PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
PULCHERIE TEKEU DJADJOU, a/k/a
Pulcherie Djadjou,
Petitioner,
v. No. 10-1889
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Argued: September 22, 2011
Decided: December 5, 2011
Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the
majority opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson concurred. Judge
Wynn wrote a dissenting opinion.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Lawrence David Rosenberg, JONES DAY,
Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Keith Ian McManus,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washing-
ton, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Danielle Beach-
2 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
Oswald, BEACH-OSWALD IMMIGRATION LAW ASSO-
CIATES, PC, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Tony West,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Joseph A.
O’Connell, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,
for Respondent.
OPINION
FLOYD, Circuit Judge:
Pulcherie Tekeu Djadjou, a native and citizen of Cameroon,
applied for asylum and withholding of removal under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and protection under
the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). The
Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all forms of relief, and the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Djadjou now
petitions this court for review of the BIA’s decision. Her peti-
tion asserts that the agency erred in making an adverse credi-
bility determination and, even if it did not so err, independent
evidence exists to establish past persecution. We uphold the
adverse credibility determination as supported by substantial
evidence and agree with the agency that Djadjou failed to pro-
vide sufficient independent evidence establishing past perse-
cution. Accordingly, we deny the petition.
I.
A.
Djadjou obtained a nonimmigrant visa and was admitted
into the United States on March 12, 2002. Her authorization
to stay in the United States expired two days later on March
14, 2002. She overstayed her authorization without permis-
sion. Not quite a year later, on February 18, 2003, she applied
for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 3
protection under the CAT. After the Department of Homeland
Security served her with a Notice to Appear, Djadjou con-
ceded removability at her initial hearing, but again requested
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
CAT.
The IJ conducted a merits hearing that spanned the course
of two days in August and September 2008. At the hearing,
Djadjou testified and offered one witness to testify on her
behalf. At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ rendered an
oral decision denying all forms of relief and ordered her vol-
untary departure. The BIA affirmed the IJ. Before explaining
the bases for their decisions, we will recount the contents of
Djadjou’s testimony and her corroborating evidence.
B.
Djadjou testified that she fled Cameroon because her life
was in danger. This danger, she maintained, arose from the
persecution that she suffered at the hands of Cameroonian
officials. According to her testimony and application, Camer-
oonian officials arrested her four times and beat and raped her
during her detainments. Her persecution, she insisted, resulted
from her political activities with opposition organizations.
What follows is Djadjou’s version of events as reflected in her
application and testimony.
Djadjou became involved in politics in Cameroon in 1991.
At the time, she was a student at a university. While involved
with a campus opposition group called the "Group of Less,"
she rose to the rank of action coordinator, which entailed
organizing strikes and marches. In response to her political
activities, the Cameroonian government blacklisted her from
obtaining employment. This blacklisting ultimately caused
her to open her own store in the Mokolo market in Yaounde,
where she sold shoes, bags, jewelry, and clothes. She
employed one salesperson at her store.
4 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
As a businesswoman, Djadjou traveled to different coun-
tries to buy goods. She traveled to the Gabon Republic five
times between 1990 and 1998, and traveled to Syria on at
least two occasions. Her passport admitted into evidence,
which was issued in 1997, reflected that she went to the
Gabon Republic in 1999. Each time she returned to Camer-
oon.
On May 27, 1991, like many of her fellow members in the
Group of Less, she joined and became involved in the Social
Democratic Front (SDF), an opposition party in Cameroon.
She became secretary general of the young adults for the
Mokolo, Komkana, Madagascar, and Carriere wards of the
SDF in 1992. In that capacity, she was responsible for, among
other things, notifying members about meetings and writing
reports for the party. She remained a member of the SDF until
1996, when she changed political parties.
The SDF held its first meeting in Yaounde in May 1992.
Sellers in the Mokolo market played a role in organizing the
meeting. The SDF demanded that the government form a
"National Sovereign Conference" to address the social, politi-
cal, and cultural problems plaguing Cameroon. In response,
the local police broke all of the counters of the Mokolo mar-
ket sellers. When the SDF members resisted the local police
by throwing rocks and building barricades, the police arrested
them for public disturbance.
It was in this context that police officers first arrested Djad-
jou on May 18, 1992, during a protest march at the Mokolo
market. She had helped mobilize the march and distribute fly-
ers. After her arrest, the officers took her to the police station
where they beat her on her legs and feet while insulting and
threatening her. That night, an officer raped her in an interro-
gation room. Over the course of the next three days, she suf-
fered further beatings. On May 21, 1992, her uncle obtained
her release after speaking with the police commissioner.
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 5
Djadjou joined the Southern Cameroons National Council
(SCNC), another opposition organization, on January 1, 1997.
She rose in prominence within the organization and was
elected secretary general that same year. Her activities as sec-
retary general again involved providing information about
meetings, printing flyers, and writing reports.
Her second arrest occurred on June 1, 1997, as a result of
her position as secretary general of the SCNC. In April or
May 1997, the government proclaimed, falsely, that the
SCNC had attacked and vandalized government buildings. In
response, officers arrested Djadjou at her store in Yaounde
and detained her for a week. Because of her position in the
SCNC, they thought she or her associates might have been
responsible. Throughout the week, her detainers beat and
insulted her. Her uncle again intervened to secure her release,
showing the police commissioner invoices demonstrating that
she was elsewhere at the time of the alleged attacks and van-
dalism.
Officials arrested Djadjou a third time on July 10, 2000,
again because of her perceived role as a leader in the SCNC.
That previous December, a radio station incorrectly
announced that certain provinces had declared their indepen-
dence as the Federal Republic of Southern Cameroon,
prompting the government to investigate and round up the
leaders of the SCNC, including Djadjou. Pursuant to a police
summons, officials arrested Djadjou in Bassamba, where she
had fled after hearing that officers were arresting SCNC
members in Yaounde. The officers took her to Bangangte and
detained her for three days. During that time, her detainers
denied her food, beat her, and tortured her. The officers also
shut down her store while she was in detainment. Her uncle,
along with twenty other family members, convened on the
police station and demanded her release. The commandant of
the station relented and released her.
Djadjou’s fourth and final arrest came on December 15,
2001. This arrest occurred at the market in Yaounde. She was
6 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
conferring with a fellow SCNC sympathizer about organizing
a meeting when an official approached and began accusing
her of sanitation violations at her store. The official ordered
an officer to break down her counter and seize her merchan-
dise. When she resisted, they arrested her. On the way to the
police station, a car door was closed on her leg, cutting it
badly. At the police station, two officers held her down and
beat her. They placed her in a cell full of water and urine with
six other detainees. Her detention lasted for four days, during
which her detainers denied her health care, water, and food.
After she lost consciousness and collapsed on the fifth day,
they took her to the hospital. When the officer guarding her
room at the hospital went to get a drink, she, with the help of
her uncle, escaped through a back door.
Following Djadjou’s escape from the hospital, her uncle
drove her to Douala Bonaberi, where she hid at her older sis-
ter’s house until it was safe for her to depart Cameroon.
Because she was accustomed to traveling, she had her pass-
port with her. To help her escape Cameroon, she obtained a
visa from the United States Embassy under the guise of
attending the 49th World Congress Association of Women
Entrepreneurs, which was being held in Mexico from January
25, 2002, to January 31, 2002. Yet, when she went to the air-
port on January 25, she observed police officers looking for
her. Frightened, she abandoned her plans and returned to hid-
ing at her sister’s house.
Her sister made arrangements for her to leave Cameroon in
March 2002. This attempt was successful. She departed on
March 11, 2002, and arrived in the United States the follow-
ing day. Since her arrival in the United States, Cameroonian
officials have continued looking for her. In October 2007,
they destroyed her business in her absence.
C.
Djadjou offered testimonial and documentary evidence to
corroborate her testimony and application.
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 7
She admitted documentation from the SDF to support her
testimony as to the persecution she suffered from her activi-
ties in that organization. She offered an SDF membership
card. Also, she provided two letters from the SDF. One letter
indicated Djadjou was a member of the SDF from 1991 to
1996, stated that she was the ex-secretary of propaganda in
charge of youth affairs, and noted that government officials
were looking for her. The other letter stated that she has been
an active member of the SDF since 1991 and was the victim
of "great tortures."
Likewise, she submitted SCNC membership cards and an
affidavit from the Chairman of the Southern Cameroons
National Council in the United States of America (SCNC-
USA), Derrick Njoh, to corroborate her testimony about her
role in the SCNC in Cameroon and the persecution that she
suffered as a result. Njoh attested that SCNC records in Cam-
eroon confirmed Djadjou’s membership since 1997, her
instrumental role in handing out flyers, tracts, and similar
items, and her participation in demonstrations. As a result, he
stated, she was arrested and detained in 2000, and her hus-
band was arrested and tortured in 1997. He obtained this
information, he maintained, through telephone conversations
with an SCNC official in Cameroon.
One witness, Howard Njeck, the Vice Chairman of the
SCNC-USA, testified on her behalf. He stated that he has
known Djadjou since 2004 when he met her at SCNC-USA
meetings in the United States. He recounted that, at those
meetings, Djadjou discussed her prior arrests in Cameroon.
Njeck also described the efforts taken by Njoh in verifying the
information in his affidavit. He affirmed that Njoh called the
SCNC official in Cameroon and that the official, although not
having personal knowledge of Djadjou, checked the records
of the SCNC. Njeck reiterated that the Cameroonian official
told Njoh that Djadjou was arrested in 2000 and her husband
was arrested in 1997. Aside from explaining how Njoh
obtained the information, Njeck further asserted that he
8 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
undertook his own independent verification of the information
by calling his friend who is active in the SCNC in Yaounde.
According to Njeck, his friend checked the SCNC’s records
in Cameroon and confirmed that Djadjou was active in the
organization. Although Njeck knew that the SCNC kept a
leadership listing, he was unaware of her holding the position
of secretary general. Finally, Njeck affirmed that Djadjou was
an active member of the SCNC-USA and regularly attended
its meetings in the United States.
Djadjou also presented letters and affidavits from family
and friends to corroborate her claims. Her uncle submitted an
affidavit supporting her testimony regarding the four arrests,
her escape from the hospital, and the government officials
destroying her shop after she departed Cameroon. Her sister
provided an affidavit stating that Djadjou hid at her house
after her fourth arrest and that she arranged for Djadjou’s
departure from Cameroon. Finally, Djadjou submitted an affi-
davit from a friend who attested to her second and fourth
arrests.
Djadjou further provided police documents from Camer-
oon. One was a "convocation" issued on July 9, 2000, that
summoned her to appear at the police station in Bangangte on
July 10, 2000. The other was a telegram dated January 2,
2002, stating that Djadjou was fleeing to Bonaberi and
requesting that she be stopped for an illegal political meeting.
Djadjou submitted an eviction notice for her business dated
March 11, 2002. In the eviction notice, a Cameroonian clerk
of court ordered that Djadjou vacate the premises within
seventy-two hours. Notably, the eviction notice included the
following handwritten notation: "Mrs. DJADJOU Pulcherie
residing in Yaounde, and her residence or place of work
where she was and talking to: (her being present on the prem-
ises receives the copy and refuses to sign)." The clerk of court
served the eviction notice at Djadjou’s business.
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 9
Finally, Djadjou offered four other pieces of evidence. She
provided photographs of destroyed property. Presumably
these photographs depicted Djadjou’s destroyed store. She
also admitted reports from Amnesty International and the
United States Department of State, and an affidavit from Jus-
tice Aloysius, a leader in the Southern Cameroons National
Council North America (SCNC/NA). The reports and Justice
Aloysius discussed the persecution of SCNC leaders and
members in Cameroon. Justice Aloysius also added that Djad-
jou was a member of the SCNC/NA.
D.
The IJ determined that Djadjou failed to prove past perse-
cution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. In doing
so, she made an adverse credibility finding as to Djadjou, but
she found Njeck’s testimony credible insofar as he testified
consistently with Njoh’s SCNC-USA affidavit. She proceeded
to provide specific reasons for rejecting each piece of Djad-
jou’s corroborating evidence. She noted various inconsisten-
cies between, or omissions in, Djadjou’s testimony and
corroborating evidence, and explained why she found each
piece of evidence deficient:
• Djadjou testified to being secretary general of the
SCNC, yet none of her corroborating evidence
mentioned her holding that position, including
Njoh’s affidavit from the SCNC-USA, and Njeck
testified that he had no knowledge of her holding
the position. Also, Djadjou’s own application
statement did not mention her leadership posi-
tion.
• Djadjou testified she was arrested four times, but
Njeck and Njoh attested to her being arrested in
2000 and did not verify the other arrests.
Although the SCNC might have been unaware of
her 1992 arrest because she was associated with
10 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
the SDF at the time, they nevertheless did not
mention her other two arrests. The IJ determined
that Djadjou offered no satisfactory reason for the
omission.
• Njeck’s and Njoh’s statements were based on
what Cameroonian SCNC officials told them that
records in Cameroon reflected, but Djadjou did
not submit those records. The IJ determined this
to be a "significant omission" and noted no other
records corroborated their statements.
• One of Djadjou’s SCNC membership cards mis-
spelled the name of the organization by leaving
the "s" off "Cameroons." The IJ found her expla-
nation of a printing error unconvincing.
• One SDF letter stated she "is an active member,"
but Djadjou testified that she ended her member-
ship in 1996. The IJ did not accept Djadjou’s
explanation that the SDF letter embodied a gram-
matical error.
• One SDF letter stated she was a member and did
not mention her leadership position with the
SDF, but another SDF letter asserted that she was
an ex-secretary of propaganda in charge of youth
affairs. Also, one SDF letter referred to her gen-
erally being the victim of torture, but the other
did not. Neither letter mentioned the 1992 arrest
to which she testified. The IJ further noted there
was no source for the information in either letter.
• Djadjou testified that she was in hiding at her sis-
ter’s house from December 2001 until she
departed for the United States, but her eviction
notice indicated that she was personally served
with the notice by a government official in a pub-
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 11
lic location on March 11, 2002. (The BIA
observed she was at her store when served.) The
IJ refused to credit the explanation that the evic-
tion notice referred to her salesperson, not Djad-
jou.
• Djadjou left Cameroon after her 1992 and 1997
arrests, but voluntarily returned, as evidenced by
her passport and testimony. The IJ refused to
credit her explanation that she wanted to continue
the fight and found that her voluntary return
undermined her credibility about her arrests and
persecution.
• The government permitted Djadjou’s business to
continue to operate, even years after she departed
Cameroon, despite her being an opposition activ-
ist.
• The police convocation and police telegram were
not authenticated, and Djadjou did not establish
a chain of custody for them.
• The letters from family and friends were not
objective evidence.
• No objective corroborating evidence established
that the photographs actually depicted Djadjou’s
destroyed business.
As a result, the IJ did not credit that Djadjou was an SDF
member or arrested in 1992 as she claimed. She found that
Djadjou may have belonged to the SCNC, but she did not
credit that she was arrested in 1997, 2000, and 2001 because
of her activities with the SCNC. She found that no persuasive
objective evidence established that Djadjou was arrested
because of her political activities and determined that she did
not flee Cameroon in fear for her life. Thus, the IJ held that
12 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
Djadjou did not establish past persecution or a well-founded
fear of future persecution, and concluded that Djadjou did not
satisfy the requirements for asylum and withholding of
removal under the INA or protection under the CAT.
Following Djadjou’s appeal of the IJ’s order, the BIA
issued its decision on July 9, 2010. In discussing the IJ’s
adverse credibility determination, the BIA stated, "As noted
by the Immigration Judge, the respondent provided conflict-
ing statements and material omissions regarding the alleged
mistreatment in Cameroon," and cited to the IJ’s analysis. It
then stated, "For example," and reiterated some of the reasons
provided by the IJ for making an adverse credibility determi-
nation. The BIA also agreed with the IJ that Djadjou failed to
offer reasonably available objective evidence to support her
claim. It noted a few additional inconsistencies and deficien-
cies in Djadjou’s evidence:
• One SDF letter that Djadjou submitted stated she
was a member from 1991 until 1996, but the
other letter indicated she was still an active mem-
ber.
• Njeck had no firsthand knowledge of Djadjou’s
mistreatment.
• Djadjou failed to offer reliable evidence from the
SDF or SCNC to corroborate her claims.
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision that Djadjou failed to
prove past persecution or a well-founded fear of future perse-
cution to qualify for asylum. It also agreed that she did not
establish eligibility for withholding of removal or protection
under the CAT. Thus, the BIA dismissed Djadjou’s appeal.
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 13
II.
A.
We begin with an overview of the relief that Djadjou seeks.
As noted, she asserts she is eligible for three forms of relief:
asylum and withholding of removal, both under the INA, and
protection under the CAT.
The INA vests in the Attorney General the discretionary
power "to grant asylum to aliens who qualify as ‘refugees.’"
Dankam v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 113, 115 (4th Cir. 2007). A
refugee is "someone ‘who is unable or unwilling to return to’
his native country ‘because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of . . . political opinion’ or
other protected grounds." Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). Asylum applicants carry the burden of
proving that they satisfy the definition of a refugee to qualify
for discretionary relief. Id. They may satisfy this burden by
"showing either that [they were] subjected to past persecution
or that [they have] a ‘well-founded’ fear of future persecution
‘on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.’" Marynenka v.
Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 600 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(1)). A rebuttable presumption of a well-founded
fear of persecution arises when an applicant establishes past
persecution. Id.
Aliens face a heightened burden of proof "to qualify for
withholding of removal to a particular country under the
INA." Dankam, 495 F.3d at 115. They must show a "‘clear
probability of persecution’ on account of a protected ground."
Id. (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984)). If they
meet this heightened burden, withholding of removal is man-
datory. Id. But because the standard for withholding of
removal is higher than the standard for asylum, if applicants
cannot demonstrate asylum eligibility, their applications for
14 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
withholding of removal will necessarily fail as well.
Marynenka, 592 F.3d at 600.
Aliens may also seek protection from removal under the
CAT. Dankam, 495 F.3d at 115. The CAT requires aliens to
demonstrate "that it is more likely than not that [they] would
be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal."
Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). It is a mandatory form of relief as well. Id.
at 115-16. Unlike applicants for asylum and withholding of
removal under the INA, applicants for protection under the
CAT do not need to show that the likelihood of torture is con-
nected to a protected ground. Id. at 115.
B.
"When, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision and
includes its own reasons for affirming, we review both deci-
sions." Marynenka, 592 F.3d at 600. We are obliged to uphold
the BIA’s determinations unless they are "manifestly contrary
to the law and an abuse of discretion." Lizama v. Holder, 629
F.3d 440, 444 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mirisawo v. Holder,
599 F.3d 391, 396 (4th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The agency abuses its discretion "if it fail[s] to offer
a reasoned explanation for its decision, or if it distort[s] or
disregard[s] important aspects of the applicant’s claim." Tassi
v. Holder, No. 10-2194, slip op. at 13 (4th Cir. Nov. 7, 2011).
Our standard of review of the agency’s findings is narrow
and deferential. Dankam, 495 F.3d at 119. We seek to ensure
that the agency’s factual findings are supported by substantial
evidence. Marynenka, 592 F.3d at 600. Substantial evidence
exists to support a finding "unless the evidence . . . was such
that any reasonable adjudicator would have been compelled to
conclude to the contrary." Id. (quoting Haoua v. Gonzales,
472 F.3d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Similarly, we cannot reverse the agency’s overall
decision that an applicant is ineligible for asylum unless we
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 15
determine that the applicant’s evidence "was such that a rea-
sonable factfinder would have to conclude that the requisite
fear of persecution existed." INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.
478, 481 (1992). Our review of legal issues, however, is de
novo. Marynenka, 592 F.3d at 600.
III.
We first address Djadjou’s contention that substantial evi-
dence does not support the agency’s adverse credibility deter-
mination. For the following reasons, we find that substantial
evidence exists to support the agency’s adverse credibility
determination.
A.
Applicants can satisfy their burden of proving eligibility for
asylum simply by testifying credibly. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a).
