DLD-075 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-3873
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COREY BRACEY,
Appellant,
v.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
SUPERINTENDENT HARLOW; DEPUTY HALL; DEPUTY
BRYANT; MAJOR GILLMORE; MAJOR SUTTER;
CAPTAIN WHITE, CAPTAIN FRONZ; CAPTAIN
MORROW; LIEUTENANT CALDWELL; LIEUTENANT
VINCENT; LIEUTENANT DEAL; SERGEANT
WOLFE; CORRECTION OFFICER STAFFORD; MAXINE
OVERTON; DR. ROMAN; MENTAL HEALTH
MANAGEMENT; WILLIAM WOODS; JOE BROWNLEE;
E. BROWNLEE, GR-9693; OFFICER HARMON;
LIEUTENANT IRWIN; SERGEANT RUFF
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 11-cv-00004)
District Judge: Sean J. McLaughlin
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Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 22, 2011
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed January 4, 2012)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Appellant Corey Bracey, then an inmate in the Restricted Housing Unit at the
State Correctional Institution at Albion (“SCI-Albion”), filed a civil rights complaint, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania against numerous SCI-Albion correctional officers and certain of its health
care staff. Bracey alleged violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights in that the correctional officer defendants failed to protect him from a vicious
attack by another inmate, and the prison health care defendants denied him proper
psychiatric care.
Shortly after filing suit, Bracey filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, Fed. R.
Civ. Pro. 65, and brief in support, in which he asserted that he suffers from depression
and psychosis, and needed more humane housing conditions and better psychiatric care.
Bracey demanded an order transferring him to another correctional facility that would be
more therapeutic. The defendants responded that Bracey’s motion for injunctive relief
was moot because he had recently been transferred to the State Correctional Institution at
Smithfield in Huntington, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Smithfield”), and was no longer
incarcerated at SCI-Albion. Therefore, there was no way to fashion any meaningful
remedy against the individual defendants. Even if the motion was not moot, it was
frivolous because his prison medical records established that Bracey received regular
psychiatric care and medications. Defendant Dr. Roman, a psychiatrist, saw Bracey on
numerous occasions, and SCI-Albion psychological or psychiatric staff treated Bracey 31
times from August 4, 2010 through May 13, 2011, prior to his transfer to SCI-Smithfield.
The only time that Bracey did not receive his medications was when he was
uncooperative with staff.
Thereafter, the Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation,
recommending that Bracey’s motion for a preliminary injunction be denied as moot, see
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Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206 (3d Cir. 1993) (inmate’s transfer to another
institution moots his claim for declaratory or injunctive relief). Bracey filed Objections,
in which he argued that his transfer did not moot his demand for proper psychiatric care.
In an order entered on September 16, 2011, the District Court denied the motion for
injunctive relief, and adopted the Report and Recommendation as the Opinion of the
Court. The court agreed that the motion was moot, reasoning that an injunction directing
the individual defendants to do, or refrain from doing, something would be meaningless
now that Bracey is at SCI-Smithfield. The Department of Corrections itself was shielded
from suit by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Bracey appeals. Our Clerk granted him leave to appeal in forma pauperis and
advised him that the appeal was subject to summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) or summary affirmance under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Interlocutory orders granting or denying
injunctions are appealable where the order relates to the relief ultimately sought by the
claimant. Hershey Foods Corp. v. Hershey Creamery Co., 945 F.2d 1272, 1277-78 (3d
Cir. 1991). The standard of review over the District Court’s mootness determination is
plenary. United States v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 363 F.3d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 2004).
We will dismiss the appeal as frivolous. An appellant may prosecute his appeal
without prepayment of the fees, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), but the in forma pauperis statute
provides that the Court shall dismiss the appeal at any time if the Court determines that it
is frivolous, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). An appeal is frivolous when it lacks an
arguable basis either in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
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Bracey’s Rule 65 motion for injunctive relief is moot for the reasons given by the District
Court, and the issue is not arguable.
The federal courts may adjudicate “only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.”
Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Lewis v. Continental
Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). This “case or controversy” requirement requires
that a party have a personal stake in the outcome through all stages, trial and appellate, of
the proceedings. See id. The Supreme Court has stated that “a present, live controversy .
. . must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.” Hall
v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48, 90 (1969). That personal stake and present, live controversy is
now absent from Bracey’s case. He asked for an injunction that restrains SCI-Albion
officials from violating his civil rights, but he has now been transferred out from under
their control. The District Court was unable to fashion any form of meaningful relief
against these defendants, and thus the motion for injunctive relief was moot. See Artway
v. Att’y Gen. of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1246 (3d Cir. 1996). The court also correctly
held that Bracey’s claim for injunctive relief against the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct and
Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993); Cory v. White, 457 U.S.
85, 91 (1982).
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal as frivolous pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)
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