United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-2121
___________
United States of America, *
*
Appellee, *
* Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court for the
* District of North Dakota.
Darrin Roy Anderson, *
*
Appellant. *
___________
Submitted: October 21, 2011
Filed: January 4, 2012
___________
Before BYE, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
___________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Darrin Roy Anderson pleaded guilty to one count of traveling with the intent
to engage in illicit sexual conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). The district
court1 sentenced him to 144 months' imprisonment, followed by a lifetime of
supervised release. The district court also imposed special conditions of release
prohibiting Anderson from consuming alcohol and possessing sexually explicit
materials. Anderson appeals the length of his sentence as substantively unreasonable.
He also appeals the special conditions of his release, arguing that the district court
1
The Honorable Ralph R. Erickson, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota.
plainly erred by prohibiting him from consuming alcohol and possessing sexually
explicit materials. We affirm.
I. Background
In December 2006, 31-year-old Anderson created an online account on the
social networking website Facebook under the alias "Tyler Anderson." Anderson used
this alias to contact adolescent girls in the Red River Valley area of Minnesota and
North Dakota. In 2009, Anderson, acting as "Tyler," used the account to contact
M.R., a 13-year-old girl. "Tyler" introduced M.R. to his cousin "Darrin" online, and
"Darrin" began texting M.R. After communicating several times, "Darrin" Anderson
offered M.R. $300 in cash in exchange for sex and arranged to meet her at the East
Grand Inn in East Grand Forks, Minnesota, on August 12, 2009. M.R. asked a friend,
J.J., to accompany her to the motel because she was afraid to go alone. At the motel,
Anderson provided the girls with alcohol, and J.J. waited in the bathroom while
Anderson and M.R. had sex. Before he left the motel, Anderson put $300 on the
dresser for M.R. and told her that he would pay her $50 for each future encounter.
On August 15, 2009, M.R.'s parents reported to East Grand Forks Police
Detective Rodney Hajicek that their 13-year-old daughter, M.R., had sexual
intercourse with an adult male, whom she met on Facebook. The mother had
confiscated M.R.'s cell phone and was receiving text messages from Anderson.
Because Detective Hajicek did not know Anderson's true identity, he encouraged the
mother to pretend to be M.R. and to arrange another meeting. The mother and
Anderson sent text messages back and forth, and the next day M.R.'s mother told
Detective Hajicek that Anderson planned to meet M.R. at the East Grand Inn on
August 18, 2009. Later, Detective Hajicek learned that a "Darrin Anderson" had
reserved a room at the East Grand Inn for August 18, 2009, but then cancelled the
reservation.
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Detective Hajicek interviewed M.R. and J.J. and showed each of them a photo
line-up with Anderson's picture. Both girls identified Anderson as the man who met
them at the motel on August 12, 2009. Further investigation revealed that Anderson
withdrew $200 on August 11, 2009, from a cash machine in Walhalla, North Dakota,
where he worked. He withdrew another $200 from a cash machine in East Grand
Forks, Minnesota, on August 12, 2009. Funds from the same account were used to
pay for a room at the East Grand Inn on August 12, 2009.
Detective Hajicek obtained a search warrant for the Facebook account of "Tyler
Anderson." The account revealed that, between December 2006 and July 2009,
Anderson engaged in more than 800 private chats, mostly with adolescent girls. In the
chats, Anderson represented himself as a young man in his teens or early twenties. He
often flirted with the girls by telling them that they were "hot," "smokin," or "sexy"
and asked them if they had boyfriends. On several occasions, Anderson sent images
of male genitalia to the girls and asked for inappropriate pictures of them in return.
Anderson told at least one girl other than M.R. that he had a cousin who "wants to
like hook wit u" and exchange "sex for money."
