Baker v. United States

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________

Nos. 08-2288 and 08-2365
_____________

DARRYL ORRIN BAKER,
Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, at F.C.I. MCKEAN;
ELLEN MCNINCHS; MR. MERRILLO;
WARDEN JAMES SHERMAN;
KATHLEEN HAWK SAWYER; MR. RAYOME
_____________

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 1-05-cv-00146)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
_____________

Argued November 9, 2011

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR.,
Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: February 13, 2012)
 _____________

Alexander Bilus, Esq. [ARGUED]
Carolyn H. Feeney, Esq.
Dechert
2929 Arch Street
18th Floor, Cira Centre
Philadelphia, PA 19104
Counsel for Appellant

Nicholas J. Bagley, Esq.
Thomas M. Bondy, Esq.
Michael E. Robinson, Esq. [ARGUED]
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20530

Robert L. Eberhardt, Esq.
Megan E. Farrell, Esq.
Office of the United States Attorney
700 Grant Street, Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellees

Matthew H. Duncan, Esq. [ARGUED]
Fine, Kaplan & Black
1835 Market Street, Suite 2800
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Court Appointed Amicus Curiae
_____________

OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________

2
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

In 2005, Darryl Orrin Baker, proceeding pro se, filed a
federal lawsuit against the United States and various officials
of the McKean Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI-
McKean”), alleging personal injuries caused by their
exposing him to second-hand smoke while he was
incarcerated at that facility in 2004, in violation of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671. The District Court
dismissed his case, but, as is discussed at length below, news
of the dismissal did not reach Baker for quite some time. His
efforts to rectify the situation created by the late notice were,
as a result, untimely.

Baker appeals the District Court‟s orders denying his
untimely motions to reopen the time to take an appeal and his
untimely motions for reconsideration of the prior order
dismissing his complaint. He contends that his motions were
untimely because prison officials delayed in transmitting to
him the District Court‟s dismissal order. He urges that
because of the delay, we should either rule that the District
Court can consider reopening the time to take an appeal, or
should deem his motion for reconsideration timely, which
would enable us to review the underlying dismissal order.

For the reasons set forth below, we hold that we cannot
relax the timing requirements for filing a motion to reopen the
time to take an appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a)(6), even for prison delay, because those
timing requirements are governed by a statute and are
jurisdictional in nature. Furthermore, while prison delay may
make an untimely motion for reconsideration timely so as to
permit us to exercise appellate jurisdiction over an order we

3
would otherwise lack jurisdiction to review, the delays Baker
complains of were not caused by prison officials, and
therefore, his untimely motions for reconsideration do not
permit us to review the underlying dismissal order.

I. Background and Procedural History

When Baker filed his complaint in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, he
was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in
Lisbon, Ohio (“FCI-Lisbon”). While his case was proceeding
in the District Court in 2005, Baker was transferred from FCI-
Lisbon to the Lewisburg United States Penitentiary (“USP-
Lewisburg”).

The District Court entered an order on July 11, 2006
granting the defendants‟ motion to dismiss (the “Dismissal
Order”), and sent notice of the dismissal to Baker and the
defendants. Unfortunately, the District Court clerk‟s office
sent the Dismissal Order to Baker‟s address at FCI-Lisbon,
the address then listed on the docket sheet, instead of USP-
Lewisburg.1 (Amicus App. at 273.) An internal docket entry
dated July 24, 2006 confirms that Baker did not receive a
copy of the order. The entry states, “***Staff notes; Order
dated 7/11/06 returned from Darryl Orrin Baker; envelope
marked „Not at this address; Return to Sender.‟” (Id. at 274.)
It appears that the clerk‟s office did not make any effort to

1
Although the docket sheet refers to Baker‟s place of
incarceration as “FCI-Lisbon,” the only federal prison in
Lisbon, Ohio is actually called “FCI-Elkton.” There is no
federal prison that is called “FCI-Lisbon.” We refer to the
prison as such, however, in order to be consistent with the
record.

4
locate Baker after the copy of the order was returned.
Unfortunately for Baker, this was just the beginning of a
series of missteps that gave rise to the procedural puzzle
presented in this appeal.

The next docket activity occurred nearly seven months
later, in February 2007. The first docket entry dated February
9, 2007 is a change-of-address notice from Baker. Baker had
written a letter to the District Court dated December 28, 2005,
notifying the clerk‟s office of his move from FCI-Lisbon to
USP-Lewisburg and providing a new mailing address.
However, the clerk‟s office did not docket the letter or enter
his address change on the docket until February 9, 2007, more
than a year after Baker had sent his notice. The second
docket entry on February 9, 2007 reflects that Baker sent a
letter to the District Court dated January 31, 2007, in which
he explained that he had obtained a copy of the docket sheet
in his case and learned from it that the District Court issued
the Dismissal Order. Baker asserted that he never received a
copy of the Dismissal Order, and as a result, had been unable
to file a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal.
Baker asked the clerk‟s office to provide him with a copy of
the Dismissal Order. The clerk‟s office did so, but not until
eleven months later, on January 7, 2008.

