FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PLAZA AUTO CENTER, INC., Nos. 10-72728
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent,
10-73125
v.
NLRB No.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 28-CA-22256
BOARD,
OPINION
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.
On Petition for Review and Cross-Application
for Enforcement of an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
Argued and Submitted
October 27, 2011—San Francisco, California
Filed December 19, 2011
Before: Susan P. Graber and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges,
and Gordon J. Quist,* Senior District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Quist
*The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
21025
21028 PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB
COUNSEL
Stephanie R. Leach, Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P., Phoenix, Ari-
zona, for the petitioner.
Jill A. Griffin and Kira Dellinger Vol, National Labor Rela-
tions Board, Washington, D.C., for the respondent.
OPINION
QUIST, District Judge:
Plaza Auto Center, Inc. (“PAC” or “company”) seeks
review of an order of the National Labor Relations Board (the
“Board”) holding that PAC violated section 8(a)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1), by firing employee Nick Aguirre (“Aguirre”) for
his outburst during a meeting with PAC management regard-
ing PAC’s compensation policies. Applying the four-factor
PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB 21029
test in Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979), the Board
concluded that in spite of his inappropriate remarks toward
PAC’s owner, Aguirre did not lose his statutory protections
under the Act. The Board has filed a cross-application for
enforcement of its order, including its finding that PAC
repeatedly violated the Act by inviting Aguirre to quit in
response to his protected activities.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) and
(f). For the reasons set forth below, we grant PAC’s petition
for review and remand to the Board to balance the Atlantic
Steel factors in light of our discussion below. We also grant
the Board’s petition for enforcement of Paragraphs 1 and
2(d)-(e) of the order.
BACKGROUND
PAC sells used cars in Yuma, Arizona, and is owned by
Tony Plaza (“Plaza”). PAC has two sales managers, Juan
Felix (“Felix”) and Gustavo MacGrew (“MacGrew”), and an
officer manager, Barbara Montenegro (“Montenegro”). PAC
hired Aguirre as a salesman at the end of August 2008. Dur-
ing Aguirre’s brief employment with PAC, which ended on
October 28, 2008, PAC conducted three-day weekend tent
sales in a Sears parking lot. Also during that time, Felix and
MacGrew held weekly meetings for the sales staff.
On his first day with PAC, Aguirre worked at a tent sale.
During his shift, when Aguirre inquired about bathroom facil-
ities, Felix pointed to the Sears store and a gas station across
the street. In a sales meeting the following week, Aguirre
asked whether salespeople could take a break to use the bath-
room and eat a meal during tent sales. Felix responded,
“you’re always on break buddy . . . you just wait for custom-
ers all day.” Felix also told Aguirre that he was free to leave
at any time if he did not like the company’s policies.
During PAC’s next tent sale in mid-September, Aguirre
spoke with other salespeople about PAC’s compensation pol-
21030 PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB
icy. They informed Aguirre that salespeople were paid a
straight commission with no draw or guaranteed minimum. In
other words, salespeople were not paid the minimum wage
and had to rely solely on their sales commissions. Aguirre
also raised the issue of a system for salespeople to alternate
bathroom breaks, but when Aguirre asked Felix for a break to
use the bathroom and get something to eat, Felix refused, reit-
erating that the salespeople were “always on a break.”
At the next sales meeting, an employee other than Aguirre
raised the issue of compensation. MacGrew responded that if
employees did their jobs correctly and followed all of the pro-
cedures, they would make money. Sometime thereafter,
Aguirre sold a vehicle listed on the company’s “flat list”—a
list of vehicles that carried a special commission because they
were difficult to sell. A similar vehicle was listed on the “flat
list” with a commission of between $1,000 to $2,000. To
Aguirre’s surprise, however, he received a check for only
$150. His fellow employees agreed that it was unfair. Aguirre
confronted Felix about the size of the check, but Felix told
Aguirre that the commission was low because he had given
the vehicle away almost for free.
