

right to petition and the right to speak. Its analysis is deeply rooted in the context

of First Amendment speech. For example, Van Deelen borrows its First

Amendment retaliation test from Worrell, a case that involved alleged retaliation

for testimony in court rather than for a petition addressed to the government.

See Van Deelen, 497 F.3d at 1155-56; Worrell, 219 F.3d at 1200. Van Deelen’s

discussion of the “public concern” requirement centers on Pickering v. Board of

Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), a case involving public employee speech rather

than petition rights. See Van Deelen, 497 F.3d at 1156. Van Deelen emphasizes

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a broad “public employee” rationale for the “public concern” test, noting that

“every case discussing the public concern test in the Supreme Court has made

pellucid that it applies only to public employees.” Id. at 1158.

Finally, it would be an odd thing to determine that private persons can

freely petition the government concerning matters both public and private without

fear of retaliation, but they cannot express an opinion on purely private matters in

the course of their dealings with government employees with the same assurance

of constitutional protection. We conclude that Van Deelen and the line of

authority on which it relies apply here, and that plaintiffs’ speech was not robbed

of constitutional protection even if it involved only matters of private concern.

Alternatively, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ speech deserved no

constitutional protection because it was analogous to the “fighting words” denied

First Amendment protection in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568

(1942). In Chaplinsky, the appellant called a city official “a God damned

racketeer” and a “damned Fascist.” Id. at 569. He was convicted of violating an

ordinance prohibiting persons from, among other things, addressing “any

offensive, derisive or annoying word” to another person, or calling him “by any

offensive or derisive name” with the intention to “deride, offend or annoy him,

or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation.” Id.

(quotation omitted). The Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s claim of First

Amendment protection, reasoning that “free speech is not absolute at all times

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and under all circumstances” and that the First Amendment does not protect

“‘fighting’ words--those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to

incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Id. at 571-72.

More recently, we have explained that “fighting words” are “epithets

(1) directed at the person of the hearer, (2) inherently likely to cause a violent

reaction, and (3) playing no role in the expression of ideas.” Cannon v. City &

Cnty. of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 873 (10th Cir. 1993). Given this standard, most if

not all of the Klens’ offensive epithets were not fighting words, because they did

express ideas--chiefly that City building department officials were incompetent

and were taking too long in processing plaintiffs’ application for a building

permit. Additionally, the words used by the Klens, objectively speaking, were

also not those “likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby

cause a breach of the peace,” Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573-74, particularly given

the circumstances in which they were uttered.

Although the Klens used less-than-polite epithets in delivering their

message, and occasionally even employed insulting terms to describe City

officials, there is no indication that their words were accompanied by provocative

gestures or threats. Nor did their use of vulgar or offensive language necessarily

make their outbursts “fighting words.” See Lewis v. City of New Orleans,

415 U.S. 130, 134 (1974). Words may convey anger and frustration without

being likely to provoke a violent reaction. Id. at 135 (Powell, J., concurring).

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 Moreover, the context in which words were delivered is key in determining

whether they would be viewed as a constitutionally-protected expression of

opinion, as opposed to fighting words. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,

402 n.4 (1992) (White, J., concurring). As we will explain, some employees did

not consider the Klens’ behavior particularly shocking or memorable, given the

rough-and-tumble world of the construction trade.

Certainly, words that constitute a “direct personal insult or an invitation to

exchange fisticuffs” can be considered fighting words. Texas v. Johnson,

491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989). But here, the personal insults were either relatively

mild (calling Duval a “boob” and Hawkinson an “idiot”), or voiced when the

targets were not present (referring to Hawkinson as an “asshole”).

There is also no indication in the record that the hearers of the Klens’

epithets were incited to a breach of the peace. The reaction of actual hearers of

the words constitutes significant probative evidence concerning whether the

speech was inherently likely to cause a violent reaction. See, e.g., Cohen v.

California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (“There is . . . no showing that anyone who

saw Cohen [wearing a jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft”] was in fact

violently aroused or that [Cohen] intended such a result”). Cynthia Worayeth, for

example, testified that she had no memory of the Klens behaving inappropriately.

She remembered that Ed Klen had been upset at times, but felt that “it’s always

-22-
been able to be resolved.” Aplt. App., Vol. 1C at 902 (depo. p. 233). She simply

noted that contractors “occasionally” get angry. Id.

Kristine Burns testified that she herself sometimes lost her temper with

contractors and was profane with them. She didn’t consider the Klens

particularly difficult to deal with. She did note that City employees became

“frustrated” with the Klens because the Klens “criticized everyone’s job

performance.” Id. at 910 (depo. pp. 62-63).

Others were offended, at least, by the Klens’ remarks. But there is no

indication they were incited to immediate violence. 5 After a particularly

contentious exchange, Don Williams told the Klens that they were big boys and

knew what they were getting into. Tom Hawkinson responded to an insult by

saying, “so I’m an asshole, huh? We’ll see about that.” Aplt. App., Vol. 1D

at 1159.

In sum, we cannot conclude on this record that the Klens’ statements,

however offensive, were “inherently likely to cause a violent reaction,” or

“play[ed] no role in the expression of ideas.” Cannon, 998 F.2d at 873. They

were not “fighting words” denied First Amendment protection.

5
Mere offense, even if objectively justified, cannot be a sufficient basis for
establishing fighting words. One does not usually retaliate unless offended. So if
mere offense were enough to demonstrate the existence of fighting words
Chaplinsky would arguably swallow the whole tort of First Amendment
retaliation.

-23-
 As a final fallback argument, defendants argue they are entitled to qualified

immunity as to this claim, because “it was not clearly established in 2004-2005

that speech (as opposed to petition) addressing a private matter is protected by the

First Amendment.” Aplee. Br. at 47. “Qualified immunity protects governmental

officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir.) (quotation

omitted), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 7 (2010). “Ordinarily, in order for the law to be

clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on

point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have

found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Zia Trust Co. ex rel. Causey v.

Montoya, 597 F.3d 1150, 1155 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). Although

there does not need to be a “prior case[ ] with precisely the same facts,” Pierce v.

Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004), “[o]ur inquiry . . . must be

undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition,” Bowling v. Rector, 584 F.3d 956, 964 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The pertinent question is “whether it would be clear to

a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

We reject defendants’ qualified immunity argument concerning this claim.

In Van Deelen, we made it clear, citing pre-2004 cases related to speech, that

-24-
“every case discussing the public concern test in the Supreme Court has made

pellucid that it applies only to public employees.” Van Deelen, 497 F.3d at 1158.

Thus, it was clearly established prior to the conduct in question in this case that

non-employee speech addressing a private matter was protected by the First

Amendment.

The district court considered only the first element of the test for plaintiffs’

First Amendment retaliation claim. Because we cannot agree with its analysis as

to that element, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on the retaliation

claim. We express no opinion concerning the remaining elements of this claim.

3. Substantive Due Process Claim

Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim has expanded over time. In their

Second Amended Verified Complaint (SAVC), plaintiffs charged that the

defendants “engaged in a continuous campaign of harassment, deceit, and delay

against the Klens, intended to injure Ed and Steve Klen and their associates in a

way unjustifiable by any government interest.” Aplt. App., Vol. 1B at 351 ¶ 186.

But the only specific adverse action alleged in the SAVC as part of the due

process claim involved the City’s delay in issuing plaintiffs a permit. See id.,

¶ 188. By the time of their summary judgment response, the claim had become

something of a kitchen sink, containing many if not most of plaintiffs’ grievances

-25-
against defendants. 6 Even now, the parties cannot exactly agree on what this

claim is about. In their opening brief, plaintiffs summarize the factual basis for

their claim as follows:

[T]he defendants . . . engaged in a course of conduct that included
unjustified delay in issuing the building permit, overcharging for and
illegally collecting fees, an unprecedented issuance of criminal
citations after officials had induced plaintiffs to engage in the
conduct charged, demands for unnecessary documentation,
obstruction of normal avenues for resolution of the plat issue, and
forgery of the plaintiffs’ building application.

Aplt. Opening Br. at 38.

