In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 11-1662
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
C OREY S EARCY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 10-CR-33—Charles N. Clevert, Jr., Chief Judge.
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 9, 2011—D ECIDED D ECEMBER 30, 2011
Before C UDAHY, P OSNER, and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
C UDAHY, Circuit Judge. This is a case about a
search warrant based on an affidavit containing infor-
mation provided by a confidential informant. Al-
though the confidential informant could have provided
additional information regarding any past inter-
actions with the defendant or regarding the model of
firearm the defendant illegally possessed, we believe
the affidavit set forth sufficient facts to establish prob-
able cause. For this reason we affirm.
2 No. 11-1662
On July 1, 2009, Officer Andrew Matson of the Greater
Racine Gang Task Force applied for a search warrant
to search the home of defendant Corey D. Searcy. His
supporting affidavit was based primarily on informa-
tion provided by a confidential informant. The affi-
davit stated, in relevant part, that the confidential in-
formant contacted Officer Matson and informed him
that he observed Searcy with a firearm in the residence
located at 2220 Harriet Street, Racine, Wisconsin within
the past 72 hours. The informant further stated that Searcy
lives at that address with other family members and
that the residence was shot at in the past two weeks
by gang members due to an ongoing gang feud.
Officer Matson’s affidavit stated that he considered
the informant reliable because the informant had
provided information in the past six months that
resulted in the arrest of three different individuals.
The affidavit also stated that Officer Matson was able
to partially corroborate the informant’s statements.
Racine Police Department records showed that Searcy’s
primary address was 2220 Harriet Street. The utilities
for that address were listed under Lenna Gardner, a family
member of Searcy. Officer Matson’s check of Searcy’s
criminal history confirmed that Searcy had a felony
conviction (Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Deliver).
Moreover, Officer Matson knew from his experience on
the Greater Racine Gang Task Force that Searcy was an
active member of the Vice Lords street gang, which,
he stated, is known for illegal activities, including
weapons-related offenses and illegal drug trafficking.
No. 11-1662 3
Based on this affidavit, a state court judge authorized
a search warrant for Searcy’s residence. Execution of
the warrant recovered two firearms. On February 23, 2010,
a grand jury indicted Searcy with one count of felon
in possession of a firearm.
On March 16, 2010, Searcy filed a pre-trial motion
to suppress evidence. He contended that the search
warrant did not establish probable cause because
the informant’s statements lacked sufficient detail and
independent corroboration. The magistrate judge con-
cluded that the totality of the circumstances supported
the finding of probable cause, and that, in any event,
the evidence survived under the good faith exception.
On the defendant’s objection to the magistrate’s recom-
mendation, the district court adopted the magistrate’s
recommendation and denied the defendant’s motion
to suppress. The defendant then entered into a plea
agreement with the government, reserving his right
to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
I.
On appeal, Searcy renews his argument that the search
warrant executed at his home was not supported by
probable cause. On this question, we review the dis-
trict court's decision de novo, but give “great deference”
to the conclusion of the judge who initially issued
the warrant. United States v. Garcia, 528 F.3d 481, 485
(7th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. McIntire, 516 F.3d
576, 578 (7th Cir. 2008)). “When an affidavit is the
only evidence presented to a judge in support of a
4 No. 11-1662
search warrant, the validity of the warrant rests solely on
the strength of the affidavit.” United States v. Peck, 317
F.3d 754, 755-56 (7th Cir. 2003). Probable cause is estab-
lished when, based on the totality of the circumstances,
the affidavit sets forth sufficient evidence to induce
a reasonably prudent person to believe that a search
will uncover evidence of a crime. See Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
Where probable cause is based on information
supplied by an informant, we employ a totality-of-the-
circumstances inquiry encompassing several factors:
first, the degree to which the informant acquired knowl-
edge of the events through firsthand observation; second,
the detail and specificity of the information provided
by the informant; third, the interval between the date of
the events and a police officer's application for the
search warrant; and fourth, the extent to which law
enforcement corroborated the informant's statements.
Garcia, 528 F.3d at 485-86. No one factor is determina-
tive and a “deficiency in one factor may be compensated
for by a strong showing in another or by some other
indication of reliability.” Peck, 317 F.3d at 756 (citing
United States v. Brack, 188 F.3d 748, 756 (7th Cir. 1999)).
