United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
__________________________
IN RE LINK_A_MEDIA DEVICES CORP.,
Petitioner.
__________________________
Miscellaneous Docket No. 990
__________________________
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware in case
no. 10-CV-00869, Judge Sue L. Robinson.
__________________________
ON PETITION
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DEANNE E. MAYNARD, Morrison & Foerster LLP, of
Washington, DC, for petitioner. With her on the petition
were BRIAN R. MATSUI and ADAM A. ELTOUKHY.; and
HAROLD J. MCELHINNY and MARK W. DANIS, of San Fran-
cisco, California.
INDRANIL MUKERJI, Fish & Richardson PC, of Wash-
ington, DC, for respondent. With him on the response
were RUFFIN B. CORDELL and WILLIAM SEKYI; THOMAS L.
HALKOWSKI, of Wilmington, Delaware; DAVID BARKAN, of
Redwood City, California; and JOHN DRAGSETH, of Min-
neapolis, Minnesota.
__________________________
IN RE LINK_A_MEDIA 2
Before RADER, Chief Judge, DYK and O’MALLEY,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
ORDER
Link_A_Media Devices Corp. (LAMD) seeks a writ of
mandamus directing the United States District Court for
the District of Delaware to vacate its order denying
LAMD’s motion to transfer venue, and to direct the Dela-
ware district court to transfer the case to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia. Marvell International Ltd. (Marvell) opposes. LAMD
replies. Because the district court abused its discretion in
denying LAMD’s motion to transfer venue under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a), this court grants LAMD’s petition for a
writ of mandamus.
I.
The petition for writ of mandamus arises out of a suit
brought by Bermuda-based Marvell charging LAMD with
patent infringement. LAMD is incorporated under the
laws of the state of Delaware where this suit was brought
in federal district court.
LAMD moved to transfer the case to the Northern
District of California, where it maintains its principal
place of business, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). That
section authorizes a district court of proper jurisdiction to
nonetheless transfer a case “[f]or the convenience of the
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.”
In its motion, LAMD stated that “Delaware had no
discernable connection to this case beyond it being
LAMD’s state of incorporation.” Petitioner’s Appendix
Materials at 15-16. LAMD further stated that Marvell is
3 IN RE LINK_A_MEDIA
a holding company, and that a related entity, which is
headquartered in the Northern District of California,
employs the inventors of the patents-in-suits and pre-
sumably houses all of Marvell’s relevant documents to
this matter. Id.
Nearly all of LAMD’s 130 employees work in its head-
quarters in the Northern District of California, and none
work in Delaware. LAMD therefore argued that it would
be more convenient for the witnesses and the parties to
try this case in the Northern District of California. In
addition, LAMD asserted that the district court failed to
apply some of the factors relevant to a venue considera-
tion.
Marvell responded that its choice of forum should be
entitled to substantial deference because it selected
Delaware for the legitimate reason that “LAMD is incor-
porated in Delaware and, thus, cannot claim surprise at
being brought into the Delaware courts for litigation.” Id.
at 121. Marvell added that “LAMD is a global company”
as opposed to a regional enterprise, and should be ex-
pected to defend itself where those products are sold and
has the resources to do so. Id. at 127.
Agreeing with Marvell, the Delaware district court
denied LAMD’s motion to transfer. LAMD then filed this
petition for a writ of mandamus.
II.
The remedy of mandamus is available only in ex-
traordinary situations to correct a clear abuse of discre-
tion or usurpation of judicial power. In re Calmar, Inc.,
854 F.2d 461, 464 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In reviewing a district
court’s ruling on a motion to transfer pursuant to
§ 1404(a), we apply the law of the regional circuit, in this
IN RE LINK_A_MEDIA 4
case the Third Circuit. See Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco
Sys., Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 836 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
The Third Circuit has held that mandamus may be
used to correct an improper transfer order if the peti-
tioner can establish a “clear and indisputable” right to the
writ. See Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, Denton & Assocs., Inc., 5
F.3d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 1993). That standard is an exacting
one, requiring the petitioner to establish that the district
court’s decision amounted to a failure to meaningfully
consider the merits of the transfer motion. See Swindell-
Dressler Corp. v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir.
1962). We find that this standard is satisfied here.
The Third Circuit has identified various private and
public interest factors to be considered in a § 1404 trans-
fer analysis. Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873,
879 (3d Cir. 1995). In this case, the district court failed to
balance those factors fairly and instead elevated two
considerations to overriding importance. With respect to
private interests, the district court’s fundamental error
was making Marvell’s choice of forum and the fact of
LAMD’s incorporation in Delaware effectively dispositive
of the transfer inquiry. See Minstar, Inc. v. Laborde, 626
F. Supp. 142, 146 (D. Del. 1985) (“[T]he mere fact that
Delaware is the plaintiffs’ choice of forum and . . . the
defendants’ state of incorporation will not, standing alone,
prevent this Court from transferring this suit to another
forum.” (quoting Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 365, 369 (D. Del.
1971)).
First, the district court placed far too much weight on
the plaintiff’s choice of forum. To be sure, the Third
Circuit places significance on a plaintiff’s choice of forum.
