UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4329
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAVID LEE STEVENSON, SR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:10-cr-00764-RBH-1)
Submitted: November 4, 2011 Decided: February 7, 2012
Before NIEMEYER, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James T. McBratney, Jr., MCBRATNEY LAW FIRM, P.A., Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant
United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David Lee Stevenson, Sr., pled guilty pursuant to a
written plea agreement to conspiracy to distribute fifty grams
or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006),
and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). The district
court sentenced him to 120 months of imprisonment for his
violation of § 846, plus a consecutive sixty-month sentence for
his violation of § 924(c), yielding a total term of 180 months
of imprisonment. Stevenson now appeals. In accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Stevenson’s attorney
has filed a brief certifying that there are no meritorious
issues for appeal but questioning the adequacy of Stevenson’s
Rule 11 hearing and the reasonableness of his 180-month sentence.
Stevenson received notice of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but has not done so. Finding no error, we
affirm.
First, Stevenson questions whether the district court
complied with the requirements of Rule 11 when accepting his
plea. Because Stevenson did not move to withdraw his guilty
plea in the district court, we examine the adequacy of the plea
colloquy for plain error. United States v Martinez, 277 F.3d
517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). Our careful review of the record
convinces us that the district court substantially complied with
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the mandates of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Stevenson’s
guilty plea and that any omission on the court’s part did not
affect Stevenson’s substantial rights. Moreover, the district
court ensured that Stevenson’s guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary and supported by a sufficient factual basis. See
United States v. DuFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir.
1991).
Turning to Stevenson’s sentence, we review a sentence
for reasonableness, applying a “deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 52 (2007). We
begin by reviewing the sentence for significant procedural
error, including such errors as “failing to calculate (or
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) [(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence.” Id. at 51. Because Stevenson did not object
to the Guidelines calculations in his presentence report, argue
for a sentence different from the one imposed, or challenge the
adequacy of the district court’s explanation of its sentencing
decision, we review for plain error. United States v. Lynn, 592
F.3d 572, 577-78 (4th Cir. 2010).
Our review of the record reveals no procedural error
in the district court’s determination of Stevenson’s sentence.
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The district court properly noted the applicable statutory
minimums and adopted the proper Guidelines range calculations
for each charge. ∗ Furthermore, it correctly noted that statute
required the sentence for Stevenson’s § 924(c) conviction to run
consecutively to any other sentence imposed. 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (2006). The district court also properly
considered the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and
explained Stevenson’s sentence in light of this consideration.
We next consider the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence, taking into account the “totality of the
circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the
Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We presume that a
sentence within a properly determined advisory Guidelines range
is substantively reasonable. United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d
178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007). Furthermore, where a statute mandates
a certain sentence, then the imposition of such a sentence is
per se reasonable. United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224
(4th Cir. 2008).
In Stevenson’s case, his aggregate 180-month sentence
was the minimum sentence required by statute. See 21 U.S.C. §
846, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006); 18 U.S.C. §
∗
The parties agree that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, is inapplicable in this
case, and we find no binding authority to the contrary.
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924(c)(1)(A)(i). Accordingly, we find that it was substantively
reasonable, and conclude that the district court committed no
error in its imposition.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
Therefore, we affirm Stevenson’s conviction and sentence. This
court requires counsel to inform Stevenson, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Stevenson requests that a petition be filed
but counsel believes such a petition would be frivolous, counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Stevenson. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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