United States v. Havelock

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 08-10472
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
v.  2:08-cr-00116-
KURT WILLIAM HAVELOCK, ROS-1
Defendant-Appellant.
 OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Roslyn O. Silver, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
June 21, 2011—Pasadena, California

Filed January 6, 2012

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Mary M. Schroeder,
Betty B. Fletcher, Stephen Reinhardt,
Kim McLane Wardlaw, Raymond C. Fisher,
Marsha S. Berzon, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,
Consuelo M. Callahan, Sandra S. Ikuta, and N. Randy Smith,
Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge B. Fletcher;
Concurrence by Judge N.R. Smith;
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Reinhardt;
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Wardlaw;
Dissent by Judge Fisher

29
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 33

COUNSEL

Daniel L. Kaplan, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Phoe-
nix, Arizona, for the appellant.

Michael Thomas Morrissey, Assistant United States Attorney,
Phoenix, Arizona, for the appellee.

OPINION

FLETCHER, B., delivered the opinion of the court, which is
joined in full by Chief Judge KOZINSKI, Judge BERZON,
Judge CALLAHAN, and Judge IKUTA. Parts I, II.A. and
II.C. are joined by Judge SCHROEDER and Judge
REINHARDT. Parts I, IIA. and II.B. are joined by Judge
WARDLAW. Parts I and II.B. are joined by Judge
FISHER and Judge N. R. SMITH. Chief Judge KOZINSKI
and Judges SCHROEDER, B. FLETCHER, REINHARDT,
WARDLAW, BERZON, CALLAHAN, IKUTA, and N. R.
SMITH join in the result:

“In matters of statutory construction . . . it makes a great
deal of difference whether you start with an answer or with
a problem.” Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Read-
ing of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 529 (1947). We start
with the problem presented by this case: the meaning of “per-
son” and of “addressed to” in 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) (“§ 876(c)”),
which prohibits the mailing of communications “addressed to
any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any per-
34 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
son or any threat to injure the person of the addressee or of
another.” The answer, we hold, is that § 876(c) refers exclu-
sively to an individual, or to a natural, person. Therefore, the
statute requires that the threatening communications be
addressed to a natural person. We also hold that in order to
identify the addressee, a court is not limited to the directions
for delivery on the outside of the envelope or on the packag-
ing, but also may look to the content of the communication.
Because appellant Kurt William Havelock’s (“Havelock”)
communications were not addressed to natural persons, we
reverse his six convictions of mailing threatening communica-
tions in violation of § 876(c).

I

A

Five days before Super Bowl XLII,1 Havelock traveled to
the Scottsdale Gun Club and purchased an AR-15 assault
rifle, five extra magazines, and ammunition to spare. Evening
found Havelock seated at his home computer, studying a map
of the parking lots surrounding the University of Phoenix Sta-
dium in Glendale, Arizona, site of the upcoming game.

On “Super Bowl Sunday,” approximately half an hour
before the opening kickoff, Havelock loaded his newly-
purchased assault rifle and several clips of ammunition into
his car and drove to a post office near the stadium. There, he
deposited six Priority Mail envelopes, two greeting cards, and
three “goodbye” letters into a mailbox. In one of the letters,
to his former employer, Havelock foresaw: “By the time this
letter reaches you, I will probably be deceased or no longer
able to sign any further needed paperwork.”

Four of the Priority Mail envelopes were addressed to
media outlets, specifically, the New York Times, the Los
1
Super Bowl XLII took place on February 3, 2008.
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 35
Angeles Times, the Phoenix New Times, and the Associated
Press. The remaining two envelopes were addressed to two
music-related websites, theshizz.org and azpunk.com. Each
envelope contained a “media packet,” as Havelock called it,
consisting of a six-page “econo-political” manifesto entitled
“Karma Leveller: Bad Thoughts on a Beautiful Day” (the
“Manifesto”); a brief account of a recent incident involving
faux pipe bombs that Havelock discarded; an apologetic letter
addressed to the police, directing them to his car, “which
[would be] parked in Glendale somewhere around the stadi-
um,” and asking them to “not take [out their] hatred for [him]
on [his] dogs,” and at the end of which Havelock handwrote
“DO NOT RESUSCITATE,” and another letter comprised of
self-described “random blatherings” that was addressed to
theshizz.org and azpunk.com, and which described Have-
lock’s tribulations as the owner of a nightclub in the City of
Tempe.

Havelock’s Manifesto was, in equal parts, a fractured medi-
tation on the purported evils of American society and a past-
tense account of the experiences, beliefs, and convictions that
set off his anticipated “econopolitical confrontation.” Punctu-
ating the Manifesto were references to the Founding Fathers
(Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson), cultural icons (John
Rambo, Mad Max, Bugs Bunny), musical groups (Pink Floyd,
AC/DC, Bad Religion), video games (Donkey Kong, Grand
Theft Auto, State of Emergency), literature (Alice in Wonder-
land, The Catcher in the Rye), and motion pictures (Road
Warrior, Hostel, The Astronaut Farmer). Quotations
abounded as well, drawn from such diverse sources as the
Hebrew Bible, H.P. Lovecraft, and Pastor Martin Niemöller.

Havelock’s Manifesto shifted among the past, present, and
future tenses at seemingly random junctures. Thus, there were
retrospective remarks, such as “Music did not make me kill,”
and “I could have used pipe bombs . . . .” The Manifesto also
included prospective remarks:
36 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
But you have attacked my family. You have
destroyed the futures of my children. So now, I will
reciprocate in kind. Only mine will not be the slow
crush of a life of a wage slave, or of malnutritioned
[sic] sicknesses, or of insurmountable debt. It will be
swift, and bloody. I will sacrifice your children upon
the altar of your excess . . . .

. . . So I will make the ultimate sacrifice; I will
give my life. And I will take as many of the baneful
and ruinous ones with me.

...

I will slay your children. I will shed the blood of
the innocent.

Although there were several indirect references to Super Bowl
XLII, the sole mention of the event by name comes when
Havelock muses, “Perhaps tshirthell.com or rottencotton.com
will print up some cool tshirts [sic] like ‘I SURVIVED
SUPERBOWL XLII.’ ”

After leaving the post office, Havelock drove to a parking
lot near the stadium “to wait for an opportunity to shoot peo-
ple.” He expected, in the process, to “commit suicide by
cops.” Minutes after arriving, however, Havelock experienced
“a change of heart.” Hysterical, he telephoned his fiancee and
confessed to having “had bad thoughts.” When they met soon
thereafter, Havelock again explained “that he had [had] bad
thoughts and he [had] threatened a lot of people in the letters.”
Havelock also told his parents that he had “done something
terribly, terribly wrong,” and that “[he] sent threatening let-
ters.”

Havelock needed no persuasion to go to the City of Tempe
police station. There, he tendered the rifle and provided the
Tempe police with copies of the materials in the media pack-
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 37
ets. The Tempe police notified the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (“FBI”). About an hour later, agents of the FBI and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms conducted a
recorded interview with Havelock and took him into custody.

B

A federal grand jury indicted Havelock for six counts of
mailing threatening communications in violation of § 876(c),
corresponding to the four media outlets and the two websites
to which Havelock mailed his Manifesto.2 The threat, as
alleged in each of the six counts, consisted of “a threat to
injure the person of another, specifically children and persons
in the vicinity of the Super Bowl XLII event in Arizona.”

Havelock moved to dismiss the indictment. As relevant
here, he argued that the phrase “any other person” in § 876(c)
refers exclusively to natural persons and, because the media
packets were addressed to corporations, the indictment failed
to allege facts sufficient to constitute an offense. Havelock
also argued that the media packets were devoid of a “threat
to injure” because the communications did not threaten to
injure immediately or in the future, but instead contained a
“post-mortem confession or explanation of his actions, which
never came to fruition.”

The district court denied the motion to dismiss. It agreed
that “any other person” referred exclusively to natural per-
sons, but held that the jury could scrutinize the envelopes, sal-
utation, and general contents of the media packets to
determine whether they were addressed to natural persons.
United States v. Havelock, 560 F. Supp. 2d 828, 830-31 (D.
Ariz. 2008). The court further ruled that the question of
whether the media packets contained true threats was a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. Id. at 834.
2
The indictment also included two counts of receiving a firearm with
intent to commit murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(b), which the dis-
trict court dismissed for lack of evidentiary support.
38 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
Havelock was tried before a jury. At the close of the evi-
dence, Havelock moved for a judgment of acquittal, wherein
he incorporated his motion to dismiss the indictment. The dis-
trict court denied the motion.

The jury convicted Havelock on all six counts of mailing
threatening communications in violation of § 876(c). The dis-
trict court sentenced Havelock to a 366-day term of imprison-
ment followed by a 36-month term of supervised release.

Havelock appealed. He argued that the district court erred
in interpreting § 876(c) to allow a trier of fact to consult the
content of a mailed communication to determine whether it
was addressed to a natural person. He further argued that his
Manifesto qualified as political speech and did not constitute
a “true threat,” and therefore was entitled to First Amendment
protection. Lastly, Havelock argued that there was insufficient
evidence that he mailed the Manifesto with the specific intent
to threaten any person.

A panel of this court reversed. United States v. Havelock,
619 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2010). One judge dissented. Id. at
1098-1101. The panel majority held that § 876(c) requires that
the mailed item containing the threatening communications be
addressed to a natural person, as reflected in the address on
the mailed item. Id. at 1092. The panel majority declined to
reach Havelock’s remaining arguments. Id. at 1098. We
granted en banc review.

II

We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo.
Phoenix Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius, 622 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th
Cir. 2010). Statutory interpretation focuses on “the language
itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and
the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). Section 876, mailing
threatening communications, is currently part of Chapter 41
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 39
of Title 18 U.S.C., Extortion and Threats. Section (c), at issue
here, makes it a felony to mail a communication “addressed
to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any
person or any threat to injure the person of the addressee or
of another.” § 876(c).

“Statutory construction must begin with the language
employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary
meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative
purpose.” Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469
U.S. 189, 194 (1985). That assumption, however, does not
apply where Congress provides a statutory definition. See
United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that in the absence of a statutory definition, a
term should be accorded its ordinary meaning).

A

[1] In the Dictionary Act, Congress provided definitions
for a number of common statutory terms that courts are to
apply “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,
unless the context indicates otherwise.” 1 U.S.C. § 1. The
Dictionary Act defines the term “person” to include “corpora-
tions, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies,
and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.” Id.
Although the Dictionary Act was enacted in 1947,3 its broad
definition of “person” is consistent with the one in the Dictio-
nary Act of 1871, which was in effect when Congress first
enacted the predecessor to § 876, 18 U.S.C. § 338a, in 1932:
“the word ‘person’ may extend and be applied to bodies poli-
tic and corporate . . . unless the context shows that such words
were intended to be used in a more limited sense.” Act of Feb.
25, 1871, Ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.
3
As originally enacted, the Dictionary Act provided that “ ‘person’ may
extend and be applied to partnerships and corporations, . . . unless the con-
text shows that such words were intended to be used in a more limited
sense.” Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-722, 61 Stat. 633.
40 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
[2] The Supreme Court has interpreted the contextual pro-
viso of the Dictionary Act in Rowland v. California Men’s
Colony, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). There, the Court applied the
definition of “person” to the in forma pauperis statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1915, and held that the context of that statute indi-
cated that its use of “person” referred only to individuals, not
to artificial entities. Rowland, 506 U.S. at 201-11.

The Court stated that “context” in 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“unless the
context indicates otherwise”), means

the text of the Act of Congress surrounding the word
at issue, or the texts of other related congressional
Acts, and this is simply an instance of the word’s
ordinary meaning: ‘[t]he part or parts of a discourse
preceding or following a ‘text’ or passage or a word,
or so intimately associated with it as to throw light
upon its meaning.

