UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4278
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BRAHIM LAJQI,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:10-
cr-00502-RWT-1)
Submitted: November 10, 2011 Decided: December 14, 2011
Before NIEMEYER and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, LaKeytria W. Felder,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Gregory
Welsh, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Brahim Lajqi appeals his sixty-month variant sentence
imposed after his plea of guilty to visa fraud, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006). We affirm.
Lajqi first argues on appeal that the uncharged
conduct upon which the variance was based should have been
proved by clear and convincing evidence because it substantially
increased his sentence beyond that which would have been
reasonable based on the offense of conviction alone. Our
precedent squarely forecloses this argument. United States v.
Grubbs, 585 F.3d 793, 801 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 1923 (2010). Lajqi also argues that his sentence was
substantively unreasonable. We review a sentence for
reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In reviewing
substantive reasonableness, we “examine[] the totality of the
circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied
the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United States v.
Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). Contrary to
Lajqi’s argument, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) does not require
any further consideration of the strength of the evidence
regarding uncharged conduct after the court finds facts by a
preponderance. Lajqi’s argument that the factual basis for the
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variance was insufficiently relevant to the offense of
conviction similarly relies on a factor not found within
§ 3553(a), and is not supported by our precedent. United States
v. Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118, 123-24 (4th Cir. 2007)
(affirming, for conviction for illegal reentry, variant sentence
imposed where court found that defendant continued to associate
with MS-13 after reentry and sentence was necessary to protect
public and deter others). Lajqi’s contention that his low
likelihood of recidivism warranted a lesser sentence is
insufficient to show that the district court abused its
discretion.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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