Cite as 2022 Ark. 23
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-21-202
Opinion Delivered: February 10, 2022
RANDY WILLIAM GAY APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 26CR-11-428]
V.
HONORABLE RALPH C. OHM,
STATE OF ARKANSAS JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED.
KAREN R. BAKER, Associate Justice
Appellant Randy William Gay appeals the Garland County Circuit Court’s denial of
his postconviction petition to vacate his conviction and sentence of death filed pursuant to
Rules 37.1–37.5 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. A Garland County jury
convicted Gay of capital murder for the shooting death of Connie Snow and sentenced Gay
to death. We affirmed his conviction and sentence in Gay v. State, 2016 Ark. 433, 506
S.W.3d 851 (“Gay I”). Gay subsequently filed a petition to vacate his conviction and
sentence. The circuit court denied his petition and this appeal followed. On January 21,
2021, we reversed and remanded this matter for entry of an order containing findings of fact
and conclusions of law in compliance with Rule 37.5(i). Gay v. State, 2021 Ark. 3, at 2
(“Gay II”). We held that the circuit court’s order denying the postconviction petition did
not include findings of fact or conclusions of law addressing Gay’s claim that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and challenge the aggravating factors of
the second-degree murders of Glen Gay––Gay’s father––and Jim Kelly. On April 23, 2021,
the circuit court entered a supplemental order denying Rule 37 relief and Gay timely
appealed.
On appeal, Gay presents the following six points: (1) he was denied the right to a fair
and impartial jury; (2) he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel; (3) form 3 of the
death-penalty jury instructions precluded the jury from exercising mercy in violation of the
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and article 2, sections 8, 9, and 10 of the
Arkansas Constitution; (4) his sentence of death did not meet the statutory and constitutional
requirements for imposing a death sentence; (5) the verdict forms were ambiguous; and (6)
the State improperly argued lack of remorse as a nonstatutory aggravating factor.
The pertinent facts are these. The record demonstrates that James Westlake testified
that he and his family operated a timber business in Garland County in 2011. James testified
that he paid Gay “a few hundred dollars each week” to “keep an eye” on their equipment
overnight. On May 10, 2011, James, Jim Westlake, and Rickey Stewart were attempting to
repair machinery at their logging business in a wooded area located in Garland County.
Around 5:00 p.m. that day, Gay arrived in a pickup truck, and Snow was in the passenger
seat. Gay got out of his truck and went to speak to James, leaving Snow in the vehicle. Gay
told James that he was using Snow to obtain information about drug trafficking in the
national forest and that she was probably going to jail. James noticed that Snow was
attempting to say something to Gay from the vehicle, and when he told Gay, Gay then
ordered Snow out of the truck. Snow did not comply and Gay went back to his truck,
retrieved a shotgun, and again ordered Snow out of the truck. James testified that Snow was
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getting out of the truck, that he did not believe Gay was going to take any action, and that
James turned away from the truck and back to the machinery when he heard a loud
“BOOM.” James testified that he turned around and saw Snow’s body on the ground and
that Gay was holding the gun toward the ground. James testified that he immediately told
Gay, “I didn’t see anything.” James testified that Gay calmly walked over and asked him if
he had any plastic, and he responded that he did not. He then asked James to help him get
his tailgate open. James said he was somewhat in shock and did not know whether Gay was
going to kill the rest of them or what his next move was. James went over and helped with
the tailgate and then checked on his elderly father. James testified that while he went to
check on his dad, he kept his eyes on Gay because he did not know what was going to
happen and watched Gay drag Snow over and load her into his truck bed. Gay then loaded
Snow’s body into his truck, left the site, and gave James a “thumbs up” on the way out.
James testified that Gay then called him on his cell phone and asked if everything was
“alright between them.” James explained that they were loading logs and did not mention
Snow because he was afraid, he did not know where Gay was, and that he and his employees
were unarmed. James testified that he and his employees left together and that once they
were back out of the woods safely to the highway, he, his brother, and Rickey called law
enforcement and waited for them to arrive.
Rickey testified that when Gay summoned Snow from the truck, she failed to move.
Gay then grabbed a bolt-action shotgun from the toolbox in the back of his truck, stuck it
through the open driver’s-side window, and again ordered her out of the vehicle. Snow still
did not move. Gay walked to the back of his truck, propped his elbow on the vehicle, again
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pointed the gun at Snow, and yelled, “I told you to get the fuck outa my truck.” Snow
stepped out of the truck, keeping her back to the inside of the open door, and said, “What
are you gonna do, shoot me?” Rickey heard Gay click off the gun’s safety, and Gay then
shot Snow in the right side of her face, killing her. Gay asked James if he had any plastic,
and when James stated that he did not, Gay asked him to help him lower the tailgate of his
truck. Gay dragged Snow by the belt loops of her jeans and her hair to the back of his truck
and threw her body into the truck bed. He then drove away from the work site, giving
James a “thumbs up” on the way out. James indicated that Gay phoned him several minutes
later to see if everything was okay and to tell him that he “got everything taken care of.”
James and the others then notified law enforcement of the murder.
That evening, Gay attended a bonfire at the home of Larry and Vera Nevels and
stayed the night with his girlfriend, Latonya McElroy. The next morning, he told McElroy
that he had to “get rid of” something. He was arrested as he got into his car to leave the
apartment. Gay claimed that he had a severe drinking problem and that he did not remember
what happened the previous day. Snow’s body was located four days later, on May 14, 2011,
approximately 1.2 miles from the shooting in a shallow creek bed. On the other side of the
creek, officers located Snow’s hair and her scalp. It was evident that animals had predated
on the body. Gay was charged with premeditated capital murder, and the State sought the
death penalty.
