OPINION OF THE COURT
Petitioner seeks leave pursuant to article 6 of the Civil Rights Law to change her surname to that of her same-sex life partner.
Under the common law, a person can simply assume any name, absent fraud or an interference with the rights of others (Matter of Anonymous, 57 Misc 2d 813, 814 [Civ Ct, NY County 1968]). Article 6 of the Civil Rights Law provides a formal procedure for changing a name, which provides the advantages of being “speedy, definite and a matter of record” (Smith v United States Cas. Co., 197 NY 420, 429 [1910]). Article 6 allows both adults and infants to petition to change their names, the latter generally through a parent or guardian (Civil Rights Law § 60). Pursuant to section 61, the petition must include the name, date of birth, place of birth, age and residence of the individual whose name is proposed to be changed and the name which he or she proposes to assume. It must also specify whether the individual has been convicted of a crime or adjudicated a bankrupt, and whether there are any judgments or liens of record or actions or proceedings in which the petitioner is a party. In addition, the application must have attached a birth certificate or equivalent if the individual was born in the State of New York. Where the court is satisfied that the petitioner’s application is true and that there is no “reasonable objection to the change of name proposed,” the court will issue an order authorizing the petitioner to assume the proposed name, and direct that notice of the change be published (Civil Rights Law § 63).
The statute requires that the court be assured that the desired name change is not intended to defraud or misrepresent, nor interfere with the rights of others (Matter of J.O.T., 120 Misc 2d 817, 818 [Civ Ct, Kings County 1983]). Petitioner avers that she has never been married, has no children either natural or adoptive and there are no orders directing her to make child support payments in any court; she has never been convicted of a crime or adjudicated a bankrupt; and there are no judgments or liens against her, nor are there any proceedings pending to which she is a party. The grounds on which she makes her application for a change of name are that she has lived with her partner Zosia Zaks for nearly a year, and they plan to file a domestic partnership agreement and start a family. She wishes to assume the same last name as her partner “to reflect their commitment to each other.” In support of her application, she includes an affidavit from her partner, Zosia Zaks, requesting the court grant petitioner’s application to assume her name.
The petition before this court does not involve children. Rather, it concerns an adult who wishes to change her surname to that of her life partner, and that individual has consented. The court need not, therefore, concern itself with factors other than those of fraud, intentional misrepresentation or interference with the rights of others.
In New Jersey, the courts recently addressed a case very similar to that before this court. There, a woman petitioned to change her last name to include the surname of her same-sex life partner. The lower court denied her application on the ground that allowing the change of name would give the appearance of approving of same-sex marriage, something not allowed under New Jersey state law. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court reversed the lower court’s ruling in a lengthy opinion, finding that because there was no intent to defraud and no criminal purposes, the trial court had no discretion to decide what New Jersey public policy was or should be (In re Application of Bacharach, 344 NJ Super 126, 129, 780 A2d 579, 581 [Super Ct App Div 2001]). It noted that as it is, the women have the right to exchange rings, declare vows in a ceremony, call their relationship a marriage, use the same surname, and adopt and rear children. Under the New Jersey antidiscrimination law, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is forbidden. In addition, New Jersey allows same-sex partners to adopt children and allows visitation rights to same-sex former domestic partners. Nonetheless, the court stated that these statutes were “essentially irrelevant” when addressing an application for a name change, although they demonstrate that the granting of the petitioner’s application would not be inconsistent with stated public policy (id. 344 NJ Super at 135, 780 A2d at 584). Furthermore, it held that the lower court’s hypothesis that some members of the public would be misled about the status of same-sex marriages in New Jersey
In New York, as in our sister state across the Hudson River, New Jersey, public policy is squarely on the side of outlawing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (Executive Law § 291 [1]; §§ 296, 296-a). Thus, assuming that public policy is an appropriate consideration in this application, the granting of it would be consistent with the public policy of the State of New York. However, as noted in the Bacharach decision, an application to change a name is not to be decided based on public policy grounds, but on a much narrower basis.
This point was eloquently underscored by another judge of this court in a recent decision concerning a name change involving a different context — an individual of transgendered experience. (Matter of Guido, 1 Misc 3d 825 [Civ Ct, NY County 2003].) In Guido the court originally denied an application to change the petitioner’s given name from one traditionally associated by many in American society with a male gendered individual to one traditionally associated with a female gendered individual until such time as the petitioner had completed gender reassignment surgery and obtained a divorce. Upon renewal, the Guido court concluded that its initial concern with whether the applicant had undergone gender reassignment surgery, and whether a divorce had been obtained from the applicant’s wife, were matters “outside the scope of the court’s jurisdiction and beyond the scope of the inquiry necessary to avoid lending the court’s assistance to fraud, deception or other interference with the rights of third parties.” (Id. at 827.) The Guido court had initially reasoned that because same-sex marriages are not recognized in New York State, it would be “ ‘inconsistent for this court to grant the relief requested’.” (Id. at 826.) In reversing itself, the Guido court concluded that its initial concerns were “misplaced, as they anticipate questions that simply are not raised by this application.” (Id. at 828.) It further stated that “there is no reason — and no legal basis — for the courts to appoint themselves the guardians of orthodoxy in such matters.” (Id. at 828.) As the court noted, the petitioner did not ask
Here, as in Guido, the court finds that its scope of review of the petition is narrow. Finding no intent to defraud or misrepresent, and no interference with the rights of others, this court grants the petitioner’s application to change her name, and as set forth in its order of November 25, 2003, the petitioner shall be known, upon publication and proof of compliance, as Gena Michele Zaks.
2.
Professor Arthur S. Leonard, Transgender Woman Gets Name Change, Gay City News, Nov. 6-12, 2003, at 9 (Guido decision adopts “pragmatic” approach that met “the immediate needs” of the petitioner but refused to recognize an actual change of sex; one of the “most sharply argued questions” facing the courts as well as society as a whole is whether a change of sex can be legally recognized in the absence of gender-reassignment surgery, based solely on body changes induced by hormone treatments).