FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 7, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM O. MAYBERRY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 11-5058
(D.C. No. 4:09-CV-00533-TLW)
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner (N.D. Okla.)
of Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
William O. Mayberry appeals from the order entered by the district court
affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s decision denying his applications
for disability insurance benefits and supplement security income benefits under
the Social Security Act. Exercising jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I.
Plaintiff applied for social security benefits based on various physical and
mental infirmities. His applications were denied initially and on reconsideration,
and a de novo hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ).
The ALJ also denied plaintiff’s applications at step five of the five-step
sequential evaluation process for determining disability. See Fischer-Ross v.
Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005) (describing five steps).
Specifically, the ALJ found that: (1) plaintiff has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since February 21, 2002; (2) plaintiff suffers from the severe
medical impairments of obesity, diabetes mellitus, depression, and a pain
disorder; (3) plaintiff’s impairments do not meet or equal any listed impairment
under the controlling regulations; (4) plaintiff has the residual functional capacity
to perform sedentary work, but he cannot perform more than “simple, repetitive
tasks,” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 18; (5) plaintiff is not able to perform his past
relevant work as a groundskeeper since he performed that work at the medium
level of exertion; but (6) considering plaintiff’s age, education, work experience,
and residual functional capacity, there are other jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that plaintiff can perform such as bench
assembler, machine operator, and order clerk.
-2-
The Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s
decision. He then filed a complaint in the district court. A magistrate judge
affirmed, and this appeal followed.
Because the Appeals Council denied review, the ALJ’s decision is the
Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of this appeal. See Doyal v.
Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 759 (10th Cir. 2003). In reviewing the ALJ’s decision,
“we neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the
agency.” Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800
(10th Cir. 1991). Instead, we review the ALJ’s decision only “to determine
whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record
and whether the correct legal standards were applied.” Doyal, 331 F.3d at 760.
Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.”
Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). It “is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A decision is not based on substantial
evidence “if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record.” Wall v. Astrue,
561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
II.
Plaintiff claims that: (1) the ALJ failed to perform a proper evaluation of
the opinions of his treating physician, Dr. LaFromboise; (2) the ALJ’s finding
that plaintiff’s statements about his impairments were not entirely credible is not
-3-
supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the ALJ’s determination of plaintiff’s
residual functional capacity is flawed because it did not include all of his relevant
impairments.
Before addressing these issues, we note that plaintiff’s medical history is
summarized in detail in the ALJ’s decision and the parties’ briefs on appeal, and
we will not repeat that history here. In addition, because we are convinced that
the ALJ’s denial of social security benefits is supported by substantial evidence in
the administrative record and free of any legal error, we do not deem it necessary
to separately address each of the multiple sub-arguments that plaintiff has
advanced in support of his three general propositions of error. Instead, we will
limit our analysis to the points discussed below.
A. Treating Physician
Plaintiff first contends the ALJ erred by giving only “limited weight” to
Dr. LaFromboise’s opinions. See Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 24. Over two years after
plaintiff filed his social security applications, Dr. LaFromboise treated him for
depression, back pain, hypertension, and other ailments. Id. at 193-200.
Dr. LaFromboise’s opinions are set forth in a letter dated March 27, 2008, in
which she stated the following:
Since 01/17/08, William Mayberry has received outpatient
services at Associated Centers for Therapy (ACT).
-4-
As the primary provider, it is my professional opinion that
William is unable to perform the duties required of a job due to a
combination of mental and physical health issues. . . .
William is easily confused and has poor ability to concentrate
on conversation of any depth. His current state is of permanent
disability.
Id. at 202.
Under the controlling regulations, the final responsibility for deciding the
ultimate issue of whether a social security claimant is “disabled” or “unable to
work” is reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1) and
416.927(e)(1) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, an ALJ is not
bound by a treating physician’s opinion on the ultimate issue of disability, id.,
and such an opinion is never entitled to controlling weight or special significance,
see Soc. Sec. Ruling (SSR) 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *1, *2, *5 (July 2, 1996).
However, opinions from any medical source on issues reserved
to the Commissioner must never be ignored. The adjudicator is
required to evaluate all evidence in the case record that may have a
bearing on the determination or decision of disability, including
opinions from medical sources about issues reserved to the
Commissioner. If the case record contains an opinion from a medical
source on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, the adjudicator
must evaluate all the evidence in the case record to determine the
extent to which the opinion is supported by the record.
Id. at *3; see also id. at *1 (stating that a social security decision “must explain
the consideration given to a treating source’s opinion(s)” on an issue reserved to
the Commissioner).
-5-
Given this framework, Dr. LaFromboise’s opinions that plaintiff is “unable
to perform the duties required of a job” and is “permanent[ly] disabled” are “not
medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the
Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e) and 417.927(e). While a physician’s
opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner are not entitled to controlling
weight or any special significance, the ALJ was still required to provide an
evaluation of the opinions and explain his reasons for either rejecting or accepting
them.
We conclude that the ALJ sufficiently explained his decision to give “little
weight” to Dr. LaFromboise’s opinions. First, the ALJ correctly noted that “it is
not clear that the doctor was familiar with the definition of ‘disability’ contained
in the Social Security Act and regulations.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 24. Second, the
ALJ stated that “[t]he course of treatment pursued by the doctor has not been
consistent with what one would expect if the claimant were truly disabled, as the
doctor has reported.” 1 Id. Although the latter statement borders on improper
1
We note that the ALJ also gave two additional reasons for discounting
Dr. LaFromboise’s opinions. First, the ALJ stated that Dr. LaFromboise
“apparently relied quite heavily on the subjective reports of symptoms and
limitations provided by the claimant, and seemed to uncritically accept as true
most, if not all, of what the claimant reported.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 24. Second,
the ALJ pointed out that, “[w]hile [Dr. LaFromboise] does have a treating
relationship with the claimant, the treatment history is quite brief, when
considering the claimant’s alleged onset date of February 2, 2002.” Id. These are
insufficient reasons for discounting Dr. LaFromboise’s opinions. The first reason
(continued...)
-6-
boilerplate language, we believe it is better construed as properly relying on
inconsistencies between Dr. LaFromboise’s opinions and her treatment records.
In his decision, the ALJ accurately summarized the treatment that
Dr. LaFromboise provided to plaintiff as follows:
Treatment records from Associated Centers for Therapy cover
the period from January 17, 2008 through June 26, 2008. Initial
evaluation showed an assessment of rule out post traumatic stress
disorder, which could be a mood disorder secondary to multiple
health problems, rule out diabetes, possible sleep apnea,
hypertension, lower back pain and rectal bleeding. The claimant was
prescribed Rozerem, Provigil, Flexeril and Lisinopril, as well as
laboratory blood tests. The claimant was followed by Dawn
LaFromboise, M.D. for his mental health needs. The claimant
reported that he was still having problems with the medications not
getting him to sleep and the depression medication made him jittery
during the day. The claimant reported the Flexeril worked to help
relieve back pain but tended to make him a little sleepy during the
day. The claimant continued to complain of depression despite
taking the Provigil. [Dr. LaFromboise therefore discontinued the
Provigil and instead prescribed Amitriptyline, an anti-depressant.]
The claimant’s affect was irritable and mood was described as
“depressed.” Insight was fair and behavior was appropriate. The
diagnostic assessment was mood disorder secondary to multiple
health problems, rule out post traumatic stress disorder, and major
depressive disorder. On April 30, 2008 the claimant reported for his
monthly appointment and reported his blood pressure medication
working and the Amitriptyline helped him to sleep. He also reported
the depression was getting better. The claimant’s mood was
congruent and affect was stressed due to family problems on May 29,
2008. The assessment was major depressive disorder, recurrent and
1
(...continued)
is conclusory and relies on improper boilerplate language, while the second
reason ignores the fact that Dr. LaFromboise saw plaintiff seven times over the
course of a six-month period and prepared detailed treatment records concerning
each visit.
-7-
possible post traumatic stress disorder. He was to continue taking
the medications of Flexeril 10mg, Lisinopril 20 mg, and
Amitriptyline raised to 100mg. He was scheduled to return in one
month. On June 26, 200[8] the claimant’s behavior was more
sociable and made good eye contact. Dr. LaFromboise reported the
claimant seemed grateful that he was coming to therapy and he
realized his depression was clearing up. The affect was euthymic
and mood was better.
Id. at 21-22.
With the exception of his consultative examinations in 2005 and 2007, two
mental and two physical, the record indicates that plaintiff received no medical
treatment for any physical or mental impairment between his alleged onset date in
February 2002 and this six-month period in 2008. Further, Dr. LaFromboise’s
treatment records do not document any particular functional limitations associated
with plaintiff’s mental and physical ailments; nor do they contain a single medical
opinion regarding plaintiff’s ability to mentally or physically perform the normal
tasks associated with working. Instead, Dr. LaFromboise’s treatment of
plaintiff’s mental and physical ailments was primarily limited to prescribing
medications. Id. at 193-200. Moreover, Dr. LaFromboise’s records show that, as
a result of her short-term treatment, plaintiff’s depression was “clearing up” and
“getting closer to euthymic” 2 as of June 2008. Id. at 193.
2
“Euthymic” is defined as “[r]elating to, or characterized by, euthymia,” and
“euthymia” means “[m]oderation of mood, not manic or depressed.” Stedman’s
Medical Dictionary 627 (27th ed. 2000).
-8-
In sum, all we have from Dr. LaFromboise is a general conclusion that
plaintiff is “permanently disabled,” without any supporting residual functional
capacity assessments 3 or other specific findings regarding actual functional
limitations. 4 This conclusion provides little guidance because of its uncertain
medical meaning, and extends into an assessment of interrelated medical,
educational, and vocational factors beyond the expertise of most physicians.
