Abulashvili v. Attorney General of the United States

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________

Nos. 08-2756 & 09-2560
_____________

VASIL ABULASHVILI & TEONA KLIBADZE
Petitioners
v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA Nos. A98-769-333 & A98-769-334)
(U.S. Immigration Judge: The Honorable Annie S. Garcy)

Argued February 28, 2011

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, Circuit Judge,
and CHAGARES, Circuit Judge

(Opinion Filed: November 15, 2011)

Jon Landau (argued)
Baumann, Landau & Simon
510 Walnut Street, Suite 1340
Philadelphia, PA 19106

Michael P. DiRaimondo
DiRaimondo & Masi LLP
401 Broadhollow Road, Suite 302
Melville, NY 11747

Attorney for Petitioners

1
Lindsay B. Glauner (argued)
Thomas W. Hussey
Ari Nazarov
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044

Attorneys for Respondent

OPINION

McKEE, Chief Judge.

Petitioners Vasil Abulashvili and Teona Klibadze seek review
of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing their
application for withholding of removal and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) and an order of the BIA
denying their motion to reopen. For the reasons explained below,
we hold that the BIA erred in dismissing the Petitioners‟ application
for asylum because the agency‟s adverse credibility determination is
not supported by substantial evidence. We also hold that the BIA
abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen. Finally, we
hold that Petitioners‟ due process rights were violated when
Immigration Judge Annie S. Garcy completely took over the cross-
examination for government‟s counsel, and thereby ceased
functioning as a neutral arbiter. We will therefore grant the petition
for review, vacate the BIA‟s orders, and remand the case to the BIA
for further proceedings.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

Vasil Abulashvili and his wife, Teona Klibadze, are citizens
of Georgia, a former U.S.S.R. republic. They entered the United
States on visitor visas in 1999 and remained longer than authorized.
On December 20, 2004, Abulashvili filed an affirmative application
for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.
Klibadze was included in the application as a derivative beneficiary

2
of Abulashvili's asylum claim.1 Abulashvili was thereafter placed
in removal proceedings, where he renewed and updated his
application for asylum.
A. Asylum Application

In his asylum application, Abulashvili claimed that he had
been persecuted in Georgia on account of his membership in the
opposition Labor Party of Georgia (“LPG”). He explained that his
troubles began in September of 1998, when the passenger minibus
he was driving was flagged down by some armed men at the side of
the road. He asserted that one of the men said that his car had
broken down and asked that he and his passenger be taken to the
home of Koba Buchukuri, the head of the Dusheti district.
Abulashvili believed that the passenger of the car was a foreigner,
and that the driver was his interpreter. Abulashvili claimed that he
had no choice but to comply because the interpreter appeared visibly
afraid of the foreigner and told Abulashvili that the foreigner was a
“real crook.” (A.R. 347). Both individuals got into Abulashvili‟s
minibus.

Abulashvili stated that he drove the foreigner and his
interpreter to Buchukuri‟s mansion, where Abulashvili waited (as
requested) until they returned from their meeting. He claimed that,
as he waited, he photographed two individuals leaving the mansion.
Abulashvili stated in his application that he had heard that
Buchukuri and his wife Martina Moldinin, who was a member of the
Georgian Parliament, were corrupt and he wanted to record who had
been in the mansion.

Abulashvili stated that the foreigner and his interpreter
returned from the meeting together with a man of Chechen descent.2
As Abulashvili resumed driving, he heard the Chechen and the
foreigner conversing in Arabic. Abulashvili stated that, at some
point during the conversation, the foreigner pulled out a gun and
began threatening the Chechen, causing the other passengers to
panic. Abulashvili stopped the minibus at that point and several
passengers jumped out. Abulashvili claimed that the foreigner then

1
Because Abulashvili is the lead petitioner and Klibadze is
only seeking coverage as a dependent spouse, we will use
Abulashvili‟s name alone when referring to the petitioners.
2
Abulashvili claimed that he also picked up additional
passengers en route to Akhmeta.
3
fired several shots at the Chechen, who fled the scene. One of the
shots hit an 18-year- old female passenger.

