FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 6, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 11-5036
v. (D.C. No. 10-CR-00133-GKF-1)
(N.D. Okla.)
JOE LEE YBARRA,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, LUCERO, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Joe Lee Ybarra was convicted by a jury of possession
of a firearm and ammunition after former conviction of a felony, possession of
fifty grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and possession
of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, all of which the
government charged as occurring “on or about January 15, 2010.” He was
sentenced to 180 months followed by eight years’ supervised release. Before and
during trial, Mr. Ybarra pursued a motion in limine to exclude evidence that he
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
sold methamphetamine one or two days before the charged offenses; the district
court ultimately denied that motion. On appeal, Mr. Ybarra argues that the
district court should have excluded the evidence under Rule 403 and/or Rule
404(b), Fed. R. Evid., and that the evidence was not inextricably intertwined with
a charged crime. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Background
The parties are familiar with the facts, and we need not restate them here.
Briefly, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant for a Tulsa residence
on January 15, 2010, around 9:00 am. Mr. Ybarra was arrested a few blocks away
from the house, wearing only a shirt and underwear, after attempting to flee.
During a search of the house, officers located a jacket covering 140.52 grams of a
mixture containing methamphetamine and a loaded .44 caliber pistol, as well as a
pair of pants holding a wallet that contained Mr. Ybarra’s driver’s license. Based
on this evidence, the government obtained a grand jury indictment against Mr.
Ybarra including the charges listed previously.
At trial, the government planned to call Sean Lansing, a drug manufacturer
and dealer who was not present during the January 15 events, to testify that he
had purchased methamphetamine from Mr. Ybarra, once or twice, one or two days
before the January 15 raid; and that Mr. Ybarra had brought the
methamphetamine to Tulsa from Dallas, Texas. Mr. Ybarra filed a motion in
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limine to exclude that testimony, arguing that it was Rule 404(b) evidence of a
prior bad act which had not been timely disclosed, and that the evidence should
be excluded regardless as unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. The government
argued that the evidence was not Rule 404(b) evidence, but rather was
“inextricably intertwined” with the charged crime of possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute, meaning that it was all part of the
same action, and also was not unduly prejudicial under Rule 403.
The district court initially reserved decision on the motion in limine,
suggesting that evidence of a crime committed on January 14 could fall within the
“on or about” language used in charging the crime, rather than being a prior bad
act. 3 R. 23. The district court heard Mr. Lansing’s proposed testimony outside
the presence of the jury and denied Mr. Ybarra’s motion in limine, ruling that the
testimony was inextricably intertwined with the crime charged. 3 R. 85-86. After
trial, the jury convicted Mr. Ybarra on all three counts.
Discussion
The only issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in denying Mr.
Ybarra’s motion in limine and admitting the testimony of Mr. Lansing. “We
review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, considering
the record as a whole.” United States v. Blechman, 657 F.3d 1052, 1063 (10th
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under that standard, “[w]e will not
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reverse a district court’s ruling if it falls within the bounds of permissible choice
in the circumstances and is not arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.” United States
v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1156 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Within that analysis, we must determine both whether the evidence
falls within Rule 404(b) and whether it should be excluded under Rule 403.
A. Rule 404(b)
Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts . . . to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). But Rule 404(b) does not apply to
evidence of other acts when that evidence is intrinsic to the charged crime(s),
meaning that the other acts are “inextricably intertwined” with the charged
crimes. United States v. Ford, 613 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 2010). Thus, if
evidence is “part and parcel of the proof of the offense charged in the
indictment,” id., Rule 404(b) cannot be the basis for its exclusion.
Mr. Lansing testified that he bought methamphetamine from Mr. Ybarra at
least once, and potentially twice, in the day or two preceding the January 15 raid.
Given that Mr. Ybarra was charged with possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine “on or about January 15,” the district court’s ruling is
supported by the record. That ruling is further supported by this court’s repeated
indication that possession with intent to distribute is an ongoing crime. See
United States v. King, 632 F.3d 646, 656 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v.
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Trotter, 483 F.3d 694, 702 (10th Cir. 2007) (vacated on other grounds), for the
proposition that “possession with intent to distribute” is “an ongoing drug-
trafficking crime”); United States v. Rogers, 556 F.3d 1130, 1140 (10th Cir.
2009) (same). Thus, Mr. Ybarra’s alleged prior drug sales were sufficiently
intertwined with the charged crime that the district court did not abuse its
discretion.
Mr. Ybarra also argues that the district court’s refusal to label Mr.
Lansing’s testimony Rule 404(b) evidence further harmed him because, as a
result, he did not receive a limiting instruction regarding that evidence. However,
Mr. Ybarra actually received the only limiting instruction he requested: “You are
here to decide whether the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged. The defendant is not on trial for
any act, conduct, or crime not charged in the indictment.” 1 R. 30. The district
court included the proposed instruction in Instruction #15. 1 R. 138. We
therefore reject this argument.
B. Rule 403
Rule 403 allows a district court to exclude evidence where “its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Mr. Ybarra claims
error because the jury could have used evidence that he sold methamphetamine in
the past to convict him of the charged crime of possession with intent to distribute
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methamphetamine on January 15. However, as explained previously, Mr.
Lansing’s testimony was used as direct evidence of Mr. Ybarra’s ongoing
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. On these facts, we
cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by ruling that the probative
value of direct evidence that Mr. Ybarra committed an ongoing drug-trafficking
crime was not substantially outweighed by the possible prejudicial effect of that
evidence.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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