In the meantime, on May 31, 2007, Baker filed2
several motions: a post-judgment motion under Federal Rule

2
Baker signed these motions on May 31, 2007, and they were
entered on the District Court docket on June 8, 2007. We
presume here that Baker filed all of his motions on the date
that he executed them. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266,
276 (1988) (deeming a notice of appeal filed “at the time

5
of Civil Procedure 60(b); a motion to file a notice of appeal
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1);3 a motion
to toll the time to take an appeal under Appellate Rule
4(a)(4); and a motion to reopen the time to take an appeal
under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6). Then, as noted above, on
January 7, 2008, nearly a year after Baker requested it, Baker
was served with a copy of the Dismissal Order. Baker then
supplemented his May 31, 2007 motions on January 16, 2008
by filing a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule
59(e). In all of these motions, Baker alleged that the prison
was responsible for his not receiving a copy of the Dismissal
Order, averring generally that staff at USP-Lewisburg
mishandled his mail by returning a copy of the Dismissal
Order to the District Court. This error, Baker contended,
prevented him from filing timely post-judgment motions and
a timely notice of appeal from the Dismissal Order.

On January 31, 2008, the District Court denied all of
Baker‟s motions. First, the District Court construed all of
Baker‟s motions under Appellate Rule 4 as motions to reopen
the time to take an appeal, pursuant to Appellate Rule 4(a)(6).
The District Court explained that it was barred from
reopening Baker‟s time to file a notice of appeal because
Baker‟s motion was not filed within the earlier of 180 days
after the judgment was entered or within seven days of his
receiving notice of the entry, as then-required by Appellate

petitioner delivered it to the prison authorities for forwarding
to the court clerk”).
3
We will refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
“Rules,” and use the short-hand “Appellate Rule” when
referring to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

6
Rule 4(a)(6)(B).4 Next, the District Court denied Baker‟s
motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) as untimely
because Baker failed to file that motion within ten days of the
Dismissal Order, as then required under Rule 59(e).5 The
District Court also denied Baker‟s Rule 60(b) motion, but that
is not at issue on appeal.

On February 9, 2008, Baker filed another motion for
reconsideration under Rule 59(e). In that motion, Baker
asserted that the District Court erred in denying his first
motion for reconsideration because it failed to consider in that
denial order that prison authorities mishandled the delivery of
the Dismissal Order. At the same time, Baker also filed
another motion to reopen the time to take an appeal. The
District Court denied these motions on April 10, 2008. As to
Baker‟s attempts to reopen the time to take an appeal, the

4
Currently, a motion to reopen the time to take an appeal
must be filed within the earlier of 180 days after the judgment
was entered or fourteen days of receiving notice of the entry.
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)(B). However, at the time Baker‟s
case was before the District Court, a litigant had to file his
motion to reopen within the earlier of 180 days after the
judgment was entered or seven days of receiving notice of the
entry. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)(B) (2007). Amendments in
2009 to Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) changed the seven-day time
limit to fourteen days.
5
Currently, a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)
must filed no later than twenty-eight days after the entry of
the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). However, at the time
Baker‟s case was before the District Court, a ten-day deadline
applied. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (2007).

7
District Court reaffirmed its previous ruling that Appellate
Rule 4(a)(6) sets a 180-day outer limit on such an attempt.
As to Baker‟s Rule 59(e) motion, the District Court rejected
Baker‟s argument that it needed to hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether prison officials actually
interfered with the delivery of his mail, believing that our
opinion in Poole v. Family Court of New Castle County, 368
F.3d 263, 265-66 (3d Cir. 2004), barred exclusion of delay
caused by prison officials from time limits for filing an appeal
in civil cases.6

Baker timely appealed the District Court‟s January 31,
2008 and April 10, 2008 orders. We consolidated Baker‟s
appeals with three other cases — Barner v. Williamson, et al.,
No. 08-1025, Long v. Atlantic City Police Department, et al.,
No. 06-4732, and Cycle Chem, Inc. v. Jackson, et al., No. 09-
1320 — that also concern the timeliness of appeals under
Appellate Rule 4(a).7

6
As we discuss below and in a companion case filed today,
Long v. Atlantic City Police Department, No. 06-4732, some
of our reasoning in Poole, upon which the District Court
relied, was mistaken. However, our ultimate ruling was
correct.
7
We appointed Fine, Kaplan and Black, R.P.C. as amicus on
behalf of the Court to brief the jurisdictional issues in the
cases. Because Baker, Barner, and Long are all appearing pro
se, we also appointed Dechert LLP as pro bono counsel to
represent them solely on the jurisdictional issues presented in
the appeals. The Court greatly appreciates the assistance
provided by amicus and pro bono counsel in these cases. We
are issuing separate opinions in each of the cases.

8
II. Discussion

Baker‟s appeals raise two issues, each of which
concerns a separate rule of appellate procedure. The first
rule, Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), concerns a district court‟s ability
to reopen the time to file an appeal. It states:

The district court may reopen the time to file an
appeal for a period of 14 days after the date
when its order to reopen is entered, but only if
all the following conditions are satisfied:

(A) the court finds that the moving party did not
receive notice under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 77 (d) of the entry of the judgment or
order sought to be appealed within 21 days after
entry;

(B) the motion is filed within 180 days after the
judgment or order is entered or within 14 days
after the moving party receives notice under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77 (d) of the
entry, whichever is earlier; and

(C) the court finds that no party would be
prejudiced.

