FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 30, 2011
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 10-8096
v. (D.C. No. 2:09-CR-00129-ABJ-1)
(D. Wyo.)
JEFFERY WAYNE DOLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, SEYMOUR and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Mr. Jeffery Doles appeals his conviction after a jury trial of failing to
report for the execution of a criminal sentence in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3146(a)(2) and (b)(A)(iii). Mr. Doles had been previously convicted for
knowingly and unlawfully selling drug paraphernalia. He was given a voluntary
surrender date but he fled to Mexico instead of reporting to the Bureau of Prisons,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
leading to his conviction in this case. We affirm.
Mr. Doles first contends the district court improperly excluded evidence
that would have been material to an affirmative defense of medical necessity for
failing to report. The medical issues arose out of a 1996 car accident in which
Mr. Doles was seriously injured. As a result, he is paralyzed from the chest down
and takes numerous medications for pain and discomfort. Mr. Doles claims the
following excluded evidence would have supported a necessity defense: (1)
evidence about his physical condition, (2) evidence about his state of mind
concerning his physical condition, (3) and evidence about his fears of receiving
inadequate care in prison. “We review the district court’s decision to admit or
exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596
F.3d 716, 737 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Doles’s argument assumes that a federal common law defense of
necessity exists. “‘Even though the Supreme Court has called it ‘an open
question whether federal courts ever have authority to recognize a necessity
defense not provided by statute,’ . . . this Court has recognized a common law
defense of necessity.” United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 637 (10th Cir.
2006) (quoting United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483,
490 (2001)). We will therefore assume that a federal necessity defense exists.
See id. at 638.
We have recognized three “traditional common law requirements of the
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necessity defense: (1) there is no legal alternative to violating the law, (2) the
harm to be prevented is imminent, and (3) a direct, causal relationship is
reasonably anticipated to exist between the defendant’s action and the avoidance
of harm.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The imminent harm that the
defendant sought to prevent must have involved a “real risk of death or serious
bodily injury.” United States v. Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d 1113, 1125 (10th Cir. 2006).
“A criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of defense
provided that theory is supported by some evidence and the law.” Id. at 1121
(internal quotation marks omitted). “For the purposes of determining the
sufficiency of the evidence to raise the jury issue, the testimony most favorable to
the defendant should be accepted.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But
the “defendant must produce evidence of each element [of the necessity defense]
sufficient to warrant its consideration by the jury.” Id. at 1122.
It is clear from the record that Mr. Doles did not, and could not have,
proffered sufficient evidence to establish the second element of his medical
necessity defense – the requirement of showing imminent harm. The district
court presiding over the underlying conviction for which Mr. Doles was required
to report to prison held several hearings because the court was concerned with
whether Mr. Doles’s physical condition could be adequately addressed in prison.
In the interim, the court granted Mr. Doles’s request for bond so he could remain
in the care of his private physicians. At a hearing held on November 24, 2008,
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the court informed Mr. Doles that he would be designated to serve his sentence at
the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota, where he would receive
excellent medical care from the Mayo Clinic. 1 In so doing, the court relied on a
letter from the Bureau of Prisons acknowledging Mr. Doles’s serious medical
issues and stating the Bureau would be able to provide the care he required.
Based on this information, the court told Mr. Doles there was no longer an
issue regarding danger to his health pending appeal. Accordingly, the court
denied Mr. Doles’s request for continuation of bail pending appeal. But it agreed
that Mr. Doles could remain on bail until he was required to report to the Bureau
of Prisons in Rochester on December 15. The court did so based on Mr. Doles’s
assurance that he could get himself to Rochester by the set date.
Given this record, it is clear that Mr. Doles was not faced with an imminent
harm involving a “real risk of death or serious bodily injury” when he chose not
to report to prison. Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d at 1125. Consequently, he was not
entitled to raise a defense of medical necessity. See id. at 1121. In the absence
of this affirmative defense, the evidence Mr. Doles sought to introduce was
irrelevant to the case and the district court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding it.
Mr. Doles also contends the district court committed reversible error when
1
We grant the government’s motion to supplement the record with a
transcript of the November 24, 2008 hearing.
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it refused to give a separate instruction on the affirmative defense of good faith.
The first instruction proposed by Mr. Doles defined the word “willfully” as
meaning that “the defendant committed the act voluntarily and with the purposes
of violating the law, and not by mistake, accident, or in good faith.” Aplt. Br. at
7. The court thought this instruction was vague and subject to misunderstanding.
Instead the court gave the following instruction: “The term ‘willfully’ means the
defendant committed the act voluntarily and with the purpose of violating a
known legal duty.” Rec., vol. I at 284. The second instruction Mr. Doles
proposed stated:
Defendant Doles, moreover, contends that he is not guilty of the
crime charged because he believed that in Good Faith that the [sic]
did not have to appear to Surrender because of a Good Faith belief
that he was not obligated to because he was improperly and illegally
tried.
Aplt. Br. at 7 (alteration in original). In refusing this instruction, the district
court said that it was misleading, and that if this kind of defense had general
application it would mean that “no one would have to appear to serve their
sentence once they appealed.” Rec., vol. III at 375.
