10-3366-cv
Richards-Byers v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Fin.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT
ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick
Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in
the City of New York, on the 30th day of November, two
thousand eleven.
PRESENT:
Dennis Jacobs,
Chief Judge,
José A. Cabranes,
Debra Ann Livingston,
Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________
Yvonne Richards-Byers,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 10-3366-cv
New York City Department of Finance,
City of New York,
Defendants-Appellees.*
_________________________________________
*
The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official
caption as shown above.
FOR APPELLANT: Yvonne Richards-Byers, pro se,
New York, NY.
FOR APPELLEES: Larry Sonnenshein and Andrew S.
Wellin, for Michael A. Cardozo,
Corporation Counsel of the City
of New York, New York, NY.
1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States
2 District Court for the Southern District of New York
3 (Daniels, J.).
4
5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
6 ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District
7 Court is AFFIRMED.
8
9 Plaintiff-Appellant Yvonne Richards-Byers,
10 proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s
11 grant of summary judgment for Defendants-Appellees the
12 City of New York and the City of New York’s Department
13 of Finance (collectively, the “Defendants”) on Richards-
14 Byers’s complaint brought under Title VII of the Civil
15 Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
16 Richards-Byers alleges retaliation by the Defendants
17 (and her coworkers) for her confidential 2002 Equal
18 Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) interview in support of a
19 coworker. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
2
1 underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and
2 issues on appeal.
3 We review de novo a district court’s grant of
4 summary judgment, with the view that “[s]ummary judgment
5 is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there
6 are no genuine issues of material fact and that the
7 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
8 law.” Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d
9 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). A plaintiff bears the initial
10 burden of proving a prima facie case of retaliation.
11 See Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 110
12 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
13 Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). To establish a prima facie
14 case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
15 (1) “she participated in an activity protected by Title
16 VII,” (2) “her participation was known to her employer,”
17 (3) “her employer thereafter subjected her to a
18 materially adverse employment action,” and (4) “there
19 was a causal connection between the protected activity
20 and the adverse employment action.” Kaytor v. Elec.
21 Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 552 (2d Cir. 2010). Because
22 Richards-Byers failed to establish a prima facie case,
23 we affirm.
24
3
1 [1] Richards-Byers has offered little beyond her own
2 speculation that any of her coworkers actually knew
3 about her confidential interview. She does not contend
4 that anyone told anyone else about the interview, and no
5 coworkers ever indicated to her that they knew about the
6 interview. Accordingly, in this instance, a jury could
7 not draw a reasonable inference of retaliation.
8 [2] Richards-Byers claims that she was not promoted and
9 received numerous adverse transfers, all in retaliation
10 for her EEO interview, but she has not shown a causal
11 connection between those events and the interview. Even
12 her first transfer -- which was closest in time to the
13 interview -- occurred more than a year later. There is
14 no circumstantial evidence that she was treated
15 differently from any similarly-situated employee, there
16 is no direct evidence of retaliatory animus, and such
17 attenuated temporal proximity cannot support an
18 inference of retaliatory intent. See Gordon v. N.Y.C.
19 Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2000); see also
20 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273
21 (2001); cf. Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-op Extension of
22 Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 554–55 (2d Cir. 2001)
23 (collecting cases).
24
4
1 The same is true of Richards-Byers’s claim that she
2 was not promoted to positions in 2004 and 2005. See
3 Breeden, 532 U.S. at 273 (“Action taken . . . 20 months
4 later suggests, by itself, no causality at all.”). This
5 is especially true of the 2004 position, which was
6 filled by the woman whose claim was the subject of
7 Richards-Byers’s 2002 EEO interview.
8 At best, the remaining allegations of failure to be
9 promoted are “mere conclusory allegations” that “cannot
10 by themselves create a genuine issue of material fact”
11 to withstand summary judgment. See Fletcher v. Atex,
12 Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1456 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal
13 quotation marks omitted).
14
15 We have considered all of Richards-Byers’s
16 additional arguments and find them to be without merit.
17 Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is
18 AFFIRMED.
19
20 FOR THE COURT:
21 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
22
5