According to the asylum application, Abulashvili drove the
bleeding girl to a nearby hospital in Akhmeta. The interpreter
accompanied Abulashvili to the hospital, and told Abulashvili that
he would not testify about the shooting because Buchukuri and other
members of the government were likely involved and he was
worried about his safety. Abulashvili asserted that the girl never
regained consciousness and later died in the hospital.

Abulashvili also claimed that when police subsequently
questioned him about the shooting, he explained what had happened
but did not reveal that he had taken photographs while waiting
outside Buchukuri‟s home. Abulashvili was held in the police
station overnight and, upon his release, the police chief warned him
that he should forget everything that had happened.

According to the asylum application, Abulashvili gave the
film containing the pictures he had taken outside of Buchukuri‟s
home to the LPG Chairman, Shalva Natelashvili. Shortly afterward,
an unknown individual called Abulashvili, questioned his visit to the
LPG office, and urged him to mind his own business. The
application also noted that the police stopped Abulashvili on October
6, 1998 while he was driving his minibus route and interrogated him
about his visit to the LPG office. Abulashvili stated that during the
ensuing detention, officers held him upside down, beat him, and
threatened to kill him if he revealed what had happened during the
September 1998 incident. He was released three days later.

Abulashvili claimed that he moved out of his apartment after
his arrest because he feared that the police would continue to harass
him. Abulashvili also asserted that in March of 1999 the Ministry of
State Security came to his former apartment and arrested Guram
Kraveishvili, Abulashvili‟s former roommate and fellow LPG
member.3 Abulashvili alleged that members of the militia demanded
that Kraveishvili tell them about Abulashvili‟s whereabouts, and that
they beat Kraveishvili when he refused to reveal any information.

3
As will be explained later in our opinion, Kraveishvili‟s last
name has also been spelled as “Kravia Shvili” in the record.
4
 Three months later, on June 5, 1999, Abulashvili married
Klibadze. On the day of their wedding, Abulashvili claimed that he
spotted the interpreter who had been in his minibus during the
September 1998 shooting. The asylum application also states that
the interpreter and another man tracked Abulashvili down six weeks
after the wedding. They threatened to inform the police about
Abulashvili‟s whereabouts unless he gave them $10,000. According
to the application, the men beat Abulashvili severely after he told
them he could not pay that amount of money.

Abulashvili claimed that he later learned from a television
news report that his former roommate (Kraveishvili) had been found
dead. Upon hearing this news, Abulashvili decided to leave Georgia
permanently because it was no longer safe for him or his wife to
remain there. They left the country on August 20, 1999.
B. Proceedings Before Immigration Judge

On March 24, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings against Abulashvili for
remaining in the United States without proper authorization. At a
hearing before an Immigration Judge, Abulashvili conceded the
charge of removability, but argued that he was entitled to relief
based upon past persecution and fear of future persecution on
account of his membership in the LPG opposition party, and his
knowledge of government corruption as determined from the events
in September 1998. Abulashvili testified that he had a close
association with the LPG party. He also claimed that he had been
involved in recruiting for the LPG and that the party had helped him
establish his minibus service. He stated that his father had been an
active LPG member and had experienced trouble with government
officials. Abulashvili testified further that he believed that he would
be harassed by those who had created problems for his father,
including Koba Buchukuri, the once-head of the Dusheti district who
was now the governor of Mtskheta-Tianeti. Abulashvili stated that
he feared that he would lose his life as well as his family if he
returned to Georgia.

On cross-examination, an attorney for the government who
had not been present at the first merits hearing began questioning
Abulashvili.4 That attorney was apparently not familiar with the

4
The first merits hearing took place on May 4, 2006 but did
not resume until August 15, 2006. An Assistant Chief
5
record and woefully unprepared. He therefore confined his
questioning to the number of times Abulashvili had been stopped by
the police while living in the United States. A few minutes into the
questioning, the IJ took over the cross-examination after determining
that the government‟s attorney was not prepared.
C. The Immigration Judge’s Decision

The IJ denied Abulashvili‟s asylum application on August 15,
2006. She determined that the application was untimely and that
Abulashvili had failed to demonstrate that he qualified for an
exception to the time limitation. The IJ further held that even if
Abulashvili had timely filed the application, he was still ineligible
for relief because his claims were not credible. The IJ defended her
decision to take over Abulashvili‟s cross-examination by noting that
the government‟s attorney had not been prepared. She explained
that “[t]he Court is certain that in order to afford the respondent with
due process and an opportunity to explain why his testimony in
Court is different from his written application, someone needed to
ask the respondent about it.” (A.R. 89).

Abulashvili appealed to the BIA, challenging the IJ‟s adverse
credibility finding and contending that the IJ‟s role in questioning
him violated his due process right to a neutral arbiter. The BIA
dismissed the appeal on May 30, 2008. Like the IJ, the BIA was
troubled that Abulashvili‟s asylum application did not claim that the
root of his problems in Georgia could have been due to his father‟s
political activism. The BIA also rejected Abulashvili‟s claim that
his due process rights had been violated. The BIA concluded that
the IJ was “ferreting out . . . the facts” and “acquiring clarity in
[Abulashvili‟s] testimony.” (A.R. 421)

We thereafter granted Abulashvili‟s motion to stay removal.
Abulashvili then filed a motion to reopen with the BIA based on

Counsel for DHS was present for Abulashvili‟s direct
examination at the first hearing, but did not attend the
subsequent hearing in August. Instead, a different DHS
attorney attended the August hearing in Yu‟s place. The IJ
noted that this switch in counsel was due to a “genuine mix
up,” but it is unclear from the record why this mix up
occurred. (A.R. 64)

6
changed country conditions, which the BIA denied because it was
untimely.5

This petition for review followed. The petition apparently
does not challenge the denial of Abulashvili‟s untimely asylum
application. (See Pet.‟s Brief, at 11).6 Rather, Abulashvili only
challenges the denial of his claim for withholding of removal and
relief pursuant to the CAT.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The BIA has jurisdiction over motions to reopen removal
proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We have jurisdiction
over Abulashvili‟s petition for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

“We review a final order of the BIA denying a motion to
reopen for abuse of discretion.” Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d
248, 250 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Under this standard, we
may reverse the BIA‟s denial of a motion to reopen if it is “arbitrary,
irrational, or contrary to law.” Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260,
265 (3d Cir. 2008).

Because the BIA‟s original order of removal adopted the
findings of the IJ and discussed the reasons behind the IJ‟s decision,
we review the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA. See Zheng v.
Gonzales, 417 F.3d 379, 381 (3d Cir. 2005). “Adverse credibility
determinations are factual findings subject to substantial evidence
review.” Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2003).
We will defer to and uphold the IJ‟s adverse credibility

5
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), Abulashvili should
have filed his motion to reopen within 90 days of when the
administrative decision became final, or by August 30, 2008.
He did not file the motion until November 14, 2008.
However, the 90-day time bar does not apply when, as here,
an applicant alleges changed country conditions. Filja v.
Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 252 (3d Cir. 2006).
6
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3), an alien has one year
from time of entry to file for asylum absent “extraordinary
circumstances,” which are not alleged here. Tarrawally v.
Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2003). That time bar
does not apply to requests for withholding of removal or
relief under the CAT.
7
determination if it is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole,” INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992), but such findings must be
based on inconsistencies and improbabilities that “go to the heart of
the asylum claim.” Id.; see also Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272
(3d Cir. 2002). 7
III. Discussion
A. The Motion to Reopen

Although Abulashvili‟s motion to reopen was untimely, the
BIA may nonetheless consider the motion if it was “based on
changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8
CFR § 1003.2(c)(2). Under these circumstances, an alien must: (1)
produce evidence demonstrating that conditions have changed in his
country of nationality; (2) demonstrate that this evidence is material;
and (3) establish that the evidence was not available and could not
have been presented at the previous proceeding. Id.; see also Zheng
v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2008).

Here, the BIA found that Abulashvili had met the first and
third factors, but not the second. Specifically, the BIA determined
there were changed circumstances in Georgia resulting from the
August 2008 conflict between Georgian and Russian forces, and
acknowledged that this evidence could not have been presented at
the previous proceeding. However, the BIA concluded that the
evidence was not material because major discrepancies between
Abulashvili‟s asylum application and his hearing testimony
established that his testimony was not credible.

The first of these alleged discrepancies pertains to
Abulashvili‟s testimony about his former roommate, Guram

7
The REAL ID Act provides that an adverse credibility
determination can be based on inconsistencies, inaccuracies,
and other factors, irrespective of whether they go to the heart
of an applicant's claim. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
However, the REAL ID Act provisions governing credibility
determinations do not apply here because Abulashvili‟s
asylum application was filed on December 20, 2004, before
the Act went into effect on May 11, 2005. See Chukwu v.
Att'y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007).

8
Kraveishvili. The IJ questioned why Abulashvili had testified that
the militia had tortured Kraveishvili when he refused to reveal
Abulashvili‟s whereabouts, yet never mentioned in his application
for asylum that Kraveishvili had been killed. The IJ considered this
omission to be a “very important” factor in her decision to deny
Abulashvili‟s application for asylum. (A.R. 98)

Even a cursory review of Abulashvili‟s asylum application
shows that the IJ was wrong. On the third page of Abulashvili‟s
statement in support of his written application, Abulashvili explained
that his roommate had been arrested, beaten and tortured. (A.R.
367). On the next page, Abulashvili wrote that Kraveishvili had
been “found dead at the wall of Alvabar cemetery” and Abulashvili
stated that it was then that he knew he had to leave Georgia “in order
to escape a death.” (A.R. 368). Thus, not only did Abulashvili state
that Kraveishvili had been killed, he added details such as where the
body was found.

Apparently, the IJ either never read Abulashvili‟s written
statement, or she overlooked part of it and concluded that a
nonexistent omission was "very important." Either explanation is
equally troubling. If the purported conflict between that statement in
his asylum application and Abulashvili‟s testimony was so critical to
resolving his claim, the fact that the IJ didn‟t make a sufficient effort
to determine what was actually in the application is both perplexing
and disconcerting.

Even worse, both the IJ and BIA were troubled by the
different spellings of the name of Abulashvili‟s former roommate in
the record. Abulashvili spelled the name as “Kraveishvili” in his
application, yet the person transcribing the hearing testimony spelled
the name as “Kravia Shvili.” This is hardly the kind of discrepancy
that a neutral fact finder would use to discredit one‟s testimony. The
explanation is so obvious that this purported “discrepancy” is hardly
worth commenting on. One does not need a doctorate in linguistics
to realize that “Kravia Shvili” is a phonetic spelling of
“Kraveishvili.” After all, Abulashvili did not produce the transcript
of his own hearing testimony; a stenographer almost certainly did. It
is also safe to assume that the stenographer was not fluent in
Georgian and that s/he did not have an ear that was accustomed to
Abulashvili‟s accent. It is hard to understand how anyone could
attach such importance to the two different spellings of the

9
roommate's name or conclude that it meant that Abulashvili was
referring to two different individuals.

Nonetheless, the BIA concluded that the two men were not
the same because “Kraveishvili is described in [Abulashvili‟s]
application as employing the services of the respondent‟s minibus.”
(A.R. 420). The BIA thought this inconsistent with Abulashvili‟s
statement in his asylum application that Kraveishvili was his former
roommate. However, we know of nothing that would prevent
someone‟s roommate from using certain services just because they
happened to be owned by the person he was rooming with. In his
asylum application, Abulashvili stated that the Ministry of State
Security “came for me in my former apartment in Tbilisi.” (A.R.
367). In the next sentence, Abulashvili discussed how members of
the Ministry “also arrested Guram Kraveishvili, member of LPG,
who took in employment my minibus.” (A.R. 367). Taken together,
these statements support an inference that Kraveishvili had been
Abulashvili‟s roommate at some point, an assertion that Abulashvili
made explicit at the hearing.

Third, the IJ and BIA took issue with Abulashvili‟s
description of where the
18-year old passenger was shot. The IJ pointed out that Abulashvili
explained in his application that the girl had been shot outside his
minibus, but testified at the hearing that the girl was shot inside and
that he did not find her until his minibus had been cleared of all
passengers.

Abulashvili stated in his asylum application that he “placed
[the girl] in minibus,” but never specified where the girl was shot.
(A.R. 366). Given the difficulty in comprehending much of
Abulashvili‟s application, which was written without the aid of an
interpreter, we are unclear whether placing the girl “in” the minibus
can fairly be interpreted to mean moving the girl “inside” the
minibus from outside. At the hearing, Abulashvili stated that, when
he had written that he placed the girl in the minibus, he simply
meant that he moved the girl to the front seat so that she could
receive more air and be more comfortable. (A.R. 185). There is
nothing inconsistent with that explanation and a statement that the
girl had in fact been shot inside the bus. Although we certainly
understand why this apparent inconsistency could fairly raise
questions, given all of the circumstances here, we have little

10
confidence that the IJ adequately considered Abulashvili‟s
explanation.

In addition, the IJ was baffled by the “sensibility of
[Abulashvili] having moved the victim of a gunshot instead of
rushing her off to the hospital.” (A.R. 73). The IJ‟s reaction to this
portion of the testimony once again suggests that she either did not
pay attention to what Abulashvili said, or she simply ignored some
of the record. Abulashvili did in fact state that he transported the
girl to the hospital after the shooting both in his asylum application
and his testimony. (A.R. 144-45, 366). The fact that he took a few
minutes to rearrange the bleeding girl so that “she won‟t get any
broken bones” and to secure her seat belt before driving to the
hospital does not strike us as incredible. (A.R. 185). A neutral fact
finder could just as easily have concluded that the addition of such
seemingly inconsequential details made his testimony about the
incident more credible, not less so.

We recognize that there were some actual inconsistencies
between the asylum application and Abulashvili‟s testimony. For
example, the IJ and BIA were concerned that Abulashvili never
mentioned in his application that he feared returning to Georgia
because his father had been an active member of the LPG, yet relied
on this fact during the hearing. Abulashvili explained at the hearing
that he did not include this information in his application because he
was relying on a friend to help him complete it, his friend had only a
slightly better proficiency in English than he did, and that his friend
was pressed for time.

Abulashvili also explained that he did not mention this
information during his interview with the asylum officer because the
officer could not understand what Abulashvili was trying to say, cut
Abulashvili off when he tried to speak, and ended the interview very
early. Abulashvili did not realize at the time that he could have
brought along an interpreter, and stated that the officer never gave
him the option of rescheduling the interview so that an interpreter
could attend.

We certainly do not suggest that the IJ or the BIA had to
accept Abulashvili‟s explanations. However, given the problems
with the IJ‟s assessment of Abulashvili‟s testimony that we have
already discussed, it is exceedingly difficult for us to conclude that
Abulashvili‟s explanations were fairly considered.

11
 The IJ and BIA also believed it was significant that
Abulashvili testified at the hearing that the police confiscated the
photos that he had taken outside of Buchukuri‟s mansion. However,
in his asylum application Abulashvili explained that he withheld the
photos from the police and gave them to the LPG Chairman, Shalva
Natelashvili. When questioned about this apparent inconsistency,
Abulashvili said that he meant that the police took his camera with
his other belongings and returned the camera to him without the
film. He explained that he did not realize that the film was missing
until he gave the camera to Natelashvili, who wanted to develop the
photos.

Finally, the IJ noted that there was an inconsistency between
the number of times Abulashvili stated that he had been arrested.
Abulashvili mentioned a third arrest at the hearing that he had not
included in his application. When the IJ pointed out the
inconsistency, Abulashvili explained that he did not include his last
arrest in the application because “it was not done by any kind of
militia” and therefore not a “legal or official arrest.” (A.R. 205).
Although unclear from the record, it appears that although the
individuals who seized Abulashvili during this last “arrest”
purported to be from the militia, they may have merely been thugs.
According to Abulashvili, these individuals took him to a building,
where they blindfolded him, held him upside down, and threatened
to kill him if he told anyone about the September 1998 events. As
we have just stated, the IJ did not have to accept this explanation.
However, at least she did have to consider it. Given the apparently
cavalier approach to evaluating Abulashvili‟s claims, we are not at
all sure that the explanation was given appropriate consideration.

An adverse credibility finding must be afforded substantial
deference so long as the finding is supported by sufficient, cogent
reasons. See Butt v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 430, 434 (3d Cir. 2005).
We must evaluate whether the credibility determination was
“appropriately based on inconsistent statements, contradictory
evidences, and inherently improbable testimony . . . in view of the
background evidence of country conditions.” Chen v. Ashcroft, 376
F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). Thus, minor omissions or
inconsistencies that do not go to the heart of an asylum applicant's
claim cannot support an adverse credibility determination. See Kaita
v. Att’y Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 2008).

12
 Here, the heart of Abulashvili‟s claim is that he would be
persecuted if he returned to Georgia because he was a member of the
LPG opposition party and knew about government corruption as
evidenced by the September 1998 events. Specifically, Abulashvili
claims that he witnessed a government official‟s potential collusion
with a Chechen insurgent and the killing of an innocent bystander.
He claims that the Georgian government used its powers of
persuasion – including threats of death, beatings, and torture – to
discourage him from revealing information about these incidents to
fellow LPG party members, who could use that information to their
political advantage.

On this record, we cannot conclude that the discrepancies
highlighted by the IJ and BIA undermine Abulashvili‟s claim.
Indeed, as we have explained, some of the purported contradictions
that the IJ relied upon are not contradictions at all, but resulted from
misreading Abulashvili‟s application, reading only part of it, or
ignoring it. To the extent that some unexplained inconsistencies
remain, we are left questioning whether those inconsistencies were
fairly evaluated.

We also note that “asylum applicants are not required to list
every incident of persecution on their I-589 statements.” Pavlova v.
INS, 441 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Pop v. INS, 270 F.3d
527, 531-32 (7th Cir. 2001) (“We hesitate to find that one seeking
asylum must state in his or her application every incident of
persecution lest the applicant have his or her credibility questioned if
the incident is later elicited in direct testimony.”).

Before concluding this part of our discussion, we also think it
important to stress that the linguistic and cultural difficulties
endemic in immigration hearings may frequently result in statements
that appear to be inconsistent, but in reality arise from a lack of
proficiency in English or cultural differences rather than attempts to
deceive.8

8
We do not, of course, have any way of knowing all of the
dynamics at work in this or any other immigration hearing
based upon our review of a cold record. However, given
some of the very obvious and troubling problems that we
have pointed out here, we think it useful to remind those
involved in the process of these difficulties.
13
 Ironically, it is quite possible that Abulashvili undermined his
own claim by testifying that he understood and spoke English.9
Later, when denying Abulashvili‟s asylum claim, the IJ stated, “The
fact that [Abulashvili] has spoken some English reassures the Court
that the respondent does have an understanding of the language, and
he testified to that effect as well.” (A.R. 87).

Yet the IJ should have realized that Abulashvili‟s purported
comprehension of English was not consistent with the difficulty he
had in communicating, and that observation would have required
neither familiarity with his language nor any particular expertise in
communication theory.

The IJ herself later explained that the majority of
Abulashvili‟s testimony was in Georgian, but that he “has peppered
his testimony with English now and then.” (A.R. 63). In addition,
portions of Abulashvili‟s asylum application are difficult to
comprehend and extremely garbled. For example, when describing
the incident where the 18-year old passenger was shot, he explained,
“I placed her in minibus and as crazy have gone aside nearby
hospital in Azhmeta. In car except of girl me a translator was.”
(A.R. 366). It is difficult to conclude that Abulashvili could
adequately express himself in English. That may explain why
portions of his application are unclear. Nevertheless, for all of the
reasons we have explained, we hold that the adverse credibility
determination is not supported by substantial evidence.
B. Due Process

Finally, Abulashvili argues that his due process rights were
violated when IJ Garcy took over the cross-examination at the
hearing after determining that the government was not adequately
prepared. Abulashvili contends that the IJ was no longer a neutral
arbiter once she assumed the role of counsel. As noted earlier, the
IJ explained that she took such an active role in questioning to

9
At the initial hearing, the IJ asked Abulashvili‟s counsel
what “your client‟s best language is,” to which Abulashvili
responded “I speak Georgian, Russian, English.” (A.R. 108).
Abulashvili‟s counsel then asked Abulashvili “Which one‟s
your best?,” to which Abulashvili responded “No, it‟s okay, I
speak English.” (A.R. 108). Abulashvili was later provided
a Georgian interpreter at the merits hearing.
14
ensure that Abulashvili could tell his side of the story and that she
was therefore trying to ensure his due process rights were protected.
(A.R. 421)

“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all „persons‟ within the
United States including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 693 (2001). To establish a due process violation, Abulashvili
must show that he was denied “a full and fair hearing,” which
includes a “neutral and impartial arbiter of the merits of his claim
and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on [his] behalf.”
See Cham v. Att’y Gen., 445 F.3d 683, 691 (3d Cir. 2008). “„No
person [may] be deprived of his interests in the absence of a
proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the
arbiter is not predisposed to find against him.‟” Wang v. Att’y Gen.,
423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,
446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)). We review alleged due process
violations in deportation proceedings de novo. Abdulrahman v.
Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 2003).

Here, IJ Garcy had every right to exercise her discretion to
question Abulashvili. See 8 USC § 1229a(b)(1). However, “"[a]n
immigration judge has a responsibility to function as a neutral,
impartial arbiter and must refrain from taking on the role of advocate
for either party." Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir.
2007).
The Due Process Clause cannot tolerate a situation where a
supposedly neutral fact finder interjects herself into the proceedings
to the extent of assuming the role of opposing counsel and taking
over cross-examination for the government. In doing so here, this IJ
asked Abulashvili a total of 87 questions. Not surprisingly, once the
IJ began cross-examining Abulashvili, the government‟s attorney did
not follow up with a single question. (A.R. 209). Why would he
since an Immigration Judge was now doing his job for him? We
cannot imagine how the IJ could be deemed a neutral arbiter under
such circumstances. Moreover, even if she could somehow remain
neutral in fact, the appearance was clearly to the contrary. It is not
the IJ‟s function to protect the government by becoming its counsel
when its own counsel is not prepared.

IJs must “assiduously refrain from becoming advocates for
either party.” Abdulrahman, 330 F.3d at 596. Even if the IJ did not
intend to become an advocate for the government, “judicial conduct

15
[is] improper . . . whenever a judge appears biased, even if she
actually is not biased.” See In re Antar (SEC v. Antar), 71 F.3d 97,
101 (3d Cir. 1995). By stepping into the role of the attorney for the
government, the IJ gave the strong impression that she was on the
government‟s side. It is difficult to conclude that Abulashvili
received a “fair and full hearing” when the IJ ceased being the
“neutral arbiter” due process demands and assumed the role of an
advocate instead.

We readily acknowledge that an IJ‟s position is an impossibly
demanding and challenging one. This has become increasingly
obvious in recent years as IJs are confronted with an exponential
growth in their caseloads. The plight of immigration judges
shoveling back a sea of cases has been chronicled in several news
articles and law journals.10 In addition, it is often very difficult to

10
See, e.g., Casey Miner, Judges On the Verge of a Nervous
Breakdown, Mother Jones, Nov. 1, 2010 (explaining that one
immigration judge‟s docket in Minnesota was pushing 1,300
cases at any given time, and that the judge sometimes
conducted 50 hearings in a single day-one every eight
minutes); Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for
Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation, Fordham L. Rev
545 (2009) (“One cannot exaggerate how overburdened and
under-resourced the immigration courts are and how pro se
cases tap those scarce resources disproportionately. In fiscal
year 2008, the nation‟s 214 immigration judges handled on
average over 1500 cases apiece. To assist them with this
enormous docket, immigration judges shared, on average, one
law clerk for every six judges.”); Howard Mintz, Immigration
Judges Struggling, Chi. Trib., Sept. 10, 2009 (“Immigration
courts have come under closer scrutiny in recent years as
caseloads exploded across the country. The number of
immigration cases jumped from more than 282,000 in 1998 to
a projected 385,000 this year, with only a modest increase in
the number of immigration judges.); Julia Preston, Study
Finds Immigration Courtrooms Backlogged , N.Y. Times,
June 18, 2009 (quoting Judge Dana L. Marks, president of the
National Association of Immigration Judges, who explained
that “[i]t‟s a system at its breaking point. How can a system
function properly when it is starved from the critical basic
resources it needs?”).

16
ascertain the veracity of an asylum applicant‟s testimony given
barriers of language and culture to which we have already alluded.
Perhaps this is why the BIA concluded that IJ Garcy was merely
engaged in a “ferreting out of the facts” and “acquiring clarity in
[Abulashvili‟s] testimony,” as we noted above. (A.R. 421).
However, that explanation and the IJ‟s own explanation would be far
more plausible if such interventions were as likely to favor the alien
as the government and if the record established that the IJ fairly
considered the entire record before making credibility
determinations. That does not appear to be the case.11
Moreover, it is one thing for an IJ to ask questions, and quite
another for an IJ to supplant the role of the government‟s attorney.
On this record, we can have no confidence that the IJ was merely
trying to ensure that Abulashvili had a full opportunity to tell his
story because, as noted above, the IJ ignored crucial parts of his
testimony in finding omissions that simply did not exist. The Due
Process Clause does not allow a neutral hearing officer to become
the functional equivalent of counsel for one of the parties; yet, that is
what appears to have happened here.
IV. The Appropriate Remedy
Where, as here, we reverse an adverse credibility
finding, “the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to
remand to the agency for additional investigation or
explanation.” INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16

11
Unfortunately, this is not the first time that IJ Garcy‟s
conduct in a hearing has come to our attention. In Wang v.
Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2005), we were deeply
troubled by her manner of questioning the asylum applicant
and noted that her “tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the
sarcasm of the IJ seem more appropriate to a court television
show than a federal court proceeding.” Similarly, in Saleh v.
Gonzales, 172 Fed.Appx. 471, 474 (3d Cir. 2006)
(unpublished), we noted that “we would be remiss were we
not to point out the unprofessional and inappropriate conduct
of Judge Garcy, the IJ in this case. On numerous occasions
the Judge verbally attacked Mr. Saleh in a manner
unbecoming of a neutral and detached arbitrator.”

Here, unlike in other cases we have had to review, we
do not take issue with the manner in which this IJ questioned
Abulashvili. Rather, we are troubled by the fact that she took
over the cross-examination for the government.
17
(2002) (per curiam) (citation and quotation marks omitted);
Butt, 429 F.3d at 437. We will therefore vacate the BIA‟s
order dated May 30, 2008 dismissing Abulashvili‟s
application for withholding of removal and relief under the
CAT. We will also vacate the BIA‟s order dated April 30,
2009 denying Abulashvili‟s motion to reopen since that was
based on the BIA's affirmance of the IJ‟s adverse credibility
determination. In addition, we will remand the case to the
BIA and instruct the agency to assess Abulashvili‟s evidence
without considering the adverse credibility determination.
See Senathirajah v. I.N.S., 157 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 1998)
(remanding to BIA with instructions to remand to IJ for
decision on asylum and withholding application, but without
consideration of erroneous adverse credibility finding
reversed on appeal). 12
In the event that the BIA deems it appropriate to
further remand this case to an IJ for another hearing, we
strongly recommend that the agency refer the matter to a
different IJ in light of the concerns that have arisen in this
case, and the appearance of partiality that cannot now be put
“back into the tube.” See Cham v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 683,

12
In its April 30, 2009 decision and accompanying order, the
BIA did not engage in any independent analysis with respect
to Abulashvili‟s CAT claim, and merely treated it in passing
at the end of its decision. When considering a motion to
reopen, the BIA must at the very least “actually consider the
evidence and argument that a party presents.” Abdulai v.
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001). Abulashvili has
submitted a detailed report from Mr. Abdoumannob Poulatov,
a human rights advocate who has been widely recognized as
an expert on country conditions in the former Soviet Union.
According to the report, Poulatov opines that because of
Abulashvili‟s membership in the LPG opposition party, he
believes that Abulashvili “will most likely face possible
intimidation, attack, and possibly even incarceration and/or
torture, if he is forced to return to any part of Georgia.” (S.A.
29). Although we certainly do not suggest that the BIA must
accept Poulatov‟s conclusions, the agency should have at the
very least considered them. On remand, the BIA should
carefully consider the evidence presented in support of
Abulashvili‟s withholding of removal and CAT claims.
18
694 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d
627, 638 (3d Cir. 2006)). “[W]hile we „recognize that
assignment of an [IJ] is within the province of the Attorney
General,‟ if on remand an IJ‟s services are needed, we believe
„the parties would be far better served by the assignment to
those proceedings of a different IJ.‟” Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft,
396 F.3d 272, 287 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Paramasamy v.
Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002)).
V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the BIA
erred in dismissing Abulashvili‟s application for withholding
of removal and protection under the CAT. We further hold
that the BIA abused its discretion in denying Abulashvili‟s
motion to reopen. Finally, we hold that Abulashvili‟s due
process rights were violated when the IJ assumed the role of
the government‟s attorney. We will therefore grant the
petition for review, vacate the orders of the BIA, and remand
the matter to the BIA for additional proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

19