[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
May 27, 2008
No. 07-14257 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00077-CR-3-MCR
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TODD LANGLEY JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 27, 2008)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Todd Langley Johnson appeals his 60-month sentence imposed after his
conviction for driving with a revoked license. Johnson was indicted for: (1)
driving under the influence in violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.193, per 18 U.S.C. §§ 7,
13 (Count One); and, (2) driving with a license suspended or revoked as a habitual
offender under Fla. Stat. § 322.264, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 322.34(2), per 18
U.S.C. §§ 7, 13 (Count Two). The charges stemmed from Johnson’s arrest for
suspicion of driving while intoxicated near Eglin Air Force Base in Shalimar,
Florida, on an area within the concurrent jurisdiction of the United States. He pled
guilty to both charges and was sentenced to consecutive five-year terms of
imprisonment.
On appeal, Johnson argues that the statute cited in Count Two, Fla. Stat.
§ 322.34(2), expressly excludes persons who have had their licenses revoked as
habitual offenders under Fla. Stat. § 322.264. As a result, Johnson argues, he was
“illegally sentenced” under § 322.34(2), because his license had been revoked as
an habitual offender.
Whether sufficient evidence supports a criminal conviction is a question of
law we review de novo. United States v. Garcia-Jaimes, 484 F.3d 1311, 1319
(11th Cir. 2007).
At the time of the offense, Johnson had his license permanently revoked as a
habitual offender, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 322.264. The indictment, however, cites
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Fla. Stat. § 322.34(2), which provides that
Any person whose driver’s license or driving privilege has been
canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons
defined in [§] 322.264, who, knowing of such cancellation,
suspension, or revocation, drives any motor vehicle upon the
highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled,
suspended, or revoked, upon:
(a) A first conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree
...
(b) A second conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree
...
(c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third
degree . . .
Fla. Stat. § 322.34(2) (emphasis added). While paragraph (2) does not address
habitual offenders, Fla. Stat. § 322.34(5) does, providing that “[a]ny person whose
driver’s license has been revoked pursuant to [§] 322.264 (habitual offender) and
who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is
revoked is guilty of a felony of the third degree . . . .” Fla. Stat. § 322.34(5).1
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(3) provides that “[u]nless the
defendant was misled and thereby prejudiced, neither an error in a citation nor a
citation’s omission is a ground to dismiss the indictment or information or to
reverse a conviction.” Moreover, the Advisory Committee Notes for Rule (7)(c)(3)
1
This offense is punishable as an offense against the United States in areas within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the United States. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 7, 13.
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provide that “[a] conviction may be sustained on the basis of a statute or regulation
other than that cited.” See United States v. Bennett, 368 F.3d 1343, 1352-55 (11th
Cir. 2004) (holding that sufficient evidence supported a conviction for attempt to
kill an officer of the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1114, where the defendant was
actually charged with a violating 18 U.S.C. § 115, which pertained to attempted
murder of a member of a United States official’s family), vacated on other
grounds, 543 U.S. 1110 (2005). In Bennett, we reasoned that the indictment
charged the requisite elements for a conviction under § 1114, the indictment made
clear the illegal act for which the defendant was being prosecuted, and nothing in
the record suggested that the defendant was misled or prejudiced by the incorrect
citation. See id. at 1354-55.
In this case, while Count Two of the indictment charged Johnson with
driving after his license was revoked as an habitual offender, but cited paragraph
(2) of Fla. Stat. § 322.34 instead of paragraph (5), the district court did not err in
sentencing Johnson for a violation of § 322.34(5), a third-degree felony. The
indictment charged the elements that are necessary to sustain a conviction under
§ 322.34(5) and made clear the illegal act for which Johnson was being prosecuted.
At the change-of-plea hearing, Johnson acknowledged as true the information
contained in a statement of facts that was filed with the court, which provided that
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he drove after having his license revoked as an habitual offender. Moreover, the
court accurately informed Johnson that the statutory maximum for his conviction
on Count Two was five years’ imprisonment. Finally, Johnson points to nothing in
the record that suggests that he was misled about either the illegal activity for
which he was being prosecuted or the potential punishment that he faced. As a
result, we affirm his sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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