United States v. Keller

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________

No. 11-1172
No. 11-1173
________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellant
v.

JASON KELLER
________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 09-cr-00237)
District Judge: Honorable Gary L. Lancaster
_________________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 8, 2011

Before: HARDIMAN, BARRY, Circuit Judges and
SLOMSKY *, District Judge
*
The Honorable Joel H. Slomsky, District Judge for the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
 (Filed: December 14, 2011)

Laura S. Irwin
Michael L. Ivory
Office of the United States Attorney
700 Grant Street
Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219-0000
Attorneys for Appellant

Sally A. Frick
437 Grant Street
Frick Building
Pittsburgh, PA 15219-0000
Attorney for Appellee

_________________

OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal requires us to interpret § 2K2.1(b)(6) of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), which increases a
defendant’s offense level by four points when he “used or
possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another
felony offense.” In a trio of cases over the past decade, we
crafted a test for district courts to use in deciding when to apply
USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6). We held that for an offense to count as
“another felony offense,” it must be distinguished from the

2
firearms offense of conviction in two ways: the offense conduct
must (1) be distinct in time or conduct, and (2) require proof of
an additional element. This appeal requires us to consider
whether Amendment 691 to the Sentencing Guidelines vitiates
our precedents holding that USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6) does not apply
when the predicate offense is burglary of the firearms that are
the subject of the conviction.

I

In 2007, Jason Keller and two others tried to burglarize
three gun shops in Western Pennsylvania, succeeding in one of
the attempts. Their modus operandi involved stealing a vehicle
and using it to break into a store that sold firearms. That plan
proved to be easier said than done. On their first try, they
fastened straps to both the vehicle and the doors of Kaufman’s
Antique and Gun Shop in Aliquippa and attempted to rip the
door from its hinges, but their straps broke. Almost two weeks
later, Keller and his cohorts tried to burglarize Gander Mountain
in Coraopolis by ramming its doors with a van. This time, the
transmission failed before the doors did. Approximately two
weeks later, Keller and his co-conspirators drove a vehicle
through the front doors of Fazi’s Firearms in Plum Boro and
absconded with thirty firearms. After his apprehension, Keller
confessed that he sold about eighteen of the firearms to
“Adrian” in Maryland for $2,000.

A grand jury of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania indicted Keller for conspiracy
to commit an offense against the United States in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371, and stealing firearms from a federally licensed
firearms dealer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(u). The
Government subsequently filed an information against Keller,

3
charging him with possessing an unregistered firearm in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Keller pleaded guilty to all
three offenses.

The Probation Office prepared a Presentence
Investigation Report, calculating Keller’s total offense level as
27 and his criminal history category as I, resulting in an advisory
Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months imprisonment. The offense
level included a four-point enhancement pursuant to USSG §
2K2.1(b)(6), which must be applied “[i]f the defendant used or
possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another
felony offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm or
ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it
would be used or possessed in connection with another felony
offense.” 1 The Probation Office concluded that Keller’s
burglary of Fazi’s Firearms was “another felony offense”
justifying application of the enhancement. Keller filed a
sentencing memorandum contesting the enhancement. Noting
that the issue was “close,” the District Court found that the
enhancement did not apply to Keller’s conduct. Over the
Government’s objection, the Court reduced Keller’s Guidelines
range to 46 to 57 months and sentenced him to 48 months in
prison. The Government filed this timely appeal.

II

The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

1
Section 2K2.1(b)(6) was amended in the 2011
Sentencing Guidelines Manual. The relevant language in this
most recent edition is found in subsection (B) of USSG
§ 2K2.1(b)(6).

4
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b).

The sole issue in this appeal concerns the District Court’s
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, which we review de
novo. United States v. Grier, 585 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2009);
see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

III

A

Section 2K2.1(b)(6) of the 2010 Sentencing Guidelines
Manual was previously found at § 2K2.1(b)(5). Interpreting that
provision, we were confronted more than once with a case
involving a defendant, like Keller here, who had possessed or
stolen one or more firearms in the course of a single criminal
act, and was thereafter convicted of a federal firearms offense.
For example, in United States v. Fenton, the defendant broke
into a sporting goods store, stole several firearms, and received
the enhancement. 2 309 F.3d 825, 826 (3d Cir. 2002).
Recognizing a circuit split over whether the burglary could
trigger the enhancement, we held that “‘another felony offense’
cannot apply to the same felonious conduct for which the
criminal defendant is being sentenced.” Id. at 827. We
reasoned that to give effect to the word “another,” the defendant

2
The application notes to the then-applicable version of
the Guidelines provided: “‘Felony offense,’ as used in
subsection (b)(5), means any offense (federal, state, or local)
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
whether or not a criminal charge was brought, or conviction
obtained.” USSG § 2K2.1 cmt. n.7 (2000). A similar note is
now found at USSG § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(C). See infra Part III.B.

5
must have committed a felony that was separate from the
firearms possession offense. Id. at 827–28. Because “almost
every federal weapons offense could be prosecuted
simultaneously under state law[] . . . deciding this issue [to the
contrary] would require enhancement for almost every weapons
offense.” Id. at 828. Therefore, we articulated a “distinction in
time or conduct” test for applying the enhancement. Id.

We revised the Fenton rule in United States v. Lloyd, 361
F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2004). In that case, Lloyd placed a bomb
under the car of a man who had pursued a woman who was
dating one of Lloyd’s criminal associates. Id. at 199. The
District Court enhanced Lloyd’s Guidelines range over an
objection based on Fenton that the enhancement was
inappropriate because he had committed only one criminal act.
Id. at 199–200. We again observed that “[t]he word ‘another’
avoids . . . [the] absurd result” of automatic enhancement based
on the offense of conviction, and we noted “it is equally clear
that the guideline was not intended to exclude only the technical
offense of conviction from the scope of ‘another felony
offense.’” Id. at 200. To assist in distinguishing between cases
involving impermissible double counting and permissible
enhancement for other felonies, we imported the same-elements
test pronounced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299
(1932), which is used in the double jeopardy context. Id.
Accordingly, we held that “the ‘distinction in time or conduct’
test set forth in Fenton requires that a felony offense must at
least satisfy Blockburger before it may be used to adjust a
sentence upward under § 2K2.1(b)(5).” Id. at 200–01. We
explained that because thefts and burglaries of firearms are
species of possession offenses, they are not “other” offenses. Id.
at 201–02. Stating that we would not “read too much into
[Fenton’s] ‘distinction of time or conduct’ requirement,” and

6
relying on the fact that Lloyd had committed no mere theft or
burglary, we held that his range was properly enhanced. Id. at
203–05.

United States v. Navarro, 476 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2007),
served as a capstone for Fenton and Lloyd. Navarro confessed
to drug distribution, which was used as the predicate “[]other
felony offense” to enhance his sentence for possessing a firearm
as a convicted felon. Id. at 190–91. We explained that “a two-
part standard may be distilled” from Fenton and Lloyd:

The first part of the test, from Blockburger, is
legal in nature and asks whether the predicate
offense and the firearms possession crime each
have an element that is not shared by the other.
The second part of the test, from Fenton, is
essentially factual in nature and asks whether
more than mere possession of the firearm—
brandishment or other use—was an integral
aspect of the predicate offense. If these two
questions are answered in the affirmative, then the
four-level enhancement under section 2K2.1(b)(5)
should apply.

Id. at 196 (citations and footnote omitted). 3 Evaluating the drug

3
Anticipating the case we decide today, the quoted
passage included a footnote:

Although not directly relevant to resolution of this
case, it should be noted that the application notes
of section 2K2.1 of the Guidelines have been
amended, and the amendments became effective

7
distribution offense under this standard, we held the
enhancement was correctly applied to Navarro. Id. at 196–97.

