UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4309
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GARCIA PAUL ROBINSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District
Judge. (2:10-cr-00157-RBS-TEM-1)
Submitted: October 31, 2011 Decided: November 18, 2011
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Walter B.
Dalton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant,
Appellate Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H.
MacBride, United States Attorney, Cameron M. Rountree, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Garcia Paul Robinson pled guilty, without a plea
agreement, to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). The district court
sentenced Robinson to seventy-two months in prison, a sentence
nine months above the top of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range. Robinson timely appealed his sentence.
On appeal, Robinson argues that his sentence is
unreasonable because the court mischaracterized his offense,
improperly concluded that his criminal record warranted an
upwardly variant sentence, imposed a longer than necessary
sentence, and failed to adequately explain its rejection of a
within-Guidelines sentence. Finding no merit to Robinson’s
claims, we affirm.
This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness,
applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v.
Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010). This review requires
appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of a sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In
determining procedural reasonableness, this court considers
whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s
advisory Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
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(2006) factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties,
and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id.
“Regardless of whether the district court imposes an
above, below, or within-Guidelines sentence, it must place on
the record an individualized assessment based on the particular
facts of the case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). If
the court finds “no significant procedural error,” it next
assesses the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, taking
“‘into account the totality of the circumstances, including the
extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.’” United
States v. Morace, 594 F.3d 340, 345-46 (4th Cir.) (quoting Gall,
552 U.S. at 51), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 307 (2010). We
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing Robinson’s sentence.
Contrary to Robinson’s assertions, the district court
did not base his sentence on clearly erroneous facts by
comparing his offense to the shootings at Fort Hood. Instead,
in considering the nature and circumstances of Robinson’s
offense, the court specifically rejected the Government’s
analogy to the Fort Hood shootings while indicating that the
fact that the offense took place on a military installation
aggravated the offense.
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Robinson contends that the district court erred by
finding that his criminal record justified a sentence above the
advisory Guidelines range. Robinson’s criminal record included
a plethora of offenses that began in 1995 when he was sixteen
and involved encounters with the criminal justice system nearly
every year until his arrest for the instant offense in November
2009. It was the continuum of Robinson’s criminal record, as
opposed to the individual offenses that formed the basis for his
sixteen criminal history points, that the district court found
egregious and which contributed to the court’s decision to
sentence Robinson above the advisory Guidelines range.
Next, Robinson argues that his six-year sentence, a
term nine months above the advisory Guidelines range, was
“overkill” in light of his acceptance of responsibility and
desire for substance abuse treatment and vocational training.
Given the nature and circumstances of Robinson’s offense, his
recidivism, and the court’s concern that his criminal conduct
was escalating, we conclude that Robinson’s sentence was not
greater than necessary to meet the sentencing goals of
§ 3553(a). To the extent that Robison argues that his sentence
was excessive in light of the much shorter sentences he received
for his prior offenses, we find his argument unconvincing. Cf.
United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 385 (2008) (“[A]
second or subsequent offense is often regarded as more serious
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because it portends greater future danger and therefore warrants
an increased sentence for purposes of deterrence and
incapacitation.”).
Finally, we find unavailing Robinson’s argument that
his sentence is unreasonable because the court failed to explain
why it rejected a within-Guidelines sentence when neither party
sought an above-Guidelines sentence. The district court gave a
thorough explanation of the basis for its upwardly variant
sentence. Implicit in this discussion was a rejection of any
argument for a within-Guidelines sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm Robinson’s sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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