Section 7, of chapter 487, of the Laws of 1862, provides, that “Each harbor-master shall have power, within the district-assigned to him, to provide and assign suitable accommodations for all ships and vessels, and regulate them in the stations they are to occupy at the wharves or in the stream, and to remove from time
Under these provisions, the harbor-master acts quasi-judicially, and his judgment is final (Benedict v. Vanderbilt, 1 Robt. 194, 202). It is conceded, in this case, that the harbor-master ordered the defendant to move his vessel, and it is clear that, if he did not refuse, he certainly neglected to move it, and for this neglect he is liable for the penalty of §50. The propriety of the removal seems to be a question confided to the good judgment of the harbor-master. The nature of the employment requires that the determination of such questions should be summary, and the legislature has clothed the harbor-master with the judicial discretion of determining whether certain vessels shall be removed, and whether they are fairly and in good faith engaged in receiving or discharging their cargoes, so
The act of 1869, supra, does not define the kind or class of vessels which are to occupy the piers and slips directed to be leased, but declares that “such lease shall be for the benefit of all persons now holding stands in the said fish market.” The lease executed under this act made the portions of the docks and slip demised private docks, and the slip a private slip, in the same manner and to the same extent as if the lease had been given to a private individual or a corporation for their individual use. But, notwithstanding such a lease, the statute in respect to the harbor-masters (act of 1862, supra) is valid as a police regulation, and extends to wharves in the hands of private owners (Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349). The act of 1862 conferred upon the harbor-master constabulary authority to prevent overcrowding and confusion, with the view of facilitating the awarding of equal rights among the shipping interests of the city, and it applies to all classes of vessels (Adams v. Farmer, 1 E. D. Smith,
In Hecker v. New York Balance Dock Co. (24 Barb. 215), the court held, that the corporation of the city of New York may direct the use of any particular slip or wharf to be appropriated exclusively for any particular craft or class of vessels, and that the jurisdiction of dock-masters and harbor-masters is coextensive with every legal and legitimate use of the basins, piers and wharves. There is nothing in the case just cited, nor in Roosevelt v. Godard (52 Barb. 533) to which the defendant’s counsel has called my attention, which throws any light upon the question involved here. Woodward, J., in deciding Vanderbilt v. Adams (7 Cow. 348), said, “It seems to me that the power exercised in this case is essentially necessary for the purpose of protecting the rights of all concerned. It is not, in the legitimate sense of the term, a violation of any right, but the exercise of a
The jurisdiction he possesses may be likened to that conferred upon health officers, whose decisions are regarded as correct and final (Metropolitan Board of Health v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661): In Hoeft v. Seaman (6 Jones & Spencer, 62) the superior court, held that the powers of the harbor-master were not absolute or arbitrary, and that they had no power to order the removal of vessels from berths occupied by them, except to make room for such others as require to be immediately accommodated for the purpose of receving and discharging their cargoes. Judge Monekl, who wrote the opinion, admits (on p. 71) that it is in conflict with Adams v. Farmer (1 E. D. Smith) where it was held that the power was general and not limited to cases where other vessels required to be immediately accommodated in receiving or discharging cargo.
On the occasion when the present penalty was incurred, the steamer Adelphi was expected to make a landing. The harbor-master found that the defendant’s vessel was in the way. A case-was presented for the exercise of his jurisdiction ; he investigated the matter, decided that the defendant’s vessel was in the way, that it was not engaged in discharging cargo, and or
A verdict was directed in favor of the plaintiff for this amount, and the motion to set it aside and for a new trial will be denied. No costs.