B

In 2006, the Sentencing Commission proposed an
amendment to USSG § 2K2.1, which was eventually adopted as
Amendment 691 and incorporated into the Guidelines. See
USSG supp. app. C amend. 691, at 170–77. In addition to
adding a subsection (5), which bumped the guideline at issue
here to subsection (6), and other changes not relevant here, the
Commission removed Application Note 15, which stated that
“‘another felony offense’ . . . refer[s] to offenses other than
explosives or firearms possession or trafficking offenses,” and
inserted a new Application Note 14, which states in relevant
part:

(A) In General.—Subsections (b)(6) and (c)(1)
apply if the firearm or ammunition
facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating,
another felony offense or another offense,

in November 2006. See U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1 cmt. n. 14 (providing
for broader interpretation of “another felony
offense,” covering even those offenses that
involve only simple possession of a firearm). We
recognize that the amendments call into question
our decision in Fenton for defendants who are
sentenced under the current Guidelines and
application notes.

Navarro, 476 F.3d at 196 n.11.

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 respectively.

(B) Application When Other Offense is
Burglary or Drug Offense.— Subsections
(b)(6) and (c)(1) apply (i) in a case in which a
defendant who, during the course of a
burglary, finds and takes a firearm, even if
the defendant did not engage in any other
conduct with that firearm during the course of
the burglary; and (ii) in the case of a drug
trafficking offense in which a firearm is
found in close proximity to drugs, drug
manufacturing materials, or drug paraphernalia. In
these cases, application of subsections (b)(1) and
(c)(1) is warranted because the presence of
the firearm has the potential of facilitating another
felony offense or another offense,
respectively.

(C) Definitions.—

“Another felony offense”, for purposes of
subsection (b)(6), means any Federal, state,
or local offense, other than the explosive or
firearms possession or trafficking offense,
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year, regardless of whether a criminal charge
was brought, or a conviction obtained.

USSG supp. app. C amend. 691, at 171–72, 174–75 (emphasis
added); see USSG § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14. Explaining the basis for
the Amendment, the Sentencing Commission wrote:

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 [T]he amendment addresses a circuit conflict
pertaining to the application of current
§2K2.1(b)(5) (re-designated by this amendment as
§2K2.1(b)(6)[] and (c)(1)), specifically with
respect to the use of a firearm “in connection
with” burglary and drug offenses. . . . [T]he
amendment provides that in burglary offenses,
these provisions apply to a defendant who takes a
firearm during the course of the burglary, even if
the defendant did not engage in any other conduct
with that firearm during the course of the
burglary. . . . The Commission determined that
application of these provisions is warranted in
these cases because of the potential that the
presence of the firearm has for facilitating another
felony offense or another offense.

USSG supp. app. C amend. 691, at 177. Thus, subsection (B) of
Application Note 14 sets forth the Commission’s view of the
correct application of subsection (A)—the facilitation
requirement—in the special cases of burglary and drug
trafficking offenses.

C

In Stinson v. United States, the Supreme Court
considered “the legal force of commentary” to the Guidelines.
508 U.S. 36, 43 (1993). A unanimous Court rejected the
analogy that commentary is to a guideline as a regulation is to a
statute, because commentary “is not the product of delegated
authority for rulemaking.” Id. at 44. Instead, “the guidelines are
the equivalent of legislative rules adopted by federal agencies,”
and the “commentary . . . assist[s] in the interpretation and

10
application of those rules.” 4 Id. at 44–45. The Court thus
applied the same deferential standard it accords to an
administrative agency’s reading of its own regulations.
“[P]rovided an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations
does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute, it must be
given ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.’” Id. at 45 (quoting Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
Significant to this appeal, the Court observed that Congress
intended the Commission to revise the Guidelines periodically
based on how the courts have interpreted them. Id. at 46.
“Amended commentary is binding on the federal courts even
though it is not reviewed by Congress, and prior judicial
constructions of a particular guideline cannot prevent the
Commission from adopting a conflicting interpretation that
satisfies the standard we set forth today.” Id.

