FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 16 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GURDEV SINGH, No. 07-74554
Petitioner, Agency No. A077-421-696
v.
MEMORANDUM *
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 28, 2011 **
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and KAPLAN, Senior District
Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for Southern New York, sitting by designation.
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of adjustment of status
because it rests on a reviewable question of law, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D),
namely that Gurdev Singh failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that his
marriage was “entered into in good faith,” id. at § 1255(e)(3).
The immigration judge (“IJ”) did not err in denying Singh’s adjustment of
status application on the ground that Singh failed to meet the necessary statutory
requirements. See id. The IJ correctly evaluated whether Singh’s marriage was
valid at its inception, see Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 1975), and she
did not err by inquiring into Singh’s and his wife’s actions after the marriage
because such actions may “bear on the subjective intent of the parties at the time
they were married,” Oropeza-Wong v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1135, 1148 (9th Cir.
2005). Furthermore, contrary to Singh’s argument, an approved I-130 petition is
not sufficient for the statutory requirement of showing a good-faith marriage. See
Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 878–79 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2002).
Substantial evidence supported the IJ’s adverse credibility finding regarding
Singh’s asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT)
claims. Singh’s direct testimony regarding the length of time he spent in the
hospital and his period of hiding before leaving India was inconsistent with his
asylum statement and testimony on cross-examination. Both these inconsistencies
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are material and go to the heart of Singh’s claim of persecution. See Li v. Ashcroft,
378 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2004). This adverse credibility finding also supported
the IJ’s denial of Singh’s withholding of removal and CAT claims.
AFFIRMED.
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