PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 10-4339
__________
LAUREEN BULL,
Appellant
v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2-07-cv-02291 )
District Judge: The Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 15, 2011
BEFORE: SLOVITER, SMITH, and NYGAARD,
Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 4, 2012)
David Zatuchni, Esq. [Argued]
Zatuchni & Associates
287 South Main Street
Lambertville, NJ 08530
Counsel for Appellant
Michael T. Bissinger, Esq.[Argued]
Day Pitney
One Jefferson Road
Parsippany, NJ 07054-2891
Counsel for Appellee
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge
After declaring a mistrial, the District Court dismissed
Laureen Bull’s state-law employment discrimination case as a
sanction for failing to produce originals of certain medical
notes requested by United Parcel Service. Bull maintains that
the District Court abused its discretion by ordering this
sanction. We agree and will reverse and remand for retrial.
I.
A.
Our review is fact-intensive. However, the basic
contours of the case can be summarized as follows. Bull, a
2
part-time employee since 1986, injured her neck and shoulder
on the job in late December 2005. Though she promptly
reported the incident and requested medical attention the
following day, there was a two-week delay before she had
access to a company doctor. She also alleges a number of
instances in which her supervisors ignored, downplayed and
misrepresented her injury to superiors.
The company doctor diagnosed her with contusions
and strains to her shoulder and neck, and restricted her lifting
to twenty-five pounds. She was referred to an orthopedic
specialist who lowered the lifting restriction to twenty
pounds. She was also given physical therapy for
approximately two months. UPS placed her on a temporary
work assignment that did not involve lifting, but at the end of
the 29-day assignment she stopped working and began
receiving workers’ compensation. On March 29, 2006, the
orthopedic specialist opined that—though Bull was only 70
percent recovered—she had reached maximum medical
improvement. The doctor restricted her overhead lifting to 10
pounds, but did not mention other types of lifting.
Bull returned to work and presented the specialist’s
note. She received a new work assignment, but after five
days her new supervisor told her that her medical restrictions
made it impossible for UPS to continue assigning work to her.
UPS advised her to seek permanent disability.
B.
Bull wished to be reinstated and asked her union
representative for help. The representative advised her to get
a second opinion from her own doctor. Through her doctor’s
3
referral, another orthopedic specialist, Dr. Farber, examined
her on June 13, 2006. Farber gave her a note that said among
other things: “patient is capable of lifting 50 pounds or
more.” D.C. No. 2-07-cv-02291, ECF No. 18-14, 10. The
collective bargaining agreement requires that employees be
capable of lifting 70 pounds. Bull faxed the note to the union
representative who, in turn, faxed it to UPS. UPS, however,
found numerous inconsistencies with the note, and told this to
the union representative. 1 Bull’s union representative then
advised Bull to get another note, and to get more information
to satisfy UPS’s issues. Bull called Dr. Farber’s office and
requested another note. She then faxed a second note from
Dr. Farber’s office, dated August 14, 2006. UPS also found
multiple problems with the second note. 2 These two notes
from Dr. Farber’s office have become central to this appeal.
1
UPS found that the Farber note, dated June 13, 2006, listed
conflicting dates and provided contradictory answers on
whether the medical condition was work related. Moreover,
the note ambiguously stated that Bull could lift “50 pounds or
more.” UPS also deemed other portions of the note as
illegible and observed that part of the note was cut off. ECF
No. 18-1, 14-15.
2
UPS asserts that the August 14, 2006 Farber note had
numerous problems, including: inconsistent dates; a
signature differs from the June note; inconsistent answers on
the issue of whether the medical condition was work-related;
and, an ambiguous instruction that “Patient is not able to lift
over 70 pounds.” The note was also cut off at the bottom.
Finally, there were portions of the note that were illegible.
ECF No. 18-1, 16-19.
4
On September 27, 2006, UPS sent a letter to Bull’s
union representative, saying in part:
As you know, we received two
notes from Dr. Farber’s office
regarding Ms. Bull’s ability to
return to work; both notes (dated
June 13, 2006 and August 14,
2006) indicate restricted duty. . . .
The Company also requests that
Ms. Bull produce the original
notes from Dr. Farber’s office due
to the fact that the notes received
to date are blurry and in some
cases illegible.
ECF No. 18-15, 9. The representative contacted Bull, and
requested again a new doctor’s note and more information.
Bull never responded. Instead, she filed a Workers’
Compensation lawsuit and contacted the Equal Opportunity
Employment Commission. She then filed the instant claim in
April 2007. During discovery, Bull turned over new copies
of the Farber notes to UPS in response to their general
discovery requests.
C.
At the March 2010 trial, during Bull’s direct
examination, her counsel sought to introduce copies of the
June 13, 2006 note from Dr. Farber. UPS objected on the
basis of best evidence. During the sidebar that followed, the
District Court asked Bull’s attorney where the original June
13, 2006 note from Dr. Farber was. He responded: “we don’t
5
have - - it doesn’t exist any more. All we have is a copy.”