6
In addition to complaints about delays in issuance of the permit, plaintiffs
complained that they were compelled to pay Capital Expansion Fees long before
they were due, Aplt. App., Vol. 1D at 1088; that Hawkinson issued citations to Ed
Klen when he was unauthorized to do so, and that he was instructed to do so by
Duval, id. at 1089, 1092; that Hawkinson falsely swore that the Klens had worked
on days when they had not, and falsely swore that he had personally served the
citations on Ed Klen, id. at 1089; that Hawkinson deliberately “posted” SWOs on
the property rather than serving them as required, so that he could claim a
violation when Ed did not know about the SWOs, id.; that other contractors were
permitted to build without a permit, while Ed Klen was prosecuted for doing so,
id.; that Ed was prosecuted for violating a stop work order even after Hawkinson
effectively rescinded the order, id. at 1090; that Hawkinson attempted to force the
Klens to cede their right to resist unauthorized inspections and to strip the
Construction Advisory Board of its right to decide issues involving building
codes, id. at 1091; that Duval refused to resolve the plat issue, id.; that Duval
cancelled a neighborhood meeting in retaliation for the Klens’ complaints, id. at
1092; that Duval wrongfully prosecuted Ed Klen based on invalid citations,
invalid SWOs, and a forged permit application, id. at 1093; that Duval attempted
to block plaintiffs’ resort to the CAB and City Council, id.; and that City manager
Don Williams conducted a “campaign of retaliation against the plaintiffs,” id. at
1094.

-26-
 Defendants, however, identify a different (but somewhat overlapping)

pentacle of bad acts that they assert forms the framework for plaintiffs’

substantive due process claim: (1) the delay in issuing their building permit;

(2) Hawkinson’s actions in first approving construction without a permit, then

issuing a stop work order; (3) alleged forgery of the second application for a

building permit; (4) the fraudulent affidavit submitted during the prosecution of

Ed Klen; and (5) Hoskinson’s trespass on their property. See Aplee. Br. at 24-26.

In assessing whether the defendants’ actions “shocked the conscience” and

thereby were sufficiently serious to give rise to a substantive due process claim,

see County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-50 (1998), we find it

appropriate to consider both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ litany of bad acts.

The district court concluded that defendants should be granted summary

judgment on this claim because plaintiffs failed to create a genuine issue of

material fact concerning whether defendants’ actions were “motivated by malice

or ill will directed toward the plaintiffs.” Aplt. App., Vol. 1D at 1475.

Defendants argue that plaintiffs had no property interest in the building permit

and that their alleged actions do not rise to the level of conscience-shocking

behavior.

The “property interest” argument raises difficult factual issues involving

the nature of the permit sought and delayed in this case (“core and shell” vs.

-27-
“special use permit”). Accordingly, it is not an appropriate basis for affirmance

of the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to this claim.

Defendants’ second argument has more merit. “[T]he due process clause is

not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised government decisions.” Camuglia

v. City of Albuquerque, 448 F.3d 1214, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation

omitted). An arbitrary deprivation of a property right may violate the substantive

component of the Due Process Clause if the arbitrariness is extreme. See id.

“The plaintiff must demonstrate a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of

potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). A high level of outrageousness is required. See id. at 1223. As

this court has stated:

The ultimate standard for determining whether there has been a
substantive due process violation is whether the challenged
government action shocks the conscience of federal judges. It is well
settled that negligence is not sufficient to shock the conscience. In
addition, a plaintiff must do more than show that the government
actor intentionally or recklessly caused injury to the plaintiff by
abusing or misusing government power.

See id. at 1222 (internal quotation marks omitted). These limits reflect the need

to restrict the scope of substantive due process claims, the concern that § 1983 not

replace state tort law, and the need to give deference to local policymaking

bodies’ decisions relating to public safety. See id. at 1223.