On September 21, 2010, a federal grand jury indicted Anderson on one count
of traveling with the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2423(b), to which Anderson pleaded guilty. According to the presentence
investigation report (PSR), Anderson had one prior conviction in 2006 for driving
under the influence of alcohol. The Guidelines range for Anderson's offense was 70
to 87 months' imprisonment, and the probation office recommended a sentence of 87
months' imprisonment, followed by five years supervised release. The probation
office also recommended that the district court impose certain special conditions upon
release, including that Anderson abstain from the use of alcohol and refrain from
possessing any materials depicting or describing sexually explicit conduct. Following
the preparation of the PSR, the district court filed a notice indicating its intent to vary
upward from the Guidelines range. In a written memorandum, the government argued
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that an upward variance of 33 months, or 120 months' imprisonment, was appropriate
"given the egregious nature of the offense conduct . . . as well as [Anderson's] long
history of sexual solicitation of young girls." Anderson argued that a Guidelines
sentence was appropriate because the Guidelines took into consideration the
seriousness of Anderson's conduct and his specific offense characteristics.
At sentencing, the district court considered that a similar offense, internet
luring, carried with it a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence, and the court
questioned the appropriateness of a Guidelines sentence in Anderson's case:
THE COURT: How do you reconcile [a six-to-seven year
Guidelines sentence for Anderson] with a 10-year mandatory minimum
sentence for luring?
[COUNSEL FOR ANDERSON]: I understand, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I mean, I know you understand. I mean, you stand
in this courtroom every day, but you tell me how it's—how do you
reconcile—you know, this is—this statute contemplates a commercial
sexual act. It's a Mann Act violation. It's the transportation of a woman
across state lines or traveling in interstate commerce in order to engage
in an illicit sexual act. It contemplates an adult woman and to come up
with this [G]uideline range it certainly doesn't contemplate, as far as I
tell, traveling across state lines to engage in an act of prostitution with
a 13-year-old girl that you've groomed and lured, does it? I mean, does
that seem to fit the [G]uideline calculation? Do you see anything in there
where it talks about, you know, that you groomed somebody, that you've
taken somebody under the age of 15? I mean, I don't see that in the
[G]uidelines.
The district court determined that an upward variance was necessary to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities, to reflect the seriousness of the offense, and to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, explaining:
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I honestly don't believe that the Sentencing Guidelines actually
contemplate this type of an offense; that if you look at the underlying
statute and the conduct that it involves I don't think that it adequately
takes into consideration the facts of this case, which are pretty
straightforward and pretty egregious . . . .
I mean, you just stop and think about what we're talking about
here. We're talking about a middle-aged man prostituting a 13-year-old
girl. We're talking about a middle-aged man offering $300 to a 13-year-
old who's got other problems and is vulnerable. I mean, it's incredible in
its perversity. The act is incredible in its objectification of a young girl.
It's heartless. It's cruel. It's callous. It's depraved. It's perverse. And
there's no other way to describe it. And that ain't the all of it.
In addition the defendant engaged in a pattern of grooming and
soliciting others, engaged in a pattern of sending pornographic images
to children. Defendant showed no remorse until he was caught, showed
no regret, showed no moral compunction at all.
If you look at the sentences that are handed down in this court for
things that in my opinion are far less depraved, 10-year period sentences
for internet luring, lifetime sentences for dealing in drugs, 30-year
sentences for drunks who abuse children while intoxicated that they pick
up at a party, I mean, the notion that somehow seven years begins to
approach the kind of sentence that would be appropriate is insane. . . .
Child pornographers get 20 years in prison in this courtroom more than
occasionally. What's worse? Trading pictures of being raped or
. . . pay[ing] the children for the privilege of raping them?
The sentence needs to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
promote respect for the law and provide just punishment for the offense.
This offense is as serious an offense as this Court sees short of crimes
that result in the murder of people because it has the same consequence,
all right? You rob a person of their innocence. You force them to live
with that for the rest of their lives. . . .
***
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The sentence must afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,
and I can assure you that any sentence that I impose will do that. It must
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. I think that is
really the heart and so[ul] of this case. This is a case where the
defendant engaged in a long-term project to take advantage of a young
girl and in fact to take advantage of any number of young girls. The
conduct was predatory. It involved grooming people for victimization
and the defendant showed no remorse. This is a picture of a man who is
capable of repeating the conduct.
***
In the end the Court's also required to consider the sentencing
options that are available[,] and the Court's supposed to be concerned
about disparity of sentencing. Ultimately that disparity of sentencing is
the reason why I think a [G]uideline sentence is completely
inappropriate in this case. I don't understand how it's possible that we
would have a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence for just engaging
in the chat and a seven-year sentence for following through in an act of
prostitution following the chat. I mean, that strikes me as insane. And I
think it only exists in the [G]uidelines and only exists in the statute
because the Congress never contemplated this.
And so it is, by definition, an area not adequately contemplated
by the Sentencing Guidelines . . . . It makes no sense to have a
sentencing scheme that says a child pornography person who trades
pictures goes to prison for a decade. A person who engages in the chat
leading up to an internet luring offense gets a 10-year mandatory
minimum sentence. But someone who crosses state lines to prostitute a
13-year-old following an internet chat should get seven years or six
years. There's no way that that could be logically explained by any
rational human being.
The district court sentenced Anderson to 144 months' imprisonment, followed by a
lifetime of supervised release. The court placed certain special conditions on
Anderson's release. The court prohibited Anderson from using alcohol, stating:
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If you're wondering why I've arrived at the conclusion that you'll
not be able to drink for the rest of your natural life, I suspect you have
an alcohol problem. I think the DUI is an indication that there's such a
problem. I also think that this behavior strikes me as indicative of some
sort of underlying psychological problem that's compounded by the use
of alcohol and that whatever the heck else is going on in your life
drinking isn't going to make it any smarter or any better and so we're
going to put a stop to that forever.
The district court also prohibited Anderson from possessing "any materials, including
pictures, photographs, books, writings, drawings, computer images, videos, [or] video
games which depict and/or describe sexually explicit conduct as defined in 18, United
States Code, Section 2256(2), that's subdivision (2), and 2256 subdivision (8)."
II. Discussion
Anderson appeals both the length of his sentence and the special conditions of
his release. First, he contends that the length of his sentence is unreasonable because
it is greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing. Second, he
argues that the district court plainly erred by prohibiting him from consuming alcohol
or possessing any sexually explicit material.
A. Substantive Reasonableness of the Sentence
Anderson argues that his sentence of 144 months' imprisonment is
substantively unreasonable for three reasons. We review substantive reasonableness
for an abuse of discretion, "'tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances,
including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.'" United States v.
Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). If a sentence is outside of the Guidelines range, "we 'may
consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the district court's
decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.'" Id.
at 461–62 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). "Just because we 'might reasonably have
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concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal
of the district court.'" Id. at 462 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). "'[I]t will be the
unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence . . . as substantively
unreasonable.'" Id. at 464 (quoting United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1090
(D.C. Cir. 2008)).
First, Anderson contends that the district court abused its discretion by
comparing the Guidelines range for his offense with sentences imposed for internet
luring without recognizing that internet luring carries with it a ten-year mandatory
minimum sentence. The sentencing transcript indicates that the district court made no
such error. At sentencing, the court stated:
I don't understand how it's possible that we would have a 10-year
mandatory minimum sentence for just engaging in the chat and a seven-
year sentence for following through in an act of prostitution following
the chat. I mean, that strikes me as insane. And I think it only exists in
the [G]uidelines and only exists in the statute because the Congress
never contemplated this.
The district court was aware that the statute under which Anderson was convicted, 18
U.S.C. § 2423(b),2 does not include a mandatory minimum sentence, whereas 18
U.S.C. § 2422(b),3 the internet luring statute, includes a minimum sentence of ten
2
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), "A person who travels in interstate commerce . . .
for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both."
3
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b):
Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign
commerce . . . knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any
individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in
prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged
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years. Anderson cites no authority for the proposition that a district court may not
compare sentences of two similar offenses when one contains a mandatory minimum
sentence and the other does not. In fact, in United States v. Hill, this court held that
a district court did not procedurally err in comparing the defendant's prostitution
offense, which did not have a mandatory minimum sentence, to other offenses, some
of which did have mandatory minimum sentences. 552 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 2009).
Reviewing the district court's sentence in Hill, this court found "no authority
prohibiting a district court from comparing a defendant's crime to other types of
crimes in an attempt to calibrate the relative severity of a defendant's conduct and
impose an appropriate sentence." Id. Anderson suggests that, because the government
did not charge him with internet luring under § 2422(b), the district court should not
have considered prior sentences imposed for that offense when determining his
sentence. That is simply not the case. As Hill indicates, a district court may consider
similar offenses for which the defendant was not charged "to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). "The district court [is] not required to
sentence [a defendant] in a vacuum or disregard its substantial sentencing
experience." Hill, 552 F.3d at 692 (citing Gall, 552 at 51–52).
Second, Anderson maintains that the district court misunderstood the elements
of internet luring and believed the minimum ten-year sentence would be imposed
"just for a defendant chatting with a minor." The internet luring statute makes it a
crime to "knowingly . . . induce[] . . . [a minor], to engage in prostitution or any
sexual activity . . . , or attempt[] to do so." 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Anderson suggests
that § 2422(b) "requires that there be an actual engagement in prostitution or other
criminal sexual activity, not just chatting, before the ten-year mandatory minimum
sentence applies or a section 2422(b) offense is even committed." In fact, the statute
is violated if a defendant simply attempts to persuade an individual to engage in
with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this
title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.
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criminal sexual activity. While the statute requires more than "just
chatting"—specifically, the knowing inducement or attempted inducement of a
minor—it does not require the commission of criminal sexual activity as Anderson
suggests. See, e.g., United States v. Bauer, 626 F.3d 1004, 1006–08 (8th Cir. 2010)
(determining that a defendant who engaged in 17 online conversations with an
undercover law enforcement officer who was posing as a 14-year-old girl was
properly convicted under § 2422(b)). In sentencing Anderson, the court stated: "A
person who engages in the chat leading up to an internet luring offense gets a 10-year
mandatory minimum sentence. But someone who crosses state lines to prostitute a 13-
year-old girl following an internet chat should get seven years or six years." The
district court did not misstate the elements of § 2422(b).
Third, Anderson contends that the district court abused its discretion by
comparing the Guidelines range for his offense with the Guidelines range for child
pornography offenses, which are the result of "specific directions given to the
Sentencing Commission by Congress." We have already upheld a similar comparison
made by another district court and find no authority for Anderson's argument that
such a comparison is erroneous. See Hill, 552 F.3d at 692 (finding that a comparison
of the defendant's prostitution offense to possession of child pornography was not in
error); see also United States v. Battiest, 553 F.3d 1132, 1137 (8th Cir. 2009)
(determining that, even if Guidelines-recommended child pornography sentences are
unduly harsh, the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the defendant's
policy argument for a lesser sentence).
The district court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors and varied upward
from the Guidelines range due to the egregiousness of Anderson's conduct, the
potential for unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the desire to protect the public
from further crimes of Anderson. Based on this record, we conclude that Anderson's
sentence was substantively reasonable.
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B. Conditions of Supervised Release
Anderson challenges two special conditions of supervised release imposed by
the district court: a lifetime prohibition from consuming alcohol and a lifetime
prohibition from possessing materials depicting or describing sexually explicit
conduct. Because Anderson did not challenge these conditions at sentencing, we
review them for plain error. See United States v. Curry, 627 F.3d 312, 314 (8th Cir.
2010) (per curiam). "To qualify for relief under this standard, the appellant must show
that the district court committed an error that is clear under current law, that the error
affects his substantial rights, and that the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. at 314–15 (citing United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
As we have said before:
A district court has broad discretion to order special conditions of
supervised release if each condition: 1) is reasonably related to the
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); 2) involves no
greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the
purposes set forth in § 3553(a); and 3) is consistent with any pertinent
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
United States v. Bender, 566 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citations
omitted). In crafting special conditions, the district court must be careful to conduct
an inquiry "on an individualized basis," looking at the specific facts of the defendant's
case. United States v. Davis, 452 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2006). "'[C]ourt[s] may not
impose [] special condition[s] on all those found guilty of a particular offense.'"
