In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-2724
B RIDGETT STEVENS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
H OUSING A UTHORITY OF
S OUTH B END , INDIANA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
S TATE OF INDIANA,
Intervenor-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:08-cv-00051-RL—Rudy Lozano, Judge.
A RGUED JANUARY 19, 2011—D ECIDED D ECEMBER 1, 2011
Before P OSNER, K ANNE and R OVNER, Circuit Judges.
R OVNER, Circuit Judge. Bridgett Stevens lived in
federally-subsidized public housing in South Bend,
2 No. 10-2724
Indiana.1 In 2008, she received three “Notice to
Terminate Lease” letters from the Housing Authority
of South Bend (“HASB”), each alleging that she had
violated lease provisions that prohibited criminal activity
on the property. After receiving the first notice, Stevens
sued HASB and a number of individuals, alleging viola-
tions of the Fair Housing Act, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and certain provisions of Indiana state law. After
receiving the third notice, she vacated the property.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants on the federal claims and declined
to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims, dismissing them without prejudice. Stevens
appeals.
I.
Stevens entered into a lease with HASB in Septem-
ber 2007. R. 62-5, at 6-23. Stevens was listed on the lease
as “Resident.” The lease named her two sons, Alfernando
Stevens (then seventeen years old) and Armondo Brown
(then eight years old), as “Household Members.” The
lease provided, among other things, that certain criminal
1
Although Bridgett Stevens spells her first name with two “t”s,
the Complaint, the pleadings, and the briefs on appeal for
both the plaintiff and the defendants spell her name with a
single “t.” See Personal Declaration, R. 62-5, at 1; Dwelling
Lease, R. 62-5, at 23; R. 62-5, at 34 (Stevens’ handwritten note
to HASB relinquishing her apartment). We will use the plain-
tiff’s own spelling and correct the case caption accordingly.
No. 10-2724 3
activities could result in immediate termination of the
lease:
Criminal Activity Grounds for Termination by HASB.
HASB has a One Strike or “Zero Tolerance” policy
with respect to violations of Lease terms regarding
criminal activity. Either of the following types of
criminal activity by the Resident, any member of the
household, a guest, or another person under their
control shall be cause for termination of this Lease
and eviction from the Dwelling Unit, even in the
absence of an arrest or conviction:
(i) Any criminal activity that threatens the health,
safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of HASB public
housing premises by other Residents; or
(ii) Any drug-related criminal activity on or off such
premises.
ANY CRIMINAL ACTIVITY OR DRUG-RELATED
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY SPECIFIED ABOVE CONSTI-
TUTES A SERIOUS VIOLATION OF MATERIAL
TERMS OF THE LEASE AND WILL BE GROUNDS
FOR TERMINATION OF THE LEASE AND EVIC-
TION FROM THE DWELLING UNIT. SUCH ACTIV-
ITY CONSTITUTES GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
AND EVICTION NOTWITHSTANDING THE AB-
SENCE OF AN ARREST OR CONVICTION.
Dwelling Lease, R. 62-5, at 19-20 (emphasis in original).
Peace in the Stevens household was short-lived. On
December 25, 2007, Stevens’ daughter, Ebony Harmon,
came to visit with her children. Harmon and her
4 No. 10-2724
children were driven to Stevens’ apartment building by
Harmon’s boyfriend, Chester Higgins. At around the
same time, Stevens’ son, Alfernando flagged down
Marcus Henderson for a ride home. Henderson was the
father of Ebony Harmon’s children. Although there
were different accounts of what happened when
Henderson and Higgins encountered each other, it is
undisputed that the two engaged in a gunfight in the
parking lot of Stevens’ apartment building. Henderson
fled before the police arrived, and Harmon drove a
wounded Higgins to the hospital. Both men survived
the incident.
On January 14, 2008, a few weeks after the shooting,
HASB issued its first “Important 30 Day Notice to Termi-
nate Lease” (“First Notice”) to Stevens. R. 62-5, at 24-26.