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). The second rule at issue is Appellate
Rule 4(a)(4). That rule states, in pertinent part:

(A) If a party timely files in the district court
any of the following motions under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the time to file an
appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the

9
 order disposing of the last such remaining
motion:

...

(iv) to alter or amend the judgment under Rule
59;

....

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). Thus, the timely filing of a Rule 59
motion tolls the time to appeal the underlying order until the
district court rules on the Rule 59 motion.

The first issue before us is whether the District Court
erred in denying Baker‟s various attempts to reopen the time
to take an appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6). Baker argues
that his motions to reopen should have been granted because,
in calculating the time during which one may move to reopen,
courts should exclude any delay attributable to prison
authorities. Under Baker‟s view of the rule, the District Court
should have started counting his time to reopen from January
7, 2008, the date he received a copy of the Dismissal Order.
If the District Court thus erred in denying Baker‟s motions to
reopen, we would reverse and remand with instructions to the
District Court to evaluate whether Baker‟s allegation of
prison delay may be credited such that his motion to reopen
could be granted, which might ultimately provide Baker the
opportunity to file a timely notice of appeal that would bring
up the Dismissal Order for appellate review. However, if the
District Court was correct in denying Baker‟s motions, then
the appeal from the Dismissal Order would be barred unless
his motion for reconsideration was timely.

10
 Thus, the second question presented is whether we
may deem his motions for reconsideration timely due to his
allegations of delay caused by prison officials in delivering
the Dismissal Order to him; doing so would toll Baker‟s time
to take an appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A). If the
answer to that question is yes, then we would have
jurisdiction over the appeal from the Dismissal Order, as well
as from the January 31, 2008 and April 10, 2008 orders
denying the various post-judgment motions. If the answer to
that question is no, then we would have jurisdiction only over
the appeals from the January 31, 2008 and April 10, 2008
orders denying his motions for reconsideration.

A. Reopening the Time to File an Appeal Under
Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)

As noted above, after learning in February 2007 that
the District Court had entered the Dismissal Order, Baker
filed various motions, all of which the District Court
construed as motions to reopen the time to take an appeal
under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), and which the District Court
denied because they were filed after the 180-day outer limit
imposed by Appellate Rule 4(a)(6). Baker asserts that his
motions to reopen should be considered timely, however,
because he could not have complied with the 180-day
requirement as he did not receive the Dismissal Order, and,
because he moved to reopen within the 180-day window of
Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), provided that time lost due to delay
caused by prison officials is excluded and his time to file his
motion to reopen runs from the date he received the order.
We first consider whether we can recognize equitable
exceptions to Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) in light of Baker‟s lack
of notice, and, if not, then we consider whether we may
exclude time lost to prison delay under Houston v. Lack in

11
determining whether Baker complied with that Rule‟s
requirements.

1. Requirements to Reopen the Time to Take an
Appeal

Appellate Rule 4(a)(1) provides that a notice of appeal
must be filed within thirty days after the entry of the
judgment or order appealed from, or within sixty days, when
one of the parties to the case is the United States. Fed R.
App. P. 4(a)(1). If a party fails to file his notice of appeal
within the thirty- or sixty-day time limit, Appellate Rule
4(a)(6) provides a limited opportunity to reopen the time to
file an appeal when certain conditions are met. First, the
district court must find that the party moving to reopen the
time to file an appeal did not receive notice of the entry of the
judgment or order sought to be appealed within twenty-one
days after its entry on the district court docket. Second, the
motion to reopen must be “filed within 180 days after the
judgment or order is entered or within 14 days after the
moving party receives notice under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 77(d) of the entry, whichever is earlier.” Third, the
district court must find that no party would be prejudiced. If
all of these conditions are met, the district court may reopen
the time to file an appeal for a period of fourteen days after
the date when its order to reopen is entered. Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(6)(A)-(C). Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) adopts these
conditions directly from a statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2107.8 While
8
Section 2107(c) provides, in pertinent part:

In addition, if the district court finds—
(1) that a party entitled to notice of the
entry of a judgment or order did not

12
according to its plain terms, the rule imposes specific time
limits within which one may move to reopen the time to file
an appeal, the question is whether those limits are subject to
any exceptions, equitable or otherwise, that would allow us to
relax the rule‟s time limits.

The Supreme Court answered this question in Bowles
v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007). Bowles missed Appellate
Rule 4(a)(1)‟s thirty-day deadline to file a notice of appeal
after being denied federal habeas relief by the district court.
Id. at 207. When Bowles moved to reopen the time to take an
appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), the district court granted
it and gave Bowles seventeen days, rather than the fourteen
days specified by Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) and § 2107(c), to file
his notice of appeal. Bowles filed his appeal within the
seventeen days allowed by the district court‟s order, but after
the fourteen-day period allowed by Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)

receive such notice from the clerk or any
party within 21 days of its entry, and
(2) that no party would be prejudiced,
the district court may, upon motion filed within
180 days after entry of the judgment or order or
within 14 days after receipt of such notice,
whichever is earlier, reopen the time for appeal
for a period of 14 days from the date of entry of
the order reopening the time for appeal.

Like Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), § 2107(c) was amended in 2009
to change the seven-day requirement to fourteen days. See
supra n.4 (noting that at the time Baker filed his motions to
reopen, the rule required a litigant to so move within the
earlier of 180 days after the entry of judgment, or seven days
after the litigant received notice of the judgment).