On April 15, 2013, Gay’s first trial ended in a mistrial after the circuit court found
that several members of the jury had violated instructions by conducting independent online
research about the murder. Gay was retried on March 11–15, 2015. Following the guilt
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phase of the trial, the jury convicted Gay of capital murder. During the penalty phase, the
prosecution introduced evidence of three prior felony offenses, all of which were used as
aggravating circumstances: (1) the second-degree murder of his then father-in-law, Jim
Kelly, in 1978; (2) the second-degree murder of his father, Glen, in 1991; and (3) the
terroristic threatening of John Ward in 2007. The defense submitted approximately seventy
mitigating circumstances, most of which related to Gay’s tumultuous and abusive
relationship with his father, his heavy alcohol use, and his good behavior while incarcerated
for his prior crimes. The jury found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and
sentenced him to death.
On May 28, 2017, Gay filed a petition to vacate his conviction and sentence pursuant
to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. On December 6, 2018, the circuit court
conducted a two-day hearing on the petition. Gay presented several expert witnesses,
including Dr. Matthew Mendel, Dr. John Roache, and law professor J. Thomas Sullivan.
Dr. Mendel, an expert on the impact of childhood trauma, testified that he had interviewed
Gay on October 24–25, 2018. He identified fourteen risk factors for a negative outcome
that resulted from adverse events during Gay’s childhood such as sexual abuse by Gay’s
father, by other juveniles in a “children’s home” and in prison; abandonment by both his
parents; alcohol abuse; physical and verbal abuse by his father; and witnessing violent acts of
his father on others, including a murder of his cousin and attempted sexual assaults of Gay’s
wives. Dr. Mendel diagnosed Gay with PTSD, alcohol dependency, and depression. He
opined that Gay’s childhood traumas and diagnoses caused him to react suddenly, violently,
and aggressively when confronted with a threatening situation and that this would have
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been helpful information for the jury to know during sentencing. Dr. Roache testified as
an expert in psychiatry and pharmacology. From a review of Gay’s records, he diagnosed
him with severe alcohol-use disorder, depression, anxiety, and PTSD. According to Dr.
Roache, the combination of alcoholism and PTSD caused Gay to react impulsively and
aggressively. Professor Sullivan testified to the capital-defense standards and also that Gay’s
attorneys performed deficiently, particularly with respect to jury selection and the
investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence. Finally, Gay’s trial counsel, Mark
Fraiser, and his mitigation specialist, Ashley Hornibrook, both testified. They explained that
many of the decisions challenged by Gay in his petition were a result of trial strategy, and
they further explained that Gay would not testify during the sentencing phase or cooperate
with their mitigation investigation.
Following the submission of posttrial briefs, on March 5, 2019, the circuit court
entered an order denying all of Gay’s claims for relief and finding that he had received
effective assistance of counsel. Gay timely appealed, and we reversed and remanded for
additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. Gay II, 2021 Ark. 3. Following our
remand, the circuit court entered a supplemental order adopting the previous order and
adding detailed findings and conclusions of law as directed by this court. The court again
concluded that Gay’s Rule 37 petition should be denied, and Gay timely appealed from this
supplemental order.
I. Fair and Impartial Jury
For his first point on appeal, Gay argues that he was denied the right to a fair and
impartial jury under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
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Constitution and article 2, sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Arkansas Constitution. Without
identifying which jurors he is referring to; Gay argues that two jurors stated that they would
automatically impose a death sentence if Gay was convicted of capital murder. Gay appears
to be referring to Sandra Barker and Carolyn Wetthington. Gay goes on to explain that the
defense challenges for cause were denied because the jurors said that they would follow the
law. Gay contends that the jurors were substantially impaired in their ability to give
meaningful consideration to mitigating evidence. Additionally, Gay argues that he was
denied the right to a fair and impartial jury because “none of the jurors were asked if they
could consider any mitigation evidence particular to Gay’s case.” In denying relief on his
fair-and-impartial-jury claims, the circuit court found that these arguments could have been
reviewed on direct appeal and that Gay failed to prove prejudice or the likelihood that the
outcome of the trial would have been different. We agree. In Reams v. State, we explained
that
[g]enerally, a petition under Rule 37 does not provide a remedy when an issue could
have been raised at trial or argued on appeal. Rule 37 is a postconviction remedy
and, as such, does not provide a method for the review of mere error in the conduct
of the trial or to serve as a substitute for appeal. However, we have made an exception
for errors that are so fundamental as to render the judgment of conviction void and
subject to collateral attack. When we review a “fundamental” or “structural” error
either on direct appeal or through the exception described above, the fundamental
nature of the error precludes application of the “harmless-error” analysis.
2018 Ark. 324, at 15–16, 560 S.W.3d 441, 452 (internal citations omitted). Gay asserts that
his denial of a request to strike jurors for cause or to voir dire them on particular mitigating
facts is an issue involving fundamental error; however, we are not persuaded by this
argument.
7
A. Strike for Cause
With regard to the circuit court’s refusal to strike jurors Barker and Wetthington for
cause, Gay fails to mention that Barker and Wetthington were not seated on the jury because
he struck both with peremptory challenges. To the extent that Gay is arguing that Barker
and Wetthington should have been struck for cause, we have explained that
[w]e do not address this claim of error because it pertains to venirepersons that
appellant excused through the use of his peremptory challenges. It is well settled that
the loss of peremptory challenges cannot be reviewed on appeal. The focus should
not be on a venireperson who was peremptorily challenged, but on the persons who
actually sat on the jury.
Willis v. State, 334 Ark. 412, 420, 977 S.W.2d 890, 894 (1998) (internal citations omitted).
In Willis, we held that because the particular venirepersons were not seated on the jury we
did not need to consider whether they should have been struck for cause. Further, to the
extent that Gay is arguing that he was forced to utilize all of the peremptory challenges, he
also fails to acknowledge that he had three strikes left. Accordingly, we do not find merit in
Gay’s argument.