In the present case, we conclude that, based on the
totality of circumstances, Officer Matson’s affidavit
provided sufficiently reliable information to support
the issuance of a search warrant. We therefore affirm
the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to
suppress. Though we agree with the defendant that
the informant’s credibility is of prime importance here,
No. 11-1662 5
an analysis of the totality-of-the-circumstances factors
shows why the information contained in the affidavit
was sufficiently reliable to support a finding of probable
cause.
First, the key information provided by the infor-
mant—that he or she observed Searcy with a gun in
his home — was obtained through firsthand observation.
This information was also transmitted within a relatively
short period of time — 72 hours—before the applica-
tion for the search warrant and certainly was not stale.
Moreover, the information furnished by the informant
was largely corroborated by law enforcement. Officer
Matson, by checking the police records, which listed
that location as his primary address, verified that Searcy
in fact resided at 2220 Harriet Street. Officer Matson
also confirmed that the utilities serving that loca-
tion were in the name of Lenna Gardner, whom
Officer Matson knew to be a member of Searcy’s family.
Lastly, the informant’s statement that Searcy’s home
was shot at by a rival gang was consistent with Officer’s
Matson’s understanding that Searcy was an active mem-
ber of the Vice Lords gang, which is often involved
in weapons-related incidents.
Searcy focuses on the affidavit’s lack of detail
about the physical location and circumstances of the
informant’s observations. Though we agree that the
affidavit was lacking in specificity, this shortcoming, on
balance, is not sufficient to overturn a finding of probable
cause. Facts indicating how the informant came to be
inside Searcy’s home or where exactly in the home he saw
6 No. 11-1662
Searcy with the gun would have been helpful, but they
are by no means required to establish probable cause. See
Garcia, 528 F.3d at 486. Rather, given the fact that the
informant’s previous dealings with the police led to
three arrests in the past six months, and, as the
magistrate judge in the current case noted, because the
informant faced criminal prosecution for furnishing
false information to police, the informant’s information
was sufficiently reliable to compensate for its lack of
detail. See United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 871 (7th
Cir. 2002) (“[A] magistrate in the exercise of sound judg-
ment is entitled to give greater weight to a tip from
a known informant, who can be held responsible
should he be found to have given misleading informa-
tion to police officers, and thus has an incentive to
provide truthful information to the detectives.”).
Searcy relies on three cases—United States v. Peck, 317
F.3d 754, United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, and United
States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 2009)—that he
argues compel a different result. They do not. In each of
those cases, the affidavit’s lack of specificity was com-
pounded by other indicia of unreliability not present
here. In Bell and Peck, for instance, the contraband in
question consisted of drugs that are easily mistaken
for other, legal substances. The same is not true of fire-
arms. Further, the amount and frequency of distribution
of the drugs were important in Bell and Peck because
those facts were elements of the offense for which
probable cause was being established. If a magistrate is
to reasonably conclude that the items being sought are
associated with a crime (i.e., possession with intent to
No. 11-1662 7
distribute), specific information had to be adduced
relating to the elements of that crime. Here, the mere
possession of a firearm is all that is required to
establish the commission of the offense.1
Moreover, the lack of specificity in Koerth, Peck, and Bell
took on increased significance because the in-
formants in those cases had no history of providing
reliable information to police. Such history is important
in determining whether, or the extent to which, an in-
formant’s information is colored by a bias against a de-
fendant. In Searcy’s case, the informant had recently
provided information to police about three different
individuals, all leading to arrests. 2 The informant’s
pattern of reporting information to police with respect to
other individuals indicates that the informant is not
targeting Searcy. We are therefore less concerned than
we were in Bell about whether the informant “is a rival
drug dealer, an angry customer, or had some beef with
[the defendant].” Bell, 585 F.3d at 1050. As the magistrate
judge below noted, “[It] is one thing to sic the authorities
onto a person against whom you might have a per-
sonal grudge. It is an entirely different matter to give
1
Of course, the suspect must also be a convicted felon, but that
element was clearly satisfied by Matson’s check of Searcy’s
criminal history
2
Searcy contends that the informant is not reliable because his
previous provision of information to police did not result
in successful convictions. The fact that the informant’s
furnished information led to arrests rather than convictions,
while potentially relevant, is not dispositive in this case. See
Garcia, 528 F.3d at 486; cf. Koerth, 312 F.3d at 867.