Bender, 556 F.3d at 752 (quoting Davis, 452 F.3d at 995) (vacating the district court's
ban on possessing sexually stimulating materials under an abuse of discretion
standard because the district court imposed the condition because the defendant was
a sex offender). Furthermore, "[c]ourts generally cannot impose [] a condition . . .
without evidence that the condition imposed is reasonably related . . . to the crime or
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to something in the defendant's history." United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241,
248–49 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Plain error results if
the district court fails to make the necessary individualized findings for imposing a
special condition. See United States v. Poitra, 648 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2011)
("The parties agree that the district court failed to make the necessary individualized
findings, and this error was plain under current law from this Court." (citing Curry,
627 F.3d at 315)).
1. Prohibition from Consuming Alcohol
Anderson contends that the district court plainly erred by prohibiting him from
consuming alcohol because the court merely speculated that he has a drinking
problem with no evidence in the record to substantiate that such a problem actually
exists. "We have held that a sentencing court abuses its discretion by imposing a total
alcohol ban in circumstances where the record evidence does not support such a
restriction." United States v. Behler, 187 F.3d 772, 779 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing United
States v. Bass, 121 F.3d 1218, 1223–24 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Prendergast,
979 F.2d 1289, 1292–93 (8th Cir. 1992)). "In cases where the defendant's history or
crime of conviction did not support a complete ban on alcohol, we have reversed."
United States v. Simons, 614 F.3d 475, 480–81 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding that the
district court did not plainly err by imposing an alcohol ban on a defendant who self-
reported that he was manic depressive and who may have been deceptive about prior
alcohol use); see Prendergast, 979 F.2d at 1293 (8th Cir. 1992) (striking special
conditions that prohibited the defendant from using alcohol where "[t]here [was] no
evidence indicating that [the defendant] suffer[ed] from alcoholism or that the use of
alcohol in any way contributed to the commission of the offense for which he was
sentenced").
Unlike Prendergast, alcohol played a role in Anderson's offense. Anderson
provided the 13-year-old victims M.R. and J.J. with alcohol both before and after he
engaged in sexual intercourse with M.R. Anderson was a member of the Facebook
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groups "All i want to do is get drunk and take pictures!!!" and "A Drunk Girls Guide
to Social Graces." In several of the Facebook chats Anderson had with adolescent
girls, he described partying with adolescents. The probation office's sentencing
recommendation noted that "alcohol was used in the instant offense as part of the
grooming process." Furthermore, although Anderson reported that he does not have
an issue with alcohol, alcohol was the cause of Anderson's only prior conviction.
Given this evidence, the district court did not commit plain error by prohibiting
Anderson from consuming alcohol. See, e.g., Simons, 614 F.3d at 481 (determining
that, although the facts might not be sufficient to justify a 20-year ban on alcohol,
even assuming the district court erred, it did not rise to the level of plain error).
2. Prohibition from Possessing Sexually Explicit Materials
Anderson also contends that the district court plainly erred by prohibiting him
from possessing materials depicting or describing sexually explicit conduct.
Anderson argues that this condition was not based on an individualized determination
but rather on his status as a sex offender.
In Bender, "we disapproved a special condition prohibiting the defendant
convicted of a sex crime from possessing sexually stimulating materials based on the
district court's abstract belief that sex offenders 'need to have a very tight rein' and
have '[no] business reading a Playboy magazine.'" United States v. Kelly, 625 F.3d
516, 520 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bender, 566 F.3d at 752). Similarly, in Kelly, we
vacated a special condition prohibiting the defendant from possessing pornography
because the district court failed to make an individualized determination that the
prohibition was warranted; instead, the district court simply "'follow[ed] the special
conditions of supervised release set out in the sentencing recommendation,'" which
also provided no justification for the condition. Id.
