United States v. Reginald Chavers

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4421

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

REGINALD CHAVERS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:08-cr-00834-PMD-1)

Submitted: December 20, 2011 Decided: December 22, 2011

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Derek J. Enderlin, ROSS AND ENDERLIN, P.A., Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Peter Thomas Phillips, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

While on supervised release, imposed as part of his

sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006), Reginald Chavers had his

release revoked. Chavers was thereafter convicted of violating

his supervised release. The district court sentenced him to

eleven months of imprisonment, two years of supervised release,

and six months of home confinement. Counsel has filed a brief

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting

there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but raising the

following issues, whether: (1) the district judge should have

recused himself; (2) the court erred by finding that Chavers

violated his supervised release because of his arrest for

domestic violence; (3) the court erred by imposing as a

condition of his supervised release that Chavers could not be

employed where he would be required to carry a weapon; (4) the

court erred by finding that Chavers changed employment in

violation of a condition of his supervised release; (5) the

court erred by sentencing him to six months of home confinement;

(6) Chavers was entitled to a detention hearing; and (7) defense

counsel had a conflict of interest. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm.

As conceded by Anders counsel, claims one, two, three,

and six are reviewed only for plain error, as Chavers raises

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them for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (detailing plain error standard).

Chavers fails to meet the demanding burden of establishing plain

error for any of these claims. Chavers provides no precedent

for his argument, and we find none, that Senior Judge Duffy had

a conflict of interest in adjudicating his supervised release

violation because he also adjudicated his underlying § 922(g)

conviction. The court heard the facts underlying the domestic

violence incident and determined by a preponderance of the

evidence that Chavers violated his condition not to engage in

new criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West 2000 &

Supp. 2011). The district court imposed as a condition of

Chavers’ supervised release that he not be employed in a

capacity where he would wear a uniform, badge, or carry a

weapon. This was reasonable in light of the fact that Chavers

was employed as an armed security guard at the time of his

underlying § 922(g) conviction. Chavers did not timely request

a detention hearing, which may be waived under 18 U.S.C. § 3142

(2006), and such claims generally are moot following conviction.

See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (observing that

defendant’s “claim to pretrial bail was moot once he was

convicted” (emphasis in original)).

Chavers remaining claims also fail. The court did not

abuse its discretion by finding that Chavers failed to provide

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his probation officer with prior notice of his change of

employment, United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th

Cir. 1999) (providing standard), the court did not err by

imposing a term of supervised release and home confinement,

United States v. Hager, 288 F.3d 136, 137-38 (4th Cir. 2002),

and Chavers’ defense counsel did not have an actual conflict of

interest because Chavers previous counsel, who was dismissed,

also worked for the public defenders’ office. Mickens v.

Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168-69 (2002).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.

Chavers’ sentence was imposed within his advisory Sentencing

Guidelines range and the prescribed statutory range and is not

plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,

438-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We therefore affirm Chavers’ conviction

and sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Chavers,

in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the

United States for further review. If Chavers requests that a

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must

state that a copy thereof was served on Chavers. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

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adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED