PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 10-4264
KWAN D. MONTIETH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge.
(3:09-cr-00023-RJC-1)
Argued: October 27, 2011
Decided: December 5, 2011
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Shedd and Judge Agee joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Roderick Morris Wright, Jr., WRIGHT LAW
FIRM OF CHARLOTTE, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Richard Lee Edwards, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anne M. Tompkins, United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
2 UNITED STATES v. MONTIETH
OPINION
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Kwan Montieth was convicted of having used
and carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug traffick-
ing crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Montieth now
appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
physical evidence recovered in a search of his residence and
statements he made to the police. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
A.
On June 10, 2008, Officer Sean Blee of the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Police Department searched the trash outside
Kwan D. Montieth’s home after receiving a tip from ATF
Agent Kevin Kelly that Montieth was selling marijuana.
Based on the evidence of drug trafficking that Blee discov-
ered in Montieth’s trash, he obtained a warrant on June 11,
2008 to search Montieth and his residence for marijuana, fire-
arms, and additional evidence of drug trafficking. Officers
were aware that Montieth lived at the residence with his wife
and two young children. In an effort to minimize both the
trauma to Montieth’s family as well as the safety risks of a
search, the officers planned to detain Montieth away from his
residence and secure his cooperation to execute the warrant.
After an undercover officer observed Montieth depart his
residence by car, Officers LeClerc and Starnes pulled him
over about eight-tenths of a mile from his home. LeClerc
smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the car. The
officers instructed Montieth to exit his vehicle, handcuffed
him, and placed him in the back of the police car. Officers
Blee and Tobbe arrived at the scene and they too smelled the
strong odor of marijuana from Montieth’s vehicle. Blee
UNITED STATES v. MONTIETH 3
informed Montieth that the police planned to execute a search
warrant at his home, and Montieth disclosed that he had mari-
juana at his residence. Blee explained that the officers pre-
ferred to execute the warrant with his cooperation to avoid an
abrupt or forcible entry into the house while his wife and chil-
dren were inside. Montieth opted to cooperate in the warrant’s
execution and asked especially that his children not see him
in handcuffs.
Upon return to the residence, Montieth remained in the
police car as the officers instructed Ms. Montieth that they
had a search warrant for the residence and that she should
leave the premises with her children. Once Montieth’s wife
and children departed, the officers—accompanied by Monti-
eth in handcuffs—entered the residence without force. Blee
and Tobbe testified that once inside Blee read to Montieth
from the search warrant and informed him of his Miranda
rights, which he verbally waived. Although the district court
found Blee’s and Tobbe’s testimony to be credible, Montieth
maintains that the officers interrogated him without adminis-
tering Miranda warnings.
Montieth told the officers that he sold marijuana and in
response to questioning identified locations in the residence
where the officers would discover marijuana, firearms, and
cash. The officers seized approximately one kilogram of mari-
juana, two firearms, ammunition, a digital scale, baggies, and
cash. The officers also searched a storage shed in the back-
yard where they recovered additional drug paraphernalia.
After the officers completed the search, Tobbe brought
Montieth to the local law enforcement center and again read
him his Miranda rights. Montieth signed a written waiver and
provided a statement about his involvement in marijuana traf-
ficking. Meanwhile, an officer informed Ms. Montieth, who
was waiting with a neighbor, that the search was over and that
the officers had left a copy of the search warrant on a table
in the house. Ms. Montieth returned home and did not find the
4 UNITED STATES v. MONTIETH
search warrant for her residence. Instead, she discovered on
the kitchen table an incomplete draft of a warrant and warrant
application for a different residence that had no connection to
Montieth.
B.
Montieth was indicted by a federal grand jury on February
17, 2009 on three counts: possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; using and carry-
ing a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and possession of a fire-
arm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Montieth filed a motion to suppress all evidence
recovered during the June 11, 2008 search and any statements
he made to police on that date. After conducting an evidenti-
ary hearing, the district court denied the motion. On August
14, 2009, Montieth entered a conditional plea of guilty for
violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), preserving his right to appeal
the denial of his suppression motion.