Considered in light of the above standards, we conclude that the

adverse actions of which plaintiffs complain do not rise to the level of

-28-
conscience-shocking behavior. Many of their complaints “are examples of the

kind of disagreement that is frequent in planning disputes.” Eichenlaub v. Twp.

of Ind., 385 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2004) (affirming district court’s dismissal of

substantive due process claim which alleged “that zoning officials applied

subdivision requirements to [plaintiffs’] property that were not applied to other

parcels; that they pursued unannounced and unnecessary inspection and

enforcement actions; that they delayed certain permits and approvals; that they

improperly increased tax assessments; and that they maligned and muzzled the

[plaintiffs’ exercise of their First Amendment rights]”).

Plaintiffs also allege that defendants employed fraud and forgery in

connection with the prosecution of Ed Klen. We deal with this claim separately

as a freestanding due process claim, infra. But to the extent Ed Klen seeks to

advance a substantive due process claim based on defendants’ conduct resulting

in his guilty plea, we conclude that the alleged deprivations (payment of a fine

and certain minimal restrictions imposed under the plea agreement) do not

constitute “affronts to personal autonomy” sufficient to invoke a substantive due

process remedy. Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 922-23 (10th Cir. 2007).

4. Fourth Amendment Claim

Plaintiffs complain that defendants George, Hawkinson and Duval violated

the Fourth Amendment by ordering Hoskinson to conduct an unauthorized

“special inspection” of the Anasazi Phase 2 premises to determine whether

-29-
unauthorized construction was going on. The district court concluded that “[t]o

the extent that the plaintiffs contend that Hoskinson’s entry onto the property was

an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the facts do not support

the claimed violation even if it is shown that Hawkinson directed the inspection.”

Aplt. App., Vol. 1D at 1477. The district court did not describe the facts on

which it relied, however, or why they did not support the claimed Fourth

Amendment violation.

Defendants argue that summary judgment should be affirmed because “a

trespass to property, negligent or intentional, is a common law tort; it does not

infringe the federal constitution.” Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1335 (10th Cir.

1981). In Wise, the plaintiff evoked only the common-law tort of trespass as the

basis for his § 1983 suit and there is no indication he sought to advance a Fourth

Amendment claim. Wise certainly should not be read to stand for the proposition

that a trespass cannot give rise to a claim under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g.,

Reeves v. Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Of course, a police

officer’s mere entry or trespass into a home without consent is enough to

constitute a search, often referred to in the case law as an ‘unlawful entry.’”).

While not every common-law trespass (into an open field, for example)

violates the Fourth Amendment, a Fourth Amendment violation may be shown if

the alleged trespass violated the plaintiff’s “constitutionally protected reasonable

expectation of privacy.” United States v. Hatfield, 333 F.3d 1189, 1195 (10th Cir.

-30-
2003) (quotation omitted). The threshold issue is thus whether plaintiffs had such

a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises of Anasazi Phase 2 searched

by Hoskinson.

The defendants characterize the premises invaded as “the ‘core and shell’

of an unfinished commercial building,” Aplee. Br. at 28, implying that plaintiffs

had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises searched. Plaintiffs,

while not denying the unfinished nature of the structure, stress the fact that “the

Klens used the premises to store their wallets, briefcases and other personal

belongings, and had installed doors and windows in order to secure the premises,”

Aplt. Opening Br. at 44-45. Plaintiffs do not argue that defendants knew they

used Anasazi Phase 2 for storage purposes before dispatching Hoskinson to

conduct the inspection.

Although plaintiffs correctly argue that “[t]he Fourth Amendment protects

an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in commercial premises,”

United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 536 (10th Cir. 1994), it is also true that “there

is a lesser expectation of privacy in commercial as contrasted with residential

buildings,” id. An unfinished commercial building, such as the premises in

question here, arguably affords even less of a reasonable expectation of privacy

than the typical commercial premises.

That said, plaintiffs appear to have shown enough evidence of a Fourth

Amendment violation to survive summary judgment on the question of whether

-31-
defendants violated the constitution. But the individual defendants also argue that

they are entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim, and we agree. Plaintiffs

have failed to show at the time defendants ordered Hoskinson to conduct an

inspection of Anasazi Phase 2 that it was clearly established that this type of

impromptu inspection of an unfinished commercial building, still under

construction, violated their Fourth Amendment rights. 7 The individual defendants

are therefore entitled to qualified immunity and we thus affirm the entry of

summary judgment in their favor on this claim.