Although Stevens disagrees with the portrayal of the
shooting in the First Notice, she does not dispute that
Henderson was at the property because Alfernando
asked him for a ride. Nor does she dispute that Higgins
was there because he drove Stevens’ invited guest, Ebony
Harmon, to the apartment. Citing the “Zero Tolerance”
policy, the First Notice directed Stevens to vacate the
apartment by January 31, 2008.
Instead of moving out, Stevens filed this lawsuit
against HASB, the executive director of HASB, and five
commissioners of HASB. Stevens alleged that the defen-
dants (1) violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b),
by locating her publicly-funded apartment building in
a primarily African-American neighborhood, segregating
her on account of race; (2) interfered with her right to
No. 10-2724 5
make and enforce a contract by terminating her lease on
account of race; (3) breached a contract between them-
selves and the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (“HUD”), for which Stevens was a
third-party beneficiary; and (4) violated her right to
equal protection and due process by threatening to take
action against her under the Indiana ejectment statute,
in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 In each instance,
Stevens alleged that the defendants’ actions caused her
emotional distress. She sought a declaratory judgment
that the Indiana ejectment statute violates both state and
federal law, an injunction against the application of the
ejectment statute to her, and both compensatory and
exemplary damages.
After Stevens filed her suit but before she served the
defendants, HASB filed an action for immediate posses-
sion of Stevens’ unit in state court. When HASB
became aware of the lawsuit, it dismissed the state
court action and reasserted the claim for immediate
possession as a compulsory counterclaim in the instant
case.
On November 6, 2008, HASB issued an “Important 30-
day Notice to Terminate Lease for Disturbing the Peace
and for an Unauthorized Live In” (“Second Notice”). R. 62-
5, at 27-29. The Second Notice asserted that the South
Bend Police Department reported to HASB on Novem-
ber 5, 2008 that police officers were called to Stevens’
2
Stevens also asserted two counts arising under Indiana
law, neither of which is at issue in this appeal.
6 No. 10-2724
apartment to investigate a fight. The officers determined
that Stevens had stabbed her husband, Christopher
Broadnax, during an argument.3 The Second Notice
also alleged that the police had been called to the apart-
ment on October 2, 2008, for another altercation be-
tween Stevens and Broadnax. At that time, Broadnax
told police officers that he was on house arrest and was
using Stevens’ unit as his principal place of residence.
He also told the officers that Stevens was high on crack
cocaine and had started the fight. The officers deter-
mined that there was an outstanding warrant for
Stevens for an unrelated charge for retail theft and there-
fore arrested Stevens. The Second Notice, again citing
the “One Strike” policy, directed Stevens to vacate the
apartment by December 8, 2008.
Only a few weeks later, on November 24, 2008, HASB
issued its final “Important 30-day Notice to Terminate
Lease” (“Third Notice”) to Stevens. R. 62-5, at 30-33.
Building on the incidents detailed in the Second Notice,
HASB asserted that Broadnax accused Stevens of stabbing
him on November 5th during an argument over the
placement of his house arrest monitor in her home.
Broadnax claimed to be living in Stevens’ apartment but
3
As with the First Notice, Stevens denied the portrayal of
events depicted in the Second Notice. She denied using illegal
drugs, and denied stabbing her husband. She did concede
that, while she was peeling potatoes, Broadnax ran up to her
and “ended up getting stabbed with the knife—well, got
punched with the knife.” R. 62-3, at 42-43. She asserted that
the stabbing was not intentional.
No. 10-2724 7
was not listed as a “Household Member” on the lease.4
Broadnax had also reported to the responding police
officers that Stevens was smoking marijuana a few hours
before the fight. The officers discovered two “marijuana
blunt roaches” on the kitchen counter.5 Based on these
incidents, the Third Notice directed Stevens to vacate
the apartment by December 24, 2008.
