FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 3, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
ANTHONY R. BRANCH,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 11-6220
BRUCE HOWARD, Warden, (D.C. No. 5:10-CV-00054-W)
(W. D. Okla.)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, MURPHY and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Anthony R. Branch, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the district court’s denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 application for federal habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A) (requiring a COA to appeal the denial of a § 2254 application).
Because Branch has failed to satisfy the standards for the issuance of a COA, we
deny his request and dismiss the matter.
I. Background
In 2007, Branch was convicted on one count of burglary in the second
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
degree—in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1435—following a jury trial in the
District Court of Garfield County, Oklahoma. He was represented by counsel.
During opening arguments to the jury in the sentencing phase, the government
referred to the length of Branch’s previous sentences for other crimes. The court
declared a mistrial and dismissed the jury. Branch then waived his right to be
sentenced by a jury. The trial court sentenced Branch to a twenty-year term of
imprisonment.
Branch filed a direct appeal with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
(OCCA), where he was represented by different counsel. His sole argument on
appeal was that the trial court erred in overruling his demurrer on sufficiency-of-
the-evidence grounds. The OCCA affirmed Branch’s conviction and sentence.
After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the
OCCA held that “a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime of second degree burglary beyond a reasonable doubt.” ROA, Vol.
1, Pt. 1, at 64.
Branch initiated federal court proceedings on January 19, 2010, by filing a
pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, who
concluded that Branch’s petition raised claims for relief that he had not exhausted
in state court. The magistrate judge recommended that the case be
administratively closed rather than dismissed so that Branch could move to
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reopen the proceedings once he had exhausted the claims in state court. The
district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and stayed the case.
In the meantime, Branch had returned to state court to seek postconviction
relief in the Garfield County District Court. The state court denied relief on July
22, 2010, and Branch filed a notice of intent to appeal the order. Branch thought
he timely filed an appeal with the OCCA on August 19, 2010. But the OCCA did
not receive his appellate briefs because he mistakenly addressed them to the
Oklahoma Attorney General. Branch filed a “Motion to Forward” with the OCCA
in an attempt to compel the attorney general’s office to forward his appeal papers
to the court. The OCCA construed Branch’s motion as a request for leave to
pursue a postconviction appeal out of time. Relying on Rule 5.2(C) of the Rules
of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the OCCA denied the motion. The
court explained that if Branch wanted “to appeal the District Court’s order
denying him post-conviction relief, the proper procedure is to file an application
in the District Court requesting a post-conviction appeal out of time.” Id., Vol. 1,
Pt. 2, at 218-19. Rather than proceeding as the OCCA had advised, Branch filed a
second postconviction appeal with the OCCA. The OCCA dismissed the appeal,
again relying on Rule 5.2(C), this time because Branch did not include an appeal
record or a copy of the order denying him postconviction relief. Branch then
returned to federal court and filed a motion to reopen habeas proceedings.
Branch’s habeas petition included five grounds for relief: (1) Branch’s trial
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counsel was ineffective when she failed to obtain an expert witness on “forensic
DNA testing” and made prejudicial statements to the jury, and Branch’s appellate
counsel was ineffective when she only raised one argument on appeal (sufficiency
of the evidence) and failed to send him a copy of the trial transcript; (2) Branch
was prejudiced by the state court’s delay in bringing him to trial; (3) the
prosecutors engaged in misconduct by failing to lay a proper foundation for the
blood evidence and disclosing the length of Branch’s prior sentences to the jury,
causing a mistrial; (4) the state court imposed an excessive sentence and the jail
fines were excessive in light of the delayed trial date; and (5) there was
insufficient evidence to find Branch guilty of second-degree burglary.
The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation that Branch’s
petition be denied. The report concluded that Branch had procedurally defaulted
on his claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, lack of a speedy trial,
prosecutorial misconduct, introduction of evidence without proper foundation,
and imposition of an excessive sentence and fine. The magistrate judge
concluded that the OCCA’s dismissal of Branch’s postconviction appeal on
timeliness grounds foreclosed these claims. That dismissal “constitute[d] an
independent and adequate state procedural ground barring federal habeas review.”
Id., Vol. 1, Pt. 2, at 346. The sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, on the other
hand, was adjudicated by the OCCA on the merits. The magistrate judge
concluded that the OCCA’s determination that the evidence was sufficient was a
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reasonable application of the standard from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
(1979).
On August 12, 2011, the district court adopted the report and
recommendation of the magistrate judge and denied Branch’s petition. The court
entered judgment the same day. Branch requested a COA from the district court,
which the court denied.
Branch filed a timely notice of appeal and a request for COA with this
court. He also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
II. Discussion
Issuance of a COA is jurisdictional. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
336 (2003). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), a state prisoner may appeal from
the denial of federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only if the district court
or this court first issues a COA. A COA may be issued “only if the applicant has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2).
When the district court ruled on the merits of a constitutional habeas claim,
the petitioner must show that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Where the district court ruled on procedural grounds, a
COA may be granted when the petitioner shows that “jurists of reason would find
it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
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constitutional right and . . . whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.” Id. “Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is
correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude
either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner
should be allowed to proceed further.” Id.
A. Procedurally Barred Grounds for Relief
Branch’s first four claims for relief were dismissed by the district court
because they were barred by independent and adequate state procedural grounds.
The district court recognized that Branch raised these claims in his postconviction
appeal, which the OCCA concluded was untimely.
We agree with the district court that Branch’s first four grounds for relief
are procedurally barred. “If a particular claim was ‘defaulted in state court on an
independent and adequate state procedural ground,’ we recognize the state courts’
procedural bar ruling and do not address the claim on the merits ‘unless cause and
prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice is shown.’” Johnson v.
Champion, 288 F.3d 1215, 1223 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Maes v. Thomas, 46
F.3d 979, 985 (10th Cir. 1995)); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
750 (1991). We have previously held that “the OCCA’s declination of
jurisdiction” under Rule 5.2(C) of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals is
an independent and adequate state procedural ground that will ordinarily preclude
federal habeas review. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1226-27 n.3. While Branch’s
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procedural default may have been a product of confusion about the proper method
for perfecting an appeal from the denial of postconviction relief, we note that the
OCCA went out of its way to explain to Branch how he could potentially remedy
the oversight, but Branch did not take the OCCA’s suggested route. See ROA,
Vol. 1, Pt. 2, at 218-19 (“Petitioner’s right to appeal is dependent upon his ability
to prove he was denied an appeal through no fault of his own.”). We conclude
that jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the district court
properly invoked this procedural bar to dispose of these claims.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Next, Branch contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for second-degree burglary.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), when a state court has “adjudicated a claim on the merits,” we may
grant relief only if the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Matthews v.
Workman, 577 F.3d 1175, 1180 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1900
(2010). In this context, the pertinent “clearly established Federal law” requires
courts to determine whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most
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favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
The OCCA concluded on direct appeal that “a rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime of second degree burglary beyond
a reasonable doubt.” ROA, Vol. 1, Pt. 1, at 64. The court considered the
evidence introduced at trial, which included
[e]vidence that [Branch’s] blood was found on the cash
register drawer, and at the time he was apprehended,
[Branch] had a bleeding cut on his wrist; that he was
seen a block away from the burglarized restaurant at
1:00 a.m., crouched down and doing “something with his
hands”; that upon seeing the passing police car, [Branch]
fled into a nearby field and attempted to hide; that no
wet spot was found on the ground where he claimed he
had gone to the bathroom; and that no other individuals
were seen in the area at the time and [Branch] refused to
divulge any further information about “another guy[”],
supports the jury’s finding that [Branch] broke and
entered the Café and unlawfully removed the cash
register drawer.
Id. Because the OCCA applied the Jackson standard in deciding Branch’s
sufficiency claim on direct review, “our task is limited by AEDPA to inquiring
whether the OCCA’s application of Jackson was unreasonable.” Matthews, 577
F.3d at 1183.
The district court concluded that OCCA’s resolution of this issue was
consistent with the Supreme Court’s standard. ROA, Vol. 1, Pt. 2, at 365. We
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agree that the OCCA applied a state-law standard analogous to the one articulated
in Jackson, and this was not an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law. We cannot conclude that the OCCA’s determination was
unreasonable in light of the evidence at trial. See Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d
1181, 1188 (10th Cir. 2004) (denying habeas relief on sufficiency-of-the-evidence
grounds where “[t]he OCCA’s decision . . . was neither contrary to nor an
unreasonable application of Jackson; nor was it based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.”). The AEDPA
“imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and
demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Felkner v.
Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305, 1307 (2011) (per curiam) (quoting Renico v. Lett, 130
S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The OCCA’s ruling
meets this standard.
We have reviewed Branch’s application for a COA, his opening brief, the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court’s order, and the
entire record on appeal. And we have construed Branch’s filings liberally
because he is proceeding pro se. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 & n.3
(10th Cir. 1991). But because Branch has not “made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right,” he is not entitled to a COA. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). Jurists of reason would not debate the district court’s resolution of
his claims.
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Finally, we also deny Branch leave to proceed in forma pauperis because he
has failed to identify “the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the
law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” McIntosh v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812-13 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting DeBardeleben v.
Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
IV. Conclusion
We DENY Branch’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, DENY his
application for a COA, and DISMISS the matter.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Chief Judge
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