In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: February 15, 2022
S22A0210. WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.
BOGGS, Presiding Justice.
After a 2017 jury trial, Tahja Tayshawn Williams was found
guilty of malice murder and other crimes arising out of the death of
Keaira Palmer and the wounding of Stefon Cook in a drive-by
shooting. 1 He appeals, asserting four enumerations of error: (1) the
1 The crimes occurred in the early morning hours of August 3, 2016. On
October 27, 2016, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Williams and six
others, individually and as parties to the crimes, for malice murder, felony
murder, three counts of aggravated assault, violation of the Georgia Street
Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, OCGA § 16-15-1 et seq. (the “Gang Act”),
and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. One count of
aggravated assault, on Ahmad Lee, was nolle prossed. Williams was tried
alone before a jury from December 11 to 15, 2017, and found guilty of all
remaining charges. On December 15, 2017, Williams was sentenced to serve
life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, 20 years in
prison to serve concurrently for the aggravated assault on Cook, 15 years in
prison to serve concurrently for the Gang Act offense, and 5 years to serve
consecutively for the firearm charge. The trial court merged the remaining
aggravated assault count into the malice murder conviction, and the felony
murder count was vacated by operation of law. On January 3, 2018, Williams’
evidence was insufficient in three respects: it merely showed
Williams’ presence, it supported his claim of justification, and it
failed to corroborate accomplice testimony; (2) the trial court erred
in denying his motion in limine to exclude jail calls to which
Williams was a party; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion
for mistrial when a co-defendant refused to answer certain
questions; and (4) the trial court improperly instructed the jury that
it could find Williams guilty of felony murder and not the underlying
aggravated assault. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to
support Williams’ convictions, the jury was authorized to reject
Williams’ claim of justification, and the accomplice testimony was
corroborated. There was no error in denying Williams’ motion to
exclude evidence of a jail telephone call as hearsay because it was
an admission of a party opponent. Williams’ motion for mistrial on
trial counsel filed a timely motion for new trial, which was amended by
appellate counsel on January 8 and 16, 2020. The parties agreed that the
motion for new trial would be decided on the briefs, and the motion was denied
on April 30, 2021. Williams’ notice of appeal was filed on May 19, 2021, and
the case was docketed in this Court for the term beginning in December 2021
and submitted for decision on the briefs.
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the ground that a witness refused to answer questions was properly
denied because Williams had the opportunity for a full and complete
cross-examination of the witness. Finally, Williams’ contention that
the trial court improperly instructed the jury is moot. We therefore
affirm.
Construed to support the jury’s verdict, the evidence showed
that late in the evening of August 2, 2016, Williams, a “Double OG”
or leader in the Six Deuce Brims gang (a subset of the Bloods),
picked up fellow gang members Rynesha Lucas and co-indictees
Ivanna Patrick and Roderick Jackson. After obtaining some money,
they drove to an apartment complex to meet more gang members:
co-indictees Sharod Jackson, Michael Anthony Miller, Roderick
Harris, and Tareco Jenkins. In the meeting that followed, Williams
told the others that he wanted to retaliate against the G-Shines, a
rival gang, because G-Shine members had committed various crimes
against Six Deuce members, including robbing Williams of several
firearms. Gang members testified that Williams decided the group
would obtain firearms and then “ride on” (that is, “pull up on your
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enemy and shoot”) the G-Shine members at their customary
gathering place, a convenience store on Glenwood Road in DeKalb
County.
The Six Deuce members acquired a number of firearms from
an unidentified individual in the apartment complex and took two
vehicles – a stolen green Lexus driven by Sharod Jackson with
Patrick, Harris, and Miller as passengers, and a black car driven by
Williams with Lucas, Roderick Jackson, and Jenkins as passengers.
Shortly after midnight, the two cars, with Williams leading, drove
past the convenience store, where the G-Shine members were
gathered outside. Williams then turned his car around and led the
group back past the front of the store, and occupants of both cars
began shooting at the crowd in the parking lot. The first shots were
fired from Williams’ car, and some in the crowd began returning fire.
Police officers later found two groups of spent shell casings on the
ground: one in the road and one in the parking lot, from at least
seven different firearms in a variety of calibers. Several people in
the parking lot were hit: Palmer was killed by a bullet that severed
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her spinal cord, Cook was shot in the neck but survived, and Ahmed
Lee was struck in the leg. 2 Surveillance video of the incident was
played for the jury.
During the incident, the Lexus was disabled, either from
gunfire or from hitting the curb, and the occupants jumped out and
ran away. Williams drove away and, after receiving telephone calls
from the occupants of the Lexus, drove to several locations to pick
them up. Later in the day, Williams was a passenger in a car that
was pulled over by the police in a traffic stop. Williams told the
driver to drive away, but she refused, and Williams fled on foot,
leaving behind a suitcase and duffel bag.
The State indicted all the participants in the drive-by shooting
except Lucas, who was 15 years old at the time of the crimes. The
indictment was nolle prossed as to Jenkins, and the remaining
defendants pled guilty; all seven of the participants testified at trial.