Stevens never challenged the Second or Third Notices.
Instead, she vacated the property in January 2009. She
left a handwritten note for HASB which read, in its en-
tirety:
1 - 27 - 09
South Bend Housing, I Bridgett Stevens have lost my
keys to 1265 South Bend Ave. I am now done with
unit. thank [sic] you. Ms. Stevens
R. 62-5, at 34. The defendants asserted that Stevens’
departure from her apartment was “voluntary,” in the
4
Stevens denied that her husband lived at the apartment but
conceded that he registered her address as his home for the
purposes of his home detention monitor for approximately
two to three weeks in 2008. R. 62-3, at 41. Allowing Broadnax,
an unauthorized tenant, to live in the apartment for that
length of time violated one of the terms of Stevens’ lease.
5
A “marijuana blunt” is a cigar that has been hollowed out
and refilled with marijuana. See Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922,
945 n.10 (7th Cir. 2009). A “roach” is the “butt of a marijuana
cigarette.” Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary of the English
Language, RHR Press, 2001. The presence of controlled sub-
stances in the apartment violated the terms of Stevens’ lease.
8 No. 10-2724
sense that she acquiesced to the Second and Third No-
tices. Stevens, of course, sees her departure as forced.
Nevertheless, she never challenged the Second or Third
Notices, and never amended her complaint to add any
claims relating to those Notices.
The district court found that Stevens’ challenges to the
Indiana ejectment statute are moot because she left her
apartment in response to the Second and Third Notices.
She did not contest the factual or legal bases for those
Notices. The court also determined that her claims did
not meet any of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
The court rejected Stevens’ segregation claim because it
was untimely, because it related only to post-acquisition
claims of discrimination, and because she failed to
provide any evidence in support of the claim. The court
ruled in favor of the defendants on Stevens’ Section 1981
claim relating to making and enforcing her lease agree-
ment because she failed to set forth any evidence that
the termination of her lease was based on racial discrim-
ination. Instead, Stevens herself claimed only that her
lease was terminated because HASB was holding her
responsible for the actions of other persons who were
not under her control. Stevens’ third-party beneficiary
claim failed because, among other things, she failed to
supply any evidence that HASB breached any contract
with HUD. Finally, the court rejected Stevens’ claim that
the First Notice violated her equal protection and due
process rights by holding her responsible for the actions
of persons who were not under her control. Stevens
conceded facts that demonstrated that one of the
shooters, Henderson, was present at the apartment as
No. 10-2724 9
an invited guest of Stevens’ son, who in turn was
listed as a Household Member on the lease. Although
Henderson was not literally under Stevens’ control in
the colloquial sense, he was present only because a House-
hold Member invited him and allowed him access to
the premises. The district court found that this was suffi-
cient to establish control under federal housing regula-
tions. The court deemed it absurd to suggest that a tenant
must be able to physically overpower a guest before
control may be established. As we noted above, the
court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining
state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice.
Steven appeals.
II.
On appeal, Stevens contends that (1) the district court
misapplied governing law on summary judgment stan-
dards; (2) the court erred in concluding that Stevens’
claims were moot; (3) the one-strike policy, as applied
to Stevens, violated the criteria set forth in Department
of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002);
(4) the court erred in granting summary judgment
on the segregated housing claim because the evidence
demonstrated disputed issues of material fact; (5) Stevens
had standing on all of her claims, and no claims were
barred by the statute of limitations; and (6) the court
erred in finding that evidence of other lease violations
justified Stevens’ eviction.
10 No. 10-2724
A.
Stevens’ contention that the district court misapplied
the standard for summary judgment is a nonstarter.
She complains that HASB was not put to the burden of
showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970),
Stevens contends that HASB failed to carry its burden
when it did not foreclose the possibility that there were
any disputes of material fact. This deficiency alone,
according to Stevens, required the district court to deny
summary judgment. But the district court did not
misstate or misapply the standards for summary judg-
ment. And even if it had, our review is plenary, and so
“we can (and will) make an independent decision
under the proper standards.” Yindee v. CCH Inc., 458
F.3d 599, 601 (7th Cir. 2006).
Moreover, we rejected this very argument recently
in Crawford v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 647 F.3d 642
(7th Cir. 2011).6 In that case, the plaintiff also claimed
that, under Adickes, it was under no burden to produce
evidence showing an issue of genuine fact unless the
defendant “wholly extinguishe[d] the possibility that the
events forming the basis of his opponent’s claims oc-
curred.” Crawford, 647 F.3d at 648. We characterized this
6
Indeed, Stevens’ argument appears to be literally cut-and-
pasted from Crawford. Counsel for Stevens was also counsel
for the plaintiff in Crawford, and on page 8 of Stevens’ opening
brief, counsel inadvertently refers to the defendant as Country-
wide, the defendant in the Crawford case.
No. 10-2724 11
interpretation as a “misapplication of Adickes” that is
“flatly contradict[ed]” by Celotex:
A party moving for summary judgment need not
introduce evidence rendering its opponents’ claims
altogether impossible in order to trigger the op-
ponent’s burden to answer with its own supporting
evidence. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Crawford, 647 F.3d at 648. As was the case in Crawford,
HASB’s motion for summary judgment compre-
hensively challenged the factual and legal support for
Stevens’ claims. The burden then shifted to Stevens to
cite evidence in the record demonstrating that genuine
issues of material fact remained for trial. Crawford, 647
F.3d at 648; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. As the district court
properly did, we will apply the standards set forth in
Celotex in reviewing the judgment.
B.
Stevens next contends that the district court erred in
concluding that her claims were moot. As will become
apparent below, our resolution of this issue will
necessarily require us to address Stevens’ third claim on
appeal, whether a strict liability eviction violates the
Supreme Court’s dictate in Rucker. Whether a case is
moot is a question of law that we review de novo. Gates
v. City of Chicago, 623 F.3d 389, 413 (7th Cir. 2010); Olson v.
Brown, 594 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct.
3478 (2010). “A case is moot when the issues presented
12 No. 10-2724
are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome.” Gates, 623 F.3d at 413 (citing
United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396
(1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). According
to Stevens, the court improperly construed the facts
in favor of the defendant when it found that Stevens
“voluntarily” left HASB property after the Second and
Third Notices and thus suffered no damages from the
First Notice. She maintains that her departure was not
voluntary but was forced by the Second and Third
Notices, each of which demanded that she vacate the
property within thirty days. As Stevens notes, the
district court acknowledged this in a footnote:
The term “voluntary” is not being used to suggest
that Plaintiff wanted to leave, rather, that she was
not forced to leave by any court order or physical use
of force. Plaintiff continues to contend that her
move was not voluntary in the sense that she only
left because the notice informed her that she had to
move within 30 days.
Stevens v. Housing Auth. of South Bend, 720 F.Supp.2d 1013,
1020 n.4 (N.D. Ind. 2010). Stevens contends that because
her departure was involuntary, a live dispute remains
and the case is not moot.
The defendant, on the other hand, insists that Stevens
voluntarily vacated the apartment because she simply
decided to leave. Having voluntarily left, HASB
contends that her claims relating to the First Notice are
moot. The source of the confusion is apparent: Stevens’
departure was not voluntary in the colloquial sense of
No. 10-2724 13
the term. She did not wish to lose her apartment and
left only because she received the Second and Third
Notices. Each of those Notices indicated that she had
violated the lease in a manner different from and in
addition to the incident that led to the First Notice, and
each subsequent Notice directed her to vacate the
property within thirty days. In her own words, she
“didn’t volunteer to vacate,” but when told she had
thirty days to move, she decided not to fight those addi-
tional Notices and “just decided to move.” R. 62-3, at 48;
R. 62-4, at 10.
Whether she left voluntarily or was forced out by the
additional Notices is irrelevant, however, to the issue
of mootness. A case is moot when a plaintiff no longer
has a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. St. John’s
United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616,
626 (7th Cir. 2007). When a court’s decision can no
longer affect the rights of the litigants in the case before
it, the case becomes moot. St. John’s, 502 F.3d at 626;
Brown v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 442 F.3d 588,
596 (7th Cir. 2006). Stevens left for reasons other than
the First Notice, and her lawsuit is based entirely on
the consequences of the First Notice. Given that she
ultimately left her apartment for reasons unrelated
to the acts that form the basis of the lawsuit, the appro-
priate question is whether she retains a legally cog-
nizable interest in the outcome of the suit and whether
the court’s decision could affect her rights. She can no
longer be restored to the apartment because she has
decided not to contest two subsequent eviction Notices
based on reasons independent of the acts alleged in this
14 No. 10-2724
case. Injunctive relief is therefore no longer available to
her. St. John’s, 502 F.3d at 626-27. Declaratory relief
suffers from the same mootness problem because it
would have no impact on Stevens going forward. St.
Johns’s, 502 F.3d at 628.
Other evidence further confirms that injunctive relief
is unavailable to Stevens. In addition to Stevens’ eviction
for the reasons stated in the Second and Third Notices,
HASB discovered during the litigation that Stevens lied
on her application for the unit. In particular, Stevens
denied having previously resided in public housing, a
denial which allowed her to conceal that she still owed
money to HASB for the prior tenancy. Applicants for
public housing who owe money from prior tenancies
are not offered new housing until the balance has been
paid. Moreover, the falsification of the application was
itself a violation of federal law that could lead to
fines and imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Stevens
certified when signing her application that all of the
information given was true and correct, but admitted
in her deposition that she gave a false answer to the
question regarding prior residency in public housing.
R. 62-4, at 48; R. 62-3, at 23.7 Stevens also violated her
lease when she allowed her husband to stay at her home
7
Although Stevens also testified that she was told she needed
to answer certain questions for the three-year period prior to
the application, the application on its face contains no such
limitation and in fact asks if she “ever” lived in a unit
subsidized by a federal program, and whether she “ever” was
housed by a Housing Authority. R. 62-4, at 48.
No. 10-2724 15
for two to three weeks without obtaining prior written
approval from HASB. R. 62-5, at 14; R. 62-3, at 41.8 Thus,
Stevens was not eligible for the apartment in the first
instance, could have been evicted even in the absence
of the events leading to the First Notice, and eventually
acceded to the Second and Third Notices which were
issued for lease violations wholly separate from the
shooting.
If a plaintiff also seeks monetary damages, however,
the case is not moot even if the underlying misconduct
that caused the injury has ceased. Brown, 442 F.3d at 596.
We thus consider next whether Stevens suffered any
money damages as a result of the First Notice. Again,
by her own testimony, she did not suffer any out-of-
pocket losses as a result of the First Notice. R. 62-4, at 12.
After the First Notice, she did not leave the apartment
8
Stevens’ husband was on a home detention program that
required him to allocate a “home detention box” to a particular
residence. Stevens testified that, for a period of two to three
weeks, Broadnax allocated his home detention box to Stevens’
apartment. R. 62-3, at 40-42. Stevens conceded that during
the time the box was allocated to her address, Broadnax stayed
at her home. Although Stevens’ daughter, Ebony Harmon,
denied that Broadnax ever lived in her mother’s apartment,
she also admitted that she did not know how often Broadnax
stayed overnight at the apartment. R. 62-6, at 5-6. Given her
lack of personal knowledge of the facts, Harmon’s testimony
cannot create a genuine issue of fact in light of her mother’s
concession that Broadnax registered the home detention box
at her apartment and stayed there for two to three weeks.
16 No. 10-2724
and incurred no expenses related to that Notice. Nor
did she incur any losses when she moved after the
Third Notice (which, again, is not at issue in this lawsuit).