Plaintiffs also argue that the City is liable for the Fourth Amendment

violation, because Hawkinson ordered the trespass in his capacity as

decision-maker for the City, and George ratified it in his capacity as the City’s

Director of Community Services. A finding of qualified immunity in favor of city

employees based on the lack of clearly established law does not shelter the city

itself from liability. See Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 419 n.8

(10th Cir. 2004). Here, the district court only addressed the City’s liability for

plaintiffs’ claims involving delay, finding that “the delay in this case was so

different from what the Klens would expect from past experience of them and

7
In support of their Fourth Amendment argument, plaintiffs cite Mimics, Inc.
v. Village of Angel Fire, 394 F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 2005). But in that case the
warrantless inspection was made of the office of a corporation located in an
existing condominium complex, not an unfinished commercial building site as in
this case.

-32-
others that it can only be explained by [Hawkinson’s] intent to harm the

plaintiffs’ business. That defeats the claim against the City.” Aplt. App.,

Vol. 1D at 1476. The district court did not discuss whether the City could be

liable for the alleged Fourth Amendment violation resulting from Hoskinson’s

trespass under a theory that Hawkinson was the City’s policymaker or that George

ratified his actions. This was appropriate because the district court found no

Fourth Amendment violation. See id. at 1477. Because we conclude, however,

that plaintiffs have produced sufficient evidence of a Fourth Amendment violation

to survive summary judgment, we reverse summary judgment in favor of the City

and remand for further proceedings as to this claim.

5. Due Process Claim Based on False Evidence

Plaintiffs complain that “Hawkinson, with Duval’s help, drafted and

presented an affidavit that falsely claimed that no one had ever been permitted to

proceed with construction after issuance of [a] SWO.” Aplt. Opening Br.

at 45-46. They also complain that Burns and others “forged the building permit

application so as to substitute Ed Klen’s name for that of the corporations, an act

which identified Ed Klen as personally responsible for the construction, thus

facilitating the personal prosecution of Ed Klen[.]” Id. at 46. This use of false

evidence, they assert, violated Ed Klen’s right to due process, providing him with

§ 1983 claims against defendants.

-33-
 We agree with the district court that Duval, who is alleged only to have

assisted with the preparation and presentation in judicial proceedings of an

affidavit signed by Hawkinson, has prosecutorial immunity concerning this claim.

See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997). We consider it only as it

relates to the other defendants named in plaintiffs’ complaint.

Defendants argue that Ed Klen’s § 1983 claims based on the use of false or

forged evidence are barred because his underlying conviction has not been

“reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a

state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a

federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477, 487 (1994). Plaintiffs respond that Heck does not apply because “a

petitioner who has no available remedy in habeas, through no lack of diligence on

his part, is not barred by Heck from pursuing a § 1983 claim.” Cohen v.

Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 1317 (10th Cir. 2010). They assert that Ed Klen was

never in custody and only paid a fine, and therefore never had an available

remedy through habeas corpus, making Heck inapplicable. See, e.g., Mays v.

Dinwiddie, 580 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he payment of . . . a fine,

absent more, is not the sort of significant restraint on liberty contemplated in the

custody requirement of the federal habeas statutes” (quotation omitted)).

The Heck issue is slightly more complicated than plaintiffs suggest.

While Ed Klen paid a fine, he also received a deferred judgment and sentence that

-34-
required him to “keep the Court advised of his current business and residential

addresses and telephone numbers” and to “commit no other violations of Title 15

of the Loveland Municipal Code during the deferred period.” Aplt. App., Vol. 1C

at 1057. In the event of a breach of any of these conditions, the Loveland

Municipal Court was empowered to enter judgment and impose sentence on his

no-contest pleas. Id. According to plaintiffs, such a sentence could include

incarceration of up to one year on each count. As Ed Klen described his

sentence, he

entered into a plea agreement and stipulation regarding his
contractor’s license under which he would plead ‘no contest’ to ten
counts of Building Without a Permit, ten counts of Violation of a
Stop Work Order, pay a $20,000.00 fine and court costs, enter into a
one-year deferred sentence and judgment, and have his contractor’s
license placed on probationary status for two years.

