BLD-093 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-4306
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GEORGE A. WINKELMAN,
Appellant
v.
ARCHIE LONGLEY, Warden
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 1-11-cv-00240)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant
to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 20, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 8, 2012)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant George Winkelman filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition in October of
2011. A United States Magistrate Judge concluded that Winkelman’s petition was an
abuse of the writ, and in the alternative that Winkelman had failed to show that a 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion was “inadequate or ineffective to challenge the validity of his
conviction.” Winkelman v. Longley, No. 11–240E, 2011 WL 5859414, at *2 (W.D. Pa.
Nov. 3, 2011) (Report and Recommendation). The District Court adopted this decision
over Winkelman’s objections, see Winkelman v. Longley, No. 1:11–cv–240, 2011 WL
5864086 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2011), and we will now affirm.
As the District Court observed, Winkelman has on several prior occasions
mounted collateral attacks on his federal conviction, beginning with a § 2255 motion on
February 20, 2007. See United States v. Winkelman, C.A. No. 08-1932 (order denying
certificate of appealability entered July 10, 2008). In December of 2008, Winkelman
filed a § 2241 petition in which he claimed, inter alia, that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007), had effectively invalidated his 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1) convictions. Despite the clear deficiencies of the petition, the District Court
undertook a lengthy review of the governing law and of the record, before determining
that Winkelman’s “situation [wa]s not the rare one rendering § 2255 inadequate or
ineffective.” See Winkelman v. Quintana, No. 08–354, 2011 WL 1434614, at *2–5
(W.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2011). Thus, “[e]ven if this Court were to find that Petitioner could
proceed under § 2241, which it does not, he clearly is not entitled to any substantive
relief.” Id. at *5. We affirmed, agreeing with the District Court that § 2255 was not
inadequate or ineffective to challenge the conviction. Winkelman v. Quintana, 440 F.
App’x 92, 93–94 (3d Cir. 2011).
We have jurisdiction over the present petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. It
presents nothing new. Winkelman again challenges the § 924(c)(1) convictions in light
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of Watson, and also attacks the conduct of the District Court in adjudicating his § 2255
motion, which he claims deprived him of due process. We agree with the District Court
that Winkelman has not shown that § 2255 relief is inadequate or ineffective. As we
explained in our prior ruling:
“Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by
which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences that are
allegedly in violation of the Constitution.” Okereke v. United States, 307
F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). A petitioner, however, may challenge a
conviction pursuant to § 2241 where a § 2255 motion would be inadequate
or ineffective. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997). . . .
Even if Watson negates [the] firearms convictions, Winkelman had an
earlier opportunity to challenge, and did attempt to challenge, his firearms
convictions under Watson. However, the District Court denied his Watson
argument on procedural grounds, and this Court denied his request to
appeal that decision. Winkelman, therefore, does not fit within the narrow
situation where a § 2255 motion would be inadequate or ineffective to
challenge a conviction.”
Winkelman, 440 F. App’x at 93–94. As nothing has changed since that decision, and as
this appeal presents no substantial question, we will again affirm the District Court’s
judgment. 1 Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also
3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
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George argues that he was denied due process because the District Court held him to
procedural requirements more stringently than it did the Government. As his grievance is
with the District Court’s actions during his § 2255 collateral attack, such a claim does not
affect the validity of his conviction and sentence.
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