She moved into her mother’s home rent-free, and her
mother paid for the move.
Stevens also claims damages for emotional distress.
Although she asserts that some of her distress was
caused by her eventual move from the apartment, the
move was caused not by the First Notice, the sole subject
of this lawsuit, but rather by the Second and Third No-
tices. We may consider only the emotional distress
she suffered as a result of receiving the First Notice.
When the injured plaintiff’s testimony is the only
proof of emotional damages, she must explain the cir-
cumstances of her injury in reasonable detail; she may
not rely on conclusory statements. Denius v. Dunlap, 330
F.3d 919, 929 (7th Cir. 2003); Alston v. King, 231 F.3d
383, 388 (7th Cir. 2000). A plaintiff must provide evi-
dence of “demonstrable emotional distress,” and may not
simply point to circumstances of the alleged constitu-
tional violation which might support an inference of
emotional injury. Alston, 231 F.3d at 388. But “an
injured person’s testimony may, by itself or in conjunc-
tion with the circumstances of a given case, be suf-
ficient to establish emotional distress without more.”
Alston, 231 F.3d at 388.
[I]n determining whether the evidence of emotional
distress is sufficient to support an award of damages,
we must look at both the direct evidence of emotional
distress and the circumstances of the act that
No. 10-2724 17
allegedly caused that distress. . . . The more
inherently degrading or humiliating the defendant’s
action is, the more reasonable it is to infer that a
person would suffer humiliation or distress from that
action; consequently, somewhat more conclusory
evidence of emotional distress will be acceptable to
support an award for emotional distress.
United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 932 (7th Cir. 1992).
Stevens concedes that she never sought the care of a
doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist, health care provider,
clergy member, or anyone else to help her cope with her
emotional distress. R. 62-4, at 3. She also confirmed that
she suffered no physical symptoms caused by her emo-
tional distress. R. 62-4, at 4. When asked to describe her
damages from HASB’s actions, she replied:
It was Christmas day, my—we didn’t even get to
enjoy Christmas [and] then you want to put me out
of my home with my kids, nowhere to go, it’s winter-
time for a shooting that you never arrested no one
for, no one ever got arrested for, went to jail for
that shooting or got evicted. Nobody—the guy never—
I mean, I never seen anybody shoot somebody five
times and not even go to jail, turn himself in and
never go to jail and you want to put me out like that.
R. 62-4, at 2. She further explained that her damages
related to receiving the First Notice around Christmas
time, shortly after suffering the trauma of the shooting
itself, and being blamed for something she did not do
and had no control over. R. 62-4, at 3-4. She expressed
outrage that, although the shooter was never charged
18 No. 10-2724
or convicted, she was subjected to an eviction notice.
She described the combination of events as “stressful,”
and as something she would never forget Id.
As Stevens acknowledged, the shooting itself was a
traumatic event that contributed to her emotional dis-
tress. Receiving an eviction notice holding her re-
sponsible for the actions of others no doubt added to her
distress. But when we consider the nature of HASB’s
action and whether it is “inherently degrading or humili-
ating” to send an eviction notice under these circum-
stances, we must conclude that Stevens has failed in
her burden. An eviction notice is likely to cause anyone
great distress but that distress is not compensable when
the notice has been lawfully issued.
Although Stevens expresses great outrage at being held
responsible for the actions of Henderson, a person who
was not her guest and who she repeatedly asserts she
could not control, she misunderstands the meaning
of both “guest” and “control” in these circumstances.