ECF No. 56-4, 21:24-25. He also pointed out that Dr. Farber
had authenticated the note. UPS responded that they had
“documented letters asking for the originals,” and that, during
this litigation, “we have asked for the originals, and we have
never seen them.” Id. at 23:4-5, 23:18-19. The District Court
ultimately decided to overrule UPS’s objections, concluding
that the argument against admission went to the weight of the
evidence, rather than its authenticity.
Moments later, as Bull’s counsel was about to request
that the note be admitted into evidence, the District Court
interrupted and said to Bull in open court: “Well, before we
do that: Where’s the original of this note?” She answered:
“The original note is in my home. . . .” Id. at 28:6. Surprised
by his client’s response, Bull’s counsel immediately said:
Your honor, I understand what
she just said. I’ve been asking her
for the originals since the very
beginning when Mr. Bissinger
[UPS’s counsel] has been asking
me for the originals. She just kept
telling me that she doesn’t have
them, she’s looked for them but
she doesn’t - - can’t find those
notes anymore, they don’t exist
any more. 3
3
In an affidavit accompanying Bull’s response to UPS’s
motion for sanctions, counsel revisits this statement. He says:
“When queried as to original Farber medical notes, Ms. Bull
indicated that she was unable to locate them and believed
6
Id. at 28:12-17. A few moments later, after a brief sidebar,
Bull’s attorney sought to clarify her statement. The following
exchange occurred in open court.
Q. Laureen, I understood –
have you looked for the original?
Have you actually been able to
find the original note?
A. I have looked for the
original note. Many things going
on in my life with the paperwork,
and the sale—got damage to my
apartment. I can try to find this
note.
they may have been lost due to flooding in her home.” ECF
No. 58-1, 2. He, then, goes on to say: “The Court should be
aware that this is undersigned counsel’s recollection of what
transpired in 2007, but not Ms. Bull’s. Ms. Bull has recently
advised her counsel that she does not recall being asked by
undersigned for the original Farber medical notes and that she
would have conducted a search for these documents back in
2007 is [sic] she had been required to do so.” Id. Moreover,
at oral argument, Bull’s counsel stated emphatically that Bull
did not lie about possessing these documents. Therefore,
without a finding by the District Court, or indeed any
testimony from Bull on this topic, we can neither speculate
upon what Bull understood or intended with regard to the
production of the Farber note originals, nor whether her
responses were credible.
7
Q. Have I asked you to look
for the original?
The Court: Well, wait a minute.
Wait a minute. In response to my
question, you said the original
was at your home. There was no
hesitation.
The Witness: Correct.
The Court: Is the original of
that note at your home?
The Witness: It should be.
The Court: As your attorney
stated, this case has been going
on for years. There were years of
discovery. This note was asked
for. Is there some reason - - have
you made a search for it
previously?
The Witness: No, sir.
Id. at 30:3-21. In the sidebar that followed, the District Court
questioned counsel for Bull and UPS on the appropriate
response to this revelation. UPS advocated excluding the
originals and any copies other than those originally faxed to
them by the union, specifically requesting that the jury be
permitted to see only the document presented to UPS. The
District Court brushed aside UPS’s suggestions and instead
8
decided to declare a mistrial and invited UPS to file a motion
for sanctions.
Bull sent the original June 13 and August 14 notes
from Dr. Farber to the District Court five days after the
mistrial. UPS filed a motion for sanctions, and in October
2010 the District Court ordered the case dismissed with
prejudice to sanction Bull’s conduct. This appeal followed.
II.
A.
The District Court ruled that Bull’s failure to produce
originals of the medical notes was spoliation and it invoked
its inherent authority to order the case dismissed with
prejudice as a sanction. See Schmid v. Milwakee Elec. Tool
Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1994). 4 Two questions arise:
first, generally, whether the production of facsimiles and
copies—in place of the originals—can be considered
spoliation; and, second, whether Bull’s specific acts or
omissions in this case provided a reasonable basis to rule that
she spoliated evidence, warranting dismissal with prejudice.
Sanctions for spoliation of evidence are reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Delaware, Inc., 489
F.3d 568, 574 (3d Cir. 2007).
B.
4
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
9
We first look at whether, generally, failing to produce
original documents can be considered spoliation. Spoliation
is usually referenced in instances where evidence has been
altered or destroyed. See Micron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus
Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Spoliation occurs
when evidence is destroyed or altered, or when a party fails to
preserve evidence in instances where litigation is pending or
reasonably foreseeable.). We have described it more broadly.
For instance, in a context not involving a mistrial or
dismissal, but while discussing a district court’s decision to
instruct the jury with an adverse inference for spoliation, we
said the following:
When the contents of a document
are relevant to an issue in a case,
the trier of fact generally may
receive the fact of the document's
nonproduction or destruction as
evidence that the party that has
prevented production did so out of
the well-founded fear that the
contents would harm him. Gumbs
v. International Harvester, Inc.,
718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir.1983);
United States v. Cherkasky Meat
Co., 259 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1958).
Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334
(3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). Indeed, a party’s failure to
produce a document can have the same practical effect as
destroying it and we reaffirm that, under certain
circumstances, nonproduction of evidence is rightfully
characterized as spoliation.
10
Here, though Bull failed to produce the originals, she
did provide UPS with facsimiles and photocopies of the
documents. The District Court concluded that, in spite of
producing copies, Bull’s conduct was spoliation because,
although UPS had not requested a forensic analysis of the
originals, such tests might have yielded information directly
relevant to the question of whether the documents were
authentic. Such an analysis might not be possible on just
copies. We are persuaded that, in some instances, original
documents might yield relevant evidence that is simply not
available from copies. As a result, we conclude with the
District Court that—theoretically—producing copies in
instances where the originals have been requested may
constitute spoliation if it would prevent discovering critical
information. With that said, we reach a very different
conclusion when we turn to the question of whether spoliation
occurred here.
C.
Spoliation occurs where: the evidence was in the
party’s control; the evidence is relevant to the claims or
defenses in the case; there has been actual suppression or
withholding of evidence; and, the duty to preserve the
evidence was reasonably foreseeable to the party. Id. 5 Two
5
The District Court essentially merged its deliberation on
spoliation with its analysis of spoliation sanctions. Though
there is some overlap between the two, there are distinctive
elements of each. We are focusing upon the spoliation
analysis first. However, we note that the sanctions analysis
includes the following factors: “(1) the degree of fault of the
11
of these factors pose little controversy in this case. There is
no question that the documents were in Bull’s control since
she admitted this on the stand and produced the documents
five days after the District Court declared the mistrial. We
also have no doubt that the Farber notes were relevant to both
the claims and defenses of this case since the notes discuss a
central issue in this case: Bull’s capacity to work. The
remaining factors, though, merit closer attention.
D.
With regard to whether Bull intentionally withheld the
original notes from Dr. Farber’s office, the District Court
summarized the facts upon which it made its decision:
Although Plaintiff would have
this Court believe that originals of
the documents in question were
never requested during discovery,
that contention is disingenuous in
light of the record, which
documents that at least as early as
September 27, 2006, Defendant
UPS had requested “that Ms. Bull
produce the original notes from
Dr. Farber’s office . . . .”
party who altered or destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of
prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and (3) whether
there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial unfairness
to the opposing party, and, where the offending party is
seriously at fault, will serve to deter such conduct by others in
the future.” Schmid, 13 F.3d at 79.
12
The District Court also said “despite numerous requests, both
formal and informal, to produce the disputed documents,
Plaintiff never responded.” As a result, the District Court
concluded that:
Common sense and
reasonableness in light of this
record, and the numerous and
repeated references to the fact that
Plaintiff never accounted for the
absence of the originals, point to
nothing less than purposeful
withholding of critical evidence
that can not [sic] be countenanced
or overlooked by this Court.
Although a District Court has discretion to draw inferences
from the record on a party’s intent, it strays beyond the
bounds of its discretion when, as here, there is no factual
basis to do so. The central problem is that the District Court
accepted, without any critical examination,
misrepresentations of the record promulgated by UPS.
We start with the District Court’s foundational
premise: UPS hounded Bull for the originals over the course
of years, but got no response. 6 To the contrary, we count a
6
UPS misstated as fact the following to the District Court:
“We have documented letters asking for the originals.” ECF
No. 56-4, 23:4-5. “I have never been able to get the originals
because they won’t give them to me. . . .” Id. at 24:7-9. “I
sent the trial subpoena. It was very clear I want the originals
13
total of only two requests by UPS for the original documents
in the entire span of this case—dating back to pre-litigation
communications—and neither of these inquiries were
discovery requests. 7
The first communication was UPS’s September 27,
2006, pre-litigation letter requesting the originals. This letter
was addressed to Bull’s union representative, not Bull. UPS
dismisses the distinction because—it says—they have sworn
testimony from the union representative that he told Bull that
UPS wanted the originals. The representative made no such
statement. He only requested that Bull provide new notes,
new information, or maybe better or clearer copies. 8 The
of the notes. Why - - and we have Rule 26, we have all of
these things, and I still don’t have it, and now we’re three
days into trial.” Id. at 37:22-25. “I don’t know what to do
here, Judge. We go through three days of trial. I asked for
the originals notes. I sent a valid subpoena. She apparently
has had them for three years, four years.” Id. at 45:23-46:1.
7
UPS’s request for production of documents in this case
asked for “copies of the documents described herein . . . .” It
did not request originals of these documents.
8
The full text of this portion of the Cherney deposition is as
follows:
Q. Did you ask or attempt to get better
copies of the notes for UPS in response to
[UPS’s request]?
A. Yes, I did.
14
union representative knew that UPS wanted the originals, but
we have no evidence that Bull knew, and we do not have any
basis to impute the union representative’s knowledge of
UPS’s request to Bull.
It does not end there, however. UPS also repeatedly
stresses that, from the beginning of discovery, Bull had the
September 27 letter from UPS. The implication is that Bull
knew about this pre-litigation request for the originals at least
by the early phase of this litigation. Although it may be
Q. Do you recall what you did response to
that?
A. Can you repeat the question?
Q. Sure. I asked you what did you do to get
better copies of the notes or words to that
effect. You said yes you did. I’m asking did
you go to Ms. Bull and ask her to get
something, did you go to Dr. Farber? What
did you do?
A. I had conversations with Laureen in
effect that there was issues with ambiguities
with the note and that to further clarify it, to get
notes that - - a note that would release her back
to full duty.
Q. Did you talk to her about the fact that the
notes in some cases were - - or the company
felt that there was some illegible parts of
the notes or that they were blurry and we
needed clearer copies?
A. Yes.
Robert Cherney Deposition, 57:14-58:12 (emphasis added).
15
technically accurate to say that the letter was in Bull’s
constructive possession, UPS fails to note that it produced the
letter in response to Bull’s general discovery request.
Producing such a letter to Bull in response to her general
requests for documents is not the same thing as presenting
Bull with a specific discovery request for the original notes
from Dr. Farber’s office. Moreover, we would expect that—
had UPS intended this letter to result in Bull turning over the
original notes in question—it would have made at least some
attempt to pursue their production when they did not
materialize. Yet, UPS never raised the nonproduction of the
originals in a motion to compel, or in any other
communication. As a result, any assertion that the pre-
litigation letter of September 27, 2006 to the union
representative put Bull on notice of UPS’s request for
originals fails.
UPS’s second request for the originals came on March
3, 2010—five days before trial commenced—in the form of
an email. Though UPS refers to it as a trial subpoena, the
District Court noted that it did not meet the requirements of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. We agree. Indeed, there is no evidence
that the document that UPS calls a subpoena was issued by
the court. As such, given that discovery was closed and that
the email is not a subpoena, we cannot treat this
communication as anything more than a reminder to Bull’s
counsel that, at trial, the best evidence rule would apply to the
notes from Dr. Farber’s office. Moreover, the record does not
contain any evidence that Bull was ever aware of this email.
Therefore, like the September 27, 2006 letter, the email fails
to provide support for an inference that Bull knew of UPS’s
request and still inadvertently or intentionally withheld the
original notes from them.
16
We conclude from this that the District Court was
flatly wrong when it declared that UPS made “multiple”
requests of Bull for the original notes. We must also
conclude that any inference of Bull’s intent to obstinately
withhold the originals also fails for a lack of any factual
foundation that she actually knew UPS wanted them.
The District Court also makes much of UPS’s
challenge to the authenticity of the Farber notes in its motion
for summary judgment, in a pretrial motion, and during its
opening argument. It infers that Bull should have understood
from UPS’s challenge to the authenticity of the notes that
UPS wanted and needed the originals. However, these, alone,
imply no such thing. It is largely counsel’s role to assess
which evidence best serves the case. It was up to UPS’s
counsel to press for the originals if it needed them, and it was
up to Bull’s counsel to diligently investigate all possible
sources for the originals if he needed them to rebut the
argument. If neither counsel pressed Bull for the originals to
make their case, we cannot impute to Bull a sophisticated
knowledge of trial strategy. Indeed, it is obvious from UPS’s
arguments at sidebar that it was content to try the case with
the copies. Moreover, UPS’s challenges to the notes’
authenticity were largely confined to information that was
readily available on the note copies. Bull, and her counsel for
that matter, had no reason to place a high priority on locating
the original notes. 9 Therefore, without anything else, Bull
could not be deemed to be “on notice” that UPS wanted or
needed the originals merely from their authenticity argument.
9
See supra notes 1 and 2.
17
Moving beyond UPS’s requests for originals, the
District Court references a statement made by Bull’s counsel
at trial as a basis to infer her intent. In the instant after Bull
revealed that the original notes from Dr. Farber’s office were
likely in her possession, her counsel said:
Your honor, I understand what
she just said. I’ve been asking her
for the originals since the very
beginning when Mr. Bissinger
[UPS’s counsel] has been asking
me for the originals. She just kept
telling me that she doesn’t have
them, she’s looked for them but
she doesn’t - - can’t find those
notes anymore, they don’t exist
any more [sic].
ECF No. 56-4, 28:12-17. Bull disputes any memory of this
request, and her attorney has moved away from saying that he
made multiple requests of Bull. 10 Yet, even if we accept
counsel’s version of events as told at trial, we do not see how
this exchange between counsel and client can be used to
ground a conclusion that Bull committed, as the District
Court said, “flagrant violations of the most basic code of
judicial propriety and honest dealing.” Absent the backdrop
of UPS’s unsubstantiated portrayal of Bull as an obstinate
stonewaller, this conclusion is dramatically overblown.
10
See supra note 3.
18
This is not to say that we take Bull’s failure to turn
over the originals to her counsel lightly. To be sure, Bull put
her counsel in a terrible position. Her counsel represented in
a side-bar to the District Court—moments before her open-
court revelation—that “we don’t have - - it [the Farber note
original] doesn’t exist any more. All we have is a copy.”