In support of his good faith defense, Mr. Doles provided a lengthy offer of
proof at trial, stating he believed that his underlying federal conviction was
illegal, he could not adequately challenge his conviction within the legal system,
and his only chance was to leave the country so that he could make a
documentary film through which he could point out the illegality of his conviction
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to the public. The district court precluded most of this evidence as irrelevant
except for Mr. Doles’s statement that he chose not to report to Rochester because
he disagreed with what had happened to him in the prosecution of the underlying
criminal action. However, the district court subsequently allowed Mr. Doles to
testify that he went to Mexico because he thought his conviction for selling drug
paraphernalia was illegal, he made a documentary about the illegality of his
conviction, and he believed he acted in good faith when he went to Mexico
because he thought his action was justified.
As we have noted, “[a] criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on
his theory of defense provided that theory is supported by some evidence and the
law. ” Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d at 1121 (internal quotation marks omitted). “We
respect the trial judge’s role as gatekeeper, reviewing such decisions for an abuse
of discretion.” Id. at 1123. “As a general rule . . . ignorance of the law is no
excuse—one is guilty of the crime if she intends to engage in the conduct that is
prohibited by the criminal statute.” United States v. Platte, 401 F.3d 1176, 1183-
84 (10th Cir. 2005); see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law
§ 5.6(a) at 395, § 5.6(d) at 406-07 (2d ed. 2003). The crime of failure to report
required the jury to find that Mr. Doles was convicted of a crime and sentenced to
prison, that he was released on bond on condition that he surrender on December
15, 2008, at the Bureau of Prisons’ Federal Medical Center in Rochester,
Minnesota, and that he thereafter willfully failed to surrender.
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Mr. Doles was not entitled to a good faith defense instruction because he
did not demonstrate how his belief in the illegality of his underlying federal
conviction negated his willful and voluntary decision not to report to the Bureau
of Prisons as ordered. As we held in Platte, where defendants argued their
actions were legally justified due to their belief that missile site operations
violated international law, the district court did not err in refusing to give a good
faith instruction because the defendants did not show how their beliefs negated
the fact “that they willfully injured national-defense materials (or premises) or
acted with intent to interfere with national defense.” Id. at 1185. Mr. Doles was
obligated to raise issues regarding the legality of his conviction in his direct
appeal. His belief that he had been illegally convicted did not excuse him from
reporting to serve his sentence.
Because Mr. Doles was not entitled to a good faith defense instruction, the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the evidence which Mr.
Doles argued was material to this defense. In the absence of this affirmative
defense, the evidence was irrelevant to this case. Cf. United States v. Doles, 335
F. App’x 736, 738-39 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (explaining in Mr. Doles’s
direct appeal that the district court “did not abuse its discretion in excluding
evidence about Mr. Doles’s acquittal on similar charges in state court,” even
though Mr. Doles “contend[ed] that his state-court acquittal demonstrate[d] that
he did not have the necessary mens rea to commit the federal crimes”).
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Finally, Mr. Doles contends the district court committed reversible error
when it denied his motion for a mistrial based on jury misconduct during jury
deliberations without investigating the circumstances that led to his motion. The
events leading up to Mr. Doles’s motion were as follows. The jury was dismissed
to begin its deliberations at 10:29 a.m. About an hour later, the jury asked
whether it could view transcripts of Mr. Doles’s testimony. While the district
court was discussing the jury’s request with the parties, the jurors indicated they
wanted to go to lunch. The district court told the courtroom deputy to dismiss the
jury for lunch. Thereafter, the court decided to deny the jury’s request for the
transcript and instead to instruct them to rely on their memories of Mr. Doles’s
testimony. When the court reconvened at 2:32 p.m., it informed the parties the
jury had reached a verdict without receiving the answer to its request, which had
not been delivered to them. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, Mr. Doles’s
attorney moved for a mistrial, pointing out that while the jury had asked whether
it could view transcripts of Mr. Doles’s testimony, “before the question was
answered the jury came back with a verdict.” Aplt. Br. at 9. In his motion, he
asserted that Mr. Doles’s constitutional right to due process had been violated.
The motion was denied.
On appeal, Mr. Doles contends the court should have questioned the jurors
to determine whether improper deliberations had taken place outside of the jury
room before denying Mr. Doles’s motion for a mistrial. Indeed, Mr. Doles
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contends the district court should have presumed that improper deliberations were
likely, given that the jurors seemingly needed a response to their request for Mr.
Doles’s transcripts in order to continue deliberations. This presumption, he
argues, could only be rebutted by questioning the jurors to ensure no misconduct
had occurred.
We ordinarily review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for
mistrial based on juror misconduct. United States v. Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 903
(10th Cir. 2005). Because Mr. Doles did not specifically argue below that his
motion for a mistrial was based on juror misconduct, however, the parties agree
that we review the denial for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). To
establish plain error, Mr. Doles “must demonstrate the district court (1)
committed error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the plain error affected his
substantial rights.” United States v. Cordery, 656 F.3d 1103, 1105 (10th Cir.
2011). “If these factors are met, we may exercise discretion to correct the error if
(4) it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. In this case, we find no error that can reasonably be described
as plain.
“Absent evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that juries follow the trial
court’s instructions.” United States v. Santiago, 977 F.2d 517, 520 (10th Cir.
1992). After closing arguments and just before jury deliberations began, the
district court instructed the jury to confine its deliberations to the jury room and
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specifically not to discuss the case on breaks or during lunch. In light of this
clear instruction not to deliberate outside of the jury room, it was not plain error
for the district court to assume the jurors did not do so during lunch. Moreover, it
was not unreasonable for the district court to conclude in this uncomplicated case
that the jury was able to resolve its deliberations without reviewing the transcript
it had requested.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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