At another sales meeting, Plaza informed the salespeople
that he was going to deduct the repair costs for a damaged
vehicle equally from all salespeople’s paychecks if no one
admitted responsibility. Aguirre responded that it would be
unfair to charge only the salespeople instead of all employees
who had access to the vehicle. Plaza then spoke about
employee negativity and stated that he had a stack of applica-
tions from prospects whom the company could easily hire as
salespeople.
In October, at another tent sale, Aguirre asked Felix which
vehicles would produce a good commission because Aguirre
thought that the company was stealing money from him in
calculating his commissions. Felix responded that Aguirre
was welcome to go elsewhere if he did not trust the company.
PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB 21031
Around the same time, Aguirre obtained information relating
to PAC’s compensation system from Arizona’s wage and
hour agency. Aguirre told his coworkers that the agency
advised him that the salespeople were entitled to the mini-
mum wage as a draw against commissions and that he
intended to speak with PAC’s office manager, Montenegro,
about this issue.
On October 28, Aguirre asked Montenegro whether PAC’s
salespeople were entitled to a minimum-wage draw. Montene-
gro responded that the company did not pay minimum wage
and that Aguirre should work elsewhere if he wanted a
minimum-wage job. Aguirre informed Montenegro that he
had spoken with the state wage agency about a draw and
asked her to look into the issue, perhaps by asking Plaza.
Later that afternoon, on October 28, Felix informed Plaza
that Aguirre complained about everything all the time and
wanted to know PAC’s vehicle costs because he did not trust
the company’s calculation of his sales commissions. Felix
then called Aguirre into Felix’s office to meet with Felix,
MacGrew, and Plaza. At the beginning of the meeting, Plaza
had no intention of firing Aguirre. Plaza began the meeting by
telling Aguirre that he was “talking a lot of negative stuff”
that would negatively affect the sales force and he was asking
too many questions. Aguirre responded that he had questions
about vehicle costs, commissions, and minimum wage. Plaza
told Aguirre that he had to follow the company’s policies and
procedures, that car salespeople normally do not know the
dealer’s cost of vehicles, and that he should not be complain-
ing about pay. Plaza twice told Aguirre that if he did not trust
the company, he need not work there. At that point, Aguirre
lost his temper and in a raised voice started berating Plaza,
calling him a “fucking mother fucking,” a “fucking crook,”
and an “asshole.” Aguirre also told Plaza that he was stupid,
nobody liked him, and everyone talked about him behind his
back. During the outburst, Aguirre stood up, pushed his chair
21032 PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB
aside, and told Plaza that if Plaza fired him, Plaza would
regret it. Plaza then fired Aguirre.
Following an evidentiary hearing, an administrative law
judge (“ALJ”) found that PAC had violated section 8(a)(1)
several times by inviting Aguirre to quit in response to his
protected protests of working conditions. As to the discharge,
however, the ALJ applied Atlantic Steel Co. and concluded
that, although Aguirre was engaged in protected activity dur-
ing the October 28 meeting, his obscene remarks and personal
attacks on Plaza cost him the Act’s protection.
The General Counsel filed exceptions regarding the dis-
charge. Over a dissent, the Board concluded that Aguirre’s
conduct was not so severe as to cause him to lose his statutory
protection. The Board thus held that PAC had violated section
8(a)(1) by firing Aguirre and reversed the ALJ’s order on that
issue.
DISCUSSION
I. PAC’s Petition for Review of the Board’s Order
Regarding the Discharge
A.
“This court will enforce an NLRB order if the Board cor-
rectly applied the law and if its factual findings are supported
by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Sierra
Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 215 (9th Cir. 1989). The
substantial evidence test requires us to evaluate the entire
record to determine whether “it would have been possible for
a reasonable jury to reach the Board’s conclusion.” Allentown
Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 366-67
(1998). Our review is more “searching” in instances where the
Board’s findings or conclusions are contrary to those of the
ALJ. United Steel Workers of Am. AFL-CIO-CLC v. NLRB,
482 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007); UAW v. NLRB, 834 F.2d
PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB 21033
816, 819 (9th Cir. 1987). The ALJ’s findings become part of
the record to be reviewed along with other evidence contrary
to the Board’s opinion. NLRB v. Searle Auto Glass, Inc., 762
F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1985). However, the Supreme Court
has observed that “evidence supporting a conclusion may be
less substantial when an impartial, experienced examiner who
has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn
conclusions different from the Board’s than when he has
reached the same conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951).