ECF No. 56-4, 21:24-25. He also unwittingly violated the
best evidence rule. Fed. R. Evid. 1002. There is no question
that the late revelation concerning the originals had impacts.
The key issue, however, is whether the discrepancy
between her statements (if in fact there is a discrepancy) was
an intentional misrepresentation or—as her counsel insists—
inadvertence. The record does not answer this question. To
be sure, the District Court was remiss in its failure to examine
this issue more closely and in its failure to make findings of
fact on inadvertence and misrepresentation. Yet, mindful that
it is UPS’s burden to prove Bull’s bad faith conduct, there are
strong reasons favoring a presumption of inadvertence.
Counsel attempted to examine Bull on the record
before the mistrial was declared to get her explanation for her
late revelation, but the District Court inexplicably would not
allow it. 11 There is no evidence that either Bull or her
11
Bull’s counsel said at sidebar:
Bull’s Counsel: I would like to pursue [the reason for Bull
not searching for the Farber notes] with Ms. - - and see ifthere
can be a clarification with her that you can ask her questions
and she can explain. You asked her a question and she gave
you a one-word response, okay? Maybe there’s more to it that
would clarify.”
19
counsel wished to be anything less than candid about this
topic. They were simply prevented from doing so by the
District Court who passed up the opportunity to take
testimony and make findings of fact. Moreover, Bull’s
counsel stated emphatically in oral argument that Bull did not
lie to him about the originals, seemingly ruling out bad faith.
Since the entire case for Bull’s bad faith seems to rest on
counsel’s words, we must take all of his words on the topic
into account, including these. Moreover, even if Bull did
obfuscate on the request from her attorney (a conclusion that
ignores Bull’s counsel’s statements, and the later
representations made by Bull to her counsel), there is still no
evidence that Bull knew UPS wanted the originals, since she
had already produced copies. In light of UPS’s utter failure
to produce any evidence of its own to ground the conclusion
that Bull acted in bad faith, all of this supports abiding by a
presumption of inadvertence.
We must keep in mind that at issue is whether the
District Court was reasonable in ruling that Bull’s late
revelation about the existence of the originals was a “flagrant
violation” and that there is:
[N]o plausible explanation other
than Plaintiff’s misconduct that
explains the withholding of the
original Farber notes. Despite
The Court: No, she gave me a one-word response. Yes, I
have it, it’s at home, and “I’ve never even tried to find it.”
ECF No. 56-4, 42:6-13.
20
numerous requests both formal
and informal, to produce the
disputed documents, Plaintiff
never responded.
On this point, our review of the record has left us with a very
different set of conclusions from the District Court. First, we
do not see any basis for the District Court’s characterization
of UPS as persistently hounding Bull for the originals.
Indeed, it did not. Second, as a result of this, there is not one
instance in which we can verify that Bull actually knew that
UPS wanted the original notes. Third, lacking such evidence
there is no basis to characterize Bull as one who lied or
obfuscated to prevail in her attempt to intentionally withhold
the originals. We conclude from all of this that the District
Court abused its discretion in ruling that, within its spoliation
analysis, Bull intentionally withheld the original documents
from UPS.
E.
We turn, finally, to the issue of whether Bull had a
foreseeable duty to preserve and turn over the originals of the
notes from Dr. Farber’s office. The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit said that the question of reasonable
foreseeability is a “flexible fact-specific standard that allows
a district court to exercise the discretion necessary to confront
the myriad factual situations inherent in the spoliation
inquiry.” Micron Technology, Inc., 645 F.3d at 1320. Here,
the District Court ruled that “it is hard to imagine evidence
that could have been more . . . foreseeable.” We conclude
that the District Court was within its discretion when it
21
determined that there was a foreseeable duty here, but we
have some reservations.
The record is scattered with support for the District
Court’s conclusion. 1.) Bull initiated both an EEOC
proceeding and the instant litigation within a year of UPS’s
employment action. 2.) Bull was aware that she and UPS
fundamentally disagreed on the meaning of the notes from
Dr. Farber’s office. 3.) Though she denies it, her counsel
says that—on at least one occasion—he asked her for the
originals. 4.) Both UPS’s motion for summary judgment and
a pre-trial motion mention the fact that UPS had never seen
the originals. UPS also raised this fact in its opening
argument. 5.) Finally, Bull had a duty under Rule 1002 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to produce the original documents
before the notes could be introduced into evidence at trial.
With that said, the duty issue is not so clear cut. We
lack evidence that counsel for either party made any
appreciable effort to induce Bull to search for and produce the
original Farber notes. Moreover, it is clear that UPS’s
challenge to the authenticity of the notes rested upon
information that was available on the copies of the
documents. This leads us to wonder whether a lay-person
like Bull, ignorant of the Rules of Evidence, might have
concluded that copies of the notes were sufficient.
Nonetheless, the question before us is not whether a
particular scenario is possible, but rather whether the duty
was objectively foreseeable. Under the circumstances of this
case, we will assume that the District Court acted within its
discretion in determining that the litigation and the future
22
need to provide access to the original notes from Dr. Farber’s
office were foreseeable. 12
F.