B. Mitigating Factors
Next, with regard to Gay’s claim that he was denied the opportunity to question
prospective jurors about mitigating factors specific to his case, Gay raised this exact issue in
Gay I, and we rejected his argument:
[Gay] makes conclusory statements and does not develop this argument. However,
based on the record discussed above, the record does not support Gay’s argument.
Further, we do not consider an argument when the appellant presents no citation to
authority or convincing argument in its support, and it is not apparent without
further research that the argument is well taken. Further, based on our review of the
record, Gay did not preserve this issue for review. Gay did not contemporaneously
object to the voir dire or proffer questions he sought to ask the potential jurors.
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Gay I, 2016 Ark. 433, at 8, 506 S.W.3d at 857 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). Because this is a death case, Gay’s direct appeal was subject to review under Rule
10 of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Criminal. We noted that the entire record
was reviewed, including those issues that were not properly preserved for appeal, and we
held that there was no reversible error. Further, the record was reviewed pursuant to
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(i) (2016) and no reversible error was found. We find no
error on this point and affirm.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
On appeal, Gay argues that (1) counsel was ineffective during jury selection; (2)
counsel was ineffective for introducing the Arkansas Department of Correction Institutional
File, also known as a “Pen Pack”; (3) counsel failed to object to victim-impact evidence;
(4) counsel failed to object to the State’s closing argument; (5) counsel failed to pursue self-
defense or imperfect self-defense theories; (6) counsel failed to properly present the Scotty
Garner murder; (7) counsel failed to investigate and present evidence of posttraumatic stress
disorder, alcohol-abuse disorder and childhood sexual abuse as mitigators; and (8) counsel
failed to investigate and challenge the aggravators.
Turning to our standard of review with regard to a circuit court’s ruling on a
petitioner’s request for Rule 37 relief, this court will not reverse the circuit court’s decision
granting or denying postconviction relief unless it is clearly erroneous. Kemp v. State, 347
Ark. 52, 55, 60 S.W.3d 404, 406 (2001). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although
there is evidence to support it, the appellate court after reviewing the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.; Prater v. State, 2012
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Ark. 164, at 8, 402 S.W.3d 68, 74. “The benchmark for judging a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must be ‘whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced
a just result.’ Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)].” Henington v. State, 2012 Ark.
181, at 3–4, 403 S.W.3d 55, 58. Pursuant to Strickland, we assess the effectiveness of counsel
under a two-prong standard. First, a petitioner raising a claim of ineffective assistance must
show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”
guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Williams v. State, 369 Ark. 104, 251 S.W.3d 290 (2007). A petitioner making an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim must show that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Springs v. State, 2012 Ark. 87, 387 S.W.3d 143. A court must
indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. Id.
Second, the petitioner must show that counsel’s deficient performance so prejudiced
petitioner’s defense that he was deprived of a fair trial. Id. The petitioner must show there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the fact-finder would have had a
reasonable doubt respecting guilt, i.e., the decision reached would have been different absent
the errors. Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006). A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. Unless a
petitioner makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a
breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result unreliable. Id. Additionally,
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conclusory statements that counsel was ineffective cannot be the basis for postconviction
relief. Anderson v. State, 2011 Ark. 488, 385 S.W.3d 783.
A. Jury Selection
In his first ineffective-assistance argument, Gay contends that his trial counsel was
ineffective during jury selection. The circuit court found that the allegations of error relative
to trial counsel’s inadequate voir dire were all matters of strategy within the limits imposed
by the circuit court, and Gay failed to demonstrate that the presence of any seated juror
prevented him from receiving a fair trial.
Specifically, Gay asserts that no juror was asked whether he or she could give
meaningful consideration and effect to any of the approximately seventy mitigating factors
presented. Trial counsel asked only if the venire could consider mitigating evidence
generally. No juror was asked, for example, if he or she could give intoxication, a history
of child abuse and sexual victimization, or a mental-health disorder meaningful
consideration and effect as a mitigating circumstance. Gay further asserts that the venire was
asked if it could consider mitigating evidence, but only as a general category of evidence,
and all venirepersons indicated that they could. To support his position, Gay relies on Morgan
v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992). In Morgan, the Court held that “[a] juror who will
automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the
evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do.
Indeed, because such a juror has already formed an opinion on the merits, the presence or
absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant to such a
juror. Therefore, based on the requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge for cause any
prospective juror who maintains such views. If even one such juror is empaneled and the
death sentence is imposed, the State is disentitled to execute the sentence.” 504 U.S. at 729.
Thus, Morgan stands for the proposition that a venireperson who will automatically vote for
the death penalty, regardless of mitigators or aggravators, should be struck for cause. It does
not stand for the proposition that Gay should have been allowed to question jurors about
their views on “particular” mitigators.
Further, Gay has not demonstrated that trial counsel’s performance was deficient
under Strickland. During the Rule 37 hearing, Fraiser testified the defense team scoured the
jury questionnaires and divided them into three stacks: good, questionable, concerning. In
the “concerned” stack were jurors that indicated they were pro-death penalty. Fraiser
testified that his strategy was to seat as many jurors “as possible who would be bordering on
being excluded because they could not consider the death penalty.” Fraiser testified that his
goal for these prospective jurors was to get them to say they could consider the death penalty
in order to prevent the prosecution from striking them for cause. At trial, Fraiser asked the
jury mitigation specific questions, including, “Do you consider [the possibility of life
without parole] a severe punishment for a crime?” and “Some people are of the belief,
because of religion, the way that they were raised, what they have read, life experience, that
if you take a life you should forfeit your life. Do you believe that?”
Matters of trial strategy and tactics, even if arguably improvident, fall within the realm
of counsel’s professional judgment and are not grounds for finding ineffective assistance of
counsel. Hartman v. State, 2017 Ark. 7, 508 S.W.3d 28. When a decision by trial counsel is
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a matter of trial tactics or strategy and that decision is supported by reasonable professional
judgment, then such a decision is not a proper basis for relief under Rule 37. Van Winkle v.
State, 2016 Ark. 98, 486 S.W.3d 778. We agree with the circuit court’s determination that
Fraiser’s voir dire was a matter of trial strategy. Finally, because Gay cannot demonstrate
deficient performance, we need not consider the prejudice prong in Strickland.
B. Pen Pack
In his second ineffective-assistance argument, Gay contends that his trial counsel was
ineffective for introducing his Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) “pen pack”
during his sentencing phase. The pen pack consisted of approximately 300 pages and
spanned all periods of time that he had been incarcerated in the ADC. Gay contends that
while his defense counsel purportedly introduced the pen pack as mitigating evidence, it
was extremely prejudicial to his defense.
Gay asserts that the pen pack contained highly damaging information, including a
record of Gay’s parole violations and revocations. Notes from Gay’s parole officer included
evidence that Gay (1) had threatened to blow up someone’s house; (2) had been arrested
for battery while on parole; (3) had been seen carrying around a shotgun; (4) had beaten up
a woman with whom he was having an affair; and (5) had been arrested for felon in
possession of a firearm. The pack also contained a letter from Gay’s father, Glen, to the
parole board. The prosecution later used it against Gay in its closing argument. Specifically,
Gay asserts that the prosecution, referring to the letter, argued that Glen had tried to help
Gay get paroled and that Gay repaid Glen by killing him. The results of Gay’s “Minnesota
Multi-phasic Personality Inventory” (MMPI) test were also contained in the pack. Gay
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argues that the prosecution read the MMPI findings to the jury, suggesting that Gay had the
personality of a cold-blooded killer.
During the Rule 37 hearing, Fraiser testified that the decision to introduce the pen
pack as evidence in mitigation was made “in the context of this case and what we had to
work with.” Fraiser explained that the majority of Gay’s adult life was spent in custody or
in isolation, which limited the evidence that the defense could explore in mitigation. Fraiser
explained that the pen pack was introduced to demonstrate Gay’s ability to conform his
behavior to the requirements of being institutionalized. Further, by the time the decision to
introduce the pen pack was made, the jury had already been introduced to proof that Gay
had been involved in two previous homicides. Fraiser opined that the jury had already found
Gay guilty and had seen the graphic pictures of Snow’s body. Thus, Fraiser testified, by the
time the pen pack was introduced, the defense was trying to convince the jury to “not
forfeit [Gay’s] life. Lock him up, put him in a confined environment, remove him from
society. He’ll no longer be a danger to society as a whole, and at least he has shown ability
to not flourish but survive accordingly in that environment.” When asked, “[O]ther than
the pen pack, what type of evidence could you have presented to adequately convey that
portion of your mitigation defense?” Fraiser testified that he could not find any ADC officer,
guard, or administrator who was willing to come forward to render an opinion. On this
issue, the circuit court found the decision to introduce the pen pack was a matter of trial
strategy and not reviewable in a Rule 37 petition.
Here, counsel made a deliberate decision to allow introduction of the pen pack, and
he provided his specific reasoning for doing so. Further, Gay’s own witness, Professor
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Sullivan, acknowledged that the pen pack was the only evidence admitted to demonstrate
that Gay was a “good prisoner in the mitigating evidence.” As the State points out, the jury
unanimously found the following mitigating factors: (1) Gay respects the chain of command
at the ADC; (2) Gay functions best when he is in a highly structured situation in which he
has a supervisor; (3) Gay has been respectful to correctional officers and administrators
during his incarceration; (4) Gay is a model inmate; (5) Gay has never been in any fights or
involved in any assaults during his years of confinement; (6) Gay has demonstrated his desire
to be productive and work at an assigned position while incarcerated; and (7) Gay has been
rule abiding and complies with staff directives and work assignments while in custody, and
as such, he is considered to be a good prospect for peaceful and productive adjustment while
in custody. Accordingly, the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the decision to
introduce the pen pack was a matter of trial strategy.
C. Victim-Impact Evidence
In his third ineffective-assistance argument, Gay contends that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to Mary Beth Lansdell’s penalty-phase victim-impact
testimony. Specifically, Gay takes issue with Ms. Lansdell’s statement about the loss of her
mother “[d]ue to the actions of one man, who had no remorse, which resulted in taking
our mother’s life so ruthlessly.” To support his argument, Gay relies on Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808 (1991), recognizing that Payne overruled Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496
(1987), which prohibited victim impact statements. However, Gay notes that the Payne
court left intact the prohibition against statements about “the crime, the defendant, and the
appropriate sentence” because such statements violated the Eighth Amendment and were
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inadmissible. Id. at 830 n.2. Gay then goes on to cite an Eighth Circuit case, Williams v.
Norris, 612 F.3d 941, 951 (8th Cir. 2010), which recognizes that the Booth prohibition
against statements about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentences remained
intact. Gay argues that Lansdell’s statement violated this prohibition because she commented
directly on Gay—calling him remorseless. She also commented on the crime—calling it
ruthless. Gay contends that without these statements, a reasonable probability exists to
believe the sentencing outcome would have been different. We disagree. The Payne court
stated that if evidence was introduced that was “so unduly prejudicial” that it rendered “the
trial fundamentally unfair,” then the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
could provide relief. Id. at 825. Given the record before us, Landsell’s statement did not rise
to the level of rendering Gay’s trial fundamentally unfair. Therefore, we agree with the
circuit court’s finding that Gay failed to demonstrate that a different verdict would have
been reached had his counsel made a sustainable objection.
As a secondary basis for denying relief, the circuit court found that the lack of
objection to victim-impact evidence is a matter of trial strategy. We agree. During the Rule
37 hearing, Fraiser testified that he believed “that is going to be pretty egregious to step on
a family victim member during their victim impact statement.” In his own experience, he
has “seen it blow up in someone’s face to their detriment.” Specifically, Fraiser recalled
being a trial attorney in the capital-murder trial of Terrick Nooner. During Nooner’s trial,
the defense attorney posed a question to a family victim after victim impact testimony.
Fraiser testified that the defense “asked a question that they should not have asked, and it
was to the point with [family victim member]’s response, the jurors were crying and the
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court reporter was visibly crying. Given this, you have to be careful.” Based on Fraiser’s
testimony regarding his experience with questioning a victim’s family member, it was a
matter of trial strategy to not appear insensitive to Lansdell’s loss. We cannot say that the
circuit court’s findings in this regard were clearly erroneous.
D. State’s Closing Argument
In his fourth ineffective-assistance argument, Gay contends that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the State’s improper closing argument. A reversal of a
judgment due to remarks made by counsel during closing arguments is rare and requires that
counsel make an appeal to the jurors’ passions and emotions. Houghton v. State, 2015 Ark.
252, 464 S.W.3d 922. Experienced advocates might differ about when, or if, objections are
called for since, as a matter of trial strategy, further objections from counsel may result in
comments seeming more significant to the jury. Id. Because many lawyers refrain from
objecting during opening statement and closing argument, absent egregious misstatements,
the failure to object during closing argument and opening statement is within the wide
range of permissible professional legal conduct. Howard, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24. Here,
the circuit court found that the lack of objection to the State’s closing argument was a matter
of trial strategy; Gay failed to show that a different verdict would have been reached had
counsel made a sustainable objection; and the argument was not a mischaracterization of the
evidence presented.
Specifically, Gay argues that the prosecutor’s comments—(1) that Gay “picked [the
victim] up like a dead deer and chunked her, after he drug her, and he chunked her into
the back of his truck”; (2) that “she’s left there for four days so animals could eat her”; and
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(3) that he “pushes her up on his knee like she’s a dead animal”—were overly inflammatory
and that there is a reasonable probability that the jury would not have sentenced him to
death had counsel objected.
We agree with the circuit court’s determination that trial counsel’s decision not to
object during the State’s closing argument was a matter of trial strategy. At trial, two
witnesses testified that after Gay shot Snow, he dragged her to the back of his truck by her
hair and belt loops, rolled her up on his knee, and put her in the back of his truck.
Additionally, medical examiner Dr. Charles Kokes testified that when Snow’s body was
recovered, bones and tissue were missing from her face, which could have been caused by
animal activity. We cannot say that the circuit court’s findings in this regard were clearly
erroneous. Accordingly, we agree with the circuit court and affirm the circuit court on this
point.
E. Self-Defense Theory
In his fifth ineffective-assistance argument, Gay contends that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to pursue a self-defense or an imperfect self-defense theory. As a basis
for this theory, Gay contends that a knife was found in the passenger compartment of the
pickup truck that Snow occupied, and a photograph of the knife in the truck was
introduced. In addition, Gay’s “Prisoner Medical Treatment Report” contained Gay’s
statements that “a woman tried to stab him.” On this issue, the circuit court found that Gay
did not show that defense counsel failed to adequately investigate possible defenses or that
such an investigation would have revealed anything that might have been admissible at trial
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in light of the other evidence presented and Gay’s refusal to testify or actively participate in
the preparation of his defense.
Counsel has a duty to “make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Kemp v. State, 348 Ark. 750, 758,
74 S.W.3d 224, 227 (2002). Counsel’s decision not to investigate must be directly assessed
for reasonableness, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments. Id. Given
what counsel had to work with, it was reasonable to opt for a strategy that he believed had
the most chance of success. The fact that he did not investigate what he believed to be a
losing defense theory was a tactical decision and not a basis for Rule 37 relief. See Flores v.
State, 350 Ark. 198, 206, 85 S.W.3d 896, 901 (2002).
Here, other than Gay’s own self-serving statement, there is no evidence that Gay
acted recklessly or in self-defense when he shot Snow. At trial, there was no evidence
presented that Snow had a weapon or acted aggressively toward Gay. The two witnesses
testified that Gay exited the truck and ordered Snow out of the truck; Snow did not comply,
and Gay went back to his truck and retrieved a shotgun and again ordered Snow out of the
truck. As Snow was attempting to exit the truck, Gay shot Snow in the right side of her
face. Further, during the Rule 37 hearing, Fraiser testified that there was no indication from
any witness during the trial that a knife was presented in a threatening manner to Gay when
he shot Snow.
As the justification of self-defense was not available to Gay, his counsel necessarily
did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise the defense. Edwards v.
19
State, 2017 Ark. 207, at 6, 521 S.W.3d 107, 112. Accordingly, we cannot say that the circuit
court erred in denying Gay’s petition on this issue.
F. Scotty Garner Murder
In his sixth ineffective-assistance argument, Gay contends that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to properly investigate and present evidence of the killing of Gay’s
cousin, Garner, as a mitigating factor. Specifically, Gay argues that the jury could have
concluded that Gay may have killed Garner. On this issue, the circuit court found that the
reference to the Garner homicide was a matter of trial strategy. Further, the circuit court
found that Gay failed to show that a different verdict would have been reached had counsel
not made reference to this.
During the penalty phase, the defense elicited testimony regarding the death of
Garner. Gloria Lindsay, Gay’s sister, testified that both Gay and Glen were present when
Garner was killed. According to Lindsay, Glen admitted to the authorities that he was the
one who shot Garner, and then he recanted. However, Lindsay testified that as far as she
knew, no one was ever charged with Garner’s death. During closing argument, Fraiser
emphasized to the jury that Glen claimed that he had shot Garner. “It was investigated and
for whatever reason the authorities at that time . . . felt that Glen Gay should not be charged
with an offense. That murder - or that homicide was ruled to be justifiable, but it’s
something that Randy saw.”
At the Rule 37 hearing, Fraiser testified that he introduced evidence about Garner’s
death to demonstrate that Gay had been exposed to violence in his life. Fraiser testified that
when Gay would not help the defense develop mitigation or facts relevant to the actual
20
merits of the charge itself, he “did not have a lot to work with, and [was] trying to use
family members to convey exposure to violence for mitigation purposes.”
Based on the foregoing, the circuit court did not err in determining that the reference
to the Garner homicide was a matter of trial strategy. Further, in light of Lindsay’s testimony
and Fraiser’s closing argument indicating that Glen had shot Garner, Gay’s bare allegation
that the jury “could” have concluded that he shot Garner is not persuasive. Accordingly,
we affirm the circuit court’s decision on this point.
G. Failure to Investigate Mitigators
In his seventh ineffective-assistance argument, Gay contends that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate and present as mitigating factors evidence of his PTSD,
alcohol abuse, and childhood sexual abuse.
In response, the State argues that Gay ignores the fact that counsel presented evidence
in virtually all of these categories during the penalty phase—multiple witnesses testified
about Gay’s chronic alcohol abuse; Lindsay offered testimony regarding Gay’s abuse at the
hands of his father, Glen; and Lindsay offered testimony that Gay had been sexually abused
by older boys at the children’s home.
The circuit court found (1) that Gay failed to show that defense counsel did not
adequately investigate possible mitigating factors; (2) that such an investigation would have
revealed anything that might have been admissible at trial in light of other evidence
presented; and (3) that Gay refused to testify or actively participate in the preparation of his
defense, including refusal to undergo a mental evaluation.
21
A trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present substantial mitigating evidence
during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial can constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Sanford v. State, 342 Ark. 22, 25 S.W.3d
414 (2000). Counsel is obligated to conduct an investigation for the purpose of ascertaining
mitigating evidence, and the failure to do so is error. Coulter v. State, 343 Ark. 22, 31 S.W.3d
826 (2000). Such error, however, does not automatically require reversal unless it is shown
that, but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the sentence would have
been different. Howard, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24. When reviewing a claim of
ineffectiveness based upon failure to present adequate mitigating evidence, we view the
totality of the evidence—both that adduced at trial and that adduced in the postconviction
proceeding. Id.
Gay asserts that prior to trial, his trial counsel received his “Prisoner Medical
Treatment Report,” which Gay contends provided the following mitigation evidence:
Gay’s prior psychiatric treatment; that two days after the Snow homicide, he was diagnosed
with “alcohol abuse, continuous drinking behavior”; evidence of prior diagnoses with
alcohol-dependence disorder; a “Mental Health Social History” noting that Gay’s father was
an alcoholic and was abusive; on the day of the homicide, Gay drank a pint of whiskey and
between twelve and twenty beers; he drank twelve beers a day for twenty-five years; Gay
was a witness to his father’s violence; Gay was victimized during a prior incarceration; Gay
was symptomatic of PTSD; and Gay’s father was abusive and had sexually abused Gay. Gay
notes that trial counsel’s file also contained numerous witness statements from an FBI
investigation that contained mitigating evidence—that Gay was a heavy drinker; that he was
22
in an orphanage when he was very young; that Gay had witnessed the murder of Garner;
and that several individuals stated that Glen had been sexually inappropriate with Sherry
(Gay’s first wife) and Candy (Gay’s half-sister). Gay asserts that trial counsel’s failure to
adequately investigate and present this evidence was unreasonable and fell below the
standard of care for defense counsel in capital cases. He also claims that a reasonable
investigation would have resulted in competent counsel consulting with, and offering the
testimony of, experts in the fields of child sexual abuse, PTSD, and chronic alcoholism.
Further, Gay asserts that had this evidence been investigated and presented, one or more
jurors would have rejected the death penalty.
During the Rule 37 hearing, Dr. Mendel, testified that he had conducted a
psychological examination of Gay. His report focused on Gay’s childhood-abuse
experiences, including sexual abuse. Dr. Mendel opined that Gay had been subjected to a
range of adverse childhood experiences that damaged him—childhood sexual abuse, verbal
and emotional abuse, the loss of his mother who stopped being involved early in his life,
and further abandonment when he spent time in an orphanage. Additionally, Gay witnessed
his father threaten violence toward others and was subjected to his father’s threats of violence
toward him. Dr. Mendel opined that Gay’s adverse childhood experiences would have
provided an enormous amount of mitigating evidence. He also testified that he diagnosed
Gay with PTSD, alcohol dependency, and major depressive disorder.
Dr. Roache testified that Gay suffered physical, sexual, and emotional abuse as a
child; Gay and his father were alcoholics; and Gay’s chronic alcohol abuse likely caused
changes to his brain that made logical reasoning and impulse control more difficult for him.
23
Dr. Roache found that Gay was predisposed to alcohol-use disorder (AUD), which was
likely genetically inherited from Glen. AUD causes structural changes in the brain that can
result in neurocognitive deficits. As a result, Gay’s actions are more impulsive or instinctual
rather than deliberative or decisional. Dr. Roache agreed with Dr. Mendel’s diagnosis of
PTSD, which causes irritable behavior and angry outbursts, reckless or self-destructive
behavior, hypervigilance, and an exaggerated startle response.
Despite Gay’s assertion to the contrary, this is not a case in which trial counsel failed
to investigate the mitigating evidence. As the State asserts, Gay’s alcohol abuse was a
consistent theme in his trial. Janice Cochran, Gay’s second wife, testified that Gay and Glen
both drank in excess and that Gay was always angry when he drank whiskey. John Ward,
Gay’s former employer, testified that Gay’s drinking was the reason he stopped giving Gay
jobs to do around his store. Lindsay testified that Gay drank heavily and was an alcoholic.
She stated that she tried unsuccessfully to get Gay to seek help for his drinking problem.
With regard to sexual abuse, Lindsay testified that Gay had been sexually abused by older
boys at the children’s home.
