[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-11611 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JAN 12, 2012
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-03157-WSD
CAROL CHINN,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PNC BANK, N.A.,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(January 12, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Carol Chinn, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of her complaint
against PNC Bank under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
Chinn argues on appeal that PNC Bank wrongfully initiated foreclosure
proceedings in violation of 12 C.F.R. § 590.4(h). After review, we affirm.
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim. Cunningham v.
Dist. Attorneys Office for Escambia County, 592 F.3d 1237, 1255 (11th Cir.
2010). In reviewing a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept well-pleaded facts
as true. Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir.
2007). Although the complaint need not set forth detailed factual allegations, it
must allege sufficient facts to render the claim "plausible on its face." Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Section 590.4 of the Code of Federal Regulations, entitled “Federally-
related residential manufactured housing loans–consumer protection provisions,”
sets forth a federal preemption scheme that protects certain borrowers from unfair
lending and foreclosure practices. See 12 C.F.R. § 590.4(b)(1). The regulation
applies only to “manufactured homes” as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 5402(6). See 12
C.F.R. § 590.2(g); 12 C.F.R. § 590.4(b)(1).
The district court dismissed Chinn’s claim because Chinn’s residence is not
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a “manufactured home” and therefore 12 C.F.R. § 590.4(h) is not applicable to her
claim. Chinn did not argue on appeal that 12 C.F.R. § 590.4(h) applied to her
residence and has therefore abandoned the argument. See Timson v. Sampson, 518
F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating although we liberally construe pro se
briefs, issues not raised in a party’s initial brief are deemed abandoned). Even if
Chinn had made this argument, it would have failed. The plain language of 12
C.F.R. § 590.4 explicitly limits its scope to manufactured housing, defined as
structures "transportable in one or more sections." 42 U.S.C. § 5402(6). Chinn
did not allege in her complaint that her property qualifies as a manufactured home
and the district court, relying on readily accessible public records, took judicial
notice that Chinn’s property is not manufactured housing.1
AFFIRMED.
1
A district court may take judicial notice of facts capable of accurate and ready
determination by using sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, including
public records. See Fed. R. Evid. 20(b); Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1260 n.2
(11th Cir. 2006).
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