8 No. 11-1662
the authorities information to support the arrests of three
separate individuals.” Def’s Br. at A. 23; see also Garcia,
528 F.3d at 486.
On balance, a reasonable fact finder could conclude
that the affidavit set forth sufficient facts to establish
probable cause. The informant provided fresh informa-
tion that he observed firsthand and which law enforce-
ment adequately corroborated. The informant’s history
of providing reliable information to the police com-
pensates for any absence of detail in the affidavit. We
therefore affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.
II.
Even if we were to assume that probable cause was
lacking, the evidence here would still survive under
the good faith exception principle of United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). It is well settled that under
Leon, the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to a
search warrant that is later declared invalid is inappro-
priate if the officers who executed the warrant relied in
good faith on the issuing judge’s finding of probable
cause. Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-24. An officer’s decision to
obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence that he or she
was acting in good faith. United States v. Otero, 495 F.3d
393, 398 (7th Cir. 2007). A defendant can rebut the pre-
sumption of good faith only by showing (1) that the
issuing judge abandoned his or her detached and
neutral role, (2) the officers were dishonest or reckless in
preparing the affidavit, or (3) the warrant was so lacking
No. 11-1662 9
in probable cause as to render the officer’s belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable. Id.
Additionally, police officers are “charged with a knowl-
edge of well-established legal principles,” Koerth, 312
F.3d at 869 (quoting United States v. Brown, 832 F.2d
991, 995 (7th Cir. 1987)), and the corresponding “responsi-
bility to learn and follow applicable legal precedent.”
United States v. Mykytiuk, 402 F.3d 773, 777-78 (7th
Cir. 2005). Thus, the evidence is admissible unless
(1) courts have clearly held that a materially similar
affidavit previously failed to establish probable cause
under facts that were indistinguishable from those pre-
sented in the case at hand, or (2) the affidavit is so
plainly deficient that any reasonably well-trained
officer “would have known that his affidavit failed
to establish probable cause and that he should not
have applied for the warrant.” Koerth, 312 F.3d at
869 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986)).
Because Officer Matson obtained a search warrant,
the defendant shoulders the burden of satisfying one of
the Leon exceptions. The defendant cannot meet this
burden. The defendant contends that in Bell, Peck, and
Koerth — all three of which found the exception applica-
ble — there were facts supporting the exception that do
not exist here. We disagree.
In Bell, this Court noted the police officers’ ability to
corroborate the informant’s information; here Officer
Matson was able to corroborate Searcy’s home address,
conviction, gang affiliation, and motive for possessing a
firearm. In Koerth, the informant was not unknown
10 No. 11-1662
and faced potential criminal charges for furnishing
false information to law enforcement. The same is
true here. Finally, in Peck, the officer’s good faith
was evidenced by the fact that he required the
informant to appear before the magistrate. Here, on the
other hand, the informant’s history of providing reliable
information was sufficient to demonstrate at least a
modicum of credibility and reliability.
But, the primary bases of applying the Leon exception
in Bell (corroboration), Koerth (incentive to provide true
information) and Peck (ensuring reliability) are all
present here. Therefore, as we did in those cases, we
find that the investigator preparing the affidavit did
not act unreasonably in relying upon the informant’s in-
formation to obtain a search warrant.
Additionally, we note that Searcy has failed to provide
us with any cases holding that an affidavit materially
similar to Officer Matson’s would fail to meet the test of
establishing probable cause (much less satisfy the Leon
test) based upon information from a named informant.
In fact, we agree with the magistrate that these facts
are eerily similar to those in United States v. Garcia, 528
F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2008). In that case, the informant — who
had previously provided information leading to the
arrest of at least three individuals — personally observed
contraband in the defendant’s home that he believed
to be cocaine because of his past experience with the
substance. Garcia, 528 F.3d at 486. The information led
to the execution of a search warrant within 72 hours.
Id. Given these factual similarities, it is entirely rea-
No. 11-1662 11
sonable, if not inescapable, for a law enforcement official
to believe that the warrant in the present case was
based upon probable cause.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the dis-
trict court is A FFIRMED.
12-30-11