B.
[1] The issue for review is whether Aguirre forfeited the
protection of the Act because of his conduct during the Octo-
ber 28 meeting.1 “[W]here an employee engages in indefensi-
ble or abusive conduct, his concerted activity will lose the
protection of the Act.” Trus Joist MacMillan, 341 N.L.R.B.
369, 370 (2004); see also Media Gen. Operations, Inc. v.
NLRB, 560 F.3d 181, 186 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Even concerted
actions that are assumed to be protected by the Act may for-
feit such protection if they are ‘egregious or flagrant.’ ” (quot-
ing Care Initiatives, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 144, 151 (1996))). To
determine whether an employee’ s conduct results in a loss of
protection, the Board considers the following factors: “(1) the
place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discus-
sion; (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4)
whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by the
employer’s unfair labor practice.” Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B.
at 816. The Board must “carefully balance” these factors and,
1
PAC argues that the termination was proper under the analysis set forth
in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980). The Board concluded that a
Wright Line analysis was unnecessary because PAC’s motivation was not
at issue—it was undisputed that PAC fired Aguirre because of his outburst
during the October 28 meeting. Because PAC’s motivation was not at
issue, this conclusion was correct. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 334 N.L.R.B.
751, 753 (2001); see also Felix Indus., 331 N.L.R.B. 144, 145-46 (2000),
enforcement denied on other grounds by 251 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
21034 PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB
where doing so shows that the employee engaged in “oppro-
brious conduct,” the employee loses the protection of the Act.
Id. These considerations recognize that “[e]mployers and
employees have a shared interest in maintaining order in the
workplace, an order that is made possible by maintaining a
certain level of decorum.” Trus Joist MacMillan, 341
N.L.R.B. at 371. Nonetheless, the Act permits some leeway
for impulsive behavior, which must be balanced against the
employer’s right to maintain order and discipline. NLRB v.
Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1965).
The ALJ found that the first, second, and fourth factors
weigh against the loss of protection, while the third factor—
the nature of the outburst—favors the loss of protection. The
ALJ concluded that, under the circumstances, the nature of
Aguirre’s outburst was such that it resulted in Aguirre’s for-
feiting the Act’s protection. The Board agreed with the ALJ
with regard to the first, second, and fourth factors but, finding
a lack of support in the record to conclude that Aguirre’s con-
duct was physically threatening or intimidating, as the ALJ
had found, the Board concluded that all four Atlantic Steel
factors weigh in favor of finding that Aguirre retained his pro-
tection under the Act.
1. Place of the Discussion
[2] When the discussion occurs in a private location away
from the normal work area and other employees, such that it
causes no disruption to order or discipline in the workplace,
this factor normally weighs in favor of protection. See, e.g.,
Stanford Hotel, 344 N.L.R.B. 558, 558 (2005) (where the
meeting was in an employee lunchroom away from the nor-
mal work area and the employee closed the door to maintain
privacy, the location weighed in favor of protection). The
Board and the ALJ concluded that this factor favored contin-
ued protection because the meeting occurred in Felix’s office
away from the workplace and did not affect employee disci-
pline. Nothing in the record undermines this finding.
PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB 21035
[3] PAC argues that this factor weighs in favor of a loss of
protection because Aguirre requested and initiated the meet-
ing with Plaza with the intent to humiliate Plaza in front of
Felix and MacGrew. We reject this argument because nothing
in the record suggests that Aguirre planned to humiliate Plaza
or any other supervisor at the start of, or before, the meeting
or that Aguirre’s conduct disrupted PAC’s business or under-
mined employee discipline.2 Trus Joist MacMillan, which
PAC cites, is distinguishable because the employee in that
case instigated the meeting for the express purpose of embar-
rassing a manager in front of other managers, which “accentu-
ate[d] and exacerbate[d] the disruptive effect of [the
employee’s] outburst.” 341 N.L.R.B. at 370. There is no such
evidence here.
2. Subject Matter of the Discussion
[4] The Board and the ALJ concluded that the second fac-
tor favors protection because the subject matter of the meeting
concerned Aguirre’s complaints related to terms and condi-
tions of employment, including PAC’s compensation policies
toward its salespeople. PAC concedes that the meeting, at
least initially, concerned issues afforded protection under the
Act, but it argues that this was no longer true when the subject
matter changed to Aguirre’s demand to know PAC’s vehicle
costs, which PAC had no legal obligation to disclose. PAC
contends that Aguirre’s obscenities and personal attacks were
triggered by Plaza’s response to Aguirre’s demand for this
information, rather than anything having to do with protected
2
There was conflicting evidence regarding who initiated the meeting.
Aguirre indicated that management arranged the meeting, stating that
Felix directed Aguirre to go into Felix’s office. ER 124. Montenegro, on
the other hand, testified that Aguirre asked to meet with Plaza to discuss
the minimum wage issue. ER 244-45. Neither the ALJ nor the Board
resolved this specific issue, although both found that Aguirre asked Mon-
tenegro to look into the issue, perhaps by asking Plaza, and that Felix cal-
led Aguirre into his office. ER 2,8. In any event, there is no basis for
concluding that Aguirre ever asked to meet with anyone other than Plaza.
21036 PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB
conduct. We disagree. The topic of vehicle costs was closely
related to—in fact intertwined with—Aguirre’s concerns
about receiving proper compensation. Aguirre’s desire to
know PAC’s costs related directly to PAC’s pay structure
because his complaint, in part, was that he could verify that
his commissions were correct only if he knew what PAC paid
for the vehicles. Moreover, as the ALJ observed, Aguirre’s
outburst was contemporaneous with Plaza’s characterization
of Aguirre’s complaints as “a lot of negative stuff” and his
statement that Aguirre should work elsewhere if he did not
like or trust the company. ER at 13. Thus, there is no basis to
segregate Aguirre’s outburst from his protected complaints
about PAC’s employment policies and practices.
3. Nature of the Outburst
The Board rejected the ALJ’s conclusion that the nature of
Aguirre’s outburst weighed against protection. The ALJ
described Aguirre’s outburst as “repeated, extensive, and per-
sonally derogatory statements to a supervisor,” noting further
that “Mr. Aguirre repeatedly reviled Mr. Plaza in obscene and
personally denigrating terms accompanied by menacing con-
duct and language.” ER 14. In contrast, while the Board
acknowledged that Aguirre “uttered more than a brief profan-
ity against Plaza,” it characterized his conduct as a single,
brief outburst provoked by Plaza’s failure to respond to
Aguirre’s concerns and Plaza’s suggestion that Aguirre work
elsewhere. ER 3. Also, finding no evidence of actual or
threatened physical harm or aggression, the Board concluded
that Aguirre’s outburst was “unaccompanied by insubordina-
tion, physical contact, threatening gestures, or threat of physi-
cal harm.” ER 4. Finally, the Board concluded that Aguirre’s
conduct was not outside the range of acceptable conduct
because Felix himself had used obscene language when deal-
ing with employees.
