UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5106
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JULIO CESAR TEJEDA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:09-cr-00131-RJC-8)
Submitted: January 20, 2012 Decided: January 27, 2012
Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Noell P. Tin, TIN, FULTON, WALKER & OWEN, PLLC, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United
States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Julio Cesar Tejeda appeals the 84-month sentence
imposed following his guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846
(2006). Counsel for Tejeda has filed a brief in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at sentencing and
the reasonableness of the sentence imposed. Counsel states,
however, that he has found no meritorious grounds for appeal.
Tejeda has filed a pro se supplemental brief raising additional
issues. We affirm.
To the extent that Tejeda challenges the sentence
imposed by the district court, we review under a deferential
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007); United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575–76 (4th
Cir. 2010). We begin by reviewing the sentence for significant
procedural error, including such errors as “failing to calculate
(or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) (2006) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence — including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If there are no
procedural errors, we then consider the substantive
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reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account the totality
of the circumstances. United States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597
F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
“When rendering a sentence, the district court ‘must
make an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented.’” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50) (emphasis omitted).
Accordingly, a sentencing court must apply the relevant §
3553(a) factors to the particular facts presented and must
“‘state in open court’” the particular reasons that support its
chosen sentence. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(c) (West 2000
& Supp. 2011)). The court’s explanation need not be exhaustive;
it must be “sufficient ‘to satisfy the appellate court that the
district court has considered the parties’ arguments and has a
reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking
authority.’” United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837 (4th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356
(2007)) (alterations omitted).
We conclude that the sentence imposed by the district
court was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The
district court calculated the Guidelines range and understood
that it was advisory. Furthermore, it is apparent that the
court had a reasoned basis for its decision. The court made an
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individualized statement explaining the sentence imposed. Thus,
the court imposed a reasonable sentence under the circumstances.
Additionally, Tejeda is not entitled to relief on his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We will address a
claim of ineffective assistance on direct appeal only if the
lawyer’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the record.
United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997).
Otherwise, such claims are more properly raised in a motion
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2011). Our
review convinces us that ineffective assistance does not
conclusively appear on the face of this record, and therefore we
decline to address this claim on direct appeal.
In his supplemental pro se brief, Tejeda first
challenges the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over
drug offenses. This claim is without merit. See United
States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (4th Cir. 1995)
(rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to § 841(a)); see also
Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 1999) (“A
federal district court plainly possesses subject matter
jurisdiction over drug cases”).
Tejeda also claims that the district court erred in
applying an enhancement for his role in the offense and in
calculating the amount of heroin attributable to him for
sentencing purposes. We have reviewed the record and find no
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error in the district court’s application of the leadership role
enhancement or in its findings as to drug quantity.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny
counsel’s motion to withdraw. This court requires that counsel
inform Tejeda, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Tejeda
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may renew his
motion for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Tejeda. We
deny Tejeda’s motion for an injunction pending appeal, and we
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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