13
and § 2107(c) had passed. Id. Bowles argued that he should
be permitted to appeal because he had filed his notice of
appeal in accordance with the district court‟s order permitting
him to do so. See id. at 214.

The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals
lacked jurisdiction over Bowles‟s appeal because it was filed
outside the fourteen-day window allowed by Appellate Rule
4(a)(6) and § 2107(c). The Court observed that “the limit on
how long a district court may reopen th[e] period [for filing
an appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)] is set forth in a
statute,” and concluded that Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) was a
jurisdictional rule, not a “simple „claim-processing rule.‟” Id.
at 213 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c)). In so holding, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the basic principle that “the taking
of an appeal within the prescribed time is „mandatory and
jurisdictional.‟” Id. at 209 (quoting Griggs v. Provident
Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982)). If a party
fails to comply with the prescribed time limits, a court of
appeals lacks jurisdiction over his case.

Continuing its efforts to clarify the difference between
jurisdictional rules—those which are strictly enforced
because they control a court‟s subject-matter jurisdiction over
a case—and claims-processing rules—those which are subject
to waiver, forfeiture, and equitable exceptions because they
do not set mandatory rules regarding a court‟s subject-matter
jurisdiction—the Court distinguished Bowles‟s case from
other cases involving claims-processing rules. For example,
in Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 448 (2004), the Supreme
Court held that a party‟s failure to comply with the timing
requirement of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004
did not deprive a court of subject-matter jurisdiction because,
in part, that rule did not derive its timing requirement from a

14
statute. Rather, Rule 4004 was a procedural claims-
processing rule, which, while important for the orderly
transaction of business and administration of cases before a
court, may be subject to waiver or forfeiture if a party waits
too long to raise the timeliness issue before the court issues a
decision on the merits. Id. at 456; see also Eberhart v. United
States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005) (holding that Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 33(a), which parallels Bankruptcy Rule
4004, is a claims-processing rule subject to waiver or
forfeiture).

The Supreme Court in Bowles was explicit in stating
that neither Kontrick nor Eberhart “calls into question our
longstanding treatment of statutory time limits for taking an
appeal as jurisdictional” such that any failure to comply with
them would divest a court of subject-matter jurisdiction. 551
U.S. at 210.9 As it explained, § 2107 “contains the type of

9
The Supreme Court‟s suggestion that some time limits have
jurisdictional force because they are derived from statute has
led lower courts to emphasize that point in assessing whether
other rules impose jurisdictional limits or merely give claims-
processing guidance. See, e.g., United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“Whether a federal rule establishing a time
limitation imposes a jurisdictional rule depends on whether
the rule derives from a statute.” (citing Kontrick, 540 U.S. at
452)). Yet, such a narrow focus is inappropriate, as some
rules based in statute are not jurisdictional. See Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1241 (2010)
(concluding that statutory rule requiring copyright holders to
register works before suing was not jurisdictional); Dolan v.
United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2536 (2010) (holding that the

15
statutory time constraints that would limit a court‟s
jurisdiction.” Id. at 211. Furthermore, it found this reasoning
to make “good sense” because Congress possesses the
authority to decide what cases lower federal courts have the
power—or jurisdiction—to consider. Id. at 212. And
“[b]ecause Congress decides whether federal courts can hear
cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what
conditions, federal courts can hear them.” Id. at 212-13.

Based on this reasoning, the Supreme Court concluded
that § 2107(c), and, thus, Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), set forth
specific limitations imposed by Congress on a district court‟s
authority to reopen the time to file an appeal. Failure to
comply with those limitations operates to deprive a court of
appeals of jurisdiction over an appellant‟s appeal. Id. at 213.
The district court‟s order permitting Bowles seventeen days
to file his notice of appeal did not effectively alter the time
limits because the district court had no authority to create
equitable exceptions to them. Id. at 214; see also In re Sealed
Case (Bowles), 624 F.3d 482, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (declining
to override the requirements of Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)
because that rule is mandatory and jurisdictional).
Accordingly, there is no doubt after Bowles that those rules

district court was able to enter a restitution order even though
it missed the statutory deadline to do so). Indeed, the Bowles
Court did not “hold that all statutory conditions imposing a
time limit should be considered jurisdictional,” but instead
looked to context and history to determine “whether a statute
ranks a requirement as jurisdictional.” Reed Elsevier, 130 S.
Ct. at 1247-48. That said, the Bowles Court expressly stated
that statutory time limits for taking an appeal are
jurisdictional.

16
listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2107, which are also embodied in
Appellate Rules 4(a)(1) and 4(a)(6), are jurisdictional, and are
not subject to equitable modification.

Here, the District Court correctly concluded that
Baker‟s failure to comply with the requirement that his
motion to reopen be filed within the earlier of 180 days after
the judgment or order is entered, or within seven days after
his receipt of notice of the Dismissal Order, was fatal. Baker
filed his motion to reopen on May 31, 2007, which was 323
days after the entry of the Dismissal Order and well beyond
the 180-day outer limit imposed by Appellate Rule 4(a)(6).10
See 2005 Advisory Committee Notes to Appellate Rule
4(a)(6) (“[A]n appeal cannot be brought more than 180 days
after entry, no matter what the circumstances.”); 1991
Advisory Committee Notes to Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)
(explaining that the rule “establishes an outer time limit of
180 days for a party who fails to receive timely notice of
entry of judgment to seek additional time to take appeal”).
Given Bowles, we cannot extend the 180-day outer limit of
Appellate Rule 4(a)(6).