1. Williams contends that the evidence was insufficient as a
2 While Williams was indicted for the shooting of Lee, that count of the
indictment was nolle prossed.
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matter of constitutional due process to support his convictions,
because he was merely present at the scene and the State did not
prove that he was a party to the crimes. He also asserts that the
State failed to disprove justification by self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Finally, Williams contends that the only evidence
connecting him with the crimes was uncorroborated accomplice
testimony.
Williams’ contention that he did not participate in the drive-by
shooting was contradicted by multiple witnesses, primarily the
seven other participants in the shooting. The testimony of those
witnesses did not always agree, and several witnesses made
contradictory statements at trial and were confronted with their
earlier statements to police. But evidence was presented that
Williams not only planned the shooting but participated in it by
driving the lead vehicle, communicating and picking up gang
members after the shooting, and later fled from a traffic stop.
“Although the eyewitness accounts of the shooting did vary to some
extent, it was for the jury to determine the credibility of the
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witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the
evidence.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bighams v. State,
296 Ga. 267, 268-269 (1) (b) (765 SE2d 917) (2014).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdicts, the jury was authorized to conclude that Williams was a
party to the crimes under OCGA § 16-2-20. See Hood v. State, 309
Ga. 493, 498 (1) (847 SE2d 172) (2020) (“Conviction as a party to a
crime requires proof that the defendant shared a common criminal
intent with the principal perpetrator of the crime, which may be
inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct before, during,
and after the offense.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)). The
trial court gave the pattern jury instruction on parties to a crime, 3
and the jury was authorized to believe the witnesses who testified
that Williams was a party to the crimes. See Blackwell v. State, 302
Ga. 820, 821-822 (1) (809 SE2d 727) (2018) (holding that when
appellant participated in a gunfight in a crowded parking lot, a
3 See Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal
Cases, § 1.42.10 (4th ed. 2007, updated July 2021).
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rational trier of fact could find he was a party to malice murder even
though he did not the fire fatal shot).
This evidence, construed in favor of the jury’s verdicts, also was
sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Williams and his companions did not act in
self-defense, but rather initiated the conflict. “Issues of witness
credibility and justification are for the jury to decide, and the jury is
free to reject a defendant’s claim that he acted in self-defense.”
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Butler v. State, 309 Ga. 755,
758 (1) (848 SE2d 97) (2020).
Likewise, there is no merit to Williams’ claim that the
testimony of his alleged accomplices was not corroborated as
required by OCGA § 24-14-8, because “multiple alleged accomplices
may corroborate one another’s testimony.” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Huff v. State, 300 Ga. 807, 809 (1) (796 SE2d
688) (2017). All seven of the participants in the drive-by shooting
testified, and they sufficiently corroborated one another’s testimony.
Moreover, in its order on Williams’ motion for new trial, the trial
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court noted that the State presented other corroborating evidence,
including Williams’ flight from the police. See Fisher v. State, 309
Ga. 814, 819-820 (2) (a) (848 SE2d 434) (2020) (holding that
defendant’s flight from police, with other evidence, corroborated
accomplice testimony). Whether accomplice testimony has been
sufficiently corroborated is a question for the jury, and even slight
corroborating evidence of a defendant’s participation in a crime is
sufficient. See Raines v. State, 304 Ga. 582, 588 (2) (a) (820 SE2d
679) (2018).
The evidence as recited above was constitutionally sufficient to
support Williams’ convictions. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S.
307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Williams contends the trial court erred in denying his
pretrial motion in limine to exclude multiple telephone calls to and
from the DeKalb County Jail. Ultimately, at trial the State
introduced only one telephone call, which was interpreted for the
jury by an expert in gang identification. In that call, made before
commission of the crimes at issue here, the caller, a jail inmate,
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reported to Williams that a member of another gang was attempting
to harm the caller in jail. He asked Williams to intervene on his
behalf with the leader of the other gang. Before the call ended,
Williams instructed the inmate to get the other gang member on the
phone and then set up a three-way conversation with the gang
leader. The gang expert testified that the number associated with
that leader appeared in Williams’ telephone records “an inordinate
number” of times.
In his brief on appeal, Williams argues only that his
statements during the single call admitted were hearsay. We
disagree. As the trial court correctly observed in its order on
Williams’ motion for new trial, Williams’ statements in the jail call
were admissions of a party opponent. “Admissions shall not be
excluded by the hearsay rule. An admission is a statement offered
against a party which is . . . [t]he party’s own statement.” OCGA §
24-8-801 (d) (2) (A). See also Lyons v. State, 309 Ga. 15, 26 (8) (b)
(843 SE2d 825) (2020) (holding appellant’s statements in voicemail
message not excluded by hearsay rule); Edwards v. State, 308 Ga.
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176, 182 (2) (839 SE2d 599) (2020) (detective’s recording of
unavailable witness’ recording of appellant’s telephone call “not
excludable as hearsay”). This enumeration of error therefore lacks
merit.