As to sexual abuse by Gay’s father, the mitigation investigator’s notes reflect that Gay
reported that he had been sexually abused by his father. However, at the Rule 37 hearing,
Fraiser testified that he decided not to introduce that evidence because he believed Gay
would have objected to any attempt to put on testimony about the sexual abuse. Fraiser
stated that he did not recall telling Gay that he expected Lindsay to testify about the sexual
abuse at the children’s home for fear that he would have insisted that he not introduce such
evidence.
24
Here, trial counsel discovered and presented mitigating evidence. Approximately
seventy mitigating circumstances were submitted to the jury. Also, Fraiser testified that Gay
refused to testify and develop mitigation facts. Further, as the State points out, the mitigation
strategy proposed in the Rule 37 proceedings was the exact opposite of the one employed
by trial counsel. At the Rule 37 hearing, Fraiser testified that the defense strategy during the
sentencing phase was to demonstrate that Gay “could conform his behavior to the
requirements of being institutionalized or in the Department of Correction[].” The
postconviction strategy would have presented Gay “as a loose cannon who will react with
violence when placed in a stressful environment.” Here, trial counsel’s decisions concerning
mitigation evidence included matters of trial strategy and tactics.
Here, the jury heard an abundance of evidence about Gay’s childhood, such as abuse
by his father, sexual abuse by other children in the children’s home, and his chronic alcohol
abuse; however, it found that most of this evidence did not rise to the level of a mitigating
circumstance. Despite this, the jury found that “the aggravating circumstances outweigh
beyond a reasonable doubt any mitigating circumstances found by any juror to exist.” Thus,
Gay has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
failure to present testimony from the doctors, the jury would have reached a different result,
namely a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Therefore, we affirm the denial of
relief on this point.
H. Failure to Adequately Investigate and Challenge the Aggravating Factors
of the Second-Degree Murders of Glen Gay and Jim Kelly
Gay’s final ineffective-assistance argument is that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to further investigate or challenge the two second-degree murders that were used as
25
aggravating factors. He contends that counsel should have presented additional
circumstances surrounding the murders of his father-in-law, Kelly, and his father, Glen, to
lessen the weight the jury gave to these aggravators. Gay asserts that the police file on Kelly’s
murder contained evidence that Gay had been drinking before the murder and that the
week before Kelly’s death, Gay had been talking about killing himself. Gay further contends
that the file contained evidence that Kelly had told Gay that he would “beat his brains out”
if he laid another hand on his daughter, Sherry. Gay further asserts that the file contained
evidence of a letter from Sherry stating that a ten-year sentence with five years suspended,
with parole eligibility after serving one-sixth of the five years was a fair and just sentence.
In addition, Gay argues that there was evidence in the file on his father’s murder that Glen
had pulled a gun on Gay, that Glen had attacked Gay’s wife, and that Gay shot Glen in self-
defense. Gay asserts that none of this evidence was presented to the jury to lessen the weight
of the aggravators related to Kelly and Glen.
In its supplemental order, the circuit court found that trial counsel fully and
completely investigated the two murder convictions by securing all files associated with the
murders in the possession of the prosecuting attorneys’ offices and the circuit court clerk’s
office. The court also found that the decision whether to challenge these aggravating factors
was a matter of trial strategy. The court noted that counsel’s strategy was to have Gay testify
during sentencing about the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and try to explain
them to the jury. However, Gay refused to testify even though counsel implored him to do
so.
26
Here, Gay fails to recognize that trial counsel successfully obtained a motion in limine
to prevent evidence about the circumstances leading up to Kelly’s murder––that Gay had
beaten his wife the night before and on previous occasions. Further, any attempt to
introduce testimony to mitigate the effect of that prior murder would have opened the door
to this harmful evidence. The file on Glen’s murder contained multiple, varying descriptions
of the circumstances behind that shooting, and Gay had admitted during a polygraph
examination that Glen did not have a gun at the time of the murder. Gay’s wife at the time,
Janice Cochran, was the only other witness to Glen’s murder. Cochran also testified during
the sentencing phase, and her version of the events would have contradicted any evidence
presented by Gay that he shot his father in self-defense. Cochran testified that she overheard
an argument between Gay and Glen, heard a loud noise, and went outside the camper to
see what had happened. Cochran testified that Gay came to the camper and retrieved
shotgun shells, and when Cochran asked what was happening, Gay shoved her back into
the camper and padlocked the door. Cochran testified that she could see Gay outside the
camper loading the shotgun, that she heard a loud noise, and that Gay came back and let
her out of the camper. Cochran testified that when she returned to where they were
camping, she found Glen, who had been shot in the head. She testified that Gay made her
help load Glen’s body into a boat and row it down the river. Cochran testified that she
convinced Gay that they should turn themselves in to the police because she was afraid of
Gay. Accordingly, because the prosecutor’s file and the testimony of the only other witness
do not support a self-defense inference, counsel did not perform deficiently by not
investigating further. Finally, even if counsel had been able to introduce additional evidence
27
about these prior murders, Gay has not demonstrated how this would have changed the
jury’s determination that these were aggravating circumstances, particularly when he pled
guilty to one murder and was found guilty of the other. Thus, postconviction relief was not
warranted on this claim.
III. Form 3
For his third point on appeal, Gay argues that the third death-penalty verdict form
(“Form 3”) prohibits the jury from exercising mercy in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments and article 2, sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Arkansas Constitution.
Form 3 provided that if the jury determined that (A) the State proved beyond a reasonable
doubt one or more aggravating circumstances; (B) the aggravating circumstances
outweighed beyond a reasonable doubt any mitigating circumstances; and (C) the
aggravating circumstances justify beyond a reasonable doubt a sentence of death, “then
sentence Randy William Gay to Death on Form 4.” Gay contends that Form 3 prohibited
the jury from exercising mercy. On this issue, the circuit court found that this allegation of
error could have been reviewed on direct appeal and does not constitute grounds for relief
under Rule 37. We agree. As set forth in Reams, supra, unless an error is so fundamental as
to render the judgment of conviction void and subject to collateral attack, a petition under
Rule 37 does not provide a remedy when an issue could have been raised at trial or argued
on appeal. Here, Gay does not argue that this alleged error is structural or fundamental in
nature. Accordingly, we agree with the circuit court’s finding that this issue does not
constitute grounds for relief under Rule 37.
