United States v. Chris Ketron

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4255

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

CHRIS KETRON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District
Judge. (1:01-cr-00058-jpj-1)

Submitted: January 19, 2012 Decided: February 16, 2012

Before WILKINSON and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John E. Davidson, DAVIDSON & KITZMAN, PLC, Charlottesville,
Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States
Attorney, Zachary T. Lee, Assistant United States Attorney,
Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Chris Ketron appeals the district court’s judgment

revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 42 months

in prison. On appeal, he contends that the district court

lacked authority to revoke his supervised release based on his

last three violations, which involved conduct occurring after

the scheduled expiration date; the district court plainly erred

in finding his first two violations were Grade A violations and

his original offense was a Class A felony; we should create a

stronger level of appellate review than “plainly unreasonable”;

his sentence should be lower based on his cooperation; and the

district court’s explanation was inadequate. We affirm.

We review a district court’s judgment revoking

supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse

of discretion. United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th

Cir. 1992). Challenges to a district court’s authority are

matters of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Buchanan, 638

F.3d 448, 451 (4th Cir. 2011). Procedural sentencing claims and

other specific claims of sentencing error raised for the first

time on appeal are reviewed for plain error. United States v.

Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132

S. Ct. 292 (2011); United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th

Cir. 2010).

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To revoke supervised release, a district court need

only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a

preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006).

We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised

release if it is within the prescribed statutory range and not

plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,

439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether the sentence

is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id. at 438. In

this initial inquiry, we take a more deferential posture

concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than

reasonableness review for Guidelines sentences. United

States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if

we find the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable

must we decide whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.

While a district court must consider the Chapter Seven

policy statements and the statutory factors applicable to

revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006),

the court need not robotically tick through every subsection,

and ultimately, the court has broad discretion to revoke the

previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the

statutory maximum. Id. at 656-57. Moreover, while a district

court must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence, the

court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a

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revocation sentence as when imposing a post-conviction sentence.

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).

We have reviewed the record and conclude that the

district court did not err or abuse its discretion in revoking

Ketron’s supervised release, and his sentence is reasonable.

First, we conclude that the district court had authority to

revoke Ketron’s term of supervised release based on conduct

occurring after its scheduled expiration date because he

absconded from supervision and the warrant issued prior to the

end of the term. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) (2006); United

States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 457-58 (4th Cir. 2011).

Next, we conclude that Ketron has failed to show that

the district court plainly erred in finding his five violations

included conduct that constituted a Grade A violation under U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.1(a)(1) (2010). We likewise

conclude that the district court did not plainly err in finding

that his original 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000) offense was a Class

A felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1) (2006); United States v.

Turner, 389 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v.

Cristobal, 293 F.3d 134, 147 (4th Cir. 2002).

Finally, we conclude that Ketron’s sentence is both

procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court

granted his request for a sentence below his Guidelines range of

51 to 63 months based on his cooperation with state authorities,

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but found he had failed to cooperate in his supervision and that

a significant sentence was required based on his failure to

conform his conduct to the law and abide by his supervised

release conditions, to reflect his history, to protect the

public, and to provide an adequate deterrent to crime.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED