UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1947
GAIL SCOTT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
HEALTH NET FEDERAL SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
ROXANNA WORDEN; EILEEN YAEGER; RITA SIEGL; KATHRYN BUCHTA,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga,
District Judge. (1:10-cv-00930-AJT-TCB)
Submitted: January 5, 2012 Decided: February 3, 2012
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gail Scott, Appellant Pro Se. George Bradley Breen, Brian
Steinbach, EPSTEIN, BECKER & GREEN, PC, Washington, DC, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gail Scott appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to her former employer, Health Net Federal
Services, LLC (“Health Net”), on her claims of employment
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010). Finding
no reversible error, we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 694
(4th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “At the summary judgment stage,
facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those
facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Summary judgment “should be rendered if the
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and
any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]here is no issue
for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986);
see also Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (“Where the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
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nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”)
(citation omitted).
Scott first claims that Health Net acted
discriminatorily by wrongfully terminating her and treating her
differently on the basis of her race. To establish a prima
facie case of wrongful termination under Title VII, Scott was
required to establish that: (1) she is a member of a protected
class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) she
was performing her job duties at a level that met her employer’s
legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse employment
action; and (4) the position remained open or was filled by
similarly qualified applicants outside the protected class.
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285
(4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
A prima facie case of disparate treatment required
Scott to establish: (1) membership in a protected class; (2)
satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and
(4) different treatment from similarly situated employees
outside the protected class. Coleman v. Maryland Court of
Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). Upon a satisfactory
prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to come
forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802-03 (1973). If the defendant meets this burden, the
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burden returns to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason
is pretextual and that discrimination was the motivating force
behind the decision. Id. at 803-04.
The district court found that Scott, an African
American female who was terminated from her position, satisfied
the first two elements for wrongful termination and disparate
treatment, as she was a member of a protected class and suffered
an adverse employment action. However, Scott failed to present
sufficient evidence with respect to the third element,
satisfactory job performance. Therefore, the district court
correctly awarded Health Net summary judgment regarding Scott’s
wrongful termination and disparate treatment claims.
Scott further claims that Health Net violated Title
VII by terminating her in retaliation for her complaints of
discrimination. To prevail on her Title VII retaliation claim,
Scott was required to show that: (1) she engaged in a protected
activity; (2) an adverse action was taken against her by the
employer; and (3) there was a causal connection between the
first two elements. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 432 (4th
Cir. 2006). Similarly, Scott failed to meet her burden of
establishing a prima facie case, as she did not prove that her
protected conduct, rather than her unsatisfactory performance,
motivated her termination. Therefore, the award of summary
judgment was proper.
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Scott also argues that Health Net acted
discriminatorily by creating a hostile work environment in
violation of Title VII. To establish a prima facie case for a
hostile work environment claim under Title VII, Scott bore the
burden to show that the offending conduct was: (1) unwelcome;
(2) based on her race or sex; (3) sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create
an abusive atmosphere; and (4) imputable to the defendant. EEOC
v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167, 175 (4th Cir. 2009).
Scott’s allegations do not rise to the level of severe or
pervasive conduct necessary to establish a hostile work
environment claim; accordingly, we find that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in awarding Health Net summary
judgment as to this claim of discrimination as well.
Scott also challenges the district court’s order
cancelling oral arguments on Health Net’s motion for summary
judgment. There is no requirement that a ruling on a motion for
summary judgment be preceded by a hearing. Cray Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Novatel Computer Sys., Inc., 33 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir.
1994), and our review of the record leads us to conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in cancelling
the summary judgment hearing. See Coakley v. Williams Const.,
Inc. v. Structural Concrete Equip., Inc., 973 F.2d 349, 352 (4th
Cir. 1992) (finding that district court’s decision to grant
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summary judgment without a hearing is governed by an abuse of
discretion standard).
Scott next avers the district court erred by denying
her motion to appoint counsel. In making this determination, a
trial judge should consider: (1) the plaintiff's financial
ability to retain an attorney; (2) the efforts of the plaintiff
to retain counsel; and (3) the merits of the case. Young v. K-
Mart Corp., 911 F.Supp. 210, 211-12 (E.D.Va. 1999). We find
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Scott’s motion to appoint counsel. See id. (denial of motion to
appoint counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion).
Finally, Scott contends that the district court
erroneously admitted Health Net counsel Brian Steinbach pro hac
vice and that Health Net counsel engaged in professional
misconduct. However, Health Net complied with Local Rule
83.1(d) of the District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia governing the admittance of an attorney pro hac vice.
Moreover, Scott fails to present evidence to support her
allegations of misconduct on appeal. Accordingly, we find
Scott’s arguments to be meritless.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
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in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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