2. Excluding Time Lost Due to Prison Delay
Under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)
10
If a litigant has not heard from a district court, he would do
well to check on the status of his case a few months after the
filing of a dispositive motion to ensure that the district court
has not rendered a decision of which the litigant is unaware,
given the 180-day outer limit for filing a motion to reopen the
time to file an appeal. Unfortunately, Baker did not ask for a
copy of the Dismissal Order until 206 days after it was
entered, by which time it was already too late to seek to
reopen the time to file an appeal.

17
 Nevertheless, Baker urges that if we cannot extend the
time, we should instead exclude time allegedly attributable to
delays caused by prison officials in transmitting the Dismissal
Order. Under his approach, we would begin counting the 7-
day/180-day requirement from January 7, 2008, the date
Baker finally received a copy of the Dismissal Order. In
order to exclude the time allegedly lost to delay caused by
prison officials, we would have to read the terms “entry” in §
2107(c) and “entered” in Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)(B) to mean
when the prisoner receives the entered order, as opposed to
when the order or judgment is actually entered by the clerk on
the docket. Baker asserts that reading the statute and the rule
in this way is not only permissible, but is required by the
Supreme Court‟s decision in Houston v. Lack, as well as our
decisions in United States v. Grana, 864 F.2d 312 (3d Cir.
1989) and United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282 (3d Cir.
2003), all cases in which the courts have fashioned ways to
take into account the potential delays caused by prison
officials that pro se prisoners may confront, while also
enforcing the time limits of Appellate Rule 4(a). If we were
to read the Appellate Rule and the statute in this way, and
agree that the delay was caused by prison officials, Baker‟s
motion to reopen would have complied with the conditions of
Appellate Rule 4(a)(6).

Houston teaches that we can, in some instances, read a
statute to take into account delays that pro se prisoners face.
But any such reading must not run contrary to the other terms
of the statute. The statute involved in that case, 28 U.S.C. §
2107(a), provides:

[N]o appeal shall bring any judgment, order, or
decree in an action, suit or proceeding of a civil
nature before a court of appeals for review

18
 unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty
days after the entry of such judgment, order or
decree.

(emphasis added). Appellate Rule 4(a)(1)(A), which requires
a party to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the entry
of the judgment or order appealed from, derives from §
2107(a). The Supreme Court held that a pro se prisoner‟s
notice of appeal should be deemed filed, under § 2107(a) and
the Appellate Rule, when he delivers it to prison authorities
for forwarding to the district court. 487 U.S. at 270. This
prison mailbox rule, the Court reasoned, was necessary in
order to accommodate the unique circumstances pro se
prisoners face in having to entrust the forwarding of their
filings to prison authorities and in being unable to guard
against any delays caused by prison officials in transmitting
their filings to the relevant court. Id. at 271. The rule of
Houston thus excludes from the time to file a notice of appeal
any time lost to delays caused by prison authorities in
transmitting the pro se prisoner‟s notice of appeal to the
district court.

In so holding, the Court expressly considered whether
the language of § 2107 permitted it to deem a notice of appeal
filed when the pro se prisoner hands it over to prison
authorities. The Court noted that the statute:

does not define when a notice of appeal has
been “filed” or designate the person with whom
it must be filed, and nothing in the statute
suggests that, in the unique circumstances of a
pro se prisoner, it would be inappropriate to
conclude that a notice of appeal is “filed” within
the meaning of § 2107 at the moment it is

19
 delivered to prison officials for forwarding to
the clerk of the district court.

487 U.S. at 272. Thus, the Supreme Court fashioned a way to
take into account “the unique circumstances of a pro se
prisoner,” while also preserving the mandatory and
jurisdictional nature of the timing requirements to file a notice
of appeal. Id.

However, unlike Houston‟s reading of § 2107(a) to
allow “filed” to be interpreted expansively, we conclude that
we cannot read “entry” within the meaning of § 2107(c) in a
way that both takes into account potential delays caused by
prison officials while also preserving the mandatory and
jurisdictional nature of the statute as Bowles requires. First,
the Appellate Rules provide that an order is “entered” when it
is actually added to the civil docket. See Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(7). If we were to read “entry” expansively to mean the
date Baker received the Dismissal Order, we would be
redefining the meaning of entry, contrary to the definition
provided in Appellate Rule 4(a)(7). In contrast, in Houston,
the Court noted that the Appellate Rules did not foreclose its
reading of “filed,” for they were silent on the question of
when a notice of appeal is actually filed. 487 U.S. at 273.

More significantly, § 2107(c) provides that if the
district court finds that a party did not receive notice of the
entry of a judgment within twenty-one days of its entry, and
that no party would be prejudiced, it:

may, upon motion filed within 180 days after
the entry of the judgment or order or within 14
days after receipt of such notice, whichever is
earlier, reopen the time for appeal for a period

20
 of 14 days from the date of entry of the order
reopening the time for appeal.

(emphasis added).11 Under its plain language, a party may
move to reopen the time to file an appeal within the earlier of:
(1) 180 days after the entry of judgment, or (2) 14 days after
receiving notice of the entry of the judgment. If we were to
read “entry” expansively to mean the date Baker received the
Dismissal Order, we would then be modifying § 2107(c) so as
to instead provide that “the district court may, upon motion
filed within 180 days after the receipt of the judgment or
order (substituted for “entry”) or within 14 days after receipt
of such notice, whichever is earlier . . . .”12 This reading is
unworkable because it sets forth two different time limits
from the notice of the order and would eviscerate the 180-day
outer time limit. No pro se prisoner would ever run up
against that limit because the earlier of the two situations
listed above would always be fourteen days after receipt of
notice of the order, and no pro se prisoner would ever reach

11
Similarly, Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)(B) provides that in order
to reopen the time to take an appeal, “the motion [must be]
filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or
within 14 days after the moving party receives notice under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry, whichever
is earlier.” (emphasis added).
12
Likewise, if we read “entered” in Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)(B)
to mean when Baker received the Dismissal Order, the rule
would then read “the motion [must be] filed within 180 days
after notice of the judgment or order is received or within 14
days after the moving party receives notice under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry, whichever is
earlier.”

21
180 days before the 14-day period expired. Thus, as to pro se
prisoners, this reading would completely eliminate an entire
clause of § 2107(c), namely, “within 180 days after the entry
of the judgment or order,” and would place no outer limit
whatsoever on the filing of motions to reopen. In light of
Bowles‟s reminder that Congress has the authority to
determine under what circumstances a federal court may hear
a case, see 551 U.S. at 212-13, we cannot endorse a reading
of § 2107(c) that completely nullifies the 180-day outer limit
on the time for a litigant—whether a pro se prisoner or not—
to take an appeal; doing so would run contrary to Congress‟s
plain intent, apparent in § 2107(c), to set a 180-day outer limit
on when a litigant may move to reopen the time to file a
notice of appeal. See also 2005 Advisory Committee Notes
to Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) (“[A]n appeal cannot be brought
more than 180 days after entry, no matter what the
circumstances.”).

Thus, unlike in Houston, where nothing in § 2107(a) or
the Appellate Rules foreclosed the reading of “filed” that the
Supreme Court adopted, here, the plain language and clear
intent of § 2107(c) forecloses the reading Baker suggests.
Indeed, § 2107(c) concerns itself with the potential for delay
in receiving notice of the entry; the point of the 180-day outer
limit is because there could be delayed notice. This limit is
there for a reason and is not superfluous. We cannot endorse
an interpretation that effectively deletes it from the statute.

Nothing in our previous decisions in Grana or Fiorelli
requires us to read § 2107(c) as Baker suggests. In Grana,
we held that delay by prison authorities in delivering mail to a
prisoner should be excluded when calculating the time for
filing a notice of appeal under Appellate Rule 4(b) in a
criminal case. 864 F.2d at 313. Relying on the Supreme

22
Court‟s holding in Houston, we “perceive[d] no difference
between delay in transmitting the prisoner‟s papers to the
court and transmitting the court‟s final judgment to him so
that he may prepare his appeal.” Id. at 316. This conclusion
is supportable in Grana in part because Appellate Rule 4(b) is
not based on a statute.13 There was no controlling statute in
Grana, but § 2107(c) is controlling here.

Fiorelli speaks to when tolling a litigant‟s time to file a
notice of appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) is
appropriate, not whether requirements in moving to reopen
the time to take an appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) are
met. As we discuss further below, Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A)
provides that a litigant‟s time to take an appeal is tolled by the
filing of certain timely post-judgment motions, including
motions for reconsideration. In Fiorelli, we held that “a
prison‟s actual delay or interference in the delivery of a final
order of the district court is excluded from the calculation of
the timeliness of motions for reconsideration . . . filed by pro
se inmates.” 337 F.3d at 289-90. The effect of this holding is
that when a motion for reconsideration is, after excluding
time lost due to prison delay, timely, a pro se prisoner‟s time
to file a notice of appeal is tolled under Appellate Rule

13
When Grana was decided, it was generally understood that
“the failure to file a timely notice of appeal in a criminal case
deprives [the court] of appellate jurisdiction.” Virgin Islands
v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 2010); see id. at 326-
27 (collecting authority and citing Grana in support of the
“prior jurisdictional view of [Appellate] Rule 4(b)”). Now,
however, Appellate Rule 4(b)‟s deadline for filing a notice of
appeal in a criminal case is considered a “rigid” claims-
processing rule. Id. at 329.

23
4(a)(4)(A). Reading “timely” in Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) to
exclude time that is actually attributable to delays caused by
prison officials for purposes of tolling is permissible, because
nothing in a statute or the Appellate Rules forecloses it.
Indeed, unlike Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), which is based in a
statute, Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) is not.14 Notably, in the
companion case of Long v. Atlantic City Police Department,
filed today, we have held that Fiorelli is still controlling
precedent. See --- F.3d ---, No. 06-4732, slip op. at 15 (3d
Cir. Feb. 10, 2012).

14
Whether Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) is a claims-processing
rule is a question we need not answer here. Even though our
holding in Lizardo v. United States, 619 F.3d 273, 277 (3d
Cir. 2010), implies that Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) is a claims-
processing rule because its provisions do not appear in a
statute and it was promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act,
that does not mean that it is not binding or lacks force. But
see Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. ---, slip op. at 12 (2012)
(noting that Appellate Rule 4 is treated “„as a single
jurisdictional threshold‟” (quoting Torres v. Oakland
Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 315 (1988))). To the contrary,
we stated in Long that “a conclusion that Appellate Rule
4(a)(4)(A) is a claims-processing rule would not prevent us
from dismissing, sua sponte, untimely appeals filed under
Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A).” Long, slip op. at 19 n.18.
Indeed, although a rule may be claims-processing in nature, a
court can still strictly enforce timing requirements contained
in that rule. See, e.g., Gonzalez, slip op. at 10 (“[C]alling a
rule nonjurisdictional does not mean that it is not mandatory .
. . .”); United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 750 (10th Cir.
2008) (holding that the court had the power to enforce claims-
processing rules by way of a sua sponte dismissal).

24
 Therefore, while there are certain instances in which
we can exclude time lost due to prison delay in calculating the
timeliness of appeals, the situation presented by Baker‟s case
is not one of them. If we were to read “entry” expansively so
as to permit the exclusion of time lost due to prison delay, we
would completely eviscerate the plain language of § 2107(c)
and Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)(B), both of which set a clear 180-
day outer limit on a motion to reopen. Therefore, the District
Court was correct in denying Baker‟s motions to reopen the
time to take an appeal.

B. Tolling the Time to File an Appeal Under
Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)

As an alternative to reopening, Baker urges that the
Dismissal Order is actually before us because his Rule 59(e)
motion should be deemed timely, such that it would toll his
time to take an appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A). As
we noted above, Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) provides, in
pertinent part, that certain “timely file[d]” post-judgment
motions, including motions to reconsider under Rule 59(e),
serve to postpone “the time to file an appeal . . . until the
entry of the order disposing of the last . . . remaining motion.”
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A).15

15
Our amicus has argued that giving Appellate Rule
4(a)(4)(A) that effect in this case would run afoul of
Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), because Baker filed his Rule 59(e)
motion after the 180-day period for file a motion to reopen
had lapsed. Based on the facts presented here, however, we
need not, and do not, consider or decide how Appellate Rules
4(a)(4) and 4(a)(6) may interact.

25
 Although Baker acknowledges that his Rule 59(e)
motion was untimely, he asks us to treat it as timely by
excluding the time lost allegedly due to prison delay, as was
permitted by Fiorelli and reinforced today in Long v. Atlantic
City Police Department. Relying on our decisions in Grana
and Fiorelli, we concluded in Long that a Rule 59(e) motion
may be deemed timely when a pro se prisoner alleges, and the
record shows, that prison officials actually delayed or
interfered with the delivery of a final order of the district
court. See Long, slip op. at 15. As we further explained in
Long,

when a pro se prisoner makes allegations in
connection with a motion for reconsideration
that could reasonably be construed as a non-
frivolous assertion that the prison delayed
delivering the court order that he is asking to be
reconsidered, the district court should engage in
fact-finding necessary to a jurisdictional
analysis under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A).

Id. at 15-16. This fact-finding by a district court is critical,
for it determines the scope of our jurisdiction.16
16
Though critical, the kind of fact-finding that a district court
must undertake need not be extensive. As we explained in
Long, “when the prisoner‟s allegations are uncontested, the
district court may of course choose to credit what the prisoner
says . . . We then, in turn, would accept any fact-finding as
long as it was not clearly erroneous.” Long, slip op. at 16-17.
Even if the district court cannot conclude on the basis of the
facts before it “whether the prison actually delayed or
interfered with a prisoner‟s receipt of an order,” a hearing
may not be necessary. Id. at 17.

26
 In Baker‟s case, the District Court did not explicitly
find any facts that indicate whether Baker‟s allegation that
prison officials mishandled the delivery of his mail was true.
In accord with our holding in Fiorelli and as affirmed in our
holding in Long, therefore, we would ordinarily remand to the
District Court to find those facts. See id. at 18. However, as
our opinion in Poole suggested and in Long makes clear,
where the delay is caused not by prison officials but by the
clerk‟s office, we cannot exclude that time when calculating
the timeliness of a pro se prisoner‟s filing.

In Poole, a civil case, we noted that the delay that
Poole complained of was “not primarily due to Poole‟s status
as an inmate but to the simple fact that he was moved.” 368
F.3d at 266 n.4. Poole was transferred from one prison
facility to another shortly before the order that he sought to
appeal was issued. The clerk‟s office sent a copy of that
order to his first prison, but when it arrived, Poole had already
been transferred to the second prison. Id. at 264. By the time
Poole received a copy of the order, his time to appeal had run.
We reasoned in Long that the cause of the complained-of
delay matters and may determine whether we exclude the
time lost as a result of that delay when calculating a litigant‟s
compliance with timing requirements. Long, slip op. at 14.17

17
In Poole, we based our reasoning that prison delay was
cognizable in criminal but not civil cases in part on the fact
that there was no criminal analogue to Rule 77(d), which
provides that “„lack of notice of the entry by the clerk does
not affect the time to appeal.‟” Poole, 368 F.3d at 266
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d)). That is incorrect. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 49(c). However, the remainder of Poole‟s reasoning

27
Thus, where, as in Poole, the delay is caused by the clerk‟s
office, the rule of Fiorelli and Grana does not apply. Cf.
Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 289 (“Grana makes clear that only
delays caused by the prison warrant tolling of the filing
deadlines, and „[t]o the extent that the delay represents slow
mail, there is nothing that this Court can do to preserve an
appellant‟s right to appellate review.‟” (emphasis added)
(quoting Grana, 864 F.2d at 316)).

Accordingly, we will not remand to the District Court
here because we can conclude from facts already contained in
the record that the delay of which Baker complains was not
due to prison officials, but rather, due to error in the clerk‟s
office. Baker contends that the prison officials at USP-
Lewisburg erroneously returned the Dismissal Order to the
District Court, rather than giving it to him. He supported this
assertion by pointing to the staff notes on the docket sheet
indicating “Order dated 7/11/06 returned from Darryl Orrin
Baker; envelope marked „Not at this address; Return to
Sender.” But Baker is incorrect in asserting that the clerk‟s
office sent the Dismissal Order to USP-Lewisburg. Rather, it
is evident that the clerk‟s office erred by sending the order to
FCI-Lisbon when he was no longer there, and by failing to
docket Baker‟s change-of-address letter and forwarding the
Dismissal Order to USP-Lewisburg where he was then
housed.

Baker‟s belief that prison officials at USP-Lewisburg
erroneously returned the order to the District Court was

is sound, because as we noted in Long, “we view the holding
in Poole as turning not on its distinction between criminal and
civil cases but rather on the nature of the alleged delay.”
Long, slip op. at 14.

28
reasonable. After all, Baker had sent his change-of-address
letter seven months before the District Court issued the
Dismissal Order. Baker lodged a complaint with the prison
mailroom staff at USP-Lewisburg in February 2007, claiming
that they returned his mail to the District Court. A prison
mailroom staff member responded to his complaint in writing.
He explained that the mail Baker alleged was returned could
not have been returned by USP-Lewisburg staff because
mailroom staff do not use a stamp stating “Not at this address;
Return to Sender.”

However, from this response, coupled with the docket
sheet, we know that the Dismissal Order was sent to FCI-
Lisbon, not to USP-Lewisburg. At the time the Dismissal
Order was issued, the docket incorrectly listed Baker‟s
current address to be at FCI-Lisbon. Taken together, it is
clear that the clerk‟s office erred by mailing the Dismissal
Order to FCI-Lisbon instead of USP-Lewisburg. Indeed,
Baker conceded as much in another federal case that he
brought against prison officials.18 It also erred by failing to
docket Baker‟s change-of-address letter and forwarding the
Dismissal Order to him there.

18
In that case, Baker sought relief based on USP-Lewisburg‟s
alleged interference with Baker‟s appeal rights in this case,
and conceded that the clerk mailed the Dismissal Order to
FCI-Lisbon. See Baker v. Williamson, No. 07-2220, 2010
WL 1816656, at *2 (M.D. Pa. May 5, 2010). The District
Court rejected Baker‟s claim that USP-Lewisburg interfered
with delivery of the Dismissal Order, and we affirmed. See
Baker v. Williamson, No. 11-1824, 2011 WL 6016931 (3d
Cir. Dec. 5, 2011).

29
 Because Baker‟s motion for reconsideration was
untimely, and that untimeliness cannot be attributed to delays
caused by prison officials, we cannot deem his motion for
reconsideration to have been timely filed for purposes of
tolling under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A). We recognize that
this conclusion works an unfortunate result for Baker. The
result is distressing, given that the clerk‟s office seriously
erred in failing to update Baker‟s address of record until more
than a year had passed from when he notified the District
Court of his move. But as the record before us shows, the
delay in receiving notice of the Dismissal Order is not due to
prison delay, but rather, due to clerk error, which does not
trigger the rule of Fiorelli and Long.19

Although we do not have jurisdiction over the
Dismissal Order, we do have jurisdiction over the District
Court‟s orders denying Baker‟s motions for reconsideration
because Baker filed a timely notice of appeal as to those
orders. The District Court properly denied Baker‟s motions
for reconsideration because as the District Court concluded
and we agree, they were untimely; the District Court was

19
In the mine run of cases, either Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) will
be available to allow reopening the time to file an appeal or
Appellate Rule 4(a)(5) will be available to allow an extension
of time to file an appeal when a litigant—whether a pro se
prisoner or not—has not received notice of the appealable
order in a timely fashion. Indeed, these Rules should be
available regardless of whether the delay is attributable to
clerk‟s office error or prison official error, because in the
normal case, notice will be received, even if somewhat
delayed, less than 180 days after the entry of the order sought
to be appealed.

30
clearly entitled to enforce the timing requirements of Rule 59.
See supra note 14. Also, the District Court did not err in
concluding that it need not hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether prison delay caused Baker to receive the
Dismissal Order late. Although the District Court based its
decision on the reasoning of Poole that we have found to be
incorrect, see supra note 17, the ultimate ruling was correct
because the available evidence conclusively shows that the
delay was not caused by prison officials. Accordingly, fact-
finding under Fiorelli is unnecessary.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment
of the District Court.

31