Montieth raises various Fourth and Fifth Amendment
claims before this court on appeal. In reviewing the district
court’s denial of Montieth’s motion to suppress, we review
legal determinations de novo and factual findings for clear
error. United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir.
2009). Where, as here, the government prevailed below, "we
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the gov-
ernment." United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th
Cir. 2008).
II.
We begin with Montieth’s claim that the officers searched
his residence without a valid warrant in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. As the district court properly found, the
search warrant was issued based on probable cause supplied
by Officer Blee’s warrant affidavit.
UNITED STATES v. MONTIETH 5
A.
A warrant is constitutionally sound when issued by a neu-
tral magistrate and supported by probable cause. See U.S.
Const. amend. IV; Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330
(2001). The magistrate’s probable cause determination is a
"practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the cir-
cumstances set forth in the affidavit before him . . . there is
a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238 (1983); see also United States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d
212, 217 (4th Cir. 2005). Because probable cause is evaluated
through a "totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis rooted in
common sense, Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, we "must accord
‘great deference’ to the magistrate’s assessment of the facts
presented to him." United States v. Blackwood, 913 F.2d 139,
142 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410, 419 (1969)). We therefore limit our inquiry to
whether there was a "substantial basis for determining the
existence of probable cause." Gates, 462 U.S. at 239.
B.
Officer Blee’s affidavit in support of the warrant revealed
the following information. Blee conducted a trash pull at
Montieth’s residence after receiving a tip from ATF Agent
Kelly that Montieth possessed a sizeable amount of mari-
juana. Blee confirmed Montieth’s address at 5606 Nesting
Court, Charlotte, NC, and searched bags retrieved from a
trashcan left for pick up at the side of the Montieth residence.
In the trash Blee found two bills addressed to Kwan Montieth
at 5606 Nesting Court, which corroborated that the trash
belonged to Montieth.
Blee also discovered in the trash extensive evidence of
marijuana trafficking, including: (1) green saran wrap with
suspected marijuana residue; (2) separate pieces of PVC pipe
wrap (often used to package marijuana) with suspected mari-
6 UNITED STATES v. MONTIETH
juana residue; (3) pieces of green wrapper with brown tape
with suspected marijuana residue; (4) several burnt marijuana
cigarettes; (5) clear plastic baggies; and (6) marijuana stems.
As part of his investigation, Blee inquired into Montieth’s
criminal history and learned that he had a prior criminal
record that included several drug offenses. Blee detailed in the
affidavit his considerable experience and training with drug
investigations and arrests, which led him to conclude based on
the trash pull that probable cause existed to search Montieth
and his residence for additional evidence of drug trafficking.
Contrary to Montieth’s assertions, the affidavit also
described with particularity the residence to be searched and
the items expected to be seized. See Andresen v. Maryland,
427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976). Blee described in detail the loca-
tion and appearance of the house at 5606 Nesting Court and
specified the items he expected to discover in the search,
including, among other things: (1) marijuana; (2) records of
illegal drug activities; (3) drug paraphernalia; (4) U.S. cur-
rency; and (5) firearms.
C.
Based on the considerable evidence of drug trafficking dis-
covered in the trash pull, and the information linking the drug
trafficking materials to Montieth and his residence, the magis-
trate properly concluded that there was a "fair probability"
that additional criminal evidence would be discovered upon
execution of the warrant.
Montieth nevertheless argues that the affidavit suffered
constitutional deficiencies and lists several bases for a search
warrant that were not included in the affidavit here. For exam-
ple, Montieth notes that the affidavit was not supported by
incriminating information gathered from officer surveillance
or from a confidential informant. But to require that the affi-
ant amass every piece of conceivable evidence before seeking
a warrant is to misunderstand the burden of probable cause.
UNITED STATES v. MONTIETH 7
See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419 ("[O]nly the probability, and not
a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of
probable cause."). The requirements for those seeking a war-
rant are not formulaic but practical, and it is difficult to script
ex ante the different combinations of facts and circumstances
that may or may not support a finding of probable cause. See
Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31; United States v. Allen, 631 F.3d
164, 172 (4th Cir. 2011). It is constitutionally sufficient, and
wisely so, that the information in Blee’s affidavit provided
substantial support for the common-sense conclusion drawn
by the magistrate.
III.
Montieth next claims that the officers’ traffic stop and
detention of him violated the Fourth Amendment. For the fol-
lowing reasons, we find his contentions unpersuasive.
A.
We note initially that Montieth’s detention qualifies as a
valid Terry stop. An officer may stop and briefly detain a per-
son "when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion
that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in crim-
inal activity." United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227
(1985) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702
(1983)); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In United
States v. Taylor, 857 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1988), we held that
under the circumstances presented, a narcotics search warrant
furnished the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct an
investigative stop of the appellants, whose suspected drug
trafficking was the target of the warrant.
As in Taylor, the officers here "possessed a search warrant
based upon probable cause to believe that appellant[ ] [was]
engaged in narcotics trafficking" and the stop likewise took
place as appellant left his home where he was believed to
keep narcotics and drug paraphernalia. Id. at 213. Moreover,
8 UNITED STATES v. MONTIETH
the warrant in this case specified the defendant’s person, in
addition to his residence, as subject to search for evidence of
drug trafficking. Once the officers pulled Montieth over, the
odor of marijuana emanating from his car offered further rea-
son to suspect he was presently engaged in criminal activity
and to support his confinement to the police car. Under these
circumstances, the detention was valid under Terry.1
B.
Montieth counters that any detention incident to the execu-
tion of a search warrant must take place inside the residence
itself, or at most on the premises. To do otherwise, he con-
tends, runs afoul of constitutional restrictions. Both the
Supreme Court and the federal circuits have recognized, how-
ever, that such an inflexible rule would contravene the ulti-
mate Fourth Amendment touchstone of objective
reasonableness.
In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981), the
Supreme Court held that "a warrant to search for contraband
founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the lim-
ited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a
proper search is conducted." The reasonableness of the sei-
zure in Summers was justified by three law enforcement
objectives: (1) "preventing flight in the event that incriminat-
ing evidence is found"; (2) "minimizing the risk of harm to
the officers"; and (3) facilitating "the orderly completion of
the search" with the assistance of the detained occupants. Id.
at 702-03; see also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005).
1
Montieth alleges that the police department’s failure to preserve a vid-
eotape of the traffic stop recorded by the mobile video recorder system on
Officer LeClerc’s patrol car was a due process violation. The district court
did not err, however, in finding that the tape had been subject to the police
department’s standard 90-day hold policy and was then "routinely
destroyed," with no bad faith on the part of law enforcement in the tape’s
destruction. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988).
UNITED STATES v. MONTIETH 9
Summers was detained as he descended the front steps out-
side his house but the Court emphasized that it did "not view
the fact that [Summers] was leaving his house when the offi-
cers arrived to be of constitutional significance." Summers,
452 U.S. at 702 n.16. The Supreme Court has since clarified
that "[a]n officer’s authority to detain incident to a search is
categorical; it does not depend on the ‘quantum of proof justi-
fying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by
the seizure.’" Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98 (quoting Summers, 452
U.S. at 705 n.19). Montieth asserts, however, that it is unlaw-
ful for the police to detain a person incident to the execution
of a warrant once he is almost a mile away from the resi-
dence. Joining several circuits to have already considered this
question, we cannot agree.
The law enforcement interests identified in Summers are no
less salient here, where the stop and detention away from the
home facilitated a safe and efficient execution of the search.
We therefore decline to delineate a geographic boundary at
which the Summers holding becomes inapplicable. Rather, in
accordance with the analysis of our sister circuits, we consider
whether the police detained the individual "as soon as practi-
cable" after observing him leave the residence. United States
v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 206 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v.
Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 339 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Summers does
not impose upon police a duty based on geographic proximity
. . . rather the focus is upon police performance, that is,
whether the police detained defendant as soon as practicable
after departing from his residence."); see also United States v.
Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 2002) ("The proximity
between an occupant of a residence and the residence itself
may be relevant in deciding whether to apply Summers, but
it is by no means controlling."). But see United States v. Sher-
rill, 27 F.3d 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1994) (declining to extend
Summers to a detention that occurred at a distance from the
residence under search, finding that under the circumstances
10 UNITED STATES v. MONTIETH
"the officers had no interest in preventing flight or minimizing
the search’s risk").
Our holding should not be overread. We do not suggest that
any detention away from the home to be searched is invari-
ably a reasonable one. The test is an objective one, and in
some circumstances the distance from the home may combine
with other factors surrounding the search to present an objec-
tively unreasonable plan of warrant execution. Fourth Amend-
ment cases tend to turn on particulars and are often neither
blanket authorizations nor blanket prohibitions. In this case,
however, the officers acted reasonably when they decided to
detain Montieth at a short distance from his home.
The facts in the Second Circuit’s Bailey decision resemble
those here. The officers waited to detain Bailey until he had
driven about a mile from his house "out of concern for their
own safety and to prevent alerting other possible occupants
[of the house]." Bailey, 652 F.3d at 206. The court declined
to draw a "‘bright line’ test under Summers at the residence’s
curb," id. at 205, because it would "strip law enforcement of
the capacity to ‘exercise unquestioned command of the situa-
tion’ at precisely the moment when Summers recognizes they
most need it," id. at 206 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 703).
Instead, based on the totality of the circumstances—and the
continued relevance of the government interests recognized in
Summers—the court concluded that the officers’ decision was
both "reasonable and prudent." Id. at 206.
So it was here. The officers concluded reasonably that the
most practicable means to execute the warrant was to detain
Montieth at a short distance from his residence. As Officers
Blee and Tobbe testified, the purpose of the traffic stop was
to elicit Montieth’s cooperation and to execute the warrant in
the safest manner possible. The officers recognized that a
forced or sudden entry into the home or one with guns drawn
might have alarmed Montieth’s wife and children. By secur-
ing Montieth’s cooperation in the search, the officers hoped
UNITED STATES v. MONTIETH 11
to avert any unnecessary danger to Montieth’s family and to
assure the officers’ safety.
Importantly, the district court found Blee’s and Tobbe’s
explanation of their plan to seek a consensual execution of the
warrant credible and reasonable. The court concluded that the
plan was a "very reasonable way to execute the search war-
rant" in light of the "officers’ knowledge that there was a
video camera in the front of the building, their training and
experience which indicated to [them] that oftentimes drug
traffickers carry weapons, and the other information available
to them." To require officers to bypass less dangerous and dis-
ruptive methods of executing a search warrant and push them
to harsher and more forcible modes of entry would be at odds
with the Fourth Amendment’s ultimate command of reason-
ableness.
C.
Appellant claims, however, that "the officers had no infor-
mation that Montieth possessed a firearm" and suggests that
it was unreasonable for the officers to fear that a forced entry
would be dangerous. Appellant’s Br. at 16. This overlooks the
fact that the inside of a home can often be a real unknown.
Officers cannot always calibrate the scope of unanticipated
hazards, whether from confederates or from firearms or from
the structure and layout of the house itself. The Supreme
Court has identified the heightened risk to police when
encountering a suspect in his home, as officers perceive that
"[a]n ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration
is more to be feared than it is in open, more familiar surround-
ings." Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333 (1990).