28
Finally, we note Gay’s acknowledgment that Kemp v. State, 324 Ark. 178, 919
S.W.2d 943 (1996) rejects his very argument.1 In Kemp, the appellant contended that the
circuit court erred in refusing to give the jury his proffered penalty-phase instruction, which
read as follows: “Whatever the jury finds regarding aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, the jury may still return a verdict of life imprisonment without parole.” In
rejecting Kemp’s argument, we explained that we have held “that AMCI 2d Form Three,
Section (C) permits the jury to show mercy, as it allows the jury to find that the aggravating
circumstances do not justify a sentence of death.” Id. at 206, 919 S.W.3d at 957. Non-
model instructions are to be given only when the circuit court finds that the model
instructions do not accurately state the law or do not contain a necessary instruction on the
subject. Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994). Accordingly, we affirm on this
issue.
IV. Sentencing Procedures
For his fourth point on appeal, Gay argues that the sentencing procedures did not
meet the statutory and constitutional requirements necessary for imposing the death penalty.
Specifically, Gay contends that because the jury foreman failed to sign Form 2 and because
there is an ambiguous mark on Form 3, his death sentence should be reversed. On this issue,
the circuit court found that Gay could have raised alleged errors or inconsistencies in the
verdict form at trial or on direct appeal, and therefore, these arguments are not cognizable
in his postconviction proceeding. We agree. As set forth in Reams, supra, unless an error is
1
While Gay recognizes that Kemp v. State does not support his argument, he states
that the issue is raised to preserve it for federal habeas review.
29
so fundamental as to render the judgment of conviction void and subject to collateral attack,
a petition under Rule 37 does not provide a remedy when an issue could have been raised
at trial or argued on appeal. Here, Gay does not argue that this alleged error is structural or
fundamental in nature. Accordingly, we agree with the circuit court’s finding that this issue
does not constitute grounds for relief under Rule 37. Accordingly, we affirm on this point.
V. Verdict Forms
For his fifth point on appeal, Gay argues that the verdict forms failed to establish that
the jury considered all mitigating evidence. The State alleged three aggravating factors
pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-604(3), which provides: “The person previously
committed another felony, an element of which was the use or threat of violence to another
person or the creation of a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another
person[.]” Gay contends that the statute and the jury instruction are vague and failed to
genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible individuals. Further, Gay contends that the
statute and instruction are also vague because while a person may “commit” an offense, the
conduct may be justified, for example, in a case of self-defense of another. The circuit court
found that this allegation of error could have been reviewed on direct appeal and does not
constitute grounds for relief under Rule 37. As set forth in Reams, supra, unless an error is
so fundamental as to render the judgment of conviction void and subject to collateral attack,
a petition under Rule 37 does not provide a remedy when an issue could have been raised
at trial or argued on appeal. Here, citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 274 (1993), and
Teater v. State, 89 Ark. App. 215, 201 S.W.3d 442 (2005), without analysis or explanation,
Gay asserts that a deficient jury instruction amounts to a structural error. The structural
30
errors involved in Sullivan and Teater are clearly distinguishable from the alleged error in the
present case. In Sullivan, the Court found that a constitutionally deficient jury instruction
concerning the burden of proof was a “structural” error that was not amenable to harmless-
error analysis and thus required automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction. The Court
stated as follows:
In [Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-309], we distinguished between, on the
one hand, “structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy
analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards,” . . . and, on the other hand, trial errors which
occur “during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be
quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented[.]” . . . Denial of
the right to a jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is certainly an error of
the former sort, the jury guarantee being a “basic protectio[n]” whose precise effects
are unmeasurable, but without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its
function. . . The right to trial by jury reflects, we have said, “a profound judgment
about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.” . . . The
deprivation of that right, with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and
indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as “structural error.”
Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281–82. In Teater, the court of appeals held that the error in omitting
the instruction on mental disease or defect is a “structural” error that is not subject to
harmless-error review. Citing Sullivan, the court of appeals explained that the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution affords a criminal defendant the right to have
an impartial jury reach the requisite finding of guilt. Teater v. State, 89 Ark. App. at 222,
201 S.W.3d at 447. Gay’s bare assertion that the instruction and statute are vague does not
rise to the level of a structural error. We agree with the circuit court’s finding that this issue
does not constitute grounds for relief under Rule 37. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit
court on this point.
31
VI. Lack of Remorse
For his final point on appeal, Gay argues that the State improperly argued lack of
remorse as a nonstatutory aggravating factor. Gay asserts that Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-604
limits the State to proving one or more of ten specific factors but that lack of remorse is
precluded. Gay contends that the State used a letter written by Gay’s father, Glen, to the
Arkansas Parole Board asking for Gay’s release. Gay asserts that the State argued that the
letter implied that Gay was remorseless. The circuit court found that this allegation of error
could have been reviewed on direct appeal and does not constitute grounds for relief under
Rule 37.
As set forth in Reams, supra, unless an error is so fundamental as to render the
judgment of conviction void and subject to collateral attack, a petition under Rule 37 does
not provide a remedy when an issue could have been raised at trial or argued on appeal.
Here, Gay does not argue that this alleged error is structural or fundamental in nature.
Therefore, we agree with the circuit court’s finding that this issue does not constitute
grounds for relief under Rule 37. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court on this point.
Affirmed.
Special Justice TIM SNIVELY joins in this opinion.
WOOD, J., not participating.
FUQUA CAMPBELL, P.A., by: J. Blake Hendrix, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Rachel Kemp, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen.; and Adam Jackson,
Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
32