UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4560
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KENNY SMITH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, Chief District
Judge. (2:10-cr-00747-DCN-1)
Submitted: December 13, 2011 Decided: December 27, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, Nick Bianchi, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Consonant with the terms of his conditional plea
agreement, Kenny Smith appeals the district court’s denial of
his motion to suppress the fruits of a search of his residence
as well as an incriminating statement he made during that
search. We affirm.
The district court’s legal conclusions underlying a
suppression determination are reviewed de novo while its factual
findings are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Guijon-
Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757, 762 (4th Cir. 2011). Because the district
court denied the motion to suppress, the evidence is construed
on appeal in the light most favorable to the Government. United
States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 320 (4th Cir. 2004).
Smith first attempts to suppress the fruits of the
search of his residence. Our review of the record persuades us
that, regardless of whether the warrant was supported by
probable cause at the time it was executed, any infirmity in the
warrant was not so obvious as to render the officers’ belief in
the warrant’s legitimacy “entirely unreasonable.” United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). See also United
States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 467 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule); United
States v. Perez, 393 F.3d 457, 460 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that
an appellate court has discretion to decide the question of good
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faith without ruling on whether the search warrant was in fact
invalid for lack of probable cause).
Smith also argues that the district court improperly
declined to suppress his statements regarding a firearm that had
been seized during the search of his residence. Essentially, a
subordinate officer recovered the firearm from the residence and
then brought it to his superior officer, who was on the porch
with Smith while the house was being searched. Upon seeing the
firearm, Smith admitted that it belonged to him. Although Smith
contends that the officers’ conduct was the functional
equivalent of police interrogation, United States v. Payne, 954
F.2d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1992), compels the opposite conclusion.
See also Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 528 (1987); United
States v. Kimbrough, 477 F.3d 144, 151 (4th Cir. 2007). Because
Smith’s statement was freely volunteered rather than the product
of coercion, the district court properly denied Smith’s motion
to suppress his admissions regarding the seized firearm.
Kimbrough, 477 F.3d at 150.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the material
before the court and argument will not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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