UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4572
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIE T. WORSHAM,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief
District Judge. (3:06-cr-00200-JRS-1)
Submitted: January 31, 2012 Decided: February 2, 2012
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Carolyn V.
Grady, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant,
Appellate Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Stephen
Wiley Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Jessica Aber
Brumberg, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Willie T. Worsham was convicted of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon and received thirty-two months’
imprisonment and three years of supervised release. After
violating conditions of his supervised release, the court
revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to two months’
imprisonment, with three years of supervised release to follow.
Worsham once again violated the conditions of his release. He
now appeals the resulting twenty-two-month sentence. Worsham’s
attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), asserting there are no meritorious issues for
appeal but questioning whether Worsham’s sentence is reasonable.
Worsham has filed a pro se supplemental brief. The Government
has declined to file a response. We affirm.
This court will affirm a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if it is not plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th
Cir. 2010). The first step in this review requires a
determination of whether the sentence is unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). “This
initial inquiry takes a more ‘deferential appellate posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion’ than
reasonableness review for [G]uidelines sentences.” United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting
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Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439) (applying “plainly unreasonable”
standard of review for probation revocation). Only if the
sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable does the
inquiry proceed to the second step of the analysis to determine
whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d
at 438–39.
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
advisory policy statement range based upon Chapter Seven of the
Sentencing Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors
applicable to supervised release revocation. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e) (2006); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438–40. A sentence is
substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper
basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
“A court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-
conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of
reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547
(internal quotation marks omitted). After thoroughly reviewing
the record, we conclude that Worsham’s sentence was both
procedurally and substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case as well as the claims raised in Worsham’s pro se
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supplemental brief and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Worsham, in writing, of the right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Worsham requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Worsham. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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