NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-1780
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GEORGE THOMAS,
also known as GEORGE THOMAS EL
George Thomas,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 2-05-cr-00138-001
District Judge: The Honorable William H. Yohn
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 13, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, RENDELL, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 13, 2012)
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OPINION
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.
George Thomas, proceeding pro se, appeals from the judgment of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. A grand jury
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returned an indictment in March of 2005, charging Thomas with two counts of
bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. On July 19, 2005, when Thomas
failed to appear for trial, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. A superseding
indictment was returned in February of 2009, adding thirteen new charges: (1) one
count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to commit an offense against the
United States; (2) eleven counts of knowingly and unlawfully possessing,
transferring, and using a means of identification of another person in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5), and aiding and abetting such conduct in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2; and (3) one count of failing to appear for trial as required by the
conditions of his release in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146(a)(1) and (b)(A)(ii).
Thomas waived his right to a jury trial. On November 17, 2009, the District Court
found him guilty of each of the fifteen counts in the superseding indictment. At
sentencing, the District Court imposed, inter alia, a sentence on each count,
yielding a total term of imprisonment of 138 months.
Thomas, proceeding pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal.1 The District
Court granted a motion by defense counsel to withdraw. On appeal, we appointed
new counsel to represent Thomas. Thereafter, Thomas moved to represent himself
and filed a waiver of counsel. In light of Thomas‟s waiver of counsel, we granted
his motion. At our direction, Thomas‟s discharged counsel mailed him transcripts
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The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
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of the District Court proceedings. When Thomas failed to file a brief and
appendix, we ordered him to show cause why his appeal should not be
administratively closed and gave him fourteen days to file his brief and appendix.
He complied in part with this order, filing only a pro se brief of five pages.
Thomas identified the District Court‟s sentence as the order being appealed.
We review a District Court‟s sentence for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Thomas does not provide any basis for disturbing
the District Court‟s sentence, which is within the guidelines range. Our review
fails to reveal any basis for finding procedural or substantive error.
Thomas‟s pro se brief also alleged prosecutorial misconduct by presenting
the testimony of one of his coconspirators, Kesimu Clark, “who received a benefit
from their testimony in the form of a sentence reduction.” Because Thomas has
not demonstrated that this issue was preserved for appeal, we review for plain
error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). “In order to
demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct under a plain error standard, the review must
reveal „egregious error or a manifest miscarriage of justice.‟” United States v.
Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). We find neither an
error nor a miscarriage of justice in presenting Clark‟s testimony. See United
States v. Hunte, 193 F.3d 173, 174 (3d Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that the
government may promise “leniency to cooperating witnesses in exchange for
truthful testimony”).
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Thomas‟s pro se brief also asserted that a search of certain property was
conducted without a warrant or consent. A review of the District Court docket
fails to reveal that any motion to suppress was raised before trial. Accordingly, we
conclude that Thomas waived any ground for suppressing evidence seized as a
result of the search. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e); United States v. Rose, 538 F.3d 175,
184 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that Rule 12(e) “governs motions to suppress
evidence raised for the first time on appeal”).
Thomas took issue with the admission of evidence that was not “personally
signed” and “sworn under penalty of perjury and legally notarized.” We are not
aware of any such requirement. Furthermore, Thomas failed to provide any
citation to the record. We are, therefore, unable to address his argument that the
evidence was inadmissible and we deem it waived. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(7)
and (9)(A).
Thomas also asserted that “since no „mala in se‟ crime has been committed
. . . [he] should be immediately released.” In addition, he submitted that his
appearance was induced by fraud. Without more, neither statement provides a
ground for setting aside his convictions for § 371 conspiracy, identity theft, bank
fraud, and failure to appear for trial.
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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