Corroborating evidence, though not always required, may be
necessary "when it is reasonable to expect such proof and
there is no reasonable explanation for its absence." Lin-Jian
v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182, 191-92 (4th Cir. 2007).
Our review of an adverse credibility determination is lim-
ited to ensuring that substantial evidence exists to support it.
Dankam, 495 F.3d at 119. We accord broad deference to the
agency’s credibility determination. Id. This deference, how-
ever, is not absolute, for the agency must provide specific,
cogent reasons for making an adverse credibility determina-
tion. Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2008).
We have recognized that omissions, inconsistent state-
ments, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable tes-
timony are appropriate bases for making an adverse
credibility determination. Kourouma v. Holder, 588 F.3d 234,
243 (4th Cir. 2009); Lin-Jian, 489 F.3d at 189. The existence
of only a few such inconsistencies, omissions, or contradic-
tions can be sufficient for the agency to make an adverse
16 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
credibility determination as to the applicant’s entire testimony
regarding past persecution. See Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d
361, 369 (4th Cir. 2004) (upholding an IJ’s adverse credibility
determination based on two inconsistencies). Minor omis-
sions, inconsistencies, and contradictions that do not go to the
heart of the applicant’s claims, however, do not necessarily
support an adverse credibility determination.1 Tassi, No. 10-
2194, slip op. at 7 n.6. Speculation, conjecture, and unsup-
ported personal opinion are insufficient reasons to discount an
applicant’s testimony or corroborating evidence. Lin-Jian,
489 F.3d at 189.
B.
We highlight two findings made by the agency that provide
substantial evidence for its adverse credibility determination:
1) the eviction notice served on Djadjou at her store when she
testified that she was in hiding elsewhere and 2) her failure to
mention her purported leadership role in her application state-
ment.
The IJ and BIA found that the eviction notice was inconsis-
tent with Djadjou’s testimony. They observed that, although
Djadjou testified she remained in hiding at her sister’s house
in Douala Bonaberi until she departed for the United States on
March 11, 2002, the eviction notice indicated that she was
present at her store in Yaounde and served with the notice the
same day. The IJ considered Djadjou’s explanation that the
eviction notice was referring to her salesperson,2 but rejected
1
The REAL ID Act of 2005 changed this rule and provides that an
inconsistency can serve as a basis for an adverse credibility determination
"without regard to whether [it] goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim."
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). But because Djadjou filed her application
before the effective date of the Act, it is inapplicable. See Tassi, No. 10-
2194, slip op. at 7 n.6.
2
Djadjou also challenges the agency’s reliance on the eviction notice on
the ground that the notice is insufficiently clear to allow her to rebut its
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 17
it, determining that the plain language of the eviction notice
indicated that it was referring to Djadjou. This was a reason-
able interpretation of the eviction notice that is entitled to our
deference. See Dankam, 495 F.3d at 122.
The BIA and IJ were justified in finding that the eviction
notice was inconsistent with Djadjou’s testimony. That Djad-
jou was at her store and capable of government officials serv-
ing her with an eviction notice suggests she was not in hiding
at her sister’s house as she testified. As the IJ found, this is
a significant inconsistency. Djadjou’s testimony that she was
in hiding not only bolstered her allegation of her last arrest,
but also indicated that she was persecuted to the point of her
going into hiding. This is not a collateral matter, but goes to
the heart of her claims of past persecution. Accordingly, the
inconsistency between the eviction notice and Djadjou’s testi-
mony was an appropriate basis for an adverse credibility
determination.
The IJ also noted an inconsistency between Djadjou’s testi-
mony that she was elected secretary general of the SCNC and
her statement in support of her application, which omitted any
reference to her holding that position. As the IJ recognized,
Djadjou testified that she was elected secretary general of the
SCNC in 1997. Yet the statement in support of her application
omits any reference to her election to that post, noting only
contents. She asserts that the relevant part is a handwritten notation that
may have been mistranslated from French to English. To support this con-
tention, she relies on the following statement from our decision in Anim
v. Mukasey: "[D]ocumentary evidence—especially evidence that is partic-
ularly damning to an applicant’s case—should be sufficiently clear and
complete to give the applicant an opportunity to meaningfully rebut its
allegations." 535 F.3d at 257. Djadjou’s reliance on Anim is misplaced.
We note simply that our concerns in Anim to which she cites arose from
the introduction of a document by the government. Here, however, Djad-
jou, not the government, admitted the eviction notice in support of her
application. We, therefore, are not concerned with whether it was clear
enough for her to challenge its contents like we were in Anim.
18 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
her selection to a leadership role in the SDF in 1992. Further-
more, Njeck, her witness, admitted he had no knowledge that
she held such a post even though the SCNC maintains leader-
ship listings, and Njoh’s affidavit on behalf of the SCNC-
USA did not mention it.
Djadjou asserts that the omission or inconsistency regard-
ing her position as secretary general was immaterial. We dis-
agree. Djadjou testified that she was arrested the second time
because of her position as secretary general in the SCNC. She
also attested that her third arrest resulted from her perceived
leadership role. Thus, her purported leadership role lay at the
heart of her claims of past persecution. She asserted that Cam-
eroonian officials targeted her because of it. Her failure to
mention it in her application reasonably casts doubt not only
on whether she held the position, but also on whether officials
targeted her as she claimed. The agency appropriately relied
on this omission as a basis for its adverse credibility determi-
nation.
Based on the inconsistency arising from Djadjou’s eviction
notice suggesting she was not in hiding as she claimed and the
omission in her application of her leadership role in the
SCNC, we conclude that a reasonable adjudicator could find
Djadjou to lack credibility. The inconsistency and omission
reasonably cast doubt on aspects of Djadjou’s testimony that
went to the heart of her claims of past persecution, and their
cumulative effect could cause a reasonable adjudicator to
question the veracity of her overall testimony. Thus, we hold
that substantial evidence exists to support the agency’s
adverse credibility determination.
IV.
A.
Despite an adverse credibility determination, applicants for
asylum can establish past persecution through independent
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 19
evidence. See Camara, 378 F.3d at 369-70. Where indepen-
dent evidence apart from the applicant’s testimony and appli-
cation statement exists, the agency must consider whether it
is sufficient to establish a claim of past persecution. See id. at
370. The agency may not ignore such evidence and reject the
claim solely on the basis of the adverse credibility determina-
tion. See id.
Djadjou insists that independent evidence apart from her
testimony and application statement exists to establish past
persecution. According to Djadjou, the agency discredited
much of her corroborative evidence for legally erroneous rea-
sons. That evidence, she contends, independently establishes
her past persecution despite the adverse credibility determina-
tion. We disagree.
B.
In reviewing the agency’s decisions, our task is not to
decide whether we agree with the agency’s reasons or would
discredit the evidence if we stood in its shoes. Rather, we
ensure that substantial evidence supports its findings, which
means we simply determine whether any reasonable adjudica-
tor would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. Anim,
535 F.3d at 252. Unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude differently, we defer to the agency. See
id. The agency, however, must provide specific, cogent rea-
sons for discrediting documentary evidence. Kourouma, 588
F.3d at 241.
The agency refused to credit the affidavits and letters pro-
vided by Djadjou’s uncle, sister, and friend on the ground that
such evidence is not objective. We have recognized before
that "evidence offered as corroborating evidence [must] be
objective . . . for it to be considered by the immigration judge
and BIA." Id. Letters and affidavits from family and friends
are not objective evidence in this context. See Gandziami-
Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 358-59 (4th Cir. 2006).
20 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
Consequently, the agency did not err in refusing to credit the
affidavits and letters provided by Djadjou’s family and
friends.
The agency also refused to credit Njeck’s testimony and
Njoh’s affidavit with respect to Djadjou’s 2000 arrest and her
husband’s 1997 arrest. By noting the absence of reliable cor-
roborating evidence from the SCNC, the BIA essentially
found that Njeck’s and Njoh’s statements were unreliable.
Throughout their decisions, the BIA and IJ noted various defi-
ciencies with the statements, including the lack of personal
knowledge, the statements’ omission of key facts from Djad-
jou’s testimony, and Djadjou’s failure to submit the records
on which Njeck and Njoh based their assertions. The IJ also
expressed skepticism about whether the Cameroonian official
who provided the information to Njoh actually examined the
records. From both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions, we glean an
overall concern about the reliability of Njoh’s and Njeck’s
statements when they attested to events of which they had no
personal knowledge based on records that they had not
reviewed and were not submitted. In essence, the hearsay
nature of the statements, which involved multiple levels of
hearsay, contributed to the agency’s concerns about their reli-
ability.
We begin with the general observation that the Federal
Rules of Evidence do not apply in immigration hearings,
which means that hearsay evidence is admissible. Anim, 535
F.3d at 256-57. For that reason, the agency may not reject cor-
roborative evidence on the sole basis that it does not comport
with the Federal Rules of Evidence. Tassi, No. 10-2194, slip
op. at 16.
Nevertheless, we have previously recognized that letters
relying on multiple levels of hearsay raise special reliability
concerns. In Anim, the government introduced a letter from an
official at the United States Department of State asserting that
she had contacted the petitioner’s native country in evaluating
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 21
documents the petitioner had introduced. 535 F.3d at 250. She
noted that she did so without disclosing that her request per-
tained to an asylum application. Id. Officials from the peti-
tioner’s native country told the State Department that the
documents were forgeries. Id. The letter contained multiple
levels of hearsay, as the State Department official had con-
tacted an investigator at the local embassy, who then con-
tacted officials in the petitioner’s native country. Id. The
immigration judge allowed the government to introduce the
letter. Id. at 251.
We held that the letter was so unreliable that its use was
fundamentally unfair to the petitioner. Id. at 256. One of our
chief concerns was that it relied on multiple levels of hearsay.
Id. at 257. Despite noting that hearsay is admissible in immi-
gration hearings and that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
apply in such hearings, we also recognized that "[h]ighly
unreliable hearsay might raise due process problems." Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Alexandrov v. Gonzales, 442
F.3d 395, 405 (6th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). We reasoned that "[m]ultiple hearsay, where the declar-
ant is steps removed from the original speaker, is particularly
problematic because the declarant in all likelihood has been
unable to evaluate the trustworthiness of the original speaker."
Id. We also noted that the letter was made all the more unreli-
able because the original source was the native country’s gov-
ernment officials, who had a powerful incentive not to be
candid. Id. We further determined that the lack of sufficient
information as to how the officials conducted the investiga-
tion into the authenticity of the documents was problematic
because it prevented the agency from evaluating the reliability
of the letter’s conclusions and denied the petitioner a mean-
ingful ability to rebut its conclusions. Id. at 257-58. Because
the use of the letter was fundamentally unfair and prejudiced
the petitioner, we found a due process violation. Id. at 261.
Although Anim’s discussion of multiple hearsay arose in a
different context, many of the same concerns about letters
22 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
relying on multiple levels of hearsay are implicated here. We
think these concerns apply with equal force when determining
whether to credit such a statement submitted by an applicant.
Statements relying on multiple levels of hearsay are typically,
though not always, highly unreliable whether offered by the
government or the applicant. If such evidence can be so
highly unreliable as to render a proceeding fundamentally
unfair when the government introduces it, the agency may
likewise refuse to credit it due to its unreliability when intro-
duced by the applicant. Although we can conceive that state-
ments relying on multiple levels of hearsay may, at times,
contain sufficient indicia of reliability so as to counteract their
inherent unreliability, this is not one of those times.
In this case, Njoh’s and Njeck’s statements relied on multi-
ple levels of hearsay. Njoh and Njeck contacted officials in
Cameroon who conveyed information they observed in
records that were supposedly accurate. Neither Njeck nor
Njoh reviewed the records personally to ascertain their accu-
racy or trustworthiness. Therefore, they could not vouch for
their accuracy or reliability. Although the IJ found Njeck
credible insofar as his statement was consistent with Njoh’s
affidavit, that finding of credibility says nothing about the
reliability of the underlying information.
Moreover, Njeck and Njoh did not include any information
to alleviate the reliability concerns associated with multiple
levels of hearsay. They offered no information about the
Cameroonian officials who reviewed the records aside from
stating their names and titles. The IJ was utterly unable to
determine whether the Cameroonian officials were credible.
Njeck and Njoh did not detail the recordkeeping practices of
the SCNC in Cameroon, but instead generally noted that the
SCNC keeps records of members that include arrests. Because
neither Njeck nor Njoh could vouch for the reliability of the
information and they did not include anything to bolster its
reliability, the IJ was essentially left without any means of
assessing it. A reasonable fact finder would naturally be con-
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 23
cerned about the weight to ascribe such evidence. Thus, the
agency had reasonable grounds for concern about the reliabil-
ity of Njeck’s and Njoh’s statements that Djadjou was
arrested in 2000 and that her husband was arrested in 1997.
We therefore hold that the agency had an appropriate basis
for rejecting as unreliable Njeck’s and Njoh’s statements
about Djadjou’s arrest.3 In doing so, we continue to recognize
that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in immigra-
tion hearings and that hearsay is admissible. At the same time,
however, statements that rely on multiple levels of hearsay
can be so highly unreliable by their nature as to justify the
agency in refusing to credit them. Because the statements
offered by Njoh and Njeck, which relied on multiple levels of
hearsay, were highly unreliable by their nature and nothing in
the statements alleviated the concerns about their reliability,
the agency had adequate justification to find them unreliable
and refuse to credit them.
3
Djadjou argues that the agency erred in its decision to discredit Njoh’s
affidavit and Njeck’s testimony because it essentially required indepen-
dent corroborating evidence to support corroborating evidence. Indeed, we
previously announced that "[t]here is no general rule that evidence offered
in corroboration requires independent corroboration." Marynenka, 592
F.3d at 602. In Marynenka, we found the immigration judge erred in
declining to credit the statement of a witness who had personally observed
the petitioner’s arrest simply because there was no way to corroborate that
information. Id. We held that the statement "could not be discredited on
the ground that it automatically required corroboration." Id. In this case,
however, the agency refused to credit Njeck’s and Njoh’s statements
because of their unreliability. Although the IJ noted the absence of other
corroborating evidence concerning the 2000 arrest, that was an additional
observation among others and not the sole reason for disregarding their
statements. Unlike in Marynenka, the agency did not automatically reject
Njeck’s and Njoh’s statements simply because they were not indepen-
dently corroborated. We find that the agency rejected Njoh’s and Njeck’s
statements as unreliable and that it did not err by additionally observing
the lack of other corroborating evidence of her 2000 arrest and her hus-
band’s 1997 arrest.
24 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
The agency also gave appropriate reasons for discrediting
the two SDF letters. As the agency noted, the two letters were
inconsistent. One letter noted that Djadjou had been a member
from 1991 until 1996, but the other letter stated that she "is
an active member."4 A reasonable adjudicator could interpret
this as a direct inconsistency. Furthermore, one letter men-
tions that she was tortured, whereas the other letter does not.
And one letter mentions that she held a leadership role in the
SDF, but the other letter merely states that she was a member
with no mention of a leadership position. Based on the cumu-
lative effect of these various inconsistencies and omissions,
we are unable to say that any reasonable adjudicator would
have been compelled to find them credible. See Dankam, 495
F.3d at 122-23 (recognizing that the cumulative effect of
seemingly minor and tangential inconsistencies can form the
basis of an adverse credibility determination). Thus, the agen-
cy’s refusal to credit them is supported by substantial evi-
dence.
The agency discounted the police convocation and police
telegram on the ground that Djadjou failed to authenticate and
provide a chain of custody for them. Djadjou maintains that
these were legally improper reasons to reject the police docu-
ments. We agree.
As earlier noted, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
apply in immigration hearings. Anim, 535 F.3d at 256. We
have previously determined that it was improper to reject a
4
Djadjou asserts that the letter stating she "is an active member" con-
tains a grammatical mistake and that it was meant to say she "was an
active member." Contrary to her assertion, however, it is unclear that this
was simply a grammatical error. The sentence, in full, states as follows:
"Djadjou Tekeu Pulcherie is an active member of the Social Democratic
Front (S.D.F.) opposition party based in Cameroon; registered in our book
of militants under the reference card [reference card number] since 1991."
Aside from Djadjou’s proffered interpretation, we see no suggestion of a
grammatical error. The agency’s interpretation of the letter as indicating
that she presently is a member is reasonable, and so we will defer to it.
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 25
document for lacking a chain of custody when no other rea-
sons existed for doubting its authenticity. Marynenka, 592
F.3d at 601. Also, we recently found it inappropriate to refuse
to credit a document because it was not authenticated when
doubts about its authenticity did not arise at the hearing and
the government did not object to its introduction. Tassi, No.
10-2194, slip op. at 19-20. Here, concerns about the authen-
ticity of the police telegram and convocation did not arise at
the hearing, and the government did not object to their intro-
duction. Furthermore, the agency provided no other reasons
for finding the documents unauthentic or unreliable. As a
result, the agency erred in rejecting the police convocation
and telegram.
Nevertheless, we hold that the agency’s error in rejecting
the police telegram and police convocation was harmless.
"Harmless-error analysis applies in immigration cases."
Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 190 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004).
We need not reverse the agency’s decision if we determine
that an "error ‘clearly had no bearing on the procedure used
or the substance of the decision reached.’" Id. (quoting Mass.
Trs. of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235,
248 (1964)). Even had the agency credited the police telegram
and convocation, it is clear that insufficient independent evi-
dence existed to establish past persecution.
The remaining independent evidence, which the agency did
not discredit or appropriately discredit, includes Djadjou’s
SCNC and SDF membership cards,5 the police telegram and
convocation, the photographs of destroyed property, the
Amnesty International and United States Department of State
reports, and Justice Aloysius’s affidavit. This evidence, stand-
5
The IJ discredited one of Djadjou’s SCNC membership cards because
it misspelled the organization’s name. Djadjou challenges that finding. We
need not decide whether the IJ erred because any such error would be
harmless. The IJ credited that Djadjou was a member of the SCNC, just
not that she was persecuted because of her membership.
26 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
ing alone and without any credible explanation, fails to estab-
lish that Djadjou was persecuted. All that the membership
cards, reports, and Justice Aloysius’s affidavit demonstrate is
that Djadjou was a member of opposition organizations whose
members have suffered persecution in Cameroon. The police
documents, without any context or credible explanation, do
not demonstrate that she was among those persecuted.
Although the police telegram requests that Djadjou be stopped
and states "illegal political meetings," it says nothing about
what actually transpired. The police convocation similarly
lacks any meaningful significance without a credible explana-
tion as to its context. Likewise, the photographs are devoid of
meaning without a credible explanation as to what they
depict. Accordingly, we affirm the agency’s finding that inde-
pendent evidence does not exist to establish past persecution.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Djadjou’s petition for
review.
PETITION DENIED
WYNN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
There is much in the majority’s opinion with which I am
inclined to agree. But given that the salient factual findings
and reasoned legal conclusions in this well-crafted majority
opinion are products of an appellate court rather than the
products of the immigration judge or the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals, I respectfully dissent.*
*I reemphasize, as we did in Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 513-514
(4th Cir. 2008), that consistency in the resolution of immigration cases is
a problem area for this and other circuits. See also Benslimane v. Gon-
zales, 430 F. 3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005); Eric M. Fink, Liars and Terror-
ists and Judges, Oh My: Moral Panic and the Symbolic Politics of
Appellate Review in Asylum Cases, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2019 (2008);
Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adju-
dication, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 295 (2007).
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 27
The law applicable to Djadjou’s claim for asylum and with-
holding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality
Act is clear. To establish eligibility for asylum, Djadjou bears
the burden of showing either past persecution or a well-
founded fear of future persecution "on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). If Djadjou is
able to demonstrate past persecution, she is "presumed to
have a well-founded fear of persecution . . . ." 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(1)); see Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 600
(4th Cir. 2010).
In the present case, given the absence of any evidence by
the government in rebuttal, if Djadjou demonstrated an
instance of past persecution on a protected ground, then Djad-
jou established an unrebutted presumption of her "well-
founded fear of persecution" and, consequently, her eligibility
of asylum in this country. Notably, Djadjou’s imprisonment
on account of her membership in a particular social group or
political opinion "indisputably can constitute [past] persecu-
tion." Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 2004)
(citing Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir.
2004)).
In determining whether an individual is eligible for asylum,
the agency must first undertake a credibility determination as
to the applicant’s evidence. Here, I am inclined to concur in
the majority’s holding that substantial evidence in the record
supported the agency’s adverse credibility determination.
However, in my view it is the eviction notice alone that
provided the agency with this substantial evidence. All other
evidence relied on by the agency was either erroneous as a
matter of law or implicated an abuse of discretion. Given that
the majority’s decision to affirm the adverse credibility deter-
mination is limited to two pieces of evidence relied upon by
the agency (i.e., the eviction notice and Djadjou’s asylum
28 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
application), I will, in turn, limit my expression of dissent to
this second piece of evidence—Djadjou’s asylum application.
According to the majority, the inconsistency between Djad-
jou’s testimony that she was elected secretary general of the
Southern Cameroons National Council ("SCNC") in 1997 and
her statement in support of her asylum application, which
omitted any reference to her position, provided the immigra-
tion judge with a basis for its adverse credibility determina-
tion. Ante at 17-18. For the majority, this omission is properly
characterized as substantial evidence because, in the majori-
ty’s view, Djadjou’s leadership role in SCNC is at the heart
of her claim of past persecution. Ante at 18. In my view, how-
ever, not only is this alleged omission illusory, this alleged
omission most assuredly does not go to the heart of Djadjou’s
claim.
First, notwithstanding the immigration judge’s unsupported
conjecture that Djadjou had "what appears to be a significant
position" J.A. 102, Djadjou’s responsibilities in SCNC were,
by all accounts, limited to passing out flyers and informing
SCNC members of meetings in her local area. Accordingly,
when Njeck called SCNC officials in Cameroon to verify
Djadjou’s participation and past persecution, he did not even
ask about her specific title. Further, when asked why an SDF
letter and the SCNC affidavit did not mention her specific
title, Djadjou testified that "they pay more attention to posi-
tions like the president’s position, the vice president’s posi-
tion . . . and the spokesperson position." J.A. 281. There is no
inconsistency in the failure of a document, whether Djadjou’s
application or otherwise, to mention a title where the authors
of such documents, whether Djadjou or others, considered
such title to be unimportant to Djadjou’s persecution claim or
her role in the organization. Consequently, this omission,
insofar as it is relied upon by the agency to make an adverse
credibility determination, is illusory and, indeed, based on the
unsupported conjecture that Djadjou’s position in the SCNC
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 29
was "a significant position" that necessarily required mention
in any discussion of Djadjou’s activities as an SCNC member.
Second, Djadjou’s asylum application states that she was
persecuted "[b]ecause [she] was a member of the SCNC"; it
does not claim that Djadjou was persecuted because of her
position in the SCNC. J.A. 560. Consequently, ambiguous
assertions that Djadjou made while testifying, that may or
may not be interpreted as indicating that she was targeted dur-
ing her second arrest because of her position in the SCNC, do
not replace the clear and unambiguous assertions that Djadjou
made in her asylum application and become, by judicial fiat
or otherwise, the "heart" of her persecution claim. Therefore,
not only are the alleged omissions in Djadjou’s application
illusory and based on unsupported conjecture, the alleged
omissions—even assuming some materiality—simply fail to
go to the heart of her persecution claim and, thus, do not pro-
vide substantial evidence for an adverse credibility determina-
tion. See Ante at 16 (citing Tassi v. Holder, No. 10-2194, slip
op. at 7 n.6 (4th Cir. Nov. 7, 2011)).
Nonetheless, as noted above, based solely on the immigra-
tion judge’s finding of an inconsistency between the eviction
notice and Djadjou’s testimony, I am inclined to concur in the
majority’s holding that substantial evidence in the record sup-
ported the agency’s adverse credibility determination.
However, as the majority aptly explains, notwithstanding
an adverse credibility determination, applicants for asylum,
such as Djadjou, may establish past persecution through inde-
pendent evidence. See Camara, 378 F.3d at 369-370. As the
majority states, "[t]he agency may not ignore such [indepen-
dent] evidence and reject the claim solely on the basis of the
adverse credibility determination." Ante at 19 (citing Camara,
378 F.3d at 369-70). Moreover, in reviewing Djadjou’s inde-
pendent evidence, the "immigration judge cannot reject docu-
mentary evidence without specific, cogent reasons why the
30 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
documents are not credible." Kourouma v. Holder, 588 F.3d
234, 241 (4th Cir. 2009).
Here, among other independent evidence submitted, Djad-
jou presented the affidavit of Njoh, which provided, in perti-
nent part, that:
1) . . . I am the chairman of the Southern Camer-
oons National Council in North America . . . .
2) . . . SCNC is viewed by the government of
[Cameroon] as a secessionist movement and in lieu
of this perception, the government persistently
embarks on a campaign of arrests, intimidation,
harassments, detentions and extrajudicial killing of
SCNC members.
***
5) That our records from the home front through
the SCNC Information and Statistic Bureau in
Southern Cameroons which is [the] repository of
vital biographical information of SCNC members
attest to [Djadjou’s] membership and active partici-
pation in popularizing the struggle to liberate and
restore the statehood of Southern Cameroons. Cor-
roborative and authentic information from the home
front reveals that [Djadjou’s] activism in the struggle
dates as far back as 1997 and she was instrumental
in distributing SCNC flyers, tracts, hand outs and
other paraphernalia to the population. Reports from
the home front also indicate that she attended meet-
ings and participated in demonstrations. These activ-
ities made her the target of acrimonious arrest and
detention such as the arrest of 2000. Unimpeachable
evidence from the home front reveal that the hus-
band of [Djadjou] . . . suffered an arrest and torture
as reprisal for [Djadjou’s] activism in the struggle.
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 31
6) That in fulfillment of my statutory responsibili-
ties as chairman of the SCNC, I undertake the verifi-
cation and confirmation of the affiliation of
members, as well as this claim of persecution on
account of their activities . . . . I have accordingly
verified and confirmed the affidavit from Mr. Henry
Nyaah, the Northern Zone Vice Chairman of the
SCNC relating to her membership and activism in
the SCNC struggle and I attest to it authenticity and
credibility. The verification was done through a lit-
any of telephone exchanges I had with Mr. Henry
Nyaah.
***
We are compelled by credible and authentic evi-
dence as well as verifiable facts from the home front
to state without fear of contradiction that . . . sending
[Djadjou] back to [Cameroon] will undoubtedly
make her a palpable target for harassment, arrests,
torture and she could possibly be killed . . . .
J.A. 369-371.
Although Njoh, the chairman of the Southern Cameroons
National Council of America, was the affiant who attested to
Djadjou’s past persecution, including her 2000 arrest, Howard
Njeck was appointed by Njoh to testify on behalf of Djadjou
in Njeck’s capacity as the Vice Chairman of the Southern
Cameroons National Council of America. Njeck’s testimony
was primarily directed at providing further authenticating and
corroborating details relevant to Njoh’s affidavit. Njeck testi-
fied that he and Njoh contacted Yuna, an SCNC official based
in Cameroon charged with keeping records of the details and
circumstances of SCNC members arrested in Cameroon.
Njeck reiterated that the Cameroonian SCNC official, Yuna,
reviewed relevant records and confirmed, among other things,
that Djadjou was arrested in 2000 for her SCNC activities.
32 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
Njeck further testified to the accuracy and reliability of
Njoh’s affidavit by explaining that the submission of affida-
vits by SCNC-USA in similar asylum proceedings is "some-
thing that [Njoh is] doing with a lot of people" and,
consequently, ensuring accuracy and reliability in such affida-
vits is essential "[i]n terms of credibility" and "in the best
interest of [SCNC-USA]" and for future asylum applicants
that seek the support of SCNC-USA. J.A. 343.
According to the majority, "[t]he agency . . . refused to
credit Njeck’s testimony and Njoh’s affidavit with respect to
Djadjou’s 2000 arrest and her husband’s 1997 arrest." Ante at
20. The problem, however, is that the immigration judge and
Board of Immigration Appeals made no such determination.
Indeed, the immigration judge expressly found that "[i]nsofar
as [Njeck] testified credibly with Mr. Njoh’s [affidavit] this
Court will find him credible." J.A. 102. Other than the immi-
gration judge’s positive determination of Njeck’s credibility,
the record is devoid of any specific, cogent reason(s) for the
immigration judge to have discredited Njeck’s testimony or
Njoh’s affidavit.
My review of the record reveals only four other findings
from the immigration judge relevant to Njoh’s affidavit or
Njeck’s testimony. First, the immigration judge noted that
Njoh’s affidavit "refers to [Djadjou] as having been arrested
one time in 2000 . . . . [However, Djadjou] has no satisfactory
explanation as to why the SCNC documents failed to mention
her other arrests." J.A. 103. Although potentially relevant to
the immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination, the
immigration judge’s finding has no bearing on the reliability
of Njoh’s affidavit, which confirms Djadjou’s arrest in 2000.
Second, the immigration judge noted "that the records from
the SCNC that were purportedly examined by Mr. Yuna have
not been provided to this Court. In sum, this omission is a sig-
nificant omission." J.A. 103. This finding, however, to the
extent that it is relevant to Djadjou’s 2000 arrest, is erroneous
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 33
under this Court’s precedent because: (1) a "‘letter from [a]
party leader’ on behalf of a party member seeking asylum can
corroborate the applicant’s claims[,]" Tassi, No. 10-2194, slip
op. at 18 (quoting Camara, 378 F.3d at 369); and (2) "[t]he
[immigration judge] did not otherwise assess the probative
value of . . . or evaluate the reliability of" Njoh’s affidavit and
Njeck’s testimony. Id.
Third, the immigration judge found that "there are no
records to corroborate the 2000 arrest of [Djadjou] . . . ." J.A.
103-104. However, given Njoh’s affidavit that confirms the
2000 arrest and Njeck’s testimony, which the immigration
judge credited, this finding is unsupported and, indeed,
appears to "distort or disregard important aspects of the
[Djadjou’s] claim." Tassi, No. 10-2194, slip op. at 13.
Fourth, the immigration judge made an ambiguous finding
that "[p]erhaps [Djadjou] was an SCNC member in Cameroon
as testified by Mr. Njeck." J.A. 107. If we are to take anything
from this finding, it is a reaffirmation that the immigration
judge regarded Njoh’s affidavit as reliable and Njeck’s testi-
mony as credible.
Nonetheless, the immigration judge concluded that there "is
simply no persuasive objective evidence that [Djadjou] was
arrested." J.A. 108. Consequently, the immigration judge
found "that the [Djadjou] has not suffered past persecution in
Cameroon and accordingly there is no presumption of a well-
founded fear of persecution should she return to that country."
J.A. 108. The immigration judge arrived at this conclusion,
which either rejected Djadjou’s independent evidence or,
alternatively, failed to consider that independent evidence
separate and apart from the immigration judge’s adverse cred-
ibility determination, without offering specific, cogent reasons
why Djadjou’s independent evidence was not reliable, in con-
travention of this Court’s precedent.
In affirming the agency’s decision, the majority "glean[s]
an overall concern [of the immigration judge and Board of
34 DJADJOU v. HOLDER
Immigration Appeals] about the reliability of Njoh’s and
Njeck’s statements [because] they attested to events of which
they had no personal knowledge based on records that they
had not reviewed and were not submitted." Ante at 20. To this
end, the majority states that "the [Board of Immigration
Appeals] essentially found that Njeck’s and Njoh’s statements
were unreliable." Ante at 20. Given that this Court has held
that speculation and conjecture are insufficient reasons to dis-
count Djadjou’s evidence, Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d
182, 189 (4th Cir. 2007), it is confounding that the majority’s
speculation and conjecture of what the immigration judge and
Board of Immigration Appeals "essentially found" and what
the majority is able to "glean" from the cold record can form
the basis of its decision to affirm.
It is interesting to note that, although the majority opinion
repeatedly asserts that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
apply to immigration hearings and concedes that hearsay evi-
dence is admissible in such proceedings (Ante at 20), the
majority nonetheless strains to find a basis for the agency’s
non-existent "unreliability determination" in relation to
Njoh’s affidavit and Njeck’s testimony by making an eviden-
tiary finding that is no where to be found in the record:
namely, that "the hearsay nature of [Njoh’s affidavit and
Njeck’s testimony], which involved multiple levels of hear-
say, contributed to the agency’s concerns about their reliabil-
ity." Ante at 20. Although this novel, well reasoned, and
potentially persuasive evidentiary finding would be entitled to
some consideration by this Court if issued by the immigration
judge, it is not the product of either the immigration judge or
the Board of Immigration Appeals. Instead, the majority
"gleans" it to be so based upon its review of a cold record. In
sum, while the record supports the immigration judge’s
adverse credibility determination, the record also shows that
Djadjou presented independent evidence, separate and apart
from her own testimony, that established her past persecution
in Cameroon. The agency may not ignore such independent
evidence, and the agency may not reject such independent
DJADJOU v. HOLDER 35
evidence solely on the basis of an adverse credibility determi-
nation. Nor may an appellate court "glean" a basis for reject-
ing independent evidence when no such basis is to be found
in the decisions of the immigration judge or Board of Immi-
gration Appeals. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.