When a plaintiff brings its charges in a venue that is not
its home forum, however, that choice of forum is entitled
to less deference. See generally Sinochem Int’l Co. v.
5 IN RE LINK_A_MEDIA
Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007)
(stating that when a plaintiff files a suit outside of its
home forum, the presumption that its choice of forum is
convenient and appropriate applies with “less force”); see
also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981)
(stating that when a plaintiff is foreign, the presumption
of favor for its choice of forum is “much less reasonable”).
Many district courts in the Third Circuit have recog-
nized this distinction. See, e.g., High River Ltd. P’ship v.
Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 487, 498-99 (M.D. Pa.
2005) (“[T]he plaintiff’s choice is ‘entitled to less weight
where the plaintiff chooses a forum which is neither his
home nor the situs of the occurrence upon which the suit
is based.’” (quoting Reed v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 166 F.
Supp. 2d 1052, 1057 (E.D. Pa. 2001)); Tischio v. Bontex,
Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 511, 521 (D.N.J. 1998) (explaining
that a plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to less weight
“where the plaintiff has not chosen his or her home fo-
rum” and “where the choice of forum by a plaintiff has
little connection with the operative facts of the lawsuit”);
Pennwalt Corp. v. Purex Indus., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 287,
289 (D. Del. 1986) (“A defendant's burden with respect to
plaintiff's choice of forum is easier to meet where the
plaintiff has not brought suit on its ‘home turf.’”).
The court’s heavy reliance on the fact that LAMD was
incorporated in Delaware was similarly inappropriate.
See Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518,
527-28 (1947) (explaining that the “[p]lace of corporate
domicile in such circumstances might be entitled to little
consideration under the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
which resists formalization and looks to the realities that
make for doing justice.”). Neither § 1404 nor Jumara list
a party’s state of incorporation as a factor for a venue
inquiry. It is certainly not a dispositive fact in the venue
transfer analysis, as the district court in this case seemed
to believe.
IN RE LINK_A_MEDIA 6
The district court also refused to consider two of the
private interest factors in a Third Circuit venue inquiry:
the convenience of the witnesses and the location of the
books and records. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Rather than
analyze the merits of the parties’ arguments relating to
these factors, the district court stated that these issues
are “outdated, irrelevant, and should be given little
weight, if any, except for those rare exceptions where
truly regional defendants are litigating.” Marvell Int’l
Ltd. v. Link_A_Media Devices Corp., Case No. 10-cv-869,
2011 WL 2293999, *2 (D. Del. June 8, 2011). While
advances in technology may alter the weight given to
these factors, it is improper to ignore them entirely.
The district court also erred when it found that con-
sideration of the public interest factors did not favor
either forum. Jumara lists six public interest factors: (i)
the enforceability of the judgment, (ii) practical considera-
tions that could make the trial easy, expeditious, or
inexpensive, (iii) court congestion, (iv) the local interest in
deciding local controversies at home, (v) the public poli-
cies of the fora, and (vi) the familiarity of the trial judge
with the applicable state law in diversity cases. 55 F.3d
at 879-80.
When reviewing the public interest factors, the dis-
trict court, again, noted LAMD’s incorporation in Dela-
ware. The defendant’s state of incorporation, however,
should not be dispositive of the public interest analysis.
Aside from LAMD’s incorporation in Delaware, that
forum has no ties to the dispute or to either party. LAMD
is headquartered in the Northern District of California,
where its relevant witnesses and evidence are located.
Marvell is a holding company that is incorporated in
Bermuda and has its principal place of business there.
The named inventors of the patents-in-suit, moreover, are
employed by a Marvell affiliate, Marvell Semiconductor,
7 IN RE LINK_A_MEDIA
Inc., which is headquartered in Santa Clara, California,
only three miles from LAMD.
Finally, Marvell argues to this court that the case
should remain in Delaware because “the District of Dela-
ware’s judges are highly experienced in patent infringe-
ment litigation.” Answer to Petition for Writ of
Mandamus 19. It appears that Marvell is confusing the
public interest factor relating to a trial court’s familiarity
with “applicable state law,” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879-80,
which is not relevant here. Marvell’s claims arise under
the federal patent laws, for which there is uniformity
nationwide, and which the Northern District of California
is equally equipped to address.
We have, by comparison, considered a district court’s
concurrent litigation involving the same patent to be a
relevant consideration, if the court’s experience was not
tenuous and the cases were co-pending. In re Verizon
Bus. Network Servs. Inc., 635 F.3d 559, 562 (Fed. Cir.
2011); In re Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342, 1346-47 (Fed.
Cir. 2010). Here, the asserted experience is with patent
cases generally and not with the patents at issue. There
is no evidence, moreover, that the District of Delaware’s
acknowledged experience in this area translates to speed-
ier resolution of patent cases than occurs in the Northern
District of California.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
The petition for a writ of mandamus is granted. The
United States District Court for the District of Delaware
is directed to vacate its order denying petitioner’s motion
to transfer venue, and to direct transfer to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia.
IN RE LINK_A_MEDIA 8
FOR THE COURT
December 2, 2011 /s/ Jan Horbaly
Date Jan Horbaly
Clerk