Federal statutes and regulations require that all public
housing authorities include in their leases the provision
that applied to Stevens here. In particular, the lease
must provide that “the tenant shall be obligated:”
(12)(i) To assure that no tenant, member of the
tenant’s household, or guest engages in: (A) Any
criminal activity that threatens the health, safety or
right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other
residents; or (B) Any drug-related criminal activity
on or off the premises;
(ii) To assure that no other person under the tenant’s
control engages in: (A) Any criminal activity that
No. 10-2724 19
threatens the health, safety or right to peaceful enjoy-
ment of the premises by other residents; or (B) Any
drug-related criminal activity on the premises;
24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6). Stevens
does not dispute that Henderson was a “guest” because
she concedes that her son, Alfernando, who was a House-
hold Member, invited him onto the premises. 9 “Control”
means only that the tenant has permitted access to the
premises. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 131. See also 24 C.F.R. § 5.100
(“Other person under the tenant’s control, for the
purposes of the definition of covered person and for parts
5, 882, 966, and 982 means that the person . . . is, or was
at the time of the activity in question, on the premises . . .
because of an invitation from the tenant or other
member of the household who has express or implied
authority to so consent on behalf of the tenant.”). The
Supreme Court noted that such “no fault” evictions are
a common practice in landlord-tenant law. Regardless
of knowledge, a tenant who cannot control criminal
activities by guests which threaten the safety of other
residents is herself a threat to the other residents. Rucker,
535 U.S. at 134. Moreover, the Court found that the
9
Stevens attempts to distinguish her case from Rucker by
asserting that “outside parties” who were not residents and
not under her control engaged in criminal activity. Again, this
misunderstands the meaning of “control.” Because it is undis-
puted that Alfernando, a Household Member who had express
or implied authority to consent to Henderson’s presence on
the premises, invited Henderson to the apartment complex
that day, the control element is met.
20 No. 10-2724
statute allowing a no-fault eviction of a tenant who
did not know that a household member or guest was
engaged in drug activity or dangerous criminal activity
posed no due process problem. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 135.
The Court noted that the government was not acting as
a sovereign in that circumstance but rather was acting as
a landlord of property that it owns, and invoking a
clause in a lease to which the tenant had agreed and
Congress had expressly required. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 135.
The Court acknowledged that the tenant may have had
a property interest in the leasehold interest requiring
due process before a deprivation of that interest, but
state laws provided for notice and procedures to be
followed. Id.
Such is the case here as well. Henderson was a guest
of Alfernando, a Household Member. Although Stevens
could not control Henderson in a literal sense, he was
permitted on the premises by a Household Member, and
that is all that is required for control. Stevens received
formal notice of the lease violation, and HASB initiated
an action in state court to accomplish the eviction.
Stevens does not claim that the state court action
provided inadequate protections for due process pur-
poses. The First Notice was therefore lawfully issued, and
Stevens has no claim for emotional distress caused by a
wholly lawful action. Because there is no relief that the
court could grant her following her departure from the
apartment for other reasons, her claims based on the
First Notice are moot.
No. 10-2724 21
C.
Stevens next disputes the district court’s ruling in
favor of HASB on her claim of segregated housing. In her
complaint, Stevens alleges that the defendants and their
predecessors located her public housing complex in an
area of South Bend that is inhabited primarily by African-
American persons. She asserts that the location of the
property segregated her and her sons because of race, in
violation of Section 3604(b) of the Fair Housing Act.
Stevens’ evidence in support of this claim consists solely
of her personal observation that the residents of the
apartment complex were primarily African-American. It
is undisputed that the public housing complex in
which Stevens lived was constructed in 1961, and so the
site was selected approximately forty-seven years
before Stevens brought her claim. The district court
found that the claim was untimely and also unsup-
ported by relevant evidence. The court also found that
the claim failed as a matter of law because actions
under Section 3604(b) of the Fair Housing Act must
concern access to housing and not post-acquisition
claims of discrimination. Stevens contends that her
claim is timely because it is based on a continuing viola-
tion, and that her own testimony that HASB housing was
segregated was sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Section 3604(b) provides that it shall be unlawful to
“discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions,
or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the
provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
22 No. 10-2724
national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). We noted in
Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn
Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004), that the Fair
Housing Act is aimed generally at access to housing and
does not address post-acquisition discrimination. We
later noted that Section 3604(b) applies to discrimina-
tion linked to any terms, conditions, or privileges that
accompanied or were related to a plaintiff’s acquisition
of her property. Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 780
(7th Cir. 2009). In Bloch, the plaintiffs were required to
agree to certain discriminatory building rules in order to
acquire their condominium unit, and we found that was
sufficient to bring their claim regarding the application
of those rules within the purview of Section 3604(b).
