UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4085
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
GEORGE MARTIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley,
District Judge. (1:05-cr-00021-IMK-JSK-1)
Submitted: October 27, 2011 Decided: November 29, 2011
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and KEENAN, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Scott C. Brown, SCOTT C. BROWN LAW OFFICE, Wheeling, West
Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United States
Attorney, Zelda E. Wesley, Assistant United States Attorney,
Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
George Martin appeals the 270-month sentence imposed
on remand for resentencing following his jury conviction of one
count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to
distribute in excess of fifty grams of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006); and two counts of
distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). See United States v. Martin, 278 F.
App’x 248 (4th Cir. 2008). On appeal, Martin argues that the
district court erred in sentencing him based on a drug amount
greater than that found by the jury and in applying a three-
level enhancement for his role in the offense. We affirm.
We review a district court’s application of the
Guidelines during sentencing de novo and its factual findings
for clear error. United States v. Mehta, 594 F.3d 277, 281 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 279 (2010). A district court
must make relevant factual findings at sentencing based on its
view of the preponderance of the evidence. United States v.
Young, 609 F.3d 348, 357 (4th Cir. 2010).
We first hold that the district court did not clearly
err in determining that Martin was responsible for 11.23
kilograms of cocaine base. Although the jury attributed to
Martin fifty grams or more of cocaine base, “[t]he district
court was free to consider, as it would with any . . . acquitted
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conduct, whether the government could establish a higher
quantity under a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id.
Martin argues that the district court erred in crediting the
recollections of known drug users and the expert witness that
calculated a drug weight based on their testimonies. However,
we give great deference to a district court’s credibility
determinations, see United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 334
(4th Cir. 2009), and do not fault the district court’s explicit
credibility findings where the witnesses gave detailed
descriptions on which the duly qualified expert based his
conservative estimates.
We likewise hold that the district court did not
clearly err in applying a three-level leadership enhancement.
Pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”)
§ 3B1.1(b) (2010), a defendant qualifies for a three-level
enhancement if he was “a manager or supervisor (but not an
organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or
more participants or was otherwise extensive.” USSG § 3B1.1(b).
In determining a defendant’s leadership role, a court should
consider seven factors:
the exercise of decision making authority, the nature
of participation in the commission of the offense, the
recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a
larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of
participation in planning or organizing the offense,
the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the
degree of control and authority exercised over others.
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USSG § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4; see also United States v. Sayles, 296
F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 2002).
Martin does not dispute that he was active in a
conspiracy involving five or more participants; he merely argues
that the evidence did not show that he acted as a manager or
supervisor. To the contrary, the district court heard testimony
that Martin exercised control over a middleman, a lookout, and
several runners to whom he “fronted” cocaine base. Accordingly,
we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in
finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Martin was a
manager or supervisor of the conspiracy.
We therefore affirm Martin’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the material before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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