The district court properly accounted for the dangers atten-
dant to the execution of a search warrant for evidence of drug
trafficking. If there were drugs in the house, there might also
be guns. In Summers—even in the absence of any "special
danger to the police . . . suggested by the evidence in th[e]
12 UNITED STATES v. MONTIETH
record"—the Supreme Court recognized that "execution of a
warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that
may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal
or destroy evidence." Summers, 452 U.S. at 702; see also
Cochran, 939 F.2d at 339 n.3 (noting that facts offered by the
government to "demonstrate the risk to the officers and sup-
port their decision to detain defendant" were "not required by
Summers").
In light of these dangers, officers may reasonably conclude
in appropriate circumstances that attempting to detain the resi-
dent inside his home may unnecessarily elevate the safety
risks attendant to a search. As the Second Circuit recently rec-
ognized, foreclosing all detentions outside the residence could
force officers to a choice between two problematic alterna-
tives:
[W]hen they observe a person of interest leaving a
residence for which they have a search warrant, they
would be required either to detain him immediately
(risking officer safety and the destruction of evi-
dence) or to permit him to leave the scene (risking
the inability to detain him if incriminating evidence
was discovered).
Bailey, 652 F.3d at 205. Here, the officers assessed the inher-
ent risks of a drug search, along with the additional problem
of forcing entry into a house with two young children inside,
and took the precaution of first seeking a consensual entry.
Although Fourth Amendment reasonableness is of course
adjudged at the time of the search or seizure, the prudence of
the officers’ plan in this case was illustrated by how it played
out in practice. The officers detained Montieth and presented
him with the option of averting a forcible police entry into his
home by cooperating in the warrant’s execution. As found by
the district court: "[I]t appears from the credible testimony of
Officer Blee that the defendant opted for the consensual entry,
UNITED STATES v. MONTIETH 13
and made a reasonable request that his children not see him
in handcuffs." Montieth’s request was honored when the
police left him in the police car while instructing his wife to
escort the children off the premises before the search. The
police then entered the home without force.
Everyone involved thus benefited from the consensual
nature of the search. The officers minimized the threat to their
safety, Montieth spared his children the sight of their father
in handcuffs, and his family was protected from the conse-
quences of an unanticipated police entry by force. As the dis-
trict court observed, "the defendant would be hard-pressed to
come up with a more reasonable method for" executing the
warrant; "[i]t seems to be a very reasonable way to do it; the
easy way rather than the hard way." A judge’s toolkit includes
common sense. It seems only sensible to observe that the offi-
cers’ detention of Montieth away from his residence was a
constitutional alternative to effectuating the warrant in a more
hazardous manner.
D.
Montieth finally raises a Miranda claim in relation to the
traffic stop. During his detention and before any Miranda
warning was administered, Montieth informed Officer Blee
that he had some marijuana in the house. Montieth claims that
he was under custodial interrogation at the time and that his
statement should have been suppressed.
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980), the
Supreme Court clarified that in addition to express question-
ing, interrogation for Miranda purposes includes only "words
or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect." See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
478 (1966) ("Any statement given freely and voluntarily with-
out any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evi-
dence."). The statement at issue fits squarely within the
14 UNITED STATES v. MONTIETH
contours of permissible evidence under Innis. The district
court found precisely that "the statement of the defendant was
spontaneous and not elicited in any way by the routine state-
ments of the officers."
Montieth claims, however, that he made his statement after
Officer Blee gave him a choice between cooperating with the
officers in the execution of the warrant or a forced police
entry into his home with his wife and children inside. This is
simply at odds with the finding of the district court that Offi-
cer Blee’s discussion of the method of executing the warrant
came after Montieth’s incriminating statement and not before.
