UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4255
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRIS KETRON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District
Judge. (1:01-cr-00058-jpj-1)
Submitted: January 19, 2012 Decided: February 16, 2012
Before WILKINSON and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John E. Davidson, DAVIDSON & KITZMAN, PLC, Charlottesville,
Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States
Attorney, Zachary T. Lee, Assistant United States Attorney,
Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Chris Ketron appeals the district court’s judgment
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 42 months
in prison. On appeal, he contends that the district court
lacked authority to revoke his supervised release based on his
last three violations, which involved conduct occurring after
the scheduled expiration date; the district court plainly erred
in finding his first two violations were Grade A violations and
his original offense was a Class A felony; we should create a
stronger level of appellate review than “plainly unreasonable”;
his sentence should be lower based on his cooperation; and the
district court’s explanation was inadequate. We affirm.
We review a district court’s judgment revoking
supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th
Cir. 1992). Challenges to a district court’s authority are
matters of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Buchanan, 638
F.3d 448, 451 (4th Cir. 2011). Procedural sentencing claims and
other specific claims of sentencing error raised for the first
time on appeal are reviewed for plain error. United States v.
Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 292 (2011); United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th
Cir. 2010).
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To revoke supervised release, a district court need
only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a
preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006).
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release if it is within the prescribed statutory range and not
plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether the sentence
is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id. at 438. In
this initial inquiry, we take a more deferential posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than
reasonableness review for Guidelines sentences. United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if
we find the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable
must we decide whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.
While a district court must consider the Chapter Seven
policy statements and the statutory factors applicable to
revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006),
the court need not robotically tick through every subsection,
and ultimately, the court has broad discretion to revoke the
previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum. Id. at 656-57. Moreover, while a district
court must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence, the
court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
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revocation sentence as when imposing a post-conviction sentence.
United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the
district court did not err or abuse its discretion in revoking
Ketron’s supervised release, and his sentence is reasonable.
First, we conclude that the district court had authority to
revoke Ketron’s term of supervised release based on conduct
occurring after its scheduled expiration date because he
absconded from supervision and the warrant issued prior to the
end of the term. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) (2006); United
States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 457-58 (4th Cir. 2011).
Next, we conclude that Ketron has failed to show that
the district court plainly erred in finding his five violations
included conduct that constituted a Grade A violation under U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.1(a)(1) (2010). We likewise
conclude that the district court did not plainly err in finding
that his original 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000) offense was a Class
A felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1) (2006); United States v.
Turner, 389 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Cristobal, 293 F.3d 134, 147 (4th Cir. 2002).
Finally, we conclude that Ketron’s sentence is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court
granted his request for a sentence below his Guidelines range of
51 to 63 months based on his cooperation with state authorities,
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but found he had failed to cooperate in his supervision and that
a significant sentence was required based on his failure to
conform his conduct to the law and abide by his supervised
release conditions, to reflect his history, to protect the
public, and to provide an adequate deterrent to crime.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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