IV

As our discussion of Stinson demonstrates, we are bound
by the commentary to USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6). Although we held
in Fenton that the offense of burglary to steal firearms could not
serve as the predicate for a USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement,
the Commission sided with those courts of appeals that had held
to the contrary. Accordingly, the rule we stated in Fenton and
reaffirmed in Lloyd and Navarro is no longer valid to the extent

4
The Court limited its holding that commentary “is akin
to an agency’s interpretation of its own legislative rules” to the
“type of commentary” at issue in Stinson. 508 U.S. at 45.
Because the Stinson Court considered an application note to a
guideline, see id. at 39, as we do here, its holding controls.

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it was applied to the burglary and drug trafficking offenses
referenced in Application Note 14(B). 5 In short, Amendment
691 has eroded our prior decisions. 6

Keller is left to argue under Stinson either that
Application Note 14 conflicts with a statute or the Constitution,
or that it is “plainly erroneous” or inconsistent with USSG
§ 2K2.1(b)(6). See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 47. Keller does not
suggest a statutory or constitutional conflict (and we find none),
but he asserts that it is plainly erroneous to treat burglary
differently from all other felonies that might serve as a
triggering offense under the guideline.

We see no plain error or inconsistency for three reasons.
First, Note 14 is entirely consistent with the plain language of
the guideline. The meaning of USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6) is

5
Whether anything remains of the Fenton, Lloyd, and
Navarro line of cases outside of the burglary and drug
trafficking contexts is a question we leave for another day.
6
Keller contends that the District Court was free to
disregard Amendment 691 under United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005), in part because Booker renders the Guidelines
advisory, and in part because he claims it casts doubt on Stinson,
which was decided in an era of mandatory Guidelines. But
Keller misreads Booker. The discretion to vary pursuant to the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors did not eliminate the need to
calculate the Guidelines range accurately in the first instance.
See United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“Courts must continue to calculate a defendant’s Guidelines
sentence precisely as they would have before Booker.” (citing
United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 2006))).

12
ambiguous in cases where the purported other felony is very
closely related to the firearms offense. The Commission
resolved that ambiguity with respect to cases, like this case and
Fenton, in which a burglary is committed for the purpose of
obtaining firearms. Second, the fact that Amendment 691
resolved a circuit split evidences sufficient difference of opinion
to belie the claims of plain error and inconsistency. The breadth
of opinion among appellate judges suggests that the guideline is
subject to different interpretations. 7 Finally, we observe that all
three of our sister circuits to consider the matter have found that
subsection (B) of Note 14 is not inconsistent with the guideline.
See United States v. Krumwiede, 599 F.3d 785, 790–91 (7th
Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Hill, 563 F.3d 572, 581 (7th
Cir. 2009)); 8 United States v. Blalock, 571 F.3d 1282, 1288
(D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Morris, 562 F.3d 1131, 1135–
36 (10th Cir. 2009).

Therefore, we are satisfied that Amendment 691, which
clarified that a burglary of firearms counts as “another felony
offense,” is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with USSG §
2K2.1(b)(6).

7
The difference of opinion was intra-circuit as well as
inter-circuit. Fenton was decided over a dissent, which reasoned
that “the risk that [the] defendant would use the firearms was
increased by the fact that he was a convicted felon and by the
fact that he possessed those firearms during a burglary.” 309
F.3d at 829 (Roth, J., dissenting).
8
Previously on the Fenton side of the circuit split, the
Seventh Circuit in Krumwiede held that Amendment 691
abrogated its precedent. See 599 F.3d at 790.

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 V

The District Court erred procedurally when it relied on
Fenton to calculate Keller’s Guidelines range. Accordingly, we
will vacate the judgment and remand so the District Court can
recalculate Keller’s Guidelines range by applying the four-point
enhancement in USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6) before considering the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and imposing a new judgment of
sentence.

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