[5] Implicit in the Board’s analysis is the suggestion that
an employee’s outburst does not factor into the loss of the
PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB 21037
Act’s protection unless accompanied by physical conduct, or
at least a threat that is physical in nature. We arrive at this
interpretation because the Board seemingly considered imma-
terial the ALJ’s finding that Aguirre personally denigrated
Plaza with obscene and insulting language. Aguirre’s verbal
attack—involving repeated insults and obscenities, all
directed at Plaza, as the ALJ found—was not brief and was,
in fact, insubordination. The rule the Board seems to espouse
is at odds with its own precedents, which recognize that an
employee’s offensive and personally denigrating remarks
alone can result in loss of protection. See, e.g., Care Initia-
tives, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. at 151 (“Among the specific types of
conduct that could exceed the protection of the Act are vulgar,
profane, and obscene language directed at a supervisor or
employer, even though uttered in the course of protected con-
certed activity.”). For example, in Stanford Hotel, 344
N.L.R.B. at 558, an employee responded to his supervisor’s
repeated demands that he admit he was not covered under the
collective bargaining agreement by calling his supervisor a
“liar,” a “bitch,” and a “f—ing son of a bitch.” Although it
ultimately decided that the employee retained his protection
in light of the other factors, the Board concluded that the
employee’s obscene and offensive outburst favored a loss of
protection. Id. at 559; see also Daimler Chrysler Corp., 344
N.L.R.B. 1324, 1328-29 (2005) (concluding that the outburst,
in which the employee called his supervisor an “asshole” and
stated, “Bullshit, I want this meeting now,” “fuck this shit,”
and that he did not “have to put up with this bullshit” was
insubordinate and profane and weighed against protection).
The District of Columbia Circuit had occasion to consider
the Board’s application of the third Atlantic Steel factor in
Felix Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir.
2001). In that case, Yonta, a 42-year-old employee, was
supervised by Petrillo, a 25-year-old whose father was the
president of the company. While at home, Yonta called
Petrillo at his office to inquire about not receiving a night
shift differential. Petrillo assured Yonta that he would get
21038 PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB
“every penny” to which he was entitled, but then told Yonta
that he was tired of “carrying” him. Yonta responded that
Petrillo was “just a fucking kid” and added, “I don’t have to
listen to a fucking kid.” When Petrillo asked Yonta what he
had just called him, Yonta confirmed, “a fucking kid.” In
response, Petrillo fired Yonta. An ALJ concluded that Yonta
lost his protection, but the Board disagreed, finding that
“ ‘Yonta’s conduct consisted of a brief, verbal outburst of
profane language, unaccompanied by any threat or physical
gestures or contact.’ ” Id. at 1054 (quoting the Board’s deci-
sion). The court observed that the Board’s rationale contra-
dicted Atlantic Steel, in which it disavowed any rule “whereby
otherwise protected activity would shield any obscene insub-
ordination short of physical violence.” Id. at 1055 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court reasoned, “[i]f an
employee is fired for denouncing a supervisor in obscene,
personally-denigrating, or insubordinate terms—and Yonta
here managed all three with economy—then the nature of his
outburst properly counts against according him the protection
of the Act.” Id. The court remanded the matter for the Board
to conduct a proper balancing, with Yonta’s statements
weighing against protection. Id.
[6] The Board’s explanation here is similar to its reasoning
in Felix Industries. But Aguirre’s outburst, even if brief, was
no less obscene, degrading, and insubordinate than Yonta’s
outburst toward his supervisor. Even in that brief moment, as
the Board characterized it, Aguirre called Plaza a “fucking
mother fucking,” a “fucking crook,” and an “asshole” and told
him that he was stupid, that nobody liked him, and that every-
one talked about him behind his back. This conduct alone
counts against Aguirre’s retaining protection. Thus, like the
Felix Industries court, we find it necessary to remand this
matter to the Board to allow it to properly consider whether
the nature of Aguirre’s outburst caused him to forfeit his pro-
tection. See Trus Joist MacMillan, 341 N.L.R.B. at 371-72
(concluding that the third Atlantic Steel factor alone may
carry enough weight to forfeit the Act’s protection).
PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB 21039
The Board argues that we still should conclude that it prop-
erly balanced the factors because it stated that it would have
reached the same result even if the third factor weighs against
protection. But the reasoning supporting that statement is
internally inconsistent. After stating that it was adopting the
ALJ’s credibility and factual findings regarding the October
28 meeting, the Board rejected the ALJ’s findings that Aguir-
re’s conduct was “belligerent,” “menacing,” and “at least
physically aggressive if not menacing.” In another, similarly
inconsistent statement, the Board claimed to rely on the ALJ’s
findings in concluding that Aguirre’s outburst did not amount
to a threat of physical harm. But, the belligerence finding was
essentially a credibility finding: the only evidence regarding
the nature of the outburst was the competing testimony of
Aguirre and PAC’s witnesses. The ALJ expressly determined
that Aguirre’s testimony was incongruous and “not as believ-
able” as the PAC witnesses’ testimony, and she did not credit
Aguirre’s account of the October 28 meeting where it con-
flicted with the accounts of the three PAC supervisors. Thus,
it was precisely because the ALJ gave more credence to the
testimony of the PAC witnesses that she found the outburst
was physically aggressive and menacing.
We cannot be sure whether this inconsistent logic colored
the Board’s statement regarding how it would balance the fac-
tors if the third factor weighed in favor of lost protection. In
other words, although the Board stated that it would have
reached the same result even if Aguirre’s outburst, as the
Board characterized it, weighed in favor of lost protection, we
cannot be sure that the Board would have reached the same
result had it adopted the ALJ’s finding that Aguirre’s outburst
involved physically aggressive and menacing conduct.
Accordingly, we remand this case to the Board to re-balance
the Atlantic Steel factors as discussed in this opinion. In doing
so, the Board should either (1) reject, with a reasoned expla-
nation, the ALJ’s credibility and factual findings regarding
the October 28 meeting, or (2) adopt those findings in their
entirety, including the finding regarding belligerence.
21040 PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB
4. Provocation by Unfair Labor Practices
[7] The Board agreed with the ALJ that the fourth factor
weighs in favor of protection because Aguirre’s outburst was
contemporaneous with both Plaza’s censure of Aguirre’s pro-
tected activities as “a lot of negative stuff” and Plaza’s unfair
labor practice of suggesting that Aguirre could work else-
where if he did not like the company’s policies. The Board’s
conclusion on this factor, like its conclusion on the second
factor, is well supported. PAC nonetheless argues that this
factor weighs in favor of loss of protection, once again
advancing its contention that the outburst was provoked by
Plaza’s lawful statement that he would not disclose informa-
tion regarding the price of cars. We reject this argument for
the reasons cited above.
II. Application for Summary Enforcement
[8] The Board is entitled to enforcement of the portion of
its order finding that PAC management violated section
8(a)(1) of the Act in several instances by inviting Aguirre to
quit in response to his protected inquiries. PAC’s failure to
challenge before the Board the ALJ’s finding on this issue
means that “the Board’s finding of those unfair labor practices
violations must be taken as established.” NLRB v. Advanced
Stretchforming Int’l, Inc., 233 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir.
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we remand to the Board for
proper balancing of the Atlantic Steel factors in light of our
conclusion that the Board erred in its initial assessment that
the nature of Aguirre’s outburst weighs in favor of protection.
As we have explained, under the Board’s own precedents,
obscene, degrading, and insubordinate comments may weigh
in favor of lost protection even absent a threat of physical
harm. In addition, the Board should give full effect to the
PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB 21041
ALJ’s factual and credibility findings, including the finding
that Aguirre’s behavior was menacing or at least physically
aggressive in that small room, unless “the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces” the Board that
they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Prods., 91 N.L.R.B.
544, 545 (1950), enforced by 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951).
Finally, we grant the Board’s petition for enforcement of the
order with regard to the Board’s findings that PAC committed
unfair labor practices by inviting Aguirre to quit in response
to his protected concerted protests of labor conditions.
Accordingly, Paragraphs 2(a)-(c) of the Board’s order are
vacated, and Paragraphs 1 and 2(d)-(e) are enforced.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
PETITION GRANTED AND REMANDED; ORDER
ENFORCED IN PART.