Id. at 199 (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary
576 (2d ed. 1942)). “Context” does not extend to legislative
history: “If Congress had meant to point . . . to legislative his-
tory . . . it would have been natural to use a more spacious
phrase, like ‘evidence of congressional intent,’ in place of
‘context.’ ” Id. at 200. In determining what a statute’s context
“indicates,” the Court stated that the scope of “indicates” is
broad. Id. The term “bespeaks something more than an
express contrary definition,” in which case ordinary rules of
statutory construction would require that courts apply the spe-
cific definition over the general one. Id. “Indicates” also “im-
poses less of a burden than . . . ‘requires’ or ‘necessitates’ ”;
thus, a court need not conclude that the Dictionary Act’s
meaning would produce an absurd result. Id. at 200-01. The
Court noted that this rule has been applied throughout the his-
tory of 1 U.S.C. § 1 and its predecessors. Id. at 200 n.3.

The Court held that four contextual features indicated that
the word “person” as used in the in forma pauperis statute
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 41
referred only to individuals. Id. at 201. First, the statute
assumed litigants could appear pro se, which indicated that
Congress must have been thinking only in terms of natural
persons. Id. at 203. Second, the statute required an affidavit
supporting the person’s “allegation of poverty,” but artificial
entities do not suffer poverty. Id. Third, it required the person
to make an affidavit, which artificial entities cannot make
because they cannot take oaths. Id. at 204. Finally, the statute
provided no resolution of the question how to apply the stat-
ute’s “inability to pay” standard to corporations, and “con-
gressional silence on the subject indicates that Congress
simply was not thinking in terms of granting in forma
pauperis status to artificial entities.” Id. at 207.

[3] We now proceed to apply the Rowland framework to
“person” as used in § 876(c), keeping in mind that “context,”
as that term is used in the Dictionary Act, is “simply an
instance of the word’s ordinary meaning.” Rowland, 506 U.S.
at 199.4

[4] The term “person” is used no less than twelve times in
§ 876. See 18 U.S.C. § 876. The term is used in various asso-
ciations, including: “release of any kidnapped person,” “any
4
The two other courts of appeal that discussed the meaning of “person”
did not apply the Rowland framework and did not categorically decide
whether “person” in § 876(c) is limited to natural persons. See United
States v. Rendelman, 641 F.3d 36, 46 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that a letter
addressed to the Marshals Service “can reasonably be understood as
addressed to the United States Marshal himself—a natural person,” but
that “the person or entity to whom the threatening communication is
addressed is not an essential element of a § 876(c) offense” and the phrase
“addressed to any other person” “simply means that an accused does not
violate that provision by mailing a threatening letter addressed to him-
self”); United States v. Williams, 376 F.3d 1048, 1053-54 (10th Cir. 2004)
(noting that its “holding that a communication addressed to a government
official . . . falls within the ambit of the conduct proscribed by § 876” was
“consistent” with two district court decisions and one unpublished Ninth
Circuit decision that held that the communication must be addressed to a
natural person).
42 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person
of the addressee or of another,” “the reputation of a deceased
person, or any threat to accuse the addressee or any other per-
son of a crime.” See id. These associations clearly require that
“person” mean a natural person. It simply makes no sense to
threaten to kidnap a corporation, or injure “the person” of a
corporation, or talk about a deceased corporation.

[5] “Person” is also used in the expression “addressed to
any other person.” See, e.g., § 876(c) (prohibiting the mailing
of “any communication with or without a name or designating
mark subscribed thereto, addressed to any other person and
containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to
injure the person of the addressee or of another”). “Since
there is a presumption that a given term is used to mean the
same thing throughout a statute, [the] presumption [is] surely
at its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a given
sentence.” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994). This
common-sense and long-recognized presumption of unifor-
mity counsels that “person” means a natural person in “ad-
dressed to any other person,” as well. See Brown, 513 U.S. at
118.

We are, of course, cognizant that the presumption of uni-
formity gives way when “there is strong evidence that Con-
gress did not intend the language to be used uniformly.” Smith
v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 261 (2005)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Not only is such evi-
dence missing here, but the statutory language compels our
reading. Section 876(c) not only requires that the mail be “ad-
dressed to any other person,” but that the offending communi-
cation contain “a threat to injure the person of the addressee
or of another.” § 876(c) (emphasis added). Although the stat-
ute does not require that the addressee and the person whom
the threat concerns be one and the same, it clearly envisions
that the addressee be a “person” that can be injured.
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 43
The clear statutory language disposes of the argument that
“person” in “addressed to any other person” should be given
the broadest meaning possible (and thus extend to non-natural
persons) in order to avoid creating absurd results. First, we
note that neither party advocated this position.5 Second, limit-
ing the statute to natural persons does not render the word
“any” superfluous. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174
(2001) (“It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every
clause and word of a statute.”). “Any” does not qualify “per-
son” on its own, but in conjunction with “other”: “addressed
to any other person.” The meaning of this expression is clear
—the communication must be addressed to any person other
than the sender. United States v. Rendelman, 641 F.3d 36, 46
(4th Cir. 2011). Third, it is true that limiting “person” to natu-
ral persons would insulate from criminal liability under
§ 876(c) the mailing of an offending communication
addressed to non-natural entities. But this is not an absurd
result. One of the purposes of § 876 is “the preservation of the
recipient’s sense of personal safety.” United States v. Aman,
31 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 1994). The recipient’s sense of per-
sonal safety is simply not implicated when the recipient is an
entity.

[6] Furthermore, we are not in the business of rewriting the
law, but that of interpreting Congress’s words when it enacted
the statute. “[T]he fact that Congress might have acted with
greater clarity or foresight does not give courts a carte blanche
to redraft statutes in an effort to achieve that which Congress
is perceived to have failed to do.” United States v. Locke, 471
U.S. 84, 95 (1985). This admonition takes on a particular
importance when the Court construes criminal laws. United
States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 69 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
5
By this, we do not mean to imply that we are bound by the parties’
statement of the law. See United States v. Ogles, 440 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th
Cir. 2006) (“We are not bound by a party’s concession as to the meaning
of the law, even if that party is the government and even in the context of
a criminal case.”).
44 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
concurring in judgment). “[B]ecause of the seriousness of
criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually
represents the moral condemnation of the community, legisla-
tures and not courts should define criminal activity.” United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971). The Congress’s def-
inition of the activity prohibited under § 876(c) compels the
conclusion that “person” refers exclusively to natural persons
throughout that subsection.

Textual cross-reference to related statutes confirms this
conclusion. Section 875, like § 876, is part of Chapter 41,
Extortions and Threats, and uses language comparable to
§ 876. See 18 U.S.C. § 875. Section 875 makes it a felony for
someone to transmit in interstate or foreign commerce certain
communications “with intent to extort from any person, firm,
association, or corporation.” Id. § 875 (c), (d). Thus, § 875
clearly envisions that “person” is limited to a natural person
and that the statute, by referring to “firm, association, or cor-
poration,” applies to both natural and non-natural persons.
Although the predecessors to §§ 875 and 876 were not
enacted as part of the same act, Congress explicitly referenced
§ 876’s predecessor, 18 U.S.C. § 338a (1932), when it
enacted § 875’s predecessor, 18 U.S.C. § 408d (1934). See
Act of May 18, 1934, Ch. 300, 48 Stat. 781 (“Provided fur-
ther. That nothing herein shall amend or repeal section 338a,
title 18, United States Code (47 Stat. 649).”) (emphasis in
original). This explicit reference to § 876’s predecessor is per-
suasive evidence that Congress’s use of “person, firm, associ-
ation, or corporation” in § 875 and its predecessor was not
accidental, but a deliberate decision to enlarge the reach of the
statute beyond that of § 876, which was limited to “person.”

[7] In sum, three contextual features indicate that the word
“person” as used in § 876(c) does not encompass the broad
definition in the Dictionary Act. See Rowland, 506 U.S. at
199-201. First, § 876 prohibits the mailing of communications
that contain threats to kidnap or injure “the person” of
another, both of which are harms that can only be inflicted on
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 45
natural persons. Second, the communication must be “ad-
dressed to any other person” and must contain a threat to
injure “the person of the addressee or of another,” which indi-
cates that the addressee must also be a natural person. Third,
the related § 875 employs the term “person” in the limited
sense of a natural person. See 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), (d) (prohib-
iting the transmission of threatening communications in inter-
state or foreign commerce, “with intent to extort from any
person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other
thing of value”). We therefore hold that the term “person,” as
used in § 876(c), is limited to natural persons.

B

Havelock argues that, as charged in the indictment, his
communications were not addressed to natural persons, but to
newspapers and websites.6 Havelock’s contention requires us
to decipher the meaning of the term “addressed to,” as used
in § 876(c), to determine whether we may look beyond the
outside of the envelope or the salutation line to the content of
the communication in order to identify the addressee.

“[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as
taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”
United States v. Gonzalez, 492 F.3d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir.
2007) (internal quotations omitted). “[T]he structure and pur-
pose of a statute may also provide guidance in determining
the plain meaning of its provisions.” Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d
6
Although the address on the face of the media packet addressed to
theshizz.org included the name of a natural person (Donald Martinez) in
addition to the website, the indictment did not name Martinez as the
addressee. Instead, the indictment charged Havelock with “knowingly
deposit[ing] in the United States mail, with intent to threaten, a communi-
cation, addressed to ‘THESHIZZ.ORG’ containing a threat to injure the
person of another.” The government has not argued that the package
mailed to theshizz.org was addressed to a natural individual by reason of
the inclusion of Martinez’s name in the address on the outside of the pack-
age. Any argument to that effect is therefore waived.
46 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
976, 980 (9th Cir. 2010). In order to determine the ordinary
meaning of a term, courts routinely rely on dictionary defini-
tions. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265,
1270 (2010) (relying on dictionary definition to determine the
ordinary meaning of the term “physical force”).

[8] Excluding those meanings that are obviously inapplica-
ble, see id., the verb “address” means “to write or otherwise
mark directions for delivery on” a letter, and “to speak, write,
or otherwise communicate directly to.” Webster’s Third Int’l
Dictionary 24 (1976). The legislative history of the statute
supports the former definition. As initially enacted, § 876’s
predecessor was designated as an offense against the postal
service. See Act of July 8, 1932, ch. 464, § 1, 47 Stat. 649; 18
U.S.C. § 338a (1932).7 This suggests that the term “address”
refers to the directions for delivery of a piece of mail. See,
e.g., United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual
§ 602.1.2 (“The delivery address specifies the location to
which the USPS is to deliver a mailpiece. [T]he piece must
have the address . . . only on the side of the piece bearing
postage.”). The language and structure of § 876, however,
favors a broader meaning.

Section 876(c) applies to “[w]hoever knowingly so deposits
or causes to be delivered, as aforesaid” certain forms of
threatening communications. § 876(c) (emphasis added). The
antecedents of “so” and “aforesaid” are found in subsection
(a), which describes the act of “knowingly deposit[ing] in any
post office or authorized depository for mail matter, to be sent
or delivered by the Postal Service or knowingly caus[ing] to
be delivered by the Postal Service according to the direction
thereon” certain forms of threatening communications. 18
U.S.C. § 876(a) (emphasis added). In light of the context—
namely, the depositing of mail matter—the phrase “the direc-
7
The offense was recodified as § 876 and became part of Title 18, Chap-
ter 41, Extortion and Threats, in 1948. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645,
62 Stat. 741.
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 47
tion thereon” clearly refers to the delivery directions super-
scribed on an envelope or other packaging.

[9] Under § 876(c), a defendant must not only “deposit[ ]
or cause to be delivered as aforesaid” a communication, but
also his communication must be “with or without a name or
designating mark subscribed thereto, addressed to any other
person and contain[ ] any threat to kidnap any person or any
threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another.”
§ 876(c). In view of the structure of this section and its impor-
tation of the mailing requirements in subsection (a), we con-
clude that subsection (c) addresses the requirements that the
communication must meet in order to fall under the purview
of § 876(c). In other words, while subsection (a) concerns the
instructions for mailing or delivery, which are necessarily on
the outside of the letter or of the package, subsection (c)—
including the “address to any other person” requirement—
concerns the communication inside the letter or package.

It is common sense that, where not otherwise specified, a
communication is presumed to be addressed to the person or
entity identified in the delivery instructions on the outside of
the envelope or the package. It is also common sense that, if
a communication is addressed to someone other than the per-
son or entity in the delivery instructions, the identity of the
addressee is often times specified in the salutation line. The
question is whether a court may look beyond these places, to
the content of the communication, to identify the addressee.

[10] The two courts of appeals that have addressed the
issue have found it proper. In United States v. Williams, 376
F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2004), the Tenth Circuit held that a trier
of fact can consider, “at a minimum, both the envelope and
the salutation of a letter” in determining whether the letter is
“addressed to any other person” within the meaning of
§ 876(c). Id. at 1052. Thus, the court ruled, a reasonable jury
could find that the letters in question—the envelopes for
which were addressed to government offices, such as “United
48 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
States Attorney’s Office,” and the salutations of which
included official titles, such as “Hey, U.S. Attorney”—were
addressed to a natural person. Id. at 1051, 1053-54. The court
reasoned:

The definition of “address” includes “to speak, write,
or otherwise communicate directly to.” The defini-
tion of “address” does not exclude the salutation of
a letter. . . . Section 876 proscribes the mailing of a
threatening communication which is “addressed to
any other person.” The word “communication”
includes the contents of a letter. Thus, at a minimum,
the envelope and the salutation of a letter can both
be considered in determining whether a communica-
tion is “addressed to any other person” within the
meaning of § 876.

Id. at 1052-53 (citations omitted) (emphasis on “communica-
tion” in original; emphasis on “includes the contents of a let-
ter” added).

In Rendelman, a Fourth Circuit case, the defendant was
charged, among other counts, with mailing a letter addressed
to “U.S. Marshall’s [sic] Service, Federal Building, 501 I
Street, Sacramento, CA” and containing a threat to injure “of-
ficers and employees of the United States engaged in the per-
formance of official duties and covered by [18 U.S.C.
§ 1114,] as follows: ‘the President and the White House
employees.’ ” Rendelman, 641 F.3d at 40. This latter allega-
tion, if proved, resulted in a higher sentence under the
enhancement provision of § 876(c): “If such a communication
is addressed to a United States judge, a Federal law enforce-
ment officer, or an official who is covered by section 1114,
the individual shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not
more than 10 years, or both.” § 876(c).

Rendelman argued that his letter was addressed to the Mar-
shals Service, not the President, therefore the indictment was
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 49
defective as it concerned the enhancement element. Rendel-
man, 641 F.3d at 46-47. The Fourth Circuit held that the
“threat contained in the . . . [l]etter was sufficiently alleged as
being ‘addressed to’, i.e., ‘directed to,’ the President and
White House employees, even though the letter was not
mailed to them.” Id. at 47.

Rendelman also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jury’s verdict on the enhancement element. Id.
at 48. The court held the issue “turns on the meaning of
‘addressed to,’ as it is used in the Enhancement Element.” Id.
After noting the conflict between the panel majority’s opinion
in this case and the Williams opinion, the Fourth Circuit
agreed with Williams:

At its essence, § 876(c) criminalizes the use of the
postal system to deliver a threatening communica-
tion. Indeed, that subsection deals with threatening
communications and not just the envelopes contain-
ing them. Hence, a threatening communication
includes more than the envelope—it includes the
contents thereof.

Id. The court then noted that § 876(c) uses the term “ad-
dressed to” twice, once in the first sentence (at issue here) and
then again in the enhancement provision:

In the Mailing Element of Count Seven, the term
“addressed to” referred to the Marshals Service in
California, as reflected on the envelope. . . . On the
other hand, the Enhancement Element alleged that
the communication contained a “threat to injure” the
President and White House employees. In evaluating
the evidence, the jury was entitled to find—as it did
—that the envelope was “addressed to” the Marshals
Service, but that the “threat to injure” was “ad-
dressed to” the President and others.
50 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
Id. at 48-49.

[11] Fundamental to both the Williams and Rendelman
opinions is the common-sense argument that § 876(c) prohib-
its the mailing of threatening communications, and that a
communication is not limited to the envelope or the packag-
ing, but includes its contents. Therefore, a court may consult
the contents of a communication to determine to whom it is
addressed.8 We agree and note that the structure of § 876(c)
supports this interpretation. As stated above, to fall under the
purview of § 876(c), a communication must meet three
requirements. The first requirement, “with or without a name
or designating mark subscribed thereto,” addresses a specific
component of a communication, the signature. By contrast,
the second and third requirements, “addressed to any other
person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any
threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another,”
appear to refer to the whole of the communication.9
8
While we are persuaded by Rendelman’s analysis that a communica-
tion in § 876(c) includes more than the envelope and packaging, we take
no position on its specific holding that the letter was “addressed” to the
President simply because it contained a threat to the President.
9
After a thorough review of the legislative history of § 876(c), we can
find no evidence that our interpretation of the statute is inconsistent with
the “clearly expressed legislative intention.” Consumer Product Safety
Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). Congress
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 338a, the predecessor statute to § 876(c), as a com-
panion to the Lindbergh Law, which was, itself, intended to “permit [fed-
eral] officers to disregard state boundaries in the pursuit of kidnapers” and,
together with § 338a, to “supply missing defenses against kidnaping.”
Horace Bomar, Jr, The Lindbergh Law, 1 Law & Contemp. Probs. 435,
435, 444 (1934); see S. Rep. No. 72-498, 1 (1932) (stating that H.R. 96,
the bill that became § 338a, was “introduced . . . to curb the growing prac-
tice of using the mails for sending to intended victims demands for money
and dire threats of confinement or death”). Nothing in the history speaks
to the issue before us, but it is clear that the concerns motivating enact-
ment of § 338a exist not only when the natural person addressee is explic-
itly specified on the envelope, but also when the person’s identity is
revealed by the contents of the communication.
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 51
[12] We hold that in order to determine whom a threaten-
ing communication is “addressed to,” a court may consult the
directions on the outside of the envelope or the packaging, the
salutation line, if any, and the contents of the communication.

C

[13] Here, as charged in the indictment, Havelock’s mail-
ings were all addressed to newspapers and websites. The
Manifesto, the only writing that the government alleges con-
tained threats, has no salutation line. Even looking to the con-
tents of the Manifesto, it indicates nothing at all about the
identity of any individual “person” to whom the communica-
tion supposedly was addressed. A few of Havelock’s state-
ments appeared to be addressed to whoever happened to read
them: e.g., “I will slay your children.” It is impossible to
determine (and is highly unlikely) that Havelock, in the
quoted phrase, was addressing any particular person whose
children he was going to slay.10 On this record, we conclude
that a reasonable jury could not have found that Havelock’s
writings were addressed to a natural person, as § 876(c)
requires.

III

[14] The term “person” as used in § 876(c) refers exclu-
sively to natural persons. To determine whether a threatening
communication is “addressed to any other person,” § 876(c),
a court may consult the directions on the outside of the enve-
lope, the salutation line, and the contents of the communica-
tion. Havelock’s writings were not addressed to natural
persons. Accordingly, we reverse Havelock’s convictions and
10
Of course, a threat to kill any children qualifies as a threat made to
the person “of another” than the addressee. § 876(c). But that threat alone
is not enough to satisfy the requirement that the communication be
addressed to “any other person” than the sender. Id.
52 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
remand to the district court for the entry of a judgment of acquit-
tal.11

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR THE ENTRY
OF A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL.

N. R. SMITH, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result:

I agree with the majority’s conclusion, but not with its anal-
ysis. The majority reads 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) too narrowly
when it concludes that § 876(c) refers exclusively to mailing
threatening communications to natural persons. Section
876(c) also prohibits mailing threatening communications to
corporations and other entities. I, therefore, do not join the
majority’s analysis of the meaning of the term “person” in
§ 876(c). However, Havelock’s convictions should be
reversed, because the government did not present any evi-
dence that Havelock had a specific intent to threaten when he
mailed the “media packets.”

I

In this case, we are called upon to interpret 18 U.S.C.
§ 876(c). “In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the
court must look to the particular statutory language at issue,
as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.”
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988).
Thus, to determine the meaning of “person” in § 876(c), we
must examine both § 876(c) and the language and design of
§ 876 as a whole. 18 U.S.C. § 876 states:
11
Because we conclude that Havelock’s writings were not addressed to
natural persons, we need not reach Havelock’s contention that his writings
were political speech protected by the First Amendment and not “true
threats” “to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual
or group of individuals.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); see
also United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011).
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 53
(a) Whoever knowingly deposits in any post office
or authorized depository for mail matter, to be sent
or delivered by the Postal Service or knowingly
causes to be delivered by the Postal Service accord-
ing to the direction thereon, any communication,
with or without a name or designating mark sub-
scribed thereto, addressed to any other person, and
containing any demand or request for ransom or
reward for the release of any kidnapped person, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both.

(b) Whoever, with intent to extort from any person
any money or other thing of value, so deposits, or
causes to be delivered, as aforesaid, any communica-
tion containing any threat to kidnap any person or
any threat to injure the person of the addressee or of
another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than twenty years, or both.

(c) Whoever knowingly so deposits or causes to be
delivered as aforesaid, any communication with or
without a name or designating mark subscribed
thereto, addressed to any other person and containing
any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to
injury the person of the addressee or of another, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both. If such a communication is
addressed to a United States judge, a Federal law
enforcement officer, or an official who is covered by
section 1114, the individual shall be fined under this
title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

(d) Whoever, with intent to extort from any person
any money or other thing of value, knowingly so
deposits or causes to be delivered, as aforesaid, any
communication, with or without a name or designat-
ing mark subscribed thereto, addressed to any other
54 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
person and containing any threat to injure the prop-
erty or reputation of the addressee or of another, or
the reputation of a deceased person, or any threat to
accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both. If such a communication is
addressed to a United States judge, a Federal law
enforcement officer, or an official who is covered by
section 1114, the individual shall be fined under this
title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

A

“Statutory interpretation must begin with the language
employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary
meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative
purpose.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009)
(internal quotations omitted). However, “[o]nly in the absence
of a statutory definition does this court normally look to the
ordinary meaning or dictionary definition of a term.” United
States v. Lettiere, 640 F.3d 1271, 1274 (9th Cir. 2011).

In this statute, the term “person” has a statutory definition
provided by the Dictionary Act. The Dictionary Act defines
“person” to include “corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as
well as individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1. This definition of “person”
applies when determining the meaning of a statute “unless the
context indicates otherwise.” Id. “Context” is “the text of the
Act of Congress surrounding the word at issue, or the texts of
other related congressional Acts.” Rowland v. Cal. Men’s
Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199 (1993). Thus, the Dictionary Act
definition of “person” applies every time the term is used in
a statute, unless the context indicates otherwise.

B

While there is a “presumption that a given term is used to
mean the same thing throughout a statute,” Brown v. Gardner,
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 55
513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994), “this presumption is not absolute.”
Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2506 (2010).

[T]he presumption is not rigid and readily yields
whenever there is such variation in the connection in
which the words are used as reasonably to warrant
the conclusion that they were employed in different
parts of the act with different intent. Where the
subject-matter to which the words refer is not the
same in the several places where they are used, or
the conditions are different, or the scope of the legis-
lative power exercised in one case is broader than
that exercised in another, the meaning well may vary
to meet the purposes of the law, to be arrived at by
a consideration of the language in which those pur-
poses are expressed, and of the circumstances under
which the language was employed.

Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932).
Put differently, the presumption of uniformity “relents when
a word used has several commonly understood meanings
among which a speaker can alternate in the course of an ordi-
nary conversation, without being confused or getting confus-
ing.” Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581,
595-96 (2004). “Statutory language must be read in context
[because] a phrase gathers meaning from the words around
it.” Id. at 596 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
“[i]dentical words appearing more than once in the same act,
and even in the same section, may be construed differently if
it appears they were used in different places with different
intent.” Vanscoter v. Sullivan, 920 F.2d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir.
1990) (citing Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, 286 U.S. at 433).

C

Section 876(c) begins with the clause: “Whoever know-
ingly so deposits or causes to be delivered as aforesaid . . . .”
The phrase “knowingly so deposits or causes to be delivered
56 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
as aforesaid” refers to the opening clauses in § 876(a): “Who-
ever knowingly deposits in any post office or authorized
depository for mail matter, to be sent or delivered by the
Postal Service or knowingly causes to be delivered by the
Postal Service according to the direction thereon . . . .”
Because § 876(c) refers to § 876(a), the principles of statutory
construction require us to examine the use of “person” in
§ 876(a) in deciding how to interpret § 876 ). See K Mart
Corp., 486 U.S. at 291.

The first instance where “person” appears in § 876(a), the
phrase “addressed to any other person,” must be interpreted
by the statutory Dictionary Act definition of “person.” The
statutory Dictionary Act definition may also be used, because
the context does not indicate otherwise. One could address
communications to both natural persons and entities. Commu-
nications regarding demands or requests for ransom or
rewards could be addressed to entities such as corporations
just as easily as they could be addressed to natural persons.
See Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 905 (9th Cir. 2005) (discuss-
ing hypothetical scenario where businesses pay ransoms for
their kidnapped business executives). Therefore, the Dictio-
nary Act definition of “person” is proper in interpreting the
phrase “addressed to any other person.”

In contrast, the context indicates otherwise regarding the
second instance where “person” appears in § 876(a)—“release
of any kidnapped person.” The context indicates that the Dic-
tionary Act definition of “person” does not apply to that par-
ticular phrase, because an entity such as a corporation cannot
be kidnapped. Thus, the use of “person” in that phrase indi-
cates a natural person definition of the term.

Examining the other instances where “person” is used in
§ 876 reveals the same pattern: the statute uses the statutory
Dictionary Act definition unless the context of a particular
phrase indicates otherwise.
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 57
Other phrases that use the Dictionary Act definition of
“person” include “with intent to extort from any person,” 18
U.S.C. § 876(b) and (d), and “any threat to accuse the
addressee or any other person of a crime,” id. § 876(d). Those
phrases use the Dictionary Act definition, because their con-
text does not indicate otherwise. Corporations and other enti-
ties may be threatened with extortion or accused of crimes.
See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,
1322 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that defendant engaged in
scheme for the purpose of extorting money from a limited
partnership); Boise Dodge, Inc. v. United States, 406 F.2d
771, 772 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (mentioning the estab-
lished rule that a corporation, through the conduct of its
agents and employees, may be convicted of a crime).

The majority points out that a natural person definition of
“person” must necessarily be used in the phrases “any threat
to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of the
addressee or of another,” id. § 876(b), and “the reputation of
a deceased person, or any threat to accuse the addressee or
any other person of a crime,” id. § 876(d). Indeed, the context
of those particular phrases indicates they do not use the statu-
tory Dictionary Act definition of “person.” Corporations or
other entities cannot be injured in their person, and there is no
such thing as a deceased entity or corporation.

Because the context of some phrases in § 876 indicates they
do not use the Dictionary Act definition, the majority mis-
takenly suggests that those phrases “clearly require that ‘per-
son’ mean a natural person” throughout the statute. However,
the majority’s conclusion appears to rest on faulty statutory
interpretation. The context of each use of “person” in § 876
indicates that the statute instead alternates between two com-
monly understood meanings: the Dictionary Act definition
and a natural person definition. The particular phrases, that
use a natural person definition of “person,” share a context
that indicates they use that definition instead of the statutory
Dictionary Act definition. Those phrases gather a natural per-
58 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
son meaning from the words like “kidnap,” “injure the per-
son,” or “deceased” around the uses of “person” in those
phrases. Conversely, the other phrases using the term “per-
son” in § 876 do not share that context, and so the statutory
Dictionary Act definition is applicable.

This use of two different definitions of “person” in the
same statute, or even in the same sentence, is not confused or
confusing. See Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 595-96. The con-
text and the words around each use of “person” show which
definition applies to each use. A speaker in an ordinary con-
versation, for example, could alternate between the Dictionary
Act and natural person definitions in § 876(a), so that the pro-
vision would prohibit threatening communications, regarding
the kidnapping of natural persons, mailed to natural persons
and mailed to entities.

D

Given the statutory interpretation of § 876(a), we then use
it in interpreting § 876(c). The first instance where the term
“person” is used in § 876(c), the phrase “addressed to any
other person,” must be interpreted by the statutory Dictionary
Act definition of “person.” Like the context of the phrase “ad-
dressed to any other person” in § 876(a), the context of this
phrase also does not indicate that the phrase uses another defi-
nition of “person.” Thus, the phrase “addressed to any other
person” in § 876(c) should be interpreted in the same manner.
Without any context indicating otherwise, the statutory Dic-
tionary Act definition of “person” is applicable.

The next two instances where “person” is used in § 876(c),
the phrases “threat to kidnap any person” and “threat to injure
the person of the addressee or of another,” instead use a natu-
ral person definition. As seen above with similar phrases from
other parts of § 876, the context of these phrases indicates
they do not use the Dictionary Act definition of “person.” An
entity such as a corporation cannot be kidnapped or injured in
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 59
its person. While the latter two phrases use a natural person
definition, that does not imply that the phrase “addressed to
any other person” must also use a natural person definition.
The context and words around each use of “person” in
§ 876(c) indicate which definition applies to each use. Only
the latter two phrases in the clause necessarily require that
“person” mean a natural person, because those uses of “per-
son” gather meaning from the words “kidnap” and “injure”
around them.

In fact, the phrase “threat to injure the person of the
addressee or of another,” does not require that the “person”
receiving the communication be a natural person. According
to that phrase, the recipient of the threatening communication
does not need to be the target of the threat of injury. The com-
munication only need to threaten to injure the person of the
addressee or another. For example, a communication could be
addressed to a corporation and contain a threat to injure the
person of a natural person employed at that corporation. In
other words, it is the target of the threat who must be capable
of being injured, not the recipient of the communication.

In sum, § 876(c) prohibits mailing threatening communica-
tions to natural persons and to corporations and other entities.

II

The majority’s argument that § 876(c) refers only to natural
persons, because it should be read in concert with § 875, is
unavailing. I generally endorse some of Judge Fisher’s com-
ments on interpreting § 876 with § 875, with the following
additional comments.

While it is true that “context” includes “texts of other
related congressional Acts,” Rowland, 506 U.S. at 199, the
majority does not demonstrate that the enactment of § 875 is
in any way related to the enactment of § 876. Indeed, the
majority admits that the predecessors to §§ 875 and 876 were
60 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
not enacted as part of the same act. Also, while the context of
a statute does not extend to its legislative history, see id. at
200, the majority has pointed to no statutory history that oth-
erwise indicates § 875 is related to § 876.

Other Congressional acts may be related to a statute at issue
if they “help illuminate the meaning” of the statute. See
Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians v. NGV Gaming, Ltd., 531
F.3d 767, 778 (9th Cir. 2008). The majority, however, does
not establish that § 875 helps illuminate the meaning of § 876.

Without a stronger demonstration of why § 875 is related
to § 876, I am not convinced that § 875 helps to interpret the
meaning of § 876.

III

I would also renew Judge Graber’s argument that limiting
the meaning of “person” in § 876(c) to natural persons pro-
duces absurd results. “[I]nterpretations of a statute which
would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative
interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are
available.” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564,
575 (1982).

As Judge Graber highlighted in her dissent to the three-
judge panel’s decision, the purpose of § 876 is “to deter the
sending of death threats and threats of bodily injury.” United
States v. Havelock, 619 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (Gra-
ber, J., dissenting). When Congress first enacted § 876, it
“went to some trouble to define broadly the prohibited
communications—the original version of § 876 expressly
covered ‘any’ letter or other communication, written or
printed, with or without any sort of signature, sent by almost
any conceivable method of mailing, containing a threat
against either the addressee or another.” Id. at 1099. The cur-
rent version of § 876(c) contains similarly broad language: it
prohibits “any communication with or without a name or des-
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 61
ignating mark subscribed thereto, addressed to any other per-
son and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any
threat to injury the person of the addressee or of another.” 18
U.S.C. § 876(c) (emphases added). Thus, “[a]t its essence,
§ 876(c) criminalizes the use of the postal system to deliver
a threatening communication.” United States v. Rendelman,
641 F.3d 36, 48 (4th Cir. 2011).

The majority’s narrow interpretation of § 876(c) runs
counter to the broad legislative purpose of § 876, by insulat-
ing senders of death threats and threats of bodily injury from
liability so long as they carefully (or accidentally) address
their threatening communications to entities and not to natural
persons. See Havelock, 619 F.3d 1091 at 1099-1100 (Graber,
J., dissenting). The majority’s interpretation thus produces
absurd results through substantially frustrating the purpose of
§ 876(c). See id.; see also Rowland, 506 U.S. at 210 (discuss-
ing cases where the Supreme Court held that the Dictionary
Act definition of “person” applied to statutes, because a natu-
ral person definition would have “substantially frustrated” the
purposes of those statutes). In contrast, applying the Dictio-
nary Act definition of “person,” except where the context
indicates otherwise, supports § 876’s broad legislative pur-
pose of deterring threatening communications. See Havelock,
619 F.3d 1091 at 1100 (Graber, J., dissenting); see also Ren-
delman, 641 F.3d at 48.

Because a natural person definition of “person” throughout
§ 876 produces absurd results and because the Dictionary Act
definition of “person” accords with § 876’s legislative pur-
pose of deterring threatening communications, I cannot agree
with the majority’s interpretation of § 876(c).

IV

Finally, because I disagree with the manner in which the
majority reached its conclusion in this case but in the end
agree with the majority’s ultimate conclusion (that Have-
62 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
lock’s six convictions should be reversed), I must briefly
address the manner in which I get to that conclusion. In gen-
eral, I support Judge Reinhardt’s view as to “specific intent to
threaten.”

A

In United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 679-81 (9th Cir.
1988), we determined that convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 876
require the government to prove the specific intent to threaten.
While we acknowledged that requirement was endorsed by
only some of our sister circuits, we have never overruled
Twine. E.g., United States v. King, 122 F.3d 808 (9th Cir.
1997). Therefore, in order to prove Havelock’s convictions,
the government bears a higher burden of proof. The govern-
ment must prove that Havelock had a specific intent to
threaten when he mailed the “media packets.” Prior to trial,
Havelock moved to dismiss the indictment, partially because
the “media packets” were devoid of “any threat to injure.” He
argued that the packets instead contained an explanation of
his violent actions (to be read after the fact). At the close of
the evidence, Havelock moved for a judgment of acquittal. In
support of his motion, he made the same arguments he had
presented in the motion to dismiss. The district court denied
both motions. Now he challenges the sufficiency of the evi-
dence for the jury to make such a finding.

When a claim of sufficiency of evidence is preserved by
making a motion for acquittal at the close of the evidence, this
court reviews the district court’s denial of the motion de novo.
See United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 1117, 1129 (9th Cir.
2000), superceded by statute on other grounds, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341. There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prose-
cution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v. Craw-
ford, 239 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 2001).
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 63
Reviewing the evidence in this record, Havelock was cor-
rect. The totality of the evidence shows that Havelock
intended the “media packet” envelopes to be read after he
died. He intended the “media packet” to be a Manifesto
explaining what he believed to be wrong in this world and
why he did what he did.

Havelock mailed the envelopes just prior to going to the
Super Bowl that day with his newly purchased rifle and
ammunition. After leaving the post office, he drove to a park-
ing lot near the Super Bowl stadium. He never followed
through with the actions he had previously contemplated.

There is no proof that Havelock specifically intended to
threaten, if the envelopes were posted on a Sunday and the
acts were to later occur on that very day. The mail would not
even be delivered until at least the day after the Super Bowl.
He did not intend anyone reading the “media packet” to be
threatened by future harm or additional harm from him.
Reviewing the “media packet,” it mostly contains statements
of the perceived social ills of modern society and numerous
quotations from and references to the Bible, popular music,
movies, bumper stickers, literature, and the Founding Fathers.
Though containing statements of harm in the future tense, the
“media packet” demonstrates that Havelock planned to com-
mit “suicide by cops,” showing that he intended the “media
packet” not to be read by anyone until after he was already
dead. When reporting his actions to the Tempe police, the
police could not even determine whether a crime had been
committed. Based on this evidence, the government did not
prove that Havelock had the specific intent to harm someone.

B

The Supreme Court has held that certain threatening com-
munications (called “true threats”) are a form of speech but do
not merit First Amendment protection. See Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). While Judge Reinhardt may be cor-
64 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
rect that these communications were not true threats (or
threats at all), my conclusion is rather based on the failure to
prove “specific intent to threaten.” I stop there because we do
not undertake Constitutional analysis unless there is no other
basis for deciding a case. E.g., United States v. Kaluna, 192
F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999). Because we may resolve this
matter based on the government’s failure to prove “specific
intent to threaten,” I do not reach the question of whether
Havelock’s communications were true threats.

V

In conclusion, I do not join the majority’s analysis of the
meaning of “person” in 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). However, the
majority correctly reverses Havelock’s criminal convictions.
I therefore concur in the result.

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part. Part I is joined by Judge WARDLAW and Judge
BERZON. Part II is joined by Judge SCHROEDER:

Writing and mailing off to the media a largely incompre-
hensible diatribe with vague allusions to evil acts that the
author intended to have accomplished by the time his Mani-
festo was received was the unwise act of a troubled mind. It
was not, however, criminal behavior that satisfies either of the
two elements required for a conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 876(c). I concur with the majority’s reversal of Havelock’s
criminal conviction and with its holding that a communication
must be addressed to a natural person. Unfortunately, the
majority’s subsequent discussion, which concludes that the
identity of the addressee can be discovered anywhere within
the body of the document, renders irrelevant the holding on
which its decision is based, and totally eliminates one of the
two essential elements required by the statute.
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 65
The statutory text clearly sets forth two elements. Specifi-
cally, it requires that 1) the communication be addressed to a
person, and 2) the communication contain a threat to a per-
son. By permitting courts to look to the entire document in
order to identify an “addressee,” the majority ignores the con-
text of the statute: the term addressee is used in relation to the
posting of mail at the post office or in a mail box. The opinion
holds, in effect, that whenever a threat against a person is con-
tained in the body of the communication, the subject or object
of the threat may also serve as the addressee. This makes little
sense with respect to the particular statute before us. I there-
fore write separately to express my disagreement with Section
II.B of the majority’s opinion.

Before I do so, however, I explain why the confusion and
inconsistency created by the majority opinion (which I never-
theless concur in, in part) is unnecessary. There is a simpler
and clearer basis for reversing Havelock’s conviction. Beside
the majority’s inability to locate an “addressee” buried within
the content of his Manifesto, there is another more substantial
reason why Havelock’s ramblings do not violate 18 U.S.C.
§ 876(c). That reason is that Havelock’s Manifesto does not
contain a threat. Even if the Manifesto could be construed as
referring to an identifiable group of persons attending a par-
ticular event, which I seriously doubt, it was intended to
arrive after the occurrence of that event. A threat can refer
only to a future, not a past, act; a threat is an act that is
intended to put its subjects or objects in fear of an event to
occur in the future. Put simply, a communication sent when
and under the circumstances Havelock’s was cannot induce
fear of an impending event, and is therefore not a threat.

In sum, while the majority decides the case in a confused
and incorrect manner based on the first element, finding that
the communication lacked a natural person addressee, I would
decide this case on the more basic question presented by the
66 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
second element, and hold that the Manifesto did not contain
a threat.1

I

The assorted writings mailed to the six news and music out-
lets which arguably refer to an event that Havelock expected
to have taken place before the communications were received
—the Superbowl—did not meet the legal requirements for a
threat, and were thus not punishable by § 876(c).

A threat must “communicate a serious expression of an
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals.” Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343, 359 (2003); see also United States v. Stewart, 420
F.3d 1007, 1017(2005). Havelock’s rambling Manifesto
included statements ranging from excoriations against the
economic and political system to quotations from popular
songs and films to critiques of video games. Among his pro-
nouncements was the declaration that “I will sacrifice your
children upon the altar of your excess, and know it has been
your own greed, your loftiness, your disdain and mistreatment
of your fellow man that has done this.” The Manifesto also
included the profession that “I will shed the blood of the inno-
cent. For the blood of the guilty will always remain unclean.
And other dregs of society will always quickly lap up the
blood of the unclean, take their place, and carry on as if noth-
ing happened. Meet the new boss, same as the old boss.”
Included within the Manifesto was also the nonsensical expla-
nation, “Oh yeah, Cthulhu made me kill! la! la! Cthulhu
Ftaghn!”
1
Havelock also argued that his Manifesto was political speech and as
such it deserves First Amendment protection. As the Supreme Court has
recognized, constitutional protections afforded to speech do not extend to
“true threats,” which have been defined as threats communicated by the
speaker with the specific intent to threaten. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343 (2003). Because Havelock’s writings were not a threat in any sense
of the word, I need not reach the constitutional question he raises.
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 67
The Manifesto clearly contains statements alluding to acts
of violence, from running people over with a Hummer to kill-
ing the children of his unidentified perceived oppressor. None
of this language identifies a person or group of persons who
might constitute the objects or subjects of any threat. In the
final lines of the Manifesto, preceding quotations from the
Old Testament and the punk rock group Bad Religion, is the
only oblique reference to the Superbowl and those in atten-
dance. I do not believe that, by its reference to a t-shirt con-
taining the message “I survived the Superbowl,” the
Manifesto sufficiently identifies an intent on the part of Have-
lock to commit a violent act regarding that event. Because
some of my colleagues appear to disagree, however, I explain
here why even if it did, we could not hold that the Manifesto
contains a threat. In any event, it is clear that no other part of
the Manifesto identifies any particular individual or group of
individuals as the intended objects of a threat or identifies any
time, place, or event at which any act of violence will occur.

A threat is “an expression of an intention to inflict evil,
injury, or damage on another,” Planned Parenthood of
Columbia v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d
1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), or an “indication of impend-
ing danger or harm.” United States v. Davila, 461 F.3d 461,
302 (2nd Cir. 2006). Threats are by definition prospective.
See Webster’s New World Dictionary 1394 (3rd Coll. ed.
1988) (defining a “threat” as “an expression of intention to
hurt”). They may include announcements of future or impend-
ing action, but not statements regarding past events or retro-
spective harm. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the
prohibition on “threats protect[s] individuals from the fear of
violence and from the disruption that fear engenders,” Black,
538 U.S. at 360 (alteration in original) (internal citation omit-
ted). Havelock’s statements were intended to be, and could
only have been, understood by the recipients as a post hoc
confession of his already completed actions. Having deposited
the Manifesto in a United States Postal Service mailbox on
the very day of the Superbowl, a mere thirty minutes before
68 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
his intended rampage at the stadium, Havelock’s Manifesto
could not have reached its intended destinations in time to put
the recipients in fear of imminent danger or to constitute a
threat of future action. To the contrary, the mailings sent by
Havelock containing his Manifesto could only have arrived
after the events alluded to within its pages had already taken
place or after any possibility of committing the acts no longer
existed.

When determining whether a defendant’s speech represents
a threat our analysis is “not confine[d] . . . to the defendant’s
statements alone,” United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d
1113, 1123 (2011), but must consider the context in which the
communication was made as well. Considering the context, it
would be impossible to conclude that Havelock’s often-
rambling statements constituted a threat, no matter how trou-
bling those statements may have been. It is clear from the fact
that none of the statements could have been read by anyone
until after the only event referred to in that document that
could arguably be the subject of a threat had already taken
place that the Manifesto lacked any capacity to threaten any
injury or express any intent to cause the victims future harm
or fear of future harm. In short: under all the circumstances,
and in context, the language of the Manifesto could not con-
stitute a threat.

Finally, Havelock’s related writings make it clear that he
intended the media packets and letters mailed the day of the
Superbowl to be examined and understood in the wake of the
already completed actions that he did not expect to survive.
It is therefore not possible that he could have intended to put
the recipients in fear of any future actions on his part because,
as Havelock acknowledged within his letters, he would be
dead by the time that the communications reached their vari-
ous destinations. Section 876(c) is a specific intent crime, and
therefore requires a “subjective, specific intent to threaten.”
United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1988); See also
Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60; Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1118
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 69
(9th Cir. 2011). Havelock’s statements and the circumstances
surrounding the mailing of the copies of his Manifesto clearly
demonstrate that he intended them to be read after his imag-
ined rampage had occurred and he was deceased.

Among the evidence that Havelock intended his writings to
be received after his demise was a letter mailed to the Office
of Personnel Management at the same time as the media pack-
ets, in which he stated “[b]y the time this letter reaches you,
I will probably be deceased or no longer able to sign any fur-
ther needed paperwork,” and directed them to transfer his
retirement funds to the mother of his children. Consistent with
his later statement that he planned to commit “suicide by
cop,” Havelock had with him in his car a letter to the police
on which he had handwritten the command “DO NOT
RESUSCITATE.” In a letter mailed to his parents, he asked
that his body be cremated and hoped that his “tragic end”
would be eye opening as he planned to “go onto [sic] a better
place.” Indeed, the Manifesto itself states near its conclusion:
“I’m going to talk to God.” These and other statements clearly
demonstrate that Havelock did not intend to survive the
events of Superbowl Sunday, and any unlawful acts referred
to in the letters sent on that day were not intended to put its
recipients in fear of future actions on his part. Nor, in context
of when they were received, could they have done so. In addi-
tion to the sheer impossibility that a Manifesto received after
Superbowl Sunday could instill in its recipients a fear of harm
that would result from events that would already have
occurred, or could no longer occur, the lack of any intent to
cause an apprehension of future harm—shown from both
words and context—precludes a finding that the Manifesto
was, in fact, a threat.

For the reasons explained above, I would hold that the
Manifesto did not contain a threat and would on that ground
reverse Havelock’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 876(c).
70 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
II

Returning to the ground on which the majority decides to
reverse Havelock’s conviction, I start with the language of the
statute.

Whoever knowingly so deposits or causes to be
delivered as aforesaid, any communication . . .
addressed to any other person and containing any
threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the
person of the addressee or of another, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 876(c) (emphasis added).

The “as aforesaid” refers to subsection (a), which states
“[w]hoever knowingly deposits in any post office or autho-
rized depository for mail matter, to be sent or delivered by the
Postal Service or knowingly causes to be delivered by the
Postal Service according to the direction thereon.” § 876(a).
The subsection at issue here explicitly punishes the mailing of
any threatening communication in the prescribed manner if it
is “addressed to any other person,” and “contain[s] any
threat” to a person. § 876(c).

The language of the statute unmistakably distinguishes
between the addressee portion of the communication and the
communication’s content. The majority initially recognizes
appropriately that “person,” in both sections of the statute,
must be a natural person. However, by subsequently conclud-
ing that a court may look to the content of the communication
to determine whom it is “addressed to” the majority renders
its holding without substance and effectively excises the “ad-
dressed to” requirement from the statute. Under the majority’s
interpretation, the “addressed to” element becomes superflu-
ous because once a threat to a person is identified within the
content of the letter the communication will necessarily con-
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 71
tain a subject or object of the threat, and that subject or object
will necessarily become the addressee of the communication.
If there is no such subject or object of the threat, then whether
or not there is an addressee of the communication who is a
natural person is irrelevant because the communication fails
to violate the statute due to the absence of a threat. Indeed, in
the instant case the majority holds that there is no addressee
because it fails to identify a target of any threat within Have-
lock’s rambling Manifesto, and without such a target there
can be no threat. Thus, the significant number of pages that
the majority devotes to explaining why § 876(c) is applicable
only when the addressee is a natural person is of no signifi-
cance under its rule that the identity of that natural person
may be located anywhere within the body of the communica-
tion. Either there is such a person identified in the body of the
communication and there is both an addressee and a threat, or
there is no person so identified and thus no addressee and no
threat. By failing to preserve the statutory distinction between
the two elements, the addressee and the contents of the com-
munication, the majority has re-written the statute, eliminat-
ing one of the two necessary elements.

The majority begins its analysis by recognizing two poten-
tial definitions of the term “address.” Neither definition sup-
ports the majority’s ultimate reading of the statute, but even
the broader definition of “to address,” meaning “to speak,
write, or otherwise communicate directly to,” Maj. Op. at 46,
does not control the question of who is the addressee of a let-
ter deposited in the mail. Section 876, adopted in 1932,
shortly after the kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby, is a statute
that punishes individuals who mail various forms of threaten-
ing communications addressed to identifiable persons by
means of the postal system. In subsection (a), the statute
clearly details the mailing requirements that are necessary to
bring a communication under the province of the statute.
These requirements are incorporated into all of the subsequent
subsections. The issue here involves the meaning of the statu-
tory use of the word “addressee,” which is a term used to des-
72 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
ignate the person to whom the Post Office is to deliver an
envelope mailed through its system. Keeping in mind that this
is a statute intended to punish the sending of certain commu-
nications through the postal system, the only reasonable inter-
pretation of the term “addressee” is the party named on the
outer envelope to whom the Post Office would deliver a com-
munication that has been mailed pursuant to the terms
described within the statute. Even if the court were permitted
to look beyond the outer envelope to the salutation line of a
communication to determine the addressee, that would clearly
be the outer limit under any definition of the words of the stat-
ute. To go further, as the majority does here, and to examine
the entire contents of the communication, in order to seek the
identities of those who may be the potential targets of the
threatening communication and to label them the addressees,
distorts the language of the statute beyond its plain meaning
and intention as well as eliminates the first of its two require-
ments, that there be an addressee as well as a threat to injure
any person.

By the majority’s own definition, to “address” a letter to
someone means to “communicate directly to” that individual.
One may “communicate directly to” another through the mail
by placing the intended recipient’s name and address on the
outer envelope and causing the post office to deliver that letter
to the person so identified. One may arguably in some limited
circumstances, even mail a letter to a corporate entity or the
office of an official and designate a natural person as the
intended recipient in the salutation line, although I need not
decide that question here. Either of these methods may con-
ceivably be viewed as a valid attempt to “communicate
directly to” another person through the mail. In any ordinary
usage of the term, however, one would not be understood as
having “communicated directly to” some individual whose
name is mentioned or discussed only within the body of a
document that is formally addressed to another — or
addressed to no one at all. One fails to “communicate directly
to” another person when one mails a letter to an artificial
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 73
entity, fails to address that person in the salutation, and men-
tions his name only in the body of the letter as an individual
whom one intends to harm. This manner of communication is
by no means “direct” and any individual identified only by
examining the contents of such a communication cannot be
referred to as the “addressee.” An individual so identified may
be the object of the threat; he may be the subject of the threat;
but an individual not intended to be the recipient of the letter
cannot, in any way, be termed the addressee of the communi-
cation. That person may properly be understood to satisfy the
second element of the statute, but he cannot satisfy the first.2

To assist it in arriving at its untenable conclusion that the
addressee may be contained in the body of the letter, the
majority selectively adopts the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in
United States v. Rendelman, 641 F.3d 36 (4th Cir. 2011). In
Rendelman, the court considered whether the sending of two
letters, whose outer envelopes were each addressed to the
U.S. Marshals Service and which contained a threat to harm
the President of the United States, was a punishable act under
§ 876(c) and subject to the ten year enhancement as a “com-
munication addressed to an official covered by 18 U.S.C.
§ 1114.”3 Id. The Rendelman court recognized that the defen-
2
The statute contemplates the possibility that a communication may be
addressed to one person and contain a threat to another by criminalizing
threats to “injure the person of the addressee or of another.” § 876(c). It
is therefore not necessary that the subject or object of the threat also be
the addressee of the communication, although if they were one and the
same the conduct would be penalized in the same manner. The threat may
be directed to the addressee or to another, but in either case the communi-
cation itself must be delivered through the mail to a natural person who
is the addressee. It is necessary under the clear language of the statute that
the communication contain the name of an addressee to whom it is mailed
through the postal system as well as a threat to a person, and we cannot
merely satisfy ourselves, as the majority does, with the presence of the lat-
ter element and not the former.
3
Section 1114 specifically identifies “any officer or employee of the
United States or of any agency in any branch of the United States Govern-
ment (including any member of the uniformed services).” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1114.
74 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
dant’s letters were “addressed to” the Marshals Service,
because they specified the Marshals Service on the outer
envelope. The court concluded that the defendant’s mailings
satisfied the “person” requirement of § 876(c) by holding that
a communication addressed to the Marshals Service “can rea-
sonably be understood as addressed to the United States Mar-
shal himself — a natural person.” Id. at 46. While we need
not adopt the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion as to the natural per-
son status of the Marshals Service, it is plain that the court
identified a “person” as the addressee based on the name sup-
plied on the outer envelopes of the charged communications,
and that it did not identify the addressee through investigating
the contents of the mailing itself. This holding, therefore, does
not provide support for the majority’s conclusion that it may
scour the contents of a communication to identify the natural
person to whom it is addressed.

After holding that the Marshals Service satisfied the statu-
tory requirement that the addressee be a “person,” the Fourth
Circuit went on to consider an entirely different subject: the
question of enhancement. It held that the defendant was sub-
ject to enhanced penalties because “the threat contained in the
. . . [l]etter was sufficiently alleged as being ‘addressed to’,
i.e., ‘directed to,’ the President . . . even though the letter was
not mailed to [him].” Id. at 47.4 The majority relies on this
4
This statement in Rendelman, as well as its holding on the enhance-
ment element, was achieved through a disingenuous substitution of statu-
tory language. Section 876(c) explicitly requires that the communication
not the threat be addressed to a person. By substituting one term — threat
— for another — communication — the Rendelman court partially altered
the meaning of the statute and eliminated, for purposes of enhancement,
the need for an addressee that would satisfy the requirement that the com-
munication be addressed to an official covered by § 1114. The Rendelman
court bifurcated the statute as it relates to the enhancement element by
contending that the second use of the phrase “addressed to” in § 876(c)
means something different than the first. This is plainly inconsistent with
the language and structure of the statute, in which the requisite manner of
mailing is fully articulated only once, in § 876(a), and then incorporated
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 75
statement to support its conclusion that a court may look to
the contents of a communication to identify an addressee.
What the Rendelman court identified within the text of the
defendant’s letters, however, was the object of the threat, not
the addressee of the communication. It is of course necessary
to look to the content of the communication to find if the
communication contains a threat, and if so, to whom or to
what that threat is directed.5 We are not limited to the outside

by reference in the subsequent sections. In practical terms, read properly,
the statute provides for an enhancement if the letter containing the threat
is addressed to a designated official and contains a threat to any person.
As Rendelman reads the enhancement provision, it applies if the letter is
addressed to any person but the threat contained in the letter is made to
a designated official. All of this is irrelevant, however, as the Fourth Cir-
cuit held in the part of its opinion deciding when a statutory offense is
committed that an addressee is a person who could be identified by the
name on the outside of the envelope. That is directly contrary to the propo-
sition for which the majority cites the case.
5
It is important to note that § 876(c) and (d) provide for enhanced pun-
ishment based on the addressee of the communication, not the target of the
threat. As a result, a perpetrator could have his punishment enhanced for
addressing a letter to a federal judge threatening to harm the judge or the
judge’s family, but would not receive an enhancement if he addressed a
letter to the judge’s family and threatened to harm the judge. This result
may seem anomalous, and may even tempt a court, such as the Fourth Cir-
cuit, to substitute the term “threat” for “addressee” in order to achieve a
result it believes better reflects the types of harms it feels merit greater
punishment. The punishment structure of the statute makes complete
sense, however, if we accept that Congress may have been more con-
cerned with the harm that would result from judges or other federal offi-
cials being unduly influenced by threats to their loved ones (or to
themselves) than it was with the possibility that those unaffiliated with the
operation of the federal government may receive threatening communica-
tions that expressed an intent to harm a federal official. Moreover, when
Congress was concerned with threats of certain types of harm inflicted
against certain categories of people, it explicitly identified such threats.
See, e.g., § 876(d). Therefore, when Congress failed to impose punishment
based on the nature of the threat we must assume that it meant what it
wrote and intended punishment based on the addressee rather than the
object of the threat.
76 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
of the envelope or the salutation line of the letter to determine
if there is a threat, and a threat to a person “contained” in a
communication can certainly be found only in the content of
the communication. This truism is of no relevance, however,
to the majority’s conclusion that it may explore the contents
of the communication in search of the addressee of the com-
munication in which the threat is contained. In contrast to the
majority’s decision, the Rendelman court looked to the con-
tent of the communication to identify the object of the send-
er’s threat, not the identity of the addressee of the
communication. The majority selectively invokes the lan-
guage of the Rendelman decision to assist it in reaching its
desired conclusion, but Rendelman, to the extent that the court
interpreted the portion of § 876(c) that is at issue in this case,
simply does not support the majority’s holding.6

The majority opinion also cites Rendelman as support for
its conclusion that the contents of a letter are fair game in
determining who the writing is “addressed to” because “[a]t
its essence, § 876(c) criminalizes the use of the postal system
6
The majority also cites to United States v. Williams, 376 F.3d 1048
(10th Cir. 2004), for its conclusion that you may look to the contents of
a letter to identify the addressee, but this reliance is also in error. In Wil-
liams, the Tenth Circuit held that one may look to the salutation line as
well as the envelope to identify the addressee, a question I would leave
open here. The Tenth Circuit, as cited by the majority, Maj. Op. 47-48,
went on to state the uncontested fact that “[t]he word ‘communication’
includes the contents of a letter.” This statement of fact does not at all
speak to the propriety of looking to the contents of a letter to identify the
addressee, and cannot reasonably be used to support the majority’s ulti-
mate conclusion that an addressee may be located anywhere within the
pages of the communication. The Second Circuit in United States v.
Davila, 461 F.3d 298 (2nd Cir. 2006), held the defendant’s mailing pun-
ishable under § 876(c), but in doing so, the court looked only to its outer
envelope to identify the addressee. Therefore, despite the majority’s cita-
tions to other circuits that have purportedly adopted the same “common-
sense” understanding that we may look to the contents of the
communication to identify an addressee, the Ninth Circuit now stands
alone in so holding.
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 77
to deliver a threatening communication.” Maj. Op. at 49
(quoting Rendelman, 641 F.3d at 48). Unfortunately we are
not asked to divine a statute’s essence but to interpret its text.
The text of § 876(c) does not merely criminalize the use of the
United States Postal Service to deliver threatening communi-
cations, but requires that such communications be deposited
in the mail “addressed to any other person” (other than the
sender) before such acts are subject to criminal penalties.
§ 876(c). In Section II.A of its opinion the majority appears
to recognize this, but in Section II.B, perhaps for practical
reasons at which we are left to guess, it goes off on an entirely
different tack. The erroneous reading of the statute offered by
the majority in Section II.B allows for the criminalization of
a wider array of bad acts consistent with their view of what
the statute should have achieved, but their reading is well
beyond the scope of conduct that is actually circumscribed by
the statutory text.

In its awkward attempt to explain the “true meaning” of the
statute, the majority violates the “cardinal principle of statu-
tory construction . . . to give effect, if possible, to every clause
and word of a statute,” United States v. Menasche, 75 S. Ct.
513, 520 (1955) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
See also Duncan v. Walker 121 S. Ct. 2120, 2125 (2001). The
Rendelman court and today’s majority choose to ignore this
axiom because it does not square with their own view as to
how the statute should have been written. Once they have
deemed its true purpose to be to punish the use of the postal
system for the delivery of all threatening communications,
any reading of the statute that falls short of this purpose is
unacceptable. In subverting the language of the statute to meet
the ends it desires, the majority ignores not only the command
that we give all words meaning, but also the central principle
in the interpretation of penal statutes that requires us to inter-
pret criminal laws narrowly. See Regents of Univ. of Califor-
nia v. Public Emp’t Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 604 (1988)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,
347-48 (1971). Today’s opinion violates both commands by
78 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
ignoring the statutory language and re-writing the statute to
encompass a broader range of conduct than is criminalized
under the clear language of the statute. If the majority had
grounded its analysis on the recognition that “[w]e are not at
liberty to rewrite the statute to reflect a meaning we deem
more desirable . . . . [but rather] must give effect to the text
[C]ongress enacted,” Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct.
831, 841(2008), it would have given the “addressed to” ele-
ment the meaning it deserves.

For the above reasons I concur in part and dissent in part
with the majority opinion; but concur only because a majority
of this en banc court fails to adopt what I believe to be the
preferable ground for reversing Havelock’s conviction.

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:

The district court denied Havelock’s Rule 29 motion for
acquittal, which incorporated the statutory and constitutional
arguments underlying his earlier motion to dismiss the indict-
ment. The district court first ruled that to violate 18 U.S.C.
§ 876(c), the communication must be addressed to a natural
person; but to decide that question, the finder of fact may look
to the contents of the communication. Second, the district
court found that Havelock’s communications were addressed
to the public, a group of natural persons. Third, it concluded
that there was sufficient evidence of a “true threat” under Vir-
ginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), to sustain Havelock’s
conviction. The panel majority reverses the district court on
the ground that Havelock’s threat was not addressed to natural
persons.

I agree with the panel majority that to violate § 876(c) the
defendant must address the communication to a natural per-
son, and that the finder of fact may look to the content of the
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 79
communication. However, I conclude that Havelock’s com-
munications were addressed to natural persons, as the district
court found, but that they were not threats, much less “true
threats,” as the district court permitted the jury to find.

By focusing on the identity of the individual addressees
threatened by the Manifesto, the majority conflates the issue
of whether the communications were addressed to natural per-
sons with the question of whether Havelock’s communica-
tions were threatening as a matter of law. Havelock deposited
self-described “media packets,” addressed to media outlets, in
a mailbox on Super Bowl Sunday, with the expectation that
the envelopes would be delivered following his shooting spree
and death. The envelopes bore no names of individuals, but
instead were directed to the New York Times, the Los Ange-
les Times, the Phoenix New Times and the Associated Press.
Nonetheless, Havelock certainly intended that natural persons
at the named media outlets would open them and ultimately
publicize his irrational rationale for the planned “econo-
political confrontation” at Super Bowl XLII after it occurred.
While we do not even need to examine the contents of the
communications to determine that they were addressed to
“persons,” I agree with the majority that in considering
whether the person addressed is a natural person, a court may
examine the contents of the communication.

A few examples illustrate this point. Suppose the address
on the envelope is:

The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Inside is a communication addressed to the United States
President that threatens to kidnap the President’s mother-in-
law. This threat, deposited in a mailbox and delivered by the
Postal Service to the White House, would certainly be punish-
able under § 876(c). Even if the contents of the communica-
80 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
tion were not addressed to the President, but threatened that
the President’s mother-in-law would be kidnapped and held
hostage unless the President took some action, we would find
the threat prohibited by § 876(c). Similarly, a letter mailed to

One First Street NE
Washington, D.C. 20543

containing a conditional threat of harm to a Justice of the
United States Supreme Court would be criminalized by
§ 876(c). In both of these examples, although only the
address, and not the name of an individual, is written on the
outside of the envelope, the contents reveal that a natural per-
son is the addressee. Similarly, suppose an envelope deposited
in the mail is addressed:

North Polar — Santa Claus
P.O. Box 56099
North Pole, AK 99705-1099

The contents of the missive threaten that unless the workers
at North Polar stop answering children’s letters to Santa, giv-
ing them the false hope of a Christmas bounty, their office
will be blown up, injuring all of them. Are the workers any
less persons to whom a threat is addressed because they are
not individually identified on the envelope that carried the
threat? A person threatening harm through the Postal Service
should not be able to evade § 876(c) by simply failing to place
the name of the threatened individual above the address to
which it is mailed.

Although, like Judge Fisher, I would conclude that Have-
lock’s communications were addressed to natural persons, I
would reverse the district court’s denial of the motion for
acquittal because there was insufficient evidence of a “true
threat” to sustain the verdict. In Virginia v. Black, the
Supreme Court held that the State may punish threatening
expression only if the “speaker means to communicate a seri-
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 81
ous expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful vio-
lence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” 538
U.S. at 359 (2003). “Because the true threat requirement is
imposed by the Constitution, the subjective test set forth in
Black must be read into all threat statutes that criminalize pure
speech.” United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117
(9th Cir. 2011). Moreover, as a matter of statutory construc-
tion, as the district court correctly instructed the jury, § 876(c)
requires specific intent to threaten. See United States v. Twine,
853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Today we hold that the
showing of an intent to threaten, required by §§ 875(c) and
876, is a showing of specific intent.”). Thus, “to ‘determine
whether the verdict [under the statutory elements] is sup-
ported by sufficient evidence,’ we must answer the question
‘whether the facts as found by the jury establish the core con-
stitutional fact of a ‘true threat.” ” Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at
1118 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Stew-
art, 420 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005)).

Havelock’s communications did not “contain a threat” to
the public, as Judge Reinhardt’s concurrence ably demon-
strates. “ ‘Whether a particular statement may properly be
considered to be a threat is governed by an objective stan-
dard—whether a reasonable person would foresee that the
statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker
communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent
to harm or assault.’ ” Planned Parenthood of the Colum-
bia/Williamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d
1058, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (quoting United States
v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)).
Here, because Havelock deposited his communications in the
mail on a Sunday, he ensured that they would not be received
until after the only possible threatened action had occurred.
Nor could Havelock have meant “to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an unlawful act of vio-
lence,” Black, 538 U.S. at 359, because the communications
clearly evidence his intent to commit suicide before his state-
ments were received by anyone. In short, “threats” portend
82 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
future—not past—action. Havelock’s statement to his fiancée
following his change of heart that “he threatened a lot of peo-
ple in the letters” is not evidence that meets the statutory or
constitutional requirements of a “true threat,” and the district
court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the evidence
was sufficient to support a finding of subjective, specific
intent.

In many ways, § 876(c) is anachronistic. It was enacted at
a time when deposit of “mail matter” for delivery by the
Postal Service was the primary means of written communica-
tion and one’s address was the place where a person received
mail. Today, the Postal Service is in serious decline, and true
threats are more likely to be emailed, texted, or posted on the
Internet. See Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1126-27 (Wardlaw, J.,
concurring in part, and dissenting in part) (collecting
instances of online threats and postings that presaged tragic
events). Havelock’s choice to use snail mail, particularly on
a Sunday, thirty minutes before the Super Bowl where he
intended to shoot attendees and commit “suicide by cop,”
guaranteed that by the time anyone actually received the com-
munication, the deed would be done—not merely threatened.

FISHER, Circuit Judge, with whom JOHNNIE B. RAWLIN-
SON, Circuit Judge, joins, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the majority
that we may look to the contents of a communication to deter-
mine to whom it is addressed, I disagree with the majority that
Havelock’s communications were not “addressed to any other
person.” 18 U.S.C. § 876(c).

As an initial matter, I have some doubts regarding the
majority’s conclusion that § 876(c) applies only to communi-
cations addressed to natural persons. Although there is some
reason to reach that conclusion, the context in which the
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 83
phrase “addressed to any other person” appears, the purpose
of § 876 and the importance of construing federal statutes to
avoid absurd results suggest that § 876(c) may apply to com-
munications addressed both to natural persons and, as relevant
here, to corporations.

I need not resolve that question, however, because even
assuming § 876(c) applies only to communications addressed
to natural persons, as the majority holds, I would hold that
Havelock’s communications were so addressed. Havelock
mailed his manifesto to media outlets such as the New York
Times, presumably for publication. Although neither the man-
ifesto nor the threats it contains were directed at any specific
person, Havelock plainly intended his manifesto to be read by
the general public — which is made up of natural persons.
Unlike the majority, I see no reason to preclude liability under
§ 876(c) when a threatening communication is addressed to,
and threatens mass murder against, a community rather than
a specific individual. Here, Havelock threatened to “slay your
children,” to “sacrifice your children upon the alter of your
excess” and to “take as many of you with me as I can.” In
doing so, he directed his manifesto (as well as his threats) to
natural persons. I would accordingly hold that the government
satisfied the “addressed to any other person” element in this
case.

I.

In July 1932, Congress enacted an Act to punish the send-
ing through the mails of certain threatening communications.
See Act of July 8, 1932, ch. 464, 47 Stat. 649. That law pro-
vided in pertinent part:

[W]hoever, with intent to extort from any person any
money or other thing or value, shall knowingly
deposit or cause to be deposited in any post office or
station thereof, or in any authorized depository for
mail matter, to be sent or delivered by the post-office
84 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
establishment of the United States, any written or
printed letter or other communication with or with-
out a name or designating mark subscribed thereto,
addressed to any other person, and containing any
threat (1) to injure the person, property, or reputation
of the addressee or of another or the reputation of a
deceased person, or (2) to kidnap any person, or (3)
to accuse the addressee or any other person of a
crime, or containing any demand or request for ran-
som or reward for the release of any kidnaped per-
son, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

Id.1 Despite several amendments, the current version of the
1932 statute, now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 876, remains largely
unchanged. It provides:

(a) Whoever knowingly deposits in any post office
or authorized depository for mail matter, to be sent
or delivered by the Postal Service or knowingly
causes to be delivered by the Postal Service accord-
ing to the direction thereon, any communication,
with or without a name or designating mark sub-
scribed thereto, addressed to any other person, and
containing any demand or request for ransom or
reward for the release of any kidnapped person, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both.

(b) Whoever, with intent to extort from any person
any money or other thing of value, so deposits, or
causes to be delivered, as aforesaid, any communica-
1
This legislation may have been motivated by the March 1932 kidnap-
ping for ransom and murder of the 18-month-old son of aviator Charles
Lindbergh, which also spurred congressional passage of the Federal Kid-
napping Act, see Act of June 22, 1932, ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1201).
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 85
tion containing any threat to kidnap any person or
any threat to injure the person of the addressee or of
another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than twenty years, or both.

(c) Whoever knowingly so deposits or causes to be
delivered as aforesaid, any communication with or
without a name or designating mark subscribed
thereto, addressed to any other person and containing
any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to
injure the person of the addressee or of another, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both. If such a communication is
addressed to a United States judge, a Federal law
enforcement officer, or an official who is covered by
section 1114, the individual shall be fined under this
title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

(d) Whoever, with intent to extort from any person
any money or other thing of value, knowingly so
deposits or causes to be delivered, as aforesaid, any
communication, with or without a name or designat-
ing mark subscribed thereto, addressed to any other
person and containing any threat to injure the prop-
erty or reputation of the addressee or of another, or
the reputation of a deceased person, or any threat to
accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both. If such a communication is
addressed to a United States judge, a Federal law
enforcement officer, or an official who is covered by
section 1114, the individual shall be fined under this
title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 876.2
2
Congress amended the 1932 Act in 1935, 1939, 1970, 1994 and 2002.
See Act of June 28, 1935, ch. 326, 49 Stat. 427; Act of May 15, 1939, ch.
86 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
In 1934, Congress adopted a related statute prohibiting the
transmission of threatening communications in interstate com-
merce. See Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 300, 48 Stat. 781. The
1934 law, entitled “An Act Applying the powers of the Fed-
eral Government, under the commerce clause of the Constitu-
tion, to extortion by means of telephone, telegraph, radio, oral
message, or otherwise,” provided as follows:

[W]hoever, with intent to extort from any person,
firm, association, or corporation any money or other
thing of value, shall transmit in interstate commerce,
by any means whatsoever, any threat (1) to injure the
person, property, or reputation of any person, or the
reputation of a deceased person, or (2) to kidnap any
person, or (3) to accuse any person of a crime, or (4)
containing any demand or request for a ransom or
reward for the release of any kidnaped person, shall
upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
. . . Provided further. That nothing herein shall
amend or repeal section 338a, title 18, United States
Code (47 Stat. 649) [now codified as 18 U.S.C.
§ 876].

Id. Like § 876, this 1934 law has been amended several times,
but remains fundamentally unchanged from its original form.3
Now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 875, it provides:

133, 53 Stat. 742; Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375,
§ 6(j)(7), 84 Stat. 719, 777 (1970); Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title XXXIII,
§§ 330016(1)(G), (H), (K), 330021(2), 108 Stat. 1796, 2147, 2150; Fed-
eral Judiciary Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, Div. C, Title
I, § 11008(d), 116 Stat. 1818, 1818.
3
Congress amended the 1934 Act in 1939, 1986 and 1994. See Act of
May 15, 1939, ch. 133, 53 Stat. 742, 744; Criminal Law and Procedure
Technical Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 63, 100 Stat.
3592, 3614; Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(G), (H), (K), 108 Stat.
1796, 2147.
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 87
(a) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign com-
merce any communication containing any demand or
request for a ransom or reward for the release of any
kidnapped person, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

(b) Whoever, with intent to extort from any person,
firm, association, or corporation, any money or other
thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign com-
merce any communication containing any threat to
kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person
of another, shall be fined under this title or impris-
oned not more than twenty years, or both.