Id., Vol. 1D at 1164.

While “[a] prisoner need not be incarcerated to satisfy the custody

requirement,” Mays, 580 F.3d at 1139, he must still at least be subject to

“restraints and conditions” that significantly restrain his liberty before a habeas

remedy is available to him, id. While the restrictions imposed on Ed Klen as a

result of his plea required him to do more than pay a fine, they do not appear to

qualify as a significant restraint on his liberty sufficient to permit him to invoke a

habeas remedy. Thus, his § 1983 claims concerning his conviction are not barred

by Heck. Accordingly, we will proceed to the merits of these claims.

-35-
 The district court granted defendants summary judgment on the false

affidavit claim because “there [was] no causal connection between [the] affidavit

and the outcome of the prosecution.” Aplt. App., Vol. 1D at 1477. It reasoned

that the affidavit “was relevant to the selective prosecution defense but not to the

merits of the case which Ed Klen did not contest by proceeding to trial.” Id.

First, we cannot agree that a defendant’s remedy under § 1983 for denial of due

process based on the use of false evidence extends only to evidence presented as

part of the prosecution’s case at trial. Use of an indictment based on perjured

testimony to bring charges, for example, itself represents a denial of due process.

Anderson v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corrs., 462 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2006).

Here, use of a perjured affidavit to defeat a defendant’s attempt to dismiss an

indictment on grounds of selective prosecution could also conceivably represent a

denial of due process, notwithstanding the lack of a subsequent trial.

Second, Klen’s no-contest plea did not preclude his claim about the use of

false evidence. While as a general matter a guilty plea waives all

nonjurisdictional challenges to a conviction, the preclusive effect of the plea in

subsequent § 1983 proceedings is to be determined case-by-case under state law.

See Slayton v. Willingham, 726 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying

Oklahoma law on preclusive effect of guilty pleas in § 1983 case). Under

Colorado law, a no-contest plea, unlike a guilty plea, does not estop the defendant

from denying fault in a later civil action. See Allen v. Martin, 203 P.3d 546,

-36-
561-62 (Colo. App. 2008). In any event, there is no indication that Ed Klen

admitted as part of the plea proceedings in municipal court that the allegedly

perjured affidavit concerning selective prosecution contained only true statements

or that he conceded as a factual matter that the prosecution had not been brought

in an unconstitutionally selective manner. Such issues were collateral to the

question of his guilt of the offenses to which he pleaded, and therefore were not

waived a fortiori by the entry of his no-contest plea. We therefore conclude that

Ed Klen’s no contest plea does not foreclose his due process challenge to the

knowing use of a perjured affidavit to defeat his defense of selective prosecution.

As a factual matter, we also cannot agree with the district court’s

conclusion that there was no causal connection between the affidavit and the

outcome of the prosecution. It is not possible to determine on this record

whether, absent the affidavit, the state municipal court would have dismissed the

prosecution against Ed Klen, obviating the need for a no contest plea to avoid the

possibility of a trial and even of jail time for the offenses. We therefore reverse

summary judgment as to this claim.

As for plaintiffs’ other assertion, that Burns and others forged the building

permit application to substitute Ed Klen’s name for that of the corporations in

order to facilitate his prosecution, the record contains nothing but speculation to

support this assertion. The district court therefore properly granted summary

judgment as to this claim.

-37-
 CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in

part, and REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

-38-
10-1311 & 10-1327, Klen, et al. v. City of Loveland, et al.

O’BRIEN, J. Concurring.

I join the court’s very able opinion. I write separately only to expand upon

the discussion of one issue.

The majority says “We agree with the district court that Duval, who is

alleged only to have assisted with the preparation and presentation in judicial

proceedings of an affidavit signed by Hawkinson, has prosecutorial immunity

concerning this claim. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997).”

Majority Op. at 33. I wholeheartedly agree, but think a more fulsome discussion

of absolute prosecutorial immunity is in order.

In Kalina v. Fletcher the prosecutor, Kalina, was seeking a warrant for the

arrest of Fletcher. Among other documents she filed with the court was a

certificate summarizing the evidence against Fletcher; she personally attested to

the truth of those summarized facts. Based on those facts a judge found probable

cause and issued the requested warrant. Fletcher was arrested and jailed for a

day. The charges against him were dismissed a month later. As it turned out

some of the certified facts were either not true or not entirely true. After the

charges against him were dismissed Fletcher brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action

against Kalina seeking damages for her part in violating his constitutional right to

be free from unreasonable seizures. The issue before the Supreme Court was

whether Kalina was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity, which would
completely insulate her not only from liability for her part in Fletcher’s improper

arrest and incarceration but from even being subject to suit.

The court traced the history and reasons for absolute prosecutorial

immunity and summarized:

These cases make it clear that the absolute immunity that protects the
prosecutor’s role as an advocate is not grounded in any special
“esteem for those who perform these functions, and certainly not
from a desire to shield abuses of office, but because any lesser
degree of immunity could impair the judicial process itself.” Malley
[v. Briggs], 475 U.S. [335,] 342, 106 S.Ct. [1092,] 1097 [(1986)].
Thus, in determining immunity, we examine “the nature of the
function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.”
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 108 S.Ct. 538, 545,
98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988).

Kalina, 522 U.S. at 127.

It then addressed Kalina’s situation, saying:

[Kalina’s] activities in connection with the preparation and filing of
two of the three charging documents-the information and the motion
for an arrest warrant-are protected by absolute immunity. Indeed,
except for her act in personally attesting to the truth of the averments
in the certification, it seems equally clear that the preparation and
filing of the third document in the package [the affidavit of probable
cause] was part of the advocate’s function as well. The critical
question, however, is whether she was acting as a complaining
witness rather than a lawyer when she executed the certification
“[u]nder penalty of perjury.”

Id. at 129.

Because Kalina was acting as a complaining witness, rather than an

advocate in an active case, the Supreme Court concluded she was not entitled to

-2-
absolute immunity. Of course, she would still be free to argue for qualified

immunity.

We confronted a slightly different claim of absolute immunity in Mink v.

Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2007). In that case Mink sued, among others,

a deputy district attorney who, pursuant to statute, reviewed an affidavit for a

search warrant prepared by an investigating officer before it was presented to

a judge. Relying on the affidavit the officer obtained a warrant, which

unconstitutionally permitted a search of Mink’s home and computer. In

considering the deputy D.A.’s claim to absolute immunity we reviewed and

summarized the applicable law as follows:

[A] prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for those actions that
cast him in the role of an advocate initiating and presenting the
government’s case. Absolute immunity, however, does not extend to
those actions that are investigative or administrative in nature,
including the provision of legal advice outside the setting of a
prosecution. See Imbler [v. Pachtman], 424 U.S. [409,] 430-31,
96 S.Ct. 984; Burns [v. Reed], 500 U.S. [478,] 486, 493-94,
111 S. Ct. 1934 [(1991)].

Mink, 482 F.3d at 1261-62.

We concluded the deputy D.A. was not entitled to absolute immunity

because her role in giving advice to the police (passing on the form and substance

of the affidavit) was unquestionably that of a lawyer, but was not part of an active

prosecutorial function:

Under the Supreme Court’s functional approach, we look to which
role the prosecutor is performing-advocate or investigator. Here, the

-3-
 review of the affidavit squarely falls on the side of investigatory
legal advice, and not advocacy before a judicial body. The deputy
district attorney played no role in preparing the affidavit, nor was she
involved in preparing, analyzing, and presenting pleadings to a court.
If she were, this would be quite a different case.

Id. at 1262 (emphasis added). We did not speak to qualified immunity as that

issue was not part of the appeal.

This is that “quite different” case alluded to in Mink. Ed Klen moved to

dismiss a pending criminal case against him. In opposing the motion to dismiss

Duval presented to the court (and allegedly assisted in drafting) an affidavit

signed by Thomas Hawkinson. His acts were clearly those of an advocate in an

active case. He is entitled to absolute immunity.

-4-