Stevens did not contest the district court’s conclusion
that Section 3604(b) did not apply here because Stevens
was granted access to housing, and the defendants urge
us to affirm on the ground that Stevens did not
dispute this particular part of the ruling. Although
Section 3604(b) seems to be a poor fit for Stevens’ claim
relating to HASB’s site selection, the claim fails for a far
more simple reason: lack of evidence.
In support of her claim that the apartment complex
housed primarily African-American tenants, Stevens
cites three pages of her deposition testimony without
identifying the portion of the record containing those
pages. Our search of the record reveals that only one of the
cited pages appears in the record on appeal. R. 62-4, at 15.
On that page, Stevens states nothing more than that her
unspecified observations were limited to South Bend
No. 10-2724 23
Housing Authority units, and that she had no knowledge
regarding the neighborhood outside of her HASB resi-
dence. She does not reference segregation on that page,
and says nothing about the racial make-up of the apart-
ment complex or the neighborhood. Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 28(a)(7) requires the appellant to
submit “a statement of facts relevant to the issues sub-
mitted for review with appropriate references to the
record.” Rule 28(a)(9)(A) requires that the argument
section of the appellant’s brief contain “appellant’s con-
tentions and the reasons for them, with citations to
the authorities and parts of the record on which the
appellant relies.” We need not credit Stevens’ version of
the facts when the materials supporting those asserted
facts are not part of the record. Stevens failed to cite
any evidence in the record that HASB engaged in any
discrimination in the selection of the apartment site
some forty-seven years before Stevens moved in. There
is no evidence in the record regarding the racial make-up
of the area at the time the complex was built, and no
demographic evidence regarding the area outside of the
complex at any time. At most, Stevens presents con-
clusory allegations unsupported by the record that the
apartment complex currently houses mostly African-
American tenants. Those conclusory allegations are
insufficient to meet Stevens’ burden on summary judg-
ment, and the court was correct to grant judgment in
favor of the defendants on that claim.
24 No. 10-2724
D.
Stevens’ remaining issues merely restate arguments
she made in other contexts. Her main complaint is that
issues of fact remained on whether other violations of
her lease justified HASB’s eviction decision on other
grounds. She contends, for example, that a HASB em-
ployee told her she was required to provide information
regarding criminal convictions only for the three years
prior to the application. She argues that this evidence
goes to the issue of her honesty in filling out the applica-
tion. But she also falsely denied on her application that
she had “ever” previously lived in public housing. In
fact, she still owed money to HASB for her prior tenancy,
and would not have been allowed to move in without
paying that prior debt.
Stevens also maintains that whether Broadnax lived
at the apartment was a genuine issue of material
fact because Ebony Harmon testified that Broadnax did
not live there and had stayed overnight only a few times.
But Harmon did not live at the apartment and did not
have personal knowledge of what happened there
every day. Stevens herself conceded that Broadnax regis-
tered his home monitoring device at her address for two
to three weeks and stayed there during that time, a clear
violation of the terms of her lease. Finally, Stevens denies
that she ever used drugs at her apartment, but does not
dispute that the police found two marijuana blunt
roaches on her countertop when they were called
there for a domestic dispute involving Broadnax. The
presence of illegal drugs in her apartment also violated
No. 10-2724 25
the lease, and provided further justification for the later
eviction notices. In sum, the district court correctly
granted judgment in favor of the defendants on all of
Stevens’ claims.
A FFIRMED.
12-1-11