3. Williams asserts that he was denied his right to a fair trial
when a witness, co-indictee Roderick Jackson, refused to answer
certain questions during his testimony. Williams contends the trial
court should have granted his motion for mistrial, because the
refusal left the jury with the impression that Jackson was afraid to
testify because Williams, the only remaining defendant, had
threatened him.
“[T]he decision to grant a motion for mistrial lies within the
trial court’s sound discretion, and the trial court’s exercise of that
discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless a mistrial is
essential to preserve the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” (Citations
and punctuation omitted.) Jordan v. State, 305 Ga. 12, 15 (2) (823
SE2d 336) (2019). See also Thomas v. State, 311 Ga. 573, 576 (3)
(858 SE2d 504) (2021). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse
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its discretion in denying Williams’ motion for mistrial.
Jackson refused to answer several questions on direct
examination, but he continued to testify and respond to the State’s
questions after Williams’ motion for mistrial was made and denied.
On cross-examination, Jackson again refused to answer certain
questions, but acknowledged that he had made statements to the
police and that those statements were true. Williams’ trial counsel
asked Jackson whether he had declined to answer certain questions
because he had been threatened by Williams, and Jackson denied
that he had been threatened by Williams or by anyone else.4
Williams’ trial counsel also elicited admissions from Jackson that
Jackson had entered into a plea agreement to serve 25 years in
prison and that he had lied to the police during their investigation,
and directly challenged Jackson with regard to his honesty and
truthfulness.
4 The trial court also offered to admit and play for the jury Jackson’s
recorded statement to police, in which he answered the questions he refused to
answer at trial, some of which implicated Williams. Williams did not accept
that offer.
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Williams relies upon our decision in Soto v. State, 285 Ga. 367,
369 (2) (677 SE2d 95) (2009), to argue that his Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation was violated. The facts in Soto were
significantly different from those presented here, however. Soto and
his co-defendant, Wiedeman, were charged with the murder of
Wiedeman’s girlfriend. Wiedeman pled guilty, and the State called
him as a witness at Soto’s trial, but in the middle of the State’s direct
examination Wiedeman suddenly said that he alone committed the
murder. Wiedeman then refused to answer any more questions from
the State or to be cross-examined by the defense, despite being
threatened with contempt by the trial court. At that point, the trial
court allowed the State to introduce Wiedeman’s prior inconsistent
statements to the police and to a fellow prisoner incriminating Soto.
See id. at 368 (2). Soto appealed, asserting that his Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation was violated, and this Court
concluded that the trial court erred in admitting the prior
statements because Soto was completely unable to cross-examine
Wiedeman:
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Here, defendant was given no opportunity whatsoever to
cross-examine Wiedeman because Wiedeman “shut down”
in the midst of direct examination and refused to answer
further questions posed by either the prosecution or the
defense. We must conclude, therefore, that the admission
of Wiedeman’s prior statements violated defendant’s
right of confrontation.
Id. at 370 (2) (b).
In this case, unlike the witness in Soto, Jackson did not decline
to testify altogether. As we observed in Johnson v. State, 310 Ga.
685 (853 SE2d 635) (2021), “[t]he main and essential purpose of the
right of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity
of cross-examination.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at
689 (2). Here, Williams was able to conduct a thorough cross-
examination, and Jackson’s testimony in many respects “actually
inured to [Williams’] benefit,” Johnson v. State, 293 Ga. 530, 533 (2)
(748 SE2d 434) (2013). The trial court did not abuse its broad
discretion in denying a motion for mistrial under these
circumstances. 5
5Williams also contends that the trial court should have stricken all of
Jackson’s testimony. But Williams did not seek to have the testimony stricken
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4. Finally, Williams asserts error in the trial court’s response
to a question from the jury. During deliberations, the jury sent a
note to the court saying, “We need clarity on whether you can find
someone guilty of felony murder but not aggravated assault. Can
you have one without the other?” While discussing how to respond
to the question, Williams’ trial counsel and the trial court agreed
that the jury was inquiring about the aggravated assault count that
was the predicate for the felony murder count. After further
discussion with counsel, the trial court instructed the jury over
Williams’ objection, “The answer . . . based on our research and my
understanding of the law is yes.”
Williams contends this instruction was incorrect and may have
confused the jury. However, we need not consider that contention.
Because the jury found Williams guilty of malice murder, the felony
murder count was vacated by operation of law, see Malcolm v. State,
263 Ga. 369, 372 (5) (434 SE2d 479) (1993), and the aggravated
at trial. See Soto, 285 Ga. at 369 (2) (rejecting claim where “neither party
sought that remedy” below).
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assault that formed the predicate for the felony murder count was
merged into the malice murder conviction. Any enumerated error
with regard to jury instructions on felony murder or the underlying
aggravated assault is therefore moot. See Walker v. State, 308 Ga.
33, 36 n.3 (2) (838 SE2d 792) (2020) (alleged errors in jury
instructions on felony murder, aggravated assault, and cruelty to
children moot because defendant convicted of malice murder).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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