Like the district courts in Bender and Kelly, the district court in this case failed
to explain its reasoning for the special condition prohibiting Anderson from
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possessing sexually explicit materials. Although the sentencing recommendation sets
forth the condition, it too fails to provide a justification for it. See Curry, 627 F.3d at
315 (finding the district court erred by prohibiting the defendant, who failed to
register as a sex offender, from possessing pornography without explanation).
Nonetheless, Anderson is not entitled to relief under plain-error review. The district
court should have articulated its reasoning, but we conclude, on this record, that its
oversight does not require reversal.
First, Anderson fails to show how the error affected his substantial rights. See
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (noting that the error "must have affected the outcome of the
district court proceedings"). There is substantial evidence in the record from which
the district court could have determined that the ban on pornography was appropriate
in this case. Although this was Anderson's first offense for sexually predatory
behavior, the record indicates that Anderson had been engaged in such conduct since
at least 2006. During that time, Anderson routinely solicited adolescent girls as young
as 13, most of whom lived locally. On a number of occasions, Anderson sent
inappropriate images to the girls via text messaging or Facebook and asked for
pictures of the girls in return. Given Anderson's history of predatory behavior and his
need for sex offender treatment, there is little likelihood that the district court upon
further consideration would remove the prohibition against possessing sexually
explicit material. See United States v. Demers, 634 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 2011)
(finding that, even if the district court plainly erred when it imposed a condition
prohibiting the defendant from possessing pornography, the error did not affect the
defendant's substantial rights "since [the defendant's] offense and history . . . ma[d]e
it unlikely that he could carry his burden of showing that the condition would not
have been imposed in any event").
Second, "[e]ven assuming [Anderson] could show the error affected his
substantial rights, we retain 'the discretion to remedy the error—discretion which
ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
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reputation of judicial proceedings.'" Poitra, 648 F.3d at 889 (quoting Puckett v.
United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009) (quotation and citation omitted). "This
final prong of plain-error review is formidable and requires a showing of more than
simple prejudice." Id. "[W]hether an alleged error seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings depends upon the nature and
context of the error as well as the facts of the particular case." Id. at 890.
In this case, the condition prohibiting Anderson from possessing sexually
explicit material was imposed following a thorough discussion of the egregiousness
of Anderson's offense. The district court explained that Anderson "engaged in a
pattern of grooming and soliciting others, engaged in a pattern of sending
pornographic images to children," and "showed no remorse until he was caught,
showed no regret, showed no moral compunction at all." The district court also noted
that "[t]his is a picture of a man who is capable of repeating the conduct." See id. at
891–92 (finding that the defendant's risk of committing future sexual offenses
supported the imposition of the special condition against possessing pornography and
made the case distinguishable from prior decisions in which the district court's error
affected the fairness, integrity, or reputation of the judicial proceedings).4 Thus,
prohibiting Anderson from possessing sexually explicit material is reasonably related
to "the nature and circumstances of [Anderson's] offense" and the goal of
"protect[ing] the public from further crimes." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(C); see also
Poitra, 648 F.3d at 891 ("[P]reventing a defendant—who has a demonstrated sexual
4
Anderson argues that Poitra is not dispositive in this case because it violates
this court's longstanding "one panel" rule. Owsley v. Luebbers, 281 F.3d 687, 690
(8th Cir. 2002) ("It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the
decision of a prior panel."). Actually, the panel in Poitra stated that, although "prior
panels of this Court have held that similar errors satisfied the fourth prong for relief
under plain-error review," "[t]hese holdings do not compel a similar conclusion here
[] because '[t]he fourth prong [of plain-error review] is meant to be applied on a case-
specific and fact-intensive basis.'" Poitra, 648 F.3d at 890 (quoting Puckett, 129 S.
Ct. at 1433).
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interest in children—from possessing all sexually explicit material is reasonably
related to preventing the defendant from committing sexual offenses in the future.").
The defendant bears the burden of persuading us to exercise our discretion in this
case, see Poitra, 648 F.3d at 889, and he has not done so.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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