Given these shortcomings, the ALJ did not err in assigning only “limited weight”
to Dr. LaFromboise’s opinions.
B. Adverse Credibility Determination
The ALJ found that plaintiff was not credible to the extent that his
statements concerning his symptoms were inconsistent with the residual
functional capacity determined by the ALJ. See Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 20.
“Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and
we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.”
3
At the hearing before the ALJ, plaintiff’s counsel told the ALJ that he was
“anticipating” that Dr. LaFromboise would provide a mental residual functional
capacity assessment form for plaintiff. See Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 230-31. As a
result, the ALJ left the administrative record open for ten days following the
hearing “to receive that record.” Id. at 231. However, there is no such record in
the administrative record that is before this court.
4
As noted above, Dr. LaFromboise did state that plaintiff is “easily confused
and has poor ability to concentrate on conversation of any depth.” Aplt. App.,
Vol. 2 at 202. The ALJ took into account the former limitation by limiting
plaintiff’s residual functional capacity to “simple, repetitive tasks,” id. at 18,
while the latter limitation finds no support in Dr. Lafromboise’s treatment records
as the doctor never mentioned any difficulties in maintaining a conversation.
-9-
Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But “[f]indings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively
linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The ALJ’s main findings in support of his adverse credibility determination
were as follows:
The claimant has described daily activities which are not limited to
the extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling
symptoms and limitations. At one point or another in the record,
either in forms completed in connection with the application and
appeal, medical records or reports, or in the claimant’s testimony, the
claimant has reported the following activities of caring for his own
personal needs, fixing meals for himself, performing the household
chores for himself, mowing the lawn and visiting with close friends.
As far as medical care, the claimant has not generally received
the type of medical treatment one would expect for a totally disabled
individual, and the treatment the claimant has received for the
allegedly disabling impairments has been essentially routine and
conservative in nature. With regard to medication side effects,
although the claimant has alleged various side effects from the use of
the medications, the medical records, such as office treatment notes,
do not corroborate those allegations. . . . The record fails to
demonstrate the presence of any pathological clinical signs,
significant medical findings, or any neurological abnormalities which
would establish the existence of a pattern of pain of such severity as
to prevent the claimant from engaging in any work on a sustained
basis.
Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 23.
Because the medical evidence in this case is so sparse, we do not need to
delve into plaintiff’s allegations regarding his activities of daily living or his
-10-
medication side effects to affirm the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination.
Simply put, there are only two limited periods of time since plaintiff’s onset date
in February 2002 when he has received medical treatment: (1) the treatment he
received from Dr. LaFromboise from January 2008 until June 2008, see
Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 193-200; and (2) the treatment he received from “OU
Physicians -Tulsa Family Medicine” from September 2008 until January 2009,
id. at 211-27. None of these medical records document any specific physical or
mental functional limitations that would preclude the sedentary residual
functional capacity, limited to simple, repetitive tasks, found by the ALJ. Rather,
as the ALJ found, plaintiff’s medical treatment “has been essentially routine and
conservative.” 5 Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 23. Thus, we conclude that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination.
5
According to plaintiff, the lack of medical evidence in this case is
attributable to the fact that “he couldn’t afford to go to the doctor.” Aplt.
Opening Br. at 33; see also id. (“The ALJ ignores that affordability may explain
Claimant’s failure to seek a physician’s advice and receive less conservative
treatment.”). This argument is without merit. Plaintiff succeeded in obtaining
extensive medical treatment from Dr. LaFromboise and the OU physicians, and he
has provided no evidence that he “sought to obtain [additional] low-cost medical
treatment” or that he has “been denied medical care because of [his] financial
condition,” Murphy v. Sullivan, 953 F.2d 383, 386-87 (8th Cir. 1992); cf. Threet
v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 1185, 1191 n.7 (10th Cir. 2003) (indicating “that inability
to pay may provide a justification for [the] claimant’s failure to seek treatment”
when there is evidence that the claimant sought and was refused treatment).
-11-
C. Residual Functional Capacity Determination
Finally, plaintiff claims the ALJ erred by not including certain additional
impairments in his residual functional capacity determination. See Aplt. Opening
Br. at 20-22 (discussing diminished and painful range of motion of spine, weak
heel/toe walking, weak grip strength, hypertension, history of rectal bleeding, dry
mouth from medications, and headaches). We agree with the Commissioner,
however, that plaintiff “has failed to show that any of the [additional]
impairments impact his ability to perform sedentary work. . . . Nor has [plaintiff]
pointed to medical evidence which would support his allegations of work-related
limitations.” Aplee. Br. at 29-30. Accordingly, we see no error in the ALJ’s
residual functional capacity determination.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
-12-