[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 12, 2011
No. 11-12469 JOHN LEY
CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cv-00347-EAJ
MARILYNN LEE, l
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(December 12, 2011)
Before BARKETT, HULL and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Marilynn Lee appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social Security
Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of her application for disability insurance
benefits (“DIB”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). She argues that the administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) erred by posing an incomplete hypothetical to the vocational expert
concerning the jobs available to her, and that the denial of DIB was not based on
substantial evidence. Specifically, she contends that the ALJ failed to adequately
incorporate her inability to hold on to items once she gripped them, as opposed to
her ability to grip them in the first place. The ALJ should have clarified which
limitation applied and to what degree it applied in its hypothetical to the
vocational expert, and the failure to do so resulted in an incomplete hypothetical.
In a social security case, we review the SSA’s legal conclusions de novo,
and its factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial
evidence. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007).
Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397,
1400 (11th Cir. 1996). We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our own
judgment for that of the agency. Id. “If the [agency]’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence we must affirm, even if the proof preponderates against it.”
Id.
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The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, “sequential” evaluation
process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled: (1) whether the claimant
is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a
severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment
meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of
Impairments; (4) whether, based on a Residual Functioning Capacity (“RFC”)
assessment, the claimant can perform any of her past relevant work despite the
impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national
economy that the claimant can perform, given the claimant’s RFC, age, education,
and work experience. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237–39 (11th Cir.
2004); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(1), (4)(i)-(v).
Here, the only issue in this appeal is the ALJ’s resolution of step five. At
step five, the SSA bears the burden to show that a significant number of jobs exist
in the national economy, which the claimant can perform. Phillips, 357 F.3d at
1239; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). An ALJ may make this
determination either by applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines or by
obtaining the testimony of a vocational expert. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239–40. “In
order for a vocational expert’s testimony to constitute substantial evidence, the
ALJ must pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the claimant’s
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impairments.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir.2002). The
ALJ is not required to include findings in the hypothetical that the ALJ has found
to be unsupported, however. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155,
1161 (11th Cir. 2004).
Lee argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical to the vocational expert failed to
adequately account for her inability to hold on to items once she gripped them and
therefore did not comprehensively describe her impairments. The ALJ found that
although Lee suffered serious burns as a result of a fire in 2003, she had been
treated since then, and that she had unlimited bilateral grip and motor movements.
Evidence in the record supporting this included: (1) a November 2005
examination showing full range of motion in her elbow, wrist, and all fingers in
both arms; (2) a December 2005 examination finding no range of motion
problems; and (3) an April 2007 report noting that, although she complained of
sharp pain in both arms, she was spontaneous with her arm movements during
conversation, which did not seem restricted. The ALJ is not required to include
findings in a hypothetical to a vocational expert that the ALJ has found to be
unsupported. Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1161. Therefore, the ALJ committed no error
by omitting an explanation of Lee’s grip limitations, which the ALJ found to be
unlimited. See id.
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AFFIRMED.
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