As the district court found: "Without any questioning of the
defendant, and it appeared the defendant responded that he
had marijuana at the house, Officer Blee then discussed with
the defendant the methods of executing the warrant." The dis-
trict court heard the evidence. Its findings were in no sense
clearly erroneous and they were made under the standard set
forth by the Supreme Court in Innis. As a result, we conclude
that Montieth’s Miranda claim is without merit.
IV.
Montieth raises several additional Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment claims pertaining to police conduct during the search.
We shall briefly address each in turn.
A.
First, Montieth claims that once inside his residence during
the search, the police interrogated him coercively and without
administering Miranda warnings. The district court, however,
found Officer Blee’s and Officer Tobbe’s testimony credible,
where they testified that the defendant verbally waived his
Miranda rights before the officers questioned him in the
kitchen.
Montieth points to no evidence which suggests that the dis-
trict court’s finding was clearly erroneous and there is nothing
UNITED STATES v. MONTIETH 15
in the record to support that conclusion. Montieth asserts that
his claim is supported by the lack of a written waiver, but a
written waiver is not required under Miranda. See North Car-
olina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). The lack of a writ-
ten waiver goes to the weight of the officers’ testimony and
the district court found that "even in the absence of a written
executed form . . . the officers are believable on the point that
they Mirandized the defendant orally" before he made state-
ments to the police.
Because we find that the interrogation was constitutionally
sound, we must reject, as did the district court, Montieth’s
claim that his statements made at the law enforcement center
—which followed a valid written Miranda waiver—were
tainted by a previous illegal interrogation during the search.
B.
Second, Montieth alleges that suppression of the evidence
discovered in the search was required because he was never
presented with a warrant authorizing the search of his resi-
dence. Montieth goes so far as to suggest that Ms. Montieth’s
discovery of a draft warrant unrelated to Montieth upon her
return to the residence proves that the officers did not possess
a valid warrant for the search.
We reject the suggestion that the police did not obtain a
valid warrant for the Montieth residence prior to the search.
As discussed earlier, the magistrate issued a warrant based on
probable cause for the Montieth residence on June 11, 2008.
The district court found "no evidence that the issuance of the
warrant [was] in any way problematic," noting that it was
issued on June 11, 2008, signed by the magistrate, and speci-
fied "where to search, what to search for, and [was] in every
possible way consistent with the appropriate execution of a
warrant." Montieth has offered us no reason to question the
authenticity of this warrant.
16 UNITED STATES v. MONTIETH
With respect to the officers’ alleged failure to leave a
proper copy of the warrant at the Montieth residence, this
omission did not amount to a constitutional violation. In
United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 472 (4th Cir. 2006),
we held that "the Fourth Amendment is not offended where
the executing officer fails to leave a copy of the search war-
rant with the property owner following the search . . . or fails
even to carry the warrant during the search." Thus, in addition
to the district court’s finding that the officers read to Montieth
from the correct warrant during the search and that the offi-
cers believed they left the correct warrant at the house, the
officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by failing to
leave a copy of the proper warrant in the house after the
search. The constitutional requirement is for the police to
secure a valid warrant before searching a suspect’s home and
here they unquestionably did.2
V.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is
AFFIRMED.
2
Montieth asserts that even if the warrant was valid, the officers disre-
garded its terms by searching the shed in the backyard, which was not
specified in the warrant. Montieth argues that not only should the drug
packaging materials found in the shed be suppressed, but also all the evi-
dence recovered in the search.
The district court did not err, however, in concluding that the shed was
within the curtilage of the home, and that the warrant for the residence was
therefore "sufficient to include within its scope the shed that is within the
privacy fence and close to the residence itself." See Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) ("[C]urtilage is the area to which extends
the intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the
privacies of life,’ and therefore has been considered part of home itself for
Fourth Amendment purposes.") (internal citation omitted); United States
v. Breza, 308 F.3d 430 (4th Cir. 2002) (considering the area’s proximity
to the home and whether it is within an enclosure surrounding the home
as factors in the curtilage inquiry).