FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FEB 14 2022
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REYES ALEXANDER MEZA- No. 20-73650
LOALLAS,
Agency No. A206-015-820
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 10, 2022**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and O’SCANNLAIN and GRABER, Circuit
Judges.
Petitioner Reyes Alexander Meza-Loallas, a native and citizen of Guatemala,
seeks review of a final decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s denial of Petitioner’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Petitioner did not
show that he would be persecuted because of his membership in a purported
particular social group. See Plancarte v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1146, 1151 (9th Cir.
2021) (reviewing for substantial evidence the factual findings that underlie the
BIA’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief).
The BIA did not err in rejecting Petitioner’s proposed social group—“future-
oriented substantial steps to oppose gang activity”—as insufficiently particular.
See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Whether a group
constitutes a ‘particular social group’ . . . is a question of law we review de
novo.”). The proposed group’s boundaries are too vague to meet the particularity
requirement because the group includes those who oppose gang activity for any
reason. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1135 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that the
BIA “has long required that a particular social group have clear boundaries and
that its characteristics have commonly accepted definitions”); Santos-Lemus v.
Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “young men in El
Salvador resisting gang violence” did not qualify as a proposed social group
because the group was “too loosely defined to meet the requirement for
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particularity” in that the group “include[d] any young men who for any reason
resist gang violence and intimidation”), abrogated on other grounds by
Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
Accordingly, the BIA permissibly denied Petitioner’s claims for asylum and
withholding of removal.
2. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that Petitioner
failed to show that he will “more likely than not” face torture by the government if
returned to Guatemala. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). No evidence in the record shows
that Petitioner had been tortured in Guatemala previously. Nor has Petitioner
provided any particularized evidence that harm will be inflicted by or with the
acquiescence of public officials. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148,
1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that generalized evidence of violence and crime that
is not particular to petitioner is insufficient to meet the standard for CAT
protection). And a petitioner’s generalized fear of the possibility of harm in the
future, no matter how sincere, cannot compel a conclusion contrary to that reached
by the agency. See Lopez v. Sessions, 901 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2018)
(holding that a generalized threat of future harm “does not provide a sufficient
basis to conclude that any harm . . . would rise to the level of torture”). Thus, the
BIA permissibly denied CAT relief.
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PETITION DENIED.
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