UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4727
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JOHNNY BOYD BURRIS, JR., a/k/a Rahiymu El Bey,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (0:03-cr-00551-CMC-1)
Submitted: December 15, 2011 Decided: December 19, 2011
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Allen B. Burnside, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Stacey Denise Haynes, Assistant
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Johnny Boyd Burris, Jr., was convicted of violating
the terms of his supervised release and was sentenced to eleven
months in prison. On appeal, his attorney has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning
whether the evidence supported a finding that Burris violated
the terms of his release and whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable. Although informed of his right to do so, Burris
has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
Burris initially contends that his supervised release
was improperly revoked. We review a district court’s decision
to revoke supervised release for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir 1992). To revoke
release, the district court need only find a violation of a
condition of release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18
U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West Supp. 2011). At Burris’s revocation
hearing, it was undisputed that Burris failed to report even
once to his probation officer. Burris asserted that he was not
subject to supervision because the Government had failed to
respond to a document he allegedly served under the Uniform
Commercial Code (“UCC”). Because the UCC is inapplicable in
criminal cases and because Burris’s assertions that he was not
subject to supervision were without support, we conclude that
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the court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Burris’s
supervised release.
Burris also contends that his eleven-month sentence is
unreasonable. A sentence imposed following revocation of
supervised release will be affirmed if it is within the
applicable statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir 2006).
Burris’s sentence is below the statutory maximum of two years.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (Class C felony). Further, the
sentence is procedurally reasonable: the district court
considered both the Chapter 7 policy statements and the 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011) factors that it was
permitted to consider. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Moreover,
we conclude that the district court reasonably rejected Burris’s
arguments for a lower sentence in light of Burris’s total
disregard of his responsibilities during supervised release.
Accordingly, the sentence is also substantively reasonable, as
the court adequately explained its reasons for imposing the
sentence. See id.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm. This court requires that counsel
inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
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client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the motion was served
on his client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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