(c) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign com-
merce any communication containing any threat to
kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person
of another, shall be fined under this title or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.

(d) Whoever, with intent to extort from any person,
firm, association, or corporation, any money or other
thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign com-
merce any communication containing any threat to
injure the property or reputation of the addressee or
of another or the reputation of a deceased person or
any threat to accuse the addressee or any other per-
son of a crime, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 875.

Sections 875 and 876 are similar in many respects, and a
side-by-side comparison shows that subsections (a) through
(d) of the two statutes closely track one another. There are,
however, some notable differences. First, whereas § 876
applies to threatening communications sent by mail, § 875
applies to threatening communications transmitted by any
88 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
means.4 Second, whereas § 875 applies only to interstate com-
munications, § 876 applies to all communications by mail,
whether interstate or intrastate. Third, and as relevant here,
although both statutes use the word “person” many times,
§ 875 on occasion employs the more specific phrase “person,
firm, association, or corporation.” I discuss the significance of
this difference in language below.

Havelock was convicted of violating § 876(c). Section
876(c) has several elements, including: (1) the knowing use
of the mails, (2) a communication, (3) “addressed to any other
person” and (4) “containing any threat to kidnap any person
or any threat to injure the person of the addressee or of anoth-
er.” 18 U.S.C. § 876(c).5 At issue here is the third element —
the requirement that a communication containing a threat be
“addressed to any other person.” We are asked to decide
whether “person,” as used in this phrase, means a “natural
person” or, in accordance with the Dictionary Act, includes
“corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”
1 U.S.C. § 1 (providing the Dictionary Act definition of “per-
son” that applies to federal statutes “unless the context indi-
cates otherwise”). We are also asked to decide whether,
assuming § 876(c) applies only to a communication addressed
to a natural person, Havelock’s communications were so
addressed.

4
Although the issue is not presented here, it appears that § 875 applies
to threats transmitted by interstate mail. Here, Havelock appears to have
mailed several of his communications from Arizona to entities outside of
the state, including the Los Angeles Times and the New York Times. The
government, however, did not charge Havelock with violating § 875(c).
5
We have also held that § 876(c) requires the additional element of a
specific intent to threaten. See United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680
(9th Cir. 1988).
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 89
II.

The first question is whether § 876(c) applies only to a
communication addressed to natural persons. Because I con-
clude that Havelock’s communications were addressed to nat-
ural persons, I need not resolve this question. Nonetheless,
given that the majority reaches the issue, I write to explain
why I think this is a close question, and why I have some
doubts about the majority’s decision not to apply the Dictio-
nary Act definition. A strong case can be made that § 876(c)
applies to a communication addressed to a corporation.

A.

The majority concludes that the narrower definition applies
because “there is a presumption that a given term is used to
mean the same thing throughout a statute.” Brown v. Gardner,
513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994). According to the majority, the two
other uses of the word person in § 876(c) refer to a natural
person, so this same definition must apply to the use of the
word “person” in the operative phrase “addressed to any other
person.”

Brown’s canon of construction may not apply here, how-
ever. Brown applies when a word is given the same meaning
throughout a statute. Here, even under the majority’s view
§ 876(c) employs at least two definitions of the word “per-
son.”

The word “person” has many meanings. Among these are:

(a) “A living human” (i.e., a natural person),

(b) “The living body of a human: searched the
prisoner’s person,” and

(c) “Law A human or organization with legal right
and duties” (i.e., the Dictionary Act definition).
90 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1310
(4th ed. 2000). Section 876(c) uses the word “person” three
times:

Whoever knowingly so deposits or causes to be
delivered as aforesaid, any communication with or
without a name or designating mark subscribed
thereto, addressed to any other person and contain-
ing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to
injure the person of the addressee or of another, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 876(c) (emphasis added). I assume that no one
disputes that the second use of the word “person” employs the
first definition. In the phrase “kidnap any person,” the word
“person” must refer to “[a] living human” (i.e., a natural per-
son), because only a natural person can be kidnapped. I also
assume that no one disputes that the third use of the word
“person” employs the second definition. In the phrase “injure
the person of the addressee or of another,” the word “person”
must refer to “[t]he living body of a human.” No other defini-
tion makes sense. Thus, without deciding whether the first use
of the word “person” employs the first definition or the third,
it is questionable whether Brown’s presumption — that “a
given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a stat-
ute” — applies to § 876(c). The majority’s reliance on Brown
therefore appears to be misplaced.

B.

The majority’s second argument rests on more solid foot-
ing. As the majority points out, § 876(c) refers to a “threat to
injure the person of the addressee or of another.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 876(c) (emphasis added). This language suggests that the
addressee has a person — a “living body” — that can be
injured. If that is the case, then perhaps the “person” to whom
a communication must be addressed must be a natural person.
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 91
This language is not dispositive, however. The highlighted
phrase could also reasonably be understood to mean a “threat
to injure the person of the addressee, if the addressee is a nat-
ural person, or the person of another.” This language thus
lends only modest support to the majority’s position.

C.

The majority’s analysis also relies on a comparison of
§§ 875 and 876. As the majority points out, § 875 employs the
word “person,” standing alone, in some contexts, but uses the
phrase “person, firm, association, or corporation” in others.
This suggests that for purposes of § 875 Congress intended
the word “person,” when standing alone, to apply only to nat-
ural persons. It also shows that Congress knows how to
employ the Dictionary Act definition explicitly when it wants
to. I agree with the majority that Congress’ use of “person”
in § 876 and its selective use of “person, firm, association, or
corporation” in § 875 supports, to a degree, the inference that
Congress intended the word “person” in § 876 to apply to
only natural persons.

The comparison between §§ 875 and 876, however, also
cuts in the opposite direction. If the majority is correct that
every use of the word “person” in § 876 refers to a natural
person, then Congress drew distinctions between §§ 875 and
876 that are difficult to fathom. I glean this lesson from com-
parisons between §§ 875(b) and 876(b) and §§ 875(d) and
876(d). These pairs of subsections are virtually identical,
except that § 875(b) and (d) apply to extortion “from any per-
son, firm, association, or corporation,” whereas § 876(b) and
(d) apply to extortion “from any person.” If the majority is
correct, then § 875 prohibits extortion from corporations, but
§ 876 does not. Why would Congress have intended this
result? Presumably Congress was equally concerned about
extortion whether it was committed through the mail or inter-
state transmission. If so, then the word “person” in the phrases
“intent to extort from any person,” in § 876(b) and (d), likely
92 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
employs the Dictionary Act definition. And if that is the case,
then the premise that the word “person” always means “natu-
ral person,” when it is used in § 876, does not hold up.

D.

The majority also fails to entirely dispel the concern that its
approach would produce absurd results — something we all
agree we should avoid. See In re Pac.-Atl. Trading Co., 64
F.3d 1292, 1303 (9th Cir. 1995) (“We will not presume Con-
gress intended an absurd result.”).

If § 876(c) applies only to a communication addressed to a
natural person, then there would be no § 876 liability in the
case of a communication, addressed to the New York Times,
and containing a threat to kill the paper’s executive editor.
There also would be no § 876 liability if the same communi-
cation threatened to kill the news staff, or their children, or
members of the public attending a concert in Central Park. It
is difficult to imagine why Congress would have intended
such results.6

The majority’s approach could also produce implausible
results when applied to § 876’s other subsections. Section
876(a), for instance, prohibits the mailing of a communica-
tion, “addressed to any other person,” and containing “any
demand or request for ransom or reward for the release of any
kidnapped person.” 18 U.S.C. § 876(a). Under the majority’s
reading of “person,” there would be no liability where a
defendant mails to a corporation a ransom demand for the
release of a person who has been kidnapped.

These results would be avoided were “person” defined in
6
If these threats were mailed interstate, the sender might be liable under
§ 875(b), which does not have an addressee requirement. When the threats
are mailed intrastate, however, the majority’s approach produces a gap in
the statutory scheme that I am concerned about.
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 93
accordance with the Dictionary Act. “Identical words appear-
ing more than once in the same act, and even in the same sec-
tion, may be construed differently if it appears they were used
in different places with different intent.” Vanscoter v. Sulli-
van, 920 F.2d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Atl. Cleaners
& Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)).
Here, Congress may have employed three distinct definitions
of “person” when it enacted § 876(c) — the second use refer-
ring to natural persons, the third use referring to the living
body of a human being and the first use referring to the Dic-
tionary Act definition.

Thus, although I agree with some of the majority’s analy-
sis, a strong case can also be made § 876(c) applies to com-
munications addressed to natural persons and corporations
alike. However, even if § 876(c) applies only to communica-
tions addressed to natural persons, I would hold that Have-
lock’s communications were so addressed. I agree with the
majority that we may look beyond the outside of the envelope
to the salutation line and the content of a communication to
determine to whom a communication is addressed. I disagree,
however, with the majority’s conclusion that Havelock’s com-
munications were not addressed to natural persons.

III.

I would hold that Havelock’s communications were
addressed to natural persons for two distinct reasons. First, as
Judge Graber explained in her panel dissent, Havelock must
have intended his manifesto to be read by employees at the
media outlets to which he sent the manifesto. Mail must be
read by human beings, so Havelock’s communications were
implicitly addressed to the media outlet employees who
would have opened and read his mailings. See United States
v. Havelock, 619 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2010) (Graber, J.,
dissenting) (“I would hold that communications mailed to the
New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Phoenix New
Times, the Associated Press, theshizz.org, and azpunk.com
94 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK
. . . [we]re implicitly addressed to the natural person who nec-
essarily will open and read them.”).

Second, Havelock addressed his manifesto to the general
public, who, of course, are natural persons.7 This is evident
from the nature of the communications and his choice of
recipients. Havelock mailed the manifesto to media outlets,
plainly intending for it to be published. The manifesto uses
language such as “you” and “your,” making clear that he
intended it to be read by the public. It says, for example, that
Havelock would “go down fighting and take as many of you
with me as I can” (emphasis added). It says, “I can get an axe
or a sword from the Knife Shop in the mall. I can get a
machete or a chainsaw at Home Depot. I can get a dozen
knives from any dollar store. If I’m going to kill, there’s noth-
ing anyone can do to stop me.” He wrote, “I have the confi-
dence to do what must be done. . . . More will come. And it
will not just be scared little school children. . . . And you can-
not stop it. Change your world before we change it for you”
(emphasis added). He wrote, “I will reciprocate in kind. . . .
It will be swift, and bloody. I will sacrifice your children upon
the altar of your excess. . . . I must go out and fight” (empha-
sis added). Saying he could “outgun” his enemies for a “brief
moment,” he said he would “make the ultimate sacrifice; I
will give my life. And I will take as many of the baneful and
ruinous ones with me. . . . I will slay your children. I will shed
the blood of the innocent” (emphasis added). Havelock
directed the messages in the manifesto, including both its
political messages and its threats, to members of the public,
who he hoped would read the manifesto following its publica-
tion by the media outlets he sent it to.
7
To “address” means “To speak to,” “To make a formal speech to,” or
“To direct (a spoken or written message) to the attention of.” American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 20 (4th ed. 2000). I rely on
the third definition here, and conclude that Havelock directed the written
messages in his manifesto to members of the public who he intended to
read it.
 UNITED STATES v. HAVELOCK 95
Disagreeing, the majority concludes that Havelock’s mani-
festo was not addressed to natural persons because it indicates
nothing about the identity of any individual person to whom
the communication supposedly was addressed. Unlike the
majority, however, I can find nothing in § 876(c) that pre-
cludes liability when a threatening communication is
addressed to, and threatens mass murder against, a community
rather than a specific individual. I also can think of no reason
why Congress would not have been concerned about threats
to commit mass murder. I would therefore hold that Have-
lock’s communications were addressed to natural persons.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.