12
This highlights a growing concern for us that is not directly
implicated in this case. As electronic document technology
progresses, the concept of an “original” document is
becoming more abstract. Moving from the more easily
distinguishable photocopy or facsimile to documents created,
transmitted and stored in an electronic form means that it will
be increasingly difficult to ascertain where the boundary of an
objectively reasonable duty to preserve such documents lies.
There are—and increasingly will be—circumstances in which
the foreseeability of a duty to preserve the information
contained in a particular document is distinguishable—under
an objective analysis—from the need to preserve that
information in its “original” form or format. Indeed, arriving
at a common understanding of what an “original” is in this
context is challenging enough. Although it does, and always
will rest with the courts to preserve the distinction between an
objectively foreseeable duty and actual knowledge of such a
duty, there is a concomitant obligation that counsel must
assume to clearly and precisely articulate the need for parties
to search for, maintain, and—where necessary—produce
“original” or source documents. This case gives us one more
opportunity to highlight our position that clarity in
communications from counsel that establish a record of a
party’s actual knowledge of this duty will ensure that this
technology-driven issue does not consume an unduly large
portion of the court’s attention in future litigation.
23
In summarizing the Brewer spoliation factors, we
conclude that the District Court was within its discretion in
determining that Bull had the original notes from Dr. Farber’s
office in her possession, that these documents were relevant
to the case’s claims and defenses, and we will assume that she
had a reasonably foreseeable duty to preserve and—when
requested—turn-over these documents. Yet, we conclude that
the District Court abused its discretion in determining that
Bull intentionally withheld these documents from UPS.
In Brewer we discussed the connection between a
finding of sanctionable spoliation and a ruling on bad faith,
stating the following:
For the [spoliation] rule to apply .
. . it must appear that there has
been an actual suppression or
withholding of the evidence. No
unfavorable inference arises when
the circumstances indicate that
the document or article in
question has been lost or
accidentally destroyed, or where
the failure to produce it is
otherwise properly accounted for.
See generally 31A C.J.S.
Evidence § 156(2); 29 Am.Jur.2d
Evidence § 177 (“Such a
presumption or inference arises,
however, only when the spoliation
or destruction [of evidence] was
intentional, and indicates fraud
and a desire to suppress the truth,
24
and it does not arise where the
destruction was a matter of
routine with no fraudulent
intent.”).
Brewer, 72 F.3d at 334 (emphasis added). Therefore, a
finding of bad faith is pivotal to a spoliation determination.
This only makes sense, since spoliation of documents that are
merely withheld, but not destroyed, requires evidence that the
documents are actually withheld, rather than—for instance—
misplaced. Withholding requires intent. 13
As a result, we must be convinced that the District
Court, on sufficient evidence, found that Bull intended to
actually withhold the original documents from UPS before we
can conclude that sanctionable spoliation occurred. There is
no such finding of record here. As we have concluded that
the District Court abused its discretion in ruling that Bull
acted in bad faith, we must rule that the District Court abused
its discretion in determining that Bull committed sanctionable
spoliation. Accordingly, the District Court’s sanction of
dismissal with prejudice, which is grounded in the conclusion
that Bull spoliated evidence, is also an abuse of discretion.
III.
13
We note that the verb “withhold” is defined as “To keep
from doing something, to keep in check or under restraint; to
hold back, restrain.” Oxford English Dictionary.
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/229665?redirectedFrom=wit
hhold#eid, last viewed December 5, 2011. It inherently
expresses an intentional act.
25
A.
Our decision to reverse the District Court’s ruling on
spoliation eliminates the need for a specific review of the
District Court’s sanction of a dismissal with prejudice, since
it arose from its determination that Bull spoliated evidence.
Yet, the District Court’s rationale for the sanction contained
in its opinion differs markedly from its analysis when it
granted the mistrial and invited a motion for sanctions. When
it granted the mistrial, the District Court based its decision on
a perceived discovery violation that it characterized as
spoliation. In its opinion it retreats from that basis and
instead relies on its inherent power to sanction. The inherent
power of the District Court to sanction parties’ conduct is, of
course, not limited to instances of spoliation. Therefore, in an
abundance of caution, we will review the record to ascertain
whether the circumstances of this case, generally construed,
provide any basis on which the District Court could
substantiate dismissing the case with prejudice.
Generally, “[w]hile we defer to the District Court's
discretion, dismissal with prejudice is only appropriate in
limited circumstances and doubts should be resolved in favor
of reaching a decision on the merits.” Emerson v. Thiel
College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). Dismissals with
prejudice are “drastic sanctions.” Poulis v. State Farm Fire
and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867 (3d Cir. 1984). Moreover,
district courts ordinarily balance six factors in assessing the
propriety of an involuntary dismissal with prejudice: “(1) the
party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the
adversary; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) willfulness or bad
faith; (5) the availability of alternative sanctions; and (6) the
merit of the claim or defense.” Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d
26
404, 411 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868). As
the District Court acknowledged, some of the Poulis factors
duplicate the spoliation analysis. Nonetheless, we will review
each one separately.
B.
We begin by looking at Bull’s personal responsibility
for withholding these documents. As we noted earlier, the
District Court concluded that there is:
[N]o plausible explanation other
than Plaintiff’s misconduct that
explains the withholding of the
original Farber notes. Despite
numerous requests, both formal
and informal, to produce the
disputed documents, Plaintiff
never responded.
As we already detailed, however, the District Court’s
inference that Bull intentionally withheld documents is not
grounded in the record. Although Rule 1002 placed
responsibility for producing the originals with Bull and her
counsel, negligence remains a reasonable explanation for
everything that happened. The same can also be said for her
possible misrepresentation of the documents’ whereabouts to
her attorney. The record simply does not have evidence, nor
a factual finding supporting bad faith intent. Moreover, had
the District Court found bad faith conduct on this evidence, it
would have clearly erred. This leads us to conclude that,
though the personal responsibility factor of the Poulis
analysis must weigh against Bull because of the duty she had
27
under Rule 1002, this factor cannot be given great weight
because there is neither evidence of, nor a finding that she
intended to withhold the documents.
C.
The District Court concluded that the next factor,
prejudice, also weighed heavily in favor of dismissal. It said:
Had Defendant been able to prove
that the document was tampered
with, that would obviously have
had significant bearing on the
case. The fact that [UPS] could
not conduct forensic analysis on
the original was certainly
prejudicial, even if the outcome of
such an analysis remains
unknown.
It also ruled that this, combined with the costs of trial
preparation and UPS’s inability to account for the originals in
the development of its trial strategy, resulted in “significant
prejudice.”
Examples of prejudice are “the irretrievable loss of
evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or
the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs
imposed on the opposing party.” Scarborough v. Eubanks,
747 F.2d 871, 876 (3d Cir. 1984). We have also said:
‘“prejudice’ for the purpose of Poulis analysis does not mean
‘irremediable harm,’ the burden imposed by impeding a
party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial
28
strategy is sufficiently prejudicial.” Ware v. Rodale Press,
Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003).
Certainly, the lack of access, coupled with UPS’s
unreimburseable costs of preparing for trial, and the
disclosure of UPS’s trial strategy all support the District
Court’s use of its discretion in ruling that UPS suffered
prejudice. For this reason, we conclude that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion here.
Again, however, we are dubious about the District
Court’s characterization of the prejudice as “severe” and
“irreparable,” since we do not know the probative value of the
originals (as compared to the copies) and are puzzled by
UPS’s lackadaisical effort in obtaining them—given how
critical they now say they were to their case.
D.
With regard to dilatoriness, the District Court ruled
that it “weighs extremely against Plaintiff.” Yet, as we
addressed above, there is no evidence that Bull was ever
aware that UPS specifically requested the Farber note
originals. Moreover, the first request that UPS made for the
documents during the litigation was literally on the eve of
trial. As a result, we do not find any reasonable basis for the
conclusion that Bull was dilatory as to the production of the
originals to UPS.
With regard to her attorney, we must rely on counsel’s
representations that the delay between his own request for the
original documents and her production of them five days after
mistrial was due to inadvertence or misunderstanding. On
29
this basis, we cannot characterize her conduct as dilatory
because there is no evidence of a willful delay.
E.
The fourth factor, bad faith, already has been discussed
in detail above. Suffice to say, in spite of the District Court’s
strong, negative characterization of Bull on this element, we
conclude that there is not a reasonable basis in the record to
conclude that she willfully withheld the documents or that her
conduct was in bad faith.
F.
With regard to the availability of lesser sanctions, the
District Court said that it had considered them “long and
seriously,” but, ultimately, concluded that anything less than
dismissal with prejudice would “condone flagrant violations
of the most basic code of judicial propriety and honest
dealing.” It went on to say: “[a] sanction other than
dismissal would be insufficient to remedy the prejudice
caused by Plaintiff’s intentional withholding of evidence and
failure to provide appropriate notice to Defendant.” Finally,
it concluded that “there is no way around the fact that
Plaintiff’s conduct has irreparably prejudiced Defendant.”
There are numerous problems with this conclusion.
As we already have said, the record does not support a
ruling that Bull intentionally withheld documents, nor that she
was conducting herself dishonestly in this litigation.
Moreover, any prejudice arising from UPS’s lack of access
was remediable because UPS could have obtained the
originals five days after the mistrial was declared.
30
Second, before the District Court declared a mistrial,
UPS originally argued against a mistrial and strongly
advocated that the District Court remedy the situation by
barring Bull from introducing the originals into evidence. 14
Unlike Ware, where the exclusion of evidence necessitated a
dismissal of the claim, the originals comprised only a portion
of the evidence and UPS was—at least originally—content to
proceed with trial using the copies of the notes that UPS had
always had in its possession.
Finally, though the District Court rejected an adverse
inference instruction as an appropriate remedy, it gave no
solid reason for this. In light of the fact that such an
instruction would have bolstered the very portion of UPS’s
case that it says suffered because it lacked the originals, we
fail to see how an adverse inference—though itself a severe
sanction—would not have been preferable to a dismissal with
prejudice. Given that dismissal with prejudice is a remedy of
last resort, we are puzzled by the District Court’s decision.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that justification
for the dismissal was overblown, and that sanctions other than
14
UPS made the following statements at sidebar, following
the discovery of the Farber originals. “I’m fine with this jury.
I don’t know that we need a mistrial, Your Honor. But using
this note is - - is clearly - - I don’t know what to do.” ECF
No. 56-4, 34:18-20. “I still say, Judge, the appropriate
remedy is to let the jury rely upon what UPS relied upon.” Id.
at 38:1-2. “I think the appropriate remedy again is to allow
the trial to proceed with the faxed versions of the notes.” Id.
at 42:25-43:1.
31
dismissal with prejudice were available to adequately address
any impacts suffered by UPS and the judicial process. The
District Court abused its discretion in concluding that
dismissal with prejudice was the only appropriate remedy.
G.
Finally, in assessing the sixth Poulis factor, the District
Court concluded that the merits of Bull’s claim are “utterly
lacking.” Yet, the District Court appears to have
misunderstood the subject of this portion of the analysis to be
Bull’s defense against sanctions. Poulis directs the District
Court to examine the merits of the underlying claim: which,
in this case, would be Bull’s employment discrimination
claim. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70. Moreover, even if the
discrimination claim was judged to be meritless, Bull also
advanced a second claim of workplace harassment that rested
on a factual foundation that is distinct from the Farber notes.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the District Court
abused its discretion in concluding that this factor weighed in
favor of dismissal because it did not even address the merits
of Bull’s claim.
H.
To summarize, then, we conclude that two of the
Poulis factors—personal responsibility and prejudice—weigh
in favor of dismissal and four factors—dilatoriness, bad faith,
availability of lesser sanctions, and the merits of the
underlying claim—weigh against a dismissal. We are left
with the question of whether the District Court’s decision to
dismiss the case with prejudice could be regarded as within
its discretion when it is based primarily upon the prejudice
32
UPS suffered. We conclude that it was an abuse of
discretion.
Earlier, we referenced a statement in dicta from
Scarborough in which we provided a list of the types of
events that would support a ruling that a party’s prejudice
alone should result in a dismissal. In that portion of the
opinion, we said:
If there has been true prejudice to
a party by its adversary’s failure
to file a timely or adequate
pleading, discovery response, or
pretrial statement, that factor
would bear substantial weight in
support of a dismissal or default
judgment. Examples of such
prejudice are the irretrievable loss
of evidence, the inevitable
dimming of witnesses' memories,
or the excessive and possibly
irremediable burdens or costs
imposed on the opposing party.
Scarborough, 747 F.2d at 876. We acknowledge that this list
is exemplary and not exhaustive. Yet, it points to the scenario
that we view as typical in a dismissal: the non-responsible
party’s case is severely impaired because it lacked the
information that was not produced. Although UPS had every
right to receive the original Farber notes, there is nothing in
the record to even suggest that it asked for them in discovery,
or that its case was crippled because it lacked them.
Moreover, UPS itself suggested early in the deliberations, that
33
sanctions short of mistrial (and therefore short of dismissal)
were sufficient to address its prejudice. We conclude from all
of this that UPS’s prejudice is not sufficiently weighty to
support the District Court’s sanction of dismissal with
prejudice.
Moreover, since all sanctions originate from the realm
of equity, we note that UPS’s representations to the District
Court, and this Court, were less than candid. It is fair to say
that UPS expended no small effort in obfuscating to the
District Court and this Court the details of its requests for the
originals. We acknowledge that it was the District Court’s
responsibility to plumb the record to learn that UPS did not,
as it repeatedly asserted, hound Bull for the originals. Yet,
UPS’s counsel crossed a line between effective advocacy and
its duty as an officer of the court to accurately present the
record, and in so doing it encouraged the District Court’s
misunderstanding of the record. 15
15
Based upon the following statement at sidebar during trial,
the District Court plainly was unaware of the fact that UPS
never asked Bull directly for the notes, and that there is no
evidence that she was aware of any such request made to
anyone else; yet, UPS never made any effort to correct the
misunderstanding. “So all they did was in my view what
would be a reasonable request. We find out she wouldn’t
give those [Farber notes] to UPS, she wouldn’t give them to
the people that are the union leaders that are supposed to be
assisting her. Then all discussions stop, a lawsuit starts, and
then all of a sudden, after three years of discovery, in the third
day of trial, we find out that these may exist but nobody ever
looked for them. Now come on. . . .This is egregious.” ECF
No. 56-4, 49:7-17.
34
We conclude that, apart from the merits of the appeal,
without the benefit of clean hands here, UPS should not be
the beneficiary of a sanction that we are, under most
circumstances, already loathe to affirm.
IV.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the District
Court abused its discretion in ordering that Bull be sanctioned
by dismissing her case with prejudice. Therefore, we will
reverse the order of the District Court and remand the cause
for a re-trial.
35