Appellate Case: 21-8070 Document: 010110644107 Date Filed: 02/11/2022 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 11, 2022
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
CHRISTOPHER FISHER,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 21-8070
(D.C. No. 0:21-CV-00014-NDF)
WARDEN PACHECO; WYOMING (D. Wyo.)
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondents - Appellees.
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ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
_________________________________
Before BACHARACH, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
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Christopher Fisher, a Wyoming state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) so he can appeal the district court’s dismissal of the
habeas corpus petition he filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing no appeal may be taken from a final order disposing of a
§ 2254 petition unless the petitioner first obtains a COA). Because reasonable jurists
would not debate the district court’s dismissal of his petition as untimely, we deny his
request for a COA and dismiss this appeal.
On August 5, 2016, Fisher shot and killed his wife in what he claimed was an act
of self-defense. He entered an Alford plea of guilty to second-degree murder in April
2017. In February 2018, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and
Appellate Case: 21-8070 Document: 010110644107 Date Filed: 02/11/2022 Page: 2
sentence. Fisher v. State, 410 P.3d 1205 (Wyo. 2018). Intermittently over the next few
years, Fisher attempted to challenge his conviction and sentence in the state courts by
filing various motions and petitions, all of which were unsuccessful.
Fisher filed his federal habeas petition in January 2021. In response to the district
court’s order to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed as untimely, Fisher
did not dispute that he failed to comply with the federal statute of limitations, but argued
he was entitled to equitable tolling because (1) he had a credible claim of innocence
based on evidence he killed his wife in self-defense, and (2) his mental illnesses,
particularly his PTSD and battered-spouse syndrome, prevented him from diligently
pursuing his rights during the statutory period. The district court rejected both
arguments. The court concluded that Fisher had not made a sufficient showing of actual
innocence to warrant equitable tolling because he had pled guilty to the offense and he
introduced no new evidence of innocence. As for Fisher’s mental-illness argument, the
district court concluded Fisher’s state litigation history, particularly the “cogently
written” pro se motion he filed in December 2018, undermined his claim that he was
unable to pursue his federal habeas claims based on mental incapacity. The court
therefore dismissed Fisher’s untimely habeas petition.
To be entitled to a COA, Fisher must show “that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). “[W]e review the district court’s decision on
equitable tolling of the limitation period for an abuse of discretion.” Burger v. Scott, 317
F.3d 1133, 1138 (10th Cir. 2003).
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Fisher argues that the district court erred in rejecting his actual-innocence
argument because the court overlooked newly discovered evidence that bolstered his
claim of self-defense. “[A]ctual innocence is not an easy showing to make,” requiring a
petitioner to present “new reliable evidence” that is “powerful enough to convince a court
that no reasonable juror would have voted to convict.” United States v. Cervini, 379 F.3d
987, 992–93 (10th Cir. 2004). Here, Fisher asserts he recently found two pieces of
exculpatory evidence in his pretrial discovery materials: (1) statements his young
children purportedly made to the Department of Family Services that allegedly differed
from the inculpatory statements they made to the police, and (2) a “cryptic notation” in a
police report suggesting that Fisher’s wife’s diary described weapons and booby traps.
Although this purported evidence may qualify as new because it was not considered by
the state trial court, see Fontenot v. Crow, 4 F. 4th 982, 1032 (10th Cir. 2021), we are not
persuaded that Fisher’s conclusory hearsay descriptions of allegedly inconsistent child
witness statements and his speculations regarding a “cryptic” police report can
reasonably be characterized as reliable. See Taylor v. Powell, 7 F. 4th 920, 927 (10th Cir.
2021) (“An actual innocence claim must be based on more than the petitioner’s
speculations and conjectures.”); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417–18 (1993)
(rejecting actual-innocence argument based on affidavits the Court found to be
“particularly suspect” because, except for one affidavit provided by an individual who
was nine years old at the time of the crime, the affidavits consisted of hearsay).
Moreover, “when contrasted with the corresponding evidence of guilt,” the evidence
described by Fisher is not “powerful enough to convince a court that no reasonable juror
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would have voted to convict.” Cervini, 379 F.3d at 992. Accordingly, reasonable jurists
would not debate the correctness of the district court’s holding that Fisher is not entitled
to equitable tolling based on actual innocence.1
As for his mental-illness argument for equitable tolling, Fisher contends the
district court “misconstrued prior filings of jail house lawyers who had tried to help
[Fisher] as proof of [Fisher’s] mental state during the term of disability.” He asserts he
did not draft any of his pro se state filings except for one postconviction petition;
accordingly, he argues, his extensive state postconviction filings do not disprove his
claim that mental illness prevented him from timely seeking federal habeas relief. Fisher
does not cite any factual support for this argument, which he raises for the first time on
appeal. See Laurson v. Leyba, 507 F.3d 1230, 1232 (10th Cir. 2007) (“As a general rule,
this court will not consider an issue not raised below.”); Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925,
927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Pro se status does not excuse the obligation of any litigant to
comply with the fundamental requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate
Procedure.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, regardless of who drafted
Fisher’s state-court filings, they demonstrate his ability to raise and litigate legal
arguments for relief during the relevant time period, whether by himself or with the
assistance of others, and we see no reason why he could not have availed himself of the
1
We note the potential applicability of our holding in Beavers v. Saffle, 216 F.3d
918, 923 (10th Cir. 2000), that self-defense arguments “go to legal innocence, as opposed
to factual innocence.” Because neither the parties nor the district court referenced
Beavers and because Fisher’s evidence clearly falls short of the “new reliable evidence”
standard discussed in Cervini, we do not decide whether Beavers might have provided an
alternative basis for the district court to deny Fisher’s actual-innocence argument.
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same resources to file his federal habeas petition. See Del Rantz v. Hartley, 577 F. App’x
805, 810–11 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished disposition cited exclusively for its persuasive
value) (holding that petitioner “has not shown that his mental disorders were the cause of
the untimeliness” in filing federal habeas petition in part because he “had the assistance
of his family and other inmates in pursuing state postconviction relief”); Yang, 525 F.3d
at 929–30 (noting that “the majority of pro se prisoners” will require “assistance in
understanding the legal process,” and therefore holding that the need for assistance does
not in itself warrant equitable tolling). In light of Fisher’s postconviction litigation
history, reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of the district court’s holding
that Fisher’s mental-health problems did not prevent him from filing a timely habeas
petition. See Del Rantz, 577 F. App’x at 810–11.
Because reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s denial of equitable
tolling, we deny Fisher’s request for a COA and dismiss the appeal. Fisher’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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