UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4055
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAMON GERARD DICKERSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:09-cr-00402-CCB-1)
Submitted: November 10, 2011 Decided: December 8, 2011
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jonathan A. Gladstone, LAW OFFICES OF JONATHAN GLADSTONE,
Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Judson T. Mihok, Assistant United States
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Damon Gerard Dickerson appeals his conviction and
sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2006). Dickerson
pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to
the agreed-upon term of 188 months’ imprisonment.
Dickerson’s plea agreement contained a provision
waiving his right to appeal his conviction or a sentence of 188
months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Dickerson claims that the
district court improperly sentenced him as an armed career
criminal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Dickerson stipulated
in his plea agreement that he met the qualifications of an armed
career criminal. The Government seeks dismissal of Dickerson’s
appeal based on Dickerson’s waiver of his appellate rights.
We approach the question of whether a defendant has
waived his right to appeal in connection with a plea proceeding
de novo. United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 626 (4th Cir.
2010). Where the United States seeks to enforce an appeal
waiver and there is no claim that the United States breached its
obligations under the plea agreement, we will enforce the waiver
if the record establishes that (1) the defendant knowingly and
intelligently agreed to waive the right to appeal; and (2) the
issue being appealed is within the scope of the waiver. United
States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).
2
Dickerson does not challenge the knowing and
intelligent waiver of his appellate rights. Instead, he argues
that he was sentenced in excess of the maximum statutory penalty
for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because he was
improperly designated and sentenced as an armed career criminal
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). We find this issue waived for appeal,
as Dickerson stipulated he was an armed career criminal and is
bound by his stipulation. See United States v. Martinez, 122
F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, we enforce the appellate